

HISTORY
OF THE
INDIAN MUTINY
1857-1858

COMMENCING FROM THE CLOSE OF THE
SECOND VOLUME OF
SIR JOHN KAYE'S HISTORY OF THE SEPOY WAR

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VOLUME I.

CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH SIR JOHN KAYE'S THIRD VOLUME

SECOND EDITION (1878)

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
LONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY

1896

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TO
MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR VINCENT EYRE, K.C.S.I., C.B.

A FRIENDSHIP OF THIRTY YEARS
DURATION, THE VALUE OF WHICH I NEED NOT
HERE ESTIMATE, IS MY SOLE, BUT SUFFICIENT, REASON
FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE MOST GRACEFUL
RIVILEGE OF AN AUTHOR, IN DEDICATING TO YOU THESE
PAGES, WHEREIN YOUR NAME OCCUPIES
A CONSPICUOUS PLACE IN CONNECTION WITH THE
MEMORABLE EVENTS WHICH I HAVE
ENDEAVOURED, FAITHFULLY AND IMPARTIALLY,
TO RECORD.

G. B. M.

controversy which had arisen after the mutiny had been quelled.

On the other hand it is always a disadvantage to continue the work of a writer from whom one may differ in essential points. This was, I felt, especially the case in the instance before me. For, whilst the first and second volumes of Sir John Kaye's work—not to speak of the political opinions they enunciated—had recounted in eloquent language the events of the earlier stages of the mutiny as they had happened, his third volume had, in the opinion alike of the actors and spectators of the drama, failed to render to those of whom it treated that impartial justice which their deeds, good or evil, had deserved.

I had read that volume in India. I do not wish to say a single word in depreciation of its style, of its brilliancy, of its literary merit. But I may simply observe that neither could the officers of the army, many in number, of all branches of the service, political and civil, as well as military; nor could I, accept it in many important particulars as history. The letters which appeared in the English newspapers, controverting many of its statements, and reflecting, I have since ascertained, but a fraction of the dissatisfaction and dissent felt regarding it, showed clearly that this

opinion was not confined to India—that it was general.

When, therefore, I was asked to continue and complete the history I replied that I would do so only on the condition that the continuation should begin from the termination of Sir John Kaye's second volume, thus ignoring the third. This was agreed to.

In performing this task the plan of my narrative has been very much affected by the necessity of adhering as much as possible to the general scheme of Sir John Kaye's work. Naturally, I would have preferred to be free to form a grouping after my own taste. But this was impossible. I have, however, deviated from the arrangement mentioned by Sir John Kaye in his third volume, so far that I have left for the fourth volume account of the storming of Dehlí, while I have included in the third the story of the first relief of Lakhnao.

It appeared to me that such an arrangement is absolutely essential to the harmony of the narrative. The first so-called relief of Lakhnao was not really a relief. It was in truth a reinforcement of the garrison. It did not deal, as did the capture of Dehlí, a deadly and a fatal blow to rebellion. The siege of the Residency still

continued after it had been effected. It seems therefore rightly included in a volume which records the progress of the mutiny. At the same time, the account of the storming of Dehlí being transferred to the fourth volume, that volume will be devoted mainly to the history of the downfall and crushing of the great rebellion.

It will be seen that I differ entirely from Sir John Kaye as to the wisdom of the action of the Government of India in the early days of the mutiny. I have given my reasons. They were formed on the spot twenty-one years ago. Further examination has confirmed them.

One word as to the authorities on which this history rests. It is based on letters, journals, and official documents, written at the time—in 1857. I have ever distrusted, and I distrust, documents penned from memory after a lapse of twenty-one years. To the dead, as well as to the living, justice must be rendered. Such justice can be dealt only by the historian who shall carefully peruse letters and journals—not meant for publication—written at the time; who shall subject these to a rigid examination; and who shall then conscientiously and impartially record the judgment formed upon that examination.

To do this I have devoted all my energies.

During the whirl of action, amid the distracting influences of the passing exigencies of the hour, it is not always possible to be impartial. The time has now arrived when the task of dealing out severe and strict justice to all may be attempted. In the process it is inevitable that men who may have been unduly exalted may be relegated to a lower place, whilst modest and neglected merit will be moved up higher. But my aim, my hope, my earnest desire, has been and is to render to all as they have deserved.

The fourth volume, containing the fall of Dehlí and the movements of the Dehlí force; the holding of the Residency and subsequently of the A'lambágh by Sir James Outram; the capture of Lakhnao and the crushing of the rebellion in Oudh by Sir Colin Campbell—afterwards Lord Clyde; the Central Indian campaign of Sir Hugh Rose (now Lord Strathnairn); and the daring achievements of Sir Robert Napier (now Lord Napier of Magdála),—will appear in the first quarter of 1879.

One word as to the spelling of proper names. I have adopted the modern system, that of spelling words in English as they are spelt in the language of Hindústán. When it is considered that by the barbarous method, or rather

no-method, hitherto in force the sense of the names is utterly lost, I cannot think that the system I have adopted will be regarded as a harmful innovation. Take, for instance, the place usually known as Cawnpore. Spelt in that way the name is absolutely without signification. But spelt in the way in which it is written by the Hindús, Kánhpúr, the meaning becomes at once apparent. Kánh is a name for Krishna; Púr stands for a city. The entire word signifies “city of Krishna.” For the convenience of those accustomed to the old method I append a glossary of the proper names I have employed, spelt according to both systems, and ranged in alphabetical order.

G. B. MALLESON.

27 West Cromwell Road.
1 May 1878.

GLOSSARY OF PROPER NAMES.

The mode of spelling now adopted.

<i>Agra</i>	<i>Agra.</i>
<i>Ajmír</i>	<i>Ajmeer.</i>
<i>Aligarh</i>	<i>Aligurh.</i>
<i>Alláhábád</i>	<i>Allahabad.</i>
<i>Alwar</i>	<i>Ulwur.</i>
<i>Ambálah</i>	<i>Umballa.</i>
<i>Arah</i>	<i>Arrah.</i>
<i>Árangábád</i>	<i>Aurungabad.</i>
<i>Azamgarh</i>	<i>Azimgurh.</i>
<i>Badáoñ</i>	<i>Budown.</i>
<i>Balandshahr</i>	<i>Bolundshuhr.</i>
<i>Banáras</i>	<i>Benares.</i>
<i>Barélí</i>	<i>Bareilly.</i>
<i>Barhámpúr</i>	<i>Berhampore.</i>
<i>Bárrákpúr</i>	<i>Barrackpore.</i>
<i>Bharatpúr</i>	<i>Bhurtpore.</i>
<i>Bhopál</i>	<i>Bhopal.</i>
<i>Bihár</i>	<i>Behar.</i>
<i>Chambal</i>	<i>Chumbul.</i>
<i>Champáran</i>	<i>Chumparun.</i>
<i>Dánápúr</i>	<i>Dinapore.</i>
<i>Dehlí</i> , or more correctly, <i>Dihlí</i>	<i>Delhi.</i>
<i>Dehrá Dún</i>	<i>Deyra Dhoon.</i>
<i>Dhár</i>	<i>Dhar.</i>
<i>Dholpúr</i>	<i>Dholepore.</i>
<i>Dísá</i>	<i>Deesa.</i>
<i>Diwás</i>	<i>Dewas.</i>
<i>Etáwa</i> , correctly <i>Itáwa</i>	<i>Etawah.</i>
<i>Faizábád</i>	<i>Fyzabad.</i>
<i>Farrakhábád</i>	<i>Furruckabad.</i>
<i>Fathgarh</i>	<i>Futtehgurh.</i>
<i>Fathpúr</i>	<i>Futtehpore.</i>
<i>Fathpur-Sikri</i>	<i>Futtehpore Sekri.</i>
<i>Gayá</i>	<i>Gyah.</i>
<i>Ghágrá</i>	<i>Gograh.</i>
<i>Gorákhpúr</i>	<i>Gorruckpore.</i>
<i>Gúmtí</i>	<i>Goomtee.</i>
<i>Gwáliár</i>	<i>Gwalior.</i>
<i>Haidarábád</i>	<i>Hydrabad.</i>
<i>Hamírpúr</i>	<i>Humeerpore.</i>

The mode of spelling now adopted.	The old mode of spelling
Itá .	Etah.
Itáwa .	Etawah.
Jabalpúr .	Jubbulpore.
Jaipúr .	Jeypore
Jalpáigori .	Julpigori
Jamná .	Jumna.
Jánpúr .	Jaunpore.
Jhánsí .	Jhansi.
Jodhpúr .	Jodhpore.
Kánhpúr .	Cawnpore.
Kotá .	Kotah.
Láhor .	Lahore.
Lakhnao .	Lucknow.
Lalatpúr .	Lullutpora.
Mathurá .	Mutra.
Máu .	Mhow.
Mewár .	Meywar.
Mírath .	Meerut.
Mirzapúr .	Mirzapore.
Morádábád .	Moradabad.
Motihári .	Motecharee.
Mozaffarnagar .	Mozuffernuggur
Mozaffarpúr .	Mozuffarpore.
Náogong, or Naogaon .	Nowgong.
Narbadá .	Nerbudda.
Nasírábád .	Nasseerabad.
Nímach .	Neemuch.
Nipál .	Nepaul.
Onáo .	Oonao.
Panjáb .	Punjaub.
Patná .	Patna.
Pasháwar .	Peshawar.
Rájpút .	Rajpoot.
Rájpútáná .	Rajpootana.
Rájsháhí .	Rajshye.
Rángún .	Rangoon.
Ságár .	Saugor.
Saháranpúr .	Saharunpore.
Sái .	Sye.
Sáran .	Sarun.
Sháhábád .	Shahabad.
Sháhjahánpúr .	Shahjehanpore.
Sítápúr .	Seetapore.
Súltánpúr .	Saltanpore.
Tírhút .	Tirhoot.
Udaipúr .	Oodeypore.

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CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH
SIR JOHN KAYE'S THIRD VOLUME.

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HISTORY
OF THE
INDIAN MUTINY OF 1857.

BOOK VII.

CHAPTER I.

IT is time now to return to Calcutta. The measures taken and the views entertained by the Government on receiving intelligence of the Mírath outbreak have been already recorded. It is evident that up to the end of the month of May they had not fully apprehended the gravity of the situation. "Everything," wrote the Secretary in the Home Department, Mr. Cecil Beadon, on the 25th of May, to the French Consul and the other French residents at Calcutta, who, with rare self-sacrifice, had placed their services at the disposal of the Government, "everything is quiet within six hundred miles of the capital. The mischief caused by a passing and groundless panic, has already been arrested; and there is every reason to hope that in the course of a few days tranquillity and confidence will be restored throughout the Presidency." Certainly the dis-

1857.
May 25.
Calcutta.

1857.
May 25.

inclination of the Government to accept, to the extent to which they were proffered, the loyal and disinterested offers of the members of the Trades' Association, of the Masonic Fraternity, of the Armenians, and of the French residents, seemed to argue on their part a conviction that the resources at their disposal were equal to any emergency, and a belief that the measures already taken would suffice to put down the revolt. But, however that may have been, nothing could justify or even palliate the tone of the reply of the Home Secretary to the French residents. It seemed at the time difficult to affirm to whom Mr. Beadon, the mouth-piece of the Government, intended to impute "a passing and groundless panic." It could not apply to the citizens of Calcutta, for not only had they evinced no fear, but they had not caused the mischief. That mischief had been caused by the sepoys; but it was scarcely the result of panic. Nor, had it been so, was the panic, it would seem, altogether groundless, and certainly it was not passing.

It is clear, at any rate, that, on the 25th of May, the Government reckoned upon order being maintained throughout the country between Calcutta and Alláhábád, and upon the prompt repression of the rebellion.

They had, on the 20th of May, commenced, and they subsequently continued, the despatch by detachments of the 84th Regiment to the North-West Provinces. They had been cheered, on the 23rd of May, by the arrival from Madras of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, and with commendable

promptitude they had, at once, sent off that regiment in the same direction. They were expecting regiments and batteries from Persia, from Ceylon, and from Rángún.

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1857.

May 25-30.

Views of the
Government.

The Government, then, felt tolerably secure regarding Bengal proper and the country south of Alláhbád. The news, however, from the districts north of the last-named city was calculated to alarm. Between the 25th and 30th of May, the native troops at Fírózpúr, at Aligarh, at Mainpúrí, at Itáwah, and at Balandshahr, had mutinied. Great fears were entertained regarding Lakhnao, Kánhpúr, A'gra, and the surrounding districts. On the other hand they were confident that the fall of Dehlí was imminent, and that the troops engaged in the capture of that place would be almost immediately available to secure the threatened districts north of Alláhbád. It is only fair to them to admit that this view was shared by the public, and, very generally, by soldiers. It was justified, moreover, by the records of the past. Neither to the invaders from the north, to the Maráthás, nor to the English under Lord Lake had the capital of the Moghols ever offered more than an ephemeral resistance. It was hardly, then, to be supposed that, garrisoned by native soldiers without a chief, it could successfully resist the trained and disciplined warriors of England.

Secure, then, of his base, of the ground lying six hundred miles in advance of it, confident that the troops in the North-West would very soon be available for the repression of rebellion in the

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Chapter I.

—
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May 31.

central districts, and fearful only regarding the rising there of the native army before the Commander-in-Chief should detach a force to keep it under, the Governor-General, on the 31st of May, despatched the following telegram to General Anson :—"I have heard to-day that you do not expect to be before Dehli until the 9th. In the meantime Cawnpore and Lucknow are severely pressed, and the country between Dehli and Cawnpore is passing into the hands of the rebels. It is of the utmost importance to prevent this, and to relieve Cawnpore, but nothing but rapid action will do it. Your force of artillery will enable you to dispose of Dehli with certainty; I, therefore, beg that you will detach one European Infantry Regiment, and a small force of European Cavalry, to the south of Dehli, without keeping them for operations there, so that Allygurh may be recovered, and Cawnpore relieved immediately. It is impossible to overrate the importance of showing European troops between Dehli and Cawnpore. Lucknow and Allahabad depend upon it."

His view
justified.

The instincts which dictated this telegram were undoubtedly true. The country between Dehlí and Alláhábád was the weakest and the most threatened part of the British position. The only error committed by the Governor-General was the error of believing that the force of artillery on the spot could dispose of the Moghol capital with certainty. But Lord Canning shared that belief with almost every other European, civilian and soldier, in British India.

1857.
June 1.

On the 1st of June, then, all looked hopeful to the Government of India. They were so sanguine, that, having only two European regiments to guard Calcutta and the country between that city and Dánápúr, they dispensed with the aid which would have been afforded them by fifteen hundred armed European citizens ; they allowed the three and a half native regiments at Bárrákpúr and the regiments at Dánápúr, Banáras, and the intermediate stations, to remain armed ; knowing that the districts lying between Dehlí and Alláhábád were in imminent peril, they yet hoped, and even confidently hoped, that the catastrophe might be delayed until either General Anson should despatch a regiment from the North-West, or until they should be strong enough to send up troops from Calcutta.

If the Government of India had had no other resources at their disposal, the course they actually pursued would have been amply justified. But writing, not, so to speak, after the event, but in the spirit of those who were present in Calcutta at the time, I am bound to affirm that they had other resources, and that they neglected them. When the lives of thousands, when the *prestige* of one's country, when the very safety of the national position, are in danger, it is a crime to depend solely upon possibilities. If the Government of India did not know, every other man in India knew, that the mutiny of the 19th Native Infantry had been no isolated act. Conscious of this, as I must suppose they were, the Government of India most certainly knew that in the long

Blindness of
the Govern-
ment with
regard to the
true character
of the crisis.

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June 1.

direct line between Dánápúr and Mírath there was but one European regiment. Yet, even in the first half of the first week of May, when fully aware that the condition of the native army was, to say the least, excited ; and that the European soldiers were to the natives in the proportion of one to twenty-four, the Government of Lord Canning had, even then, actually ordered the return of the 84th Regiment to Rángún, and had only been deterred from this step by the opportune outbreak of mutiny at Lakhnao on the 3rd of that month.

The 84th Regiment remained, then, at Bárrák-púr to watch over, on the 6th of May, the disbandment of a mutinous portion of the 34th Native-Infantry. That act accomplished, nothing further remained for it to do. Yet the first detachment of the 84th started for the North-West only fourteen days later (20th May). This delay not only remains unexplained, but it is inexplicable. So far as Bengal was concerned the Government of India had been content to dispense with the 84th Regiment on the 3rd of May, and to send it out of India. Yet though the occurrences at Lakhnao on that day disclosed the latent weakness in the centre of our line, the 84th was detained motionless near Calcutta ! It is true it was used on the 6th, but subsequently to that date it wasted fourteen precious days,—days which, if profitably employed, might almost certainly have secured Kánpúr !

I cannot but think that a mistake, but little less important, was committed when the first offer of the Calcutta citizens, made on the 20th of May,

was refused. The acceptance of that offer would have disengaged for immediate action the wing of a regiment. As events happened, the first batch of the 84th Regiment, leaving Calcutta the 20th of May, succeeded in reaching Kánpúr early in June. Now, it cannot be questioned that the entire 84th Regiment, if despatched on the 6th of May, might have reached Kánpúr during that month. Its presence would probably have prevented the outbreak which occurred there; and, in that case, it might certainly have been strengthened by a wing of the 53rd, leaving Calcutta the 21st, and by the Madras Fusiliers which actually left on the 23rd.

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June 1.

The reason why the Government did not act in the manner in which it might have acted is explained by Mr. Secretary Beadon in his letter already quoted to the French residents at Calcutta:— “Everything is quiet within six hundred miles of the capital. The mischief, caused by a passing and groundless panic, has fortunately been arrested; and there is every reason to hope that, in the course of a few days, tranquillity and confidence will be restored throughout the Presidency.” This “reason to hope” had, I have shown, no solid foundation. The hope which existed was, in fact, without reason. It had sufficient vitality, however, to induce the Government to risk the weakest and most threatened point of their line, in order that they might appear strong to the world.

The week that followed the 1st of June disclosed to the Government their error, to the world the short-sightedness of the Government.

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1857.
June 1-7.

Their first
awakening.

During that week intelligence reached Calcutta of the mutiny at Lakhnao, of the defection of all the regiments occupying Oudh, of revolts at A'zimgarh, at Banáras, and at Alláhábád, of the massacre of the Europeans at Jhánsí. This news increased the anxiety of the Government regarding the safety of their weak centre line; for Oudh was separated from Kánpúr but by the river, and even before the defection of that province, the position of Kánpúr, garrisoned by native troops and in close proximity to the stronghold of the discontented heir of a prince whom we had dispossessed, had inspired alarm. Counter-balancing, in a measure, the effect of this evil news—the Government saw with satisfaction the arrival, during that week, in Calcutta of the 64th Foot and 78th Highlanders from Persia, of a wing of the 35th Foot from Múlmén, of a wing of the 37th Regiment, and of a company of Royal Artillery from Ceylon. Awake now to the danger before them they pushed on these regiments to the north with praiseworthy activity. The uncompleted state of the railway rendered the progress of the detachments slow. In default of this means of transit, single-horsed post-carriages—the quickest mode of travelling then available—bullock carriages, and steamers, were employed to the fullest possible extent. The Government, in fact, did then all that was possible to save the threatened line.

I have said that the Government were awake to the danger before them in the north. It is strange, however, that their eyes were not yet

The awak-
ing not com-
plete.

opened to the full magnitude of the crisis ; that they ignored the danger at their very door. At the time that they were despatching every available European soldier to protect a station in their centre line from the possible mutiny of the armed sepoys who garrisoned it, they allowed the sepoys close to Calcutta to remain armed ; the native garrison of Dánápur to remain armed. What is more, in spite of so many examples of disaffection, they believed in the loyalty of these men. Their policy at this period was to trust, or to seem to trust, every native regiment until it should revolt. Such a policy naturally greatly restricted the movements of the European troops, for it was often necessary to keep these inactive at a station to guard against a possible outbreak.

Thus, with the news of the revolt of many regiments stationed within the limits of the six hundred miles indicated by Mr. Beadon in his famous letter of the 25th of May ringing in their ears, the Government reported to the Court of Directors their belief that a public profession of loyalty made by the 70th Regiment of Native Infantry, then stationed at Bárrákpúr, would "have the happiest influence on the minds of all well-disposed men in the Native Army." They, therefore, allowed three and a half native regiments at that station to retain their arms. To the 6th Native Infantry at Alláhábád, on the eve of a revolt accompanied by marked barbarity, the Government sent, at the same time, their acknowledgment of a similar profession. They would not believe the fact which was patent to all

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June 1-7.

around them,—the fact that the entire native army was animated by but one feeling, and that the mutiny of a regiment was merely a question of time and of opportunity.

Their views regarding the possibility of an advance from Dehlí in the direction of their weak central line were encouraged by the receipt, at this period, of information of a victory gained by the Mírath garrison over the rebels issuing from Dehlí at the rivulet Hindan, near the town of Ghází-ídín Nagar. This victory, in which the rebels lost five guns, was gained on the 31st of May. It encouraged the hope that almost any post might bring the intelligence of the fall of the great fortress.

Death of General Anson.

Another most important item of intelligence conveyed to the Government during this absorbing week was that of the death by cholera of the Commander-in-Chief, General Anson, at Ambála, on the 27th of May. This much to be lamented event did not occur until General Anson had prepared and set in action the measures which were to the end persistently carried out for the capture of Dehlí. His demise was a great—time

His character. proved it to be a most sensible loss. A man of very remarkable natural talents, General Anson had, during a residence in India of more than five years, used those talents to master completely the necessities of Indian warfare. He was a perfect judge of character. No man ever more quickly detected the veneer of superficiality. He could not conceal his contempt for a man whom he discovered to be playing a part. Hence, pro-

bably, there swarmed up after his death enemies and detractors. They have not succeeded, however, in sullying his fair fame. For to him, as truly now as when death snatched him from the triumph which he had prepared, may be applied the immortal epitaph which the great historian of the Peninsular War composed for one of the most illustrious of English Generals :—“ The honest loved, the dishonest feared him. For, while he lived he did not shun, but scorned and spurned the base, and, with characteristic propriety, they spurned at him when he was dead.”

Consequent upon the death of General Anson the command of the force destined to besiege Dehlí devolved upon Major-General Sir Henry Barnard, commanding the Sirhind Division.

I have now given a picture—a severe but accurate picture—of the information possessed by the Government of India up to the end of the first week of June, of the deductions they drew from that information, of their hopes, their fears, and beliefs. It will have been observed that whilst, in the main, their view of the position was correct, they had not even then sounded the full depths of the disaster ; and that as in May, so still, early in June, they preferred the upholding of their infallibility as a Government to throwing themselves frankly upon the loyalty of the only classes they could absolutely trust,—the Europeans and Eurasians living and settled in India.

The fortnight which followed was full of startling incidents, but incidents marked by the same general correctness of view regarding strategy,

Summary of
the mental
range of the
Government.

12 FURTHER AWAKENING OF THE GOVERNMENT.

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June 6.

The awak-
ing almost
complete.

the same weakness of political vision, and the same distrust of their own countrymen.

On the night of the 6th of June the native regiment at Alláhábád which, the previous day, had been thanked by the Government for its professions of unwavering loyalty, mutinied and murdered nearly all its officers, including some young boys just arrived from England. The fortress of Alláhábád, occupying a most commanding position on the Jamná, and considered the gateway to the North-West, escaped by a miracle. The telegraphic lines were cut or destroyed, and communication with the army before Dehlí became impossible except by way of Láhor or Bombay. The troops in Rájputáná and in Central India were likewise reported to have risen. There had been a mutiny at Banáras, but thanks to the wise and statesmanlike conduct of Mr. Frederic Gubbins of the Civil Service, and the bold measures adopted by Colonel Neill and his Madras Fusiliers, the mutiny had been suppressed, and the disaffected of the great Hindú city had been overawed.

From the 7th of June, indeed, it may be truly affirmed that the outlook to the Government of India had become darkness intensified. Mr. Beadon's intact line of six hundred miles had been attempted in many places. Beyond it all was impenetrable.

In this extremity the Government still clung to the army before Dehlí. On the 10th of June Lord Canning drafted to the Major-General commanding that army a letter in which he urged

Lord Can-
ning's anxiety
regarding his
weak central
line.

him to send southwards, with the least possible delay, an European force as large as he could spare.* He kept the letter by him for eleven days, and only despatched it when the chances of relieving the central line from Calcutta seemed almost desperate.

Two days after that letter had been penned Lord Canning yielding to the solicitations of the ablest of his councillors, Mr. J. P. Grant, resolved to avail himself of the aid which had been proffered him, three weeks earlier, by the citizens of Calcutta. But in order to induce the Governor-General to agree to this tardy concession, it was necessary for Mr. Grant to lay aside all gloss, to sacrifice the false confidence on which Mr. Beadon had laid so much stress three weeks previously, and to describe facts as they really

* The letter, in a more complete form, runs as follows :— “Benares has been made safe. So has Allahabad, I hope, but only just in time. Henceforward, the reinforcements will be pushed up still further—to Cawnpore; but the disorganised state of the country between Allahabad and Cawnpore may interpose delay; and both telegraph and dawk from any place north of Allahabad is now cut off from Calcutta. I cannot, therefore, speak so confidently of the time when help will reach Sir Hugh Wheeler. It may not be for four or five days, or even more. This makes it all the more urgently necessary that you should push down an European force immediately. When it reaches the Cawnpore division, it will, according to the instructions which have been sent to you, pass under Sir Hugh Wheeler’s command. And with him will rest the responsibility of relieving Lucknow, and pacifying the country from Cawnpore downwards. It will be for you to judge what your own movements should be. All that I require is, that an European force as large an one as you can spare, should be sent southwards with the least possible delay, and that it should not be detained an hour for the purpose of finishing off affairs at Dehli after once the great blow has been struck.”

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June 10.

Mr. Grant's
practical
advice.

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were. "In reality," wrote Mr. Grant early in June, "in reality as well as in appearance we are very weak here, where we ought to be—and if we can't be should at least appear to be—as strong as possible. We have as enemies three Native Infantry regiments and a half, of which one and a half are the very worst type we know; one, two, three (for no one knows) thousand armed men at Garden Reach, or available there at a moment; some hundred armed men of the Scinde Ameers at Dum-Dum; half the Mahomedan population; and all the blackguards of all sorts of a town of six hundred thousand people. Against these we have one and a half weak regiments, most of whom dare not leave the Fort. There is no reason to expect real help in real danger from the Native Police. The insurrection is regularly spreading down to us. Is this an emergency or not? My conviction is that even a street row at the capital would give us an awful shake—not only in Bengal, but in Bombay and Madras—at this moment."

This remonstrance, vivid, true, and out-spoken, expressed in nervous, even in passionate language, the thoughts of the much maligned citizens of Calcutta. The daily newspapers had for a fortnight been pressing the same arguments on the Governor-General. These had failed to shake the reluctance of Lord Canning to take his own countrymen into his confidence, to admit that he had the smallest occasion for their aid. But now one of his colleagues, and incomparably the ablest of his colleagues, pressed upon him, in language more

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June 12.

clear and more forcible than any used by the Press, the dangers of persistence in the same policy of distrust. That even the weighty utterances of Mr. Grant would, in any case, have met the fate of the expressed opinions of the European community is scarcely probable. But he did not stand quite alone in his view. It happened that an examination of the records of the Home Office showed that the question of raising volunteers in India had been thoroughly discussed in the time of Lord Dalhousie; that a decision in favour of the measure had been recorded; and that that decision had received the endorsement of the Court of Directors. This discovery added force to Mr. Grant's argument. He clenched it further by recording his opinion that it was probable that, if a Volunteer Corps were not raised in the crisis then before them, the Home Government would ask the reason why. These arguments proved successful. Lord Canning, still retaining his opinion as to the practical uselessness of the measure, sanctioned, on the 12th of June, the enrolment of the citizens of Calcutta as volunteers.

Lord Canning
sanctions the
enrolment of
volunteers.

The Calcutta citizens nobly responded to the call of the Government. In a very few days the three arms, Horse, Foot, and Artillery, sprang into vigorous life. Men of all classes and of all positions pressed forward to enrol themselves, and in less than three weeks a brigade was formed sufficiently strong to guard Calcutta, and to enable the Government, had they deemed it necessary, to send all the regular troops into the field.

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June 18.

The European
and Native
press.

The day following that on which the Government had thus announced their intention to solicit the aid which three weeks previously they had rejected, they introduced and passed through the Legislative Council a measure calculated, above all others, to rouse the indignation of the community and to deaden the loyalty to which they had but just at the moment appealed.

It can well be imagined that the events occurring all over the country had not been unnoticed by the public press. In India the fourth estate was represented by two distinct bodies of men. There was the English press advocating English interests, generally owned and entirely contributed to by Englishmen. Running parallel with this was the native press, the organ of native interests and owned and contributed to by natives. The two divisions were subject to the same laws and amenable to the same jurisdiction. So blended had become the interests of the native and the European that, as a rule, the two sections referred to advocated identical measures. It did happen indeed occasionally, though rarely, that they espoused opposite sides. Such had been the case when the legislature brought in a measure to introduce a native magistracy with power to try Europeans. Against this measure the European press had protested, whilst it was eagerly supported by the organs of native public opinion. But such occasions were not common. As traders, the interests of the European and of the native merchants were identical. The land question, which was to assume so great a prominence in

later years, had then been but incidentally referred to. The two sections acted alike as critics on the conduct of the Government, and, as a rule, they performed this delicate duty with judgment, with temper, and with moderation.

It is true that, when dealing with individual officials, the press of India, native as well as European, was often extremely uncompromising. It certainly called a spade a spade. And as the Indian officials had experienced none of the rough training to which the statesmen of Europe are subjected, and were often men who owed their high positions to favour rather than to merit, this habit of plain speaking had been apt to engender, and often did engender, feelings of rancorous dislike in the breasts of the criticised.

When the early incidents of the mutiny occurred, that is, when the 19th Regiment of Native Infantry misbehaved at Barhámpúr, the English press had spoken out very plainly. It had urged the Government to adopt at once decided measures. More than one writer had pointed out that the Barhámpúr incident was a spark which, if not immediately crushed, would be speedily fanned into a flame. The native press was more deliberate and more reticent, but it offered no great opposition to vigorous action. The warnings of the press were disregarded. The Government did not act with promptitude, nor when it acted, did it act with vigour. When the spark had been fanned into a flame, when, that is to say, the outbreak at Mírath had disclosed to all who were not wilfully blind the gigantic extent of the

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insurrection, whilst the European press clamoured more vehemently for prompt action, and urged the Government to throw themselves on the loyalty of the European community, the tone of the native press almost immediately changed. Possibly the supineness which they witnessed made them believe that the fatal day for the English had arrived, just as their fathers had seen that day overtake the Moghols, the Maráthás, and the Síkhs. Possibly the Bengálí portion of the native press, representing a highly educated people, unversed in arms, but alone capable of administering the country should it fall under native domination, possibly the Bengálí portion believed that their prospects would be greatly improved by the overthrow of the British power. Certainly many of them doubted our ultimate success. But whatever may have been the reason, it is at least undeniable that from the time of the arrival in Calcutta of the news of the Mírath outbreak the tone of the native press changed. It began to speak out against the Government, and to show very plainly that it had sympathy with the revolters.

This alteration in the tone of the native press was brought to the notice of Lord Canning early in June, and he was urged then to interfere, by legislative action, with its freedom. Unlike his colleagues, however, Lord Canning had been brought up in a free country. He had been accustomed all his life to the freedom of the press. He had seen in England that the law of the land was sufficient to put down license. He knew that

an honest Government had no better friend than a free and out-speaking public critic. To the solicitations of his councillors, then, he replied that "the remedy was worse than the disease."

But a few days later the opinions of Lord Canning in this respect underwent a change. On the 13th of June he, for the first and only time during his tenure of office, went down to the Legislative Council, and declaring there that the incendiary tone of the native press had driven him to the conclusion at which he had reluctantly arrived, he brought forward and carried a measure to place the native press under restrictions so galling that, compared to them, the restrictions on the press of France during the darkest days of the reign of Napoleon III. were light and easy.

Had Lord Canning stopped there, he would have carried with him the voice of the public. The times were critical, the native press had encouraged sedition and rebellion, and it was necessary that authority should assert itself. But when Lord Canning proceeded to include in the same measure of stern repression the European press, in spite of "the loyalty and intelligence which marked their labours," on the ground, mainly, that he could not draw a line of demarcation between European and native publications,*

* The following are the exact words used by Lord Canning with respect to the European press:—"The remarks I have taken occasion to make with reference to the Native Press, I do not direct

I see no solid standing ground upon which a line can be drawn marking off one from the other, when the question to make with reference to the Native Press, I do not direct to work mischief at a crisis

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The Gagging Act.

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Indignation of
the European
community.

he evoked an outburst of opposition such as has been seldom witnessed in Calcutta. It was not only that the English community of that place resented the restriction of their liberties. Had such a restriction been proposed by a Government in which they had confidence they would have borne it patiently. But on this occasion they disbelieved in the sincerity of the Government. They had seen them slow to be convinced, slow to move, slow to avail themselves of the advantages forced upon them, confident where they should have been distrustful, and distrustful where they should have been confident. They had seen them arrogant whilst blundering, supercilious whilst courting disaster. They knew now that disaster had befallen them, that Mr. Beadon's line of six hundred miles had been broken, and that the central line beyond it was terribly endangered. And, yet, no sooner had they become aware of this than the Government shut their mouths. There was but one conclusion for them to draw. They believed then, and many believe still, that the action of the Government was

like this. For whilst I am turned to the most mischievous purposes in the hands of persons capable of dressing them up for the Native ear. I am glad to admit that the bill is not specially levelled at the European press, but I do not see any reason, under their management nor do I consider it possible which, though perfectly innocuous as far as European readers are concerned, may, in justice, to draw any line of demarcation between European and Native publications."

prompted by a determination to prevent, if possible, the transmission to England of any printed record of their mistakes.

That the Government was actuated by any such motive I am now far from thinking. But their action in muzzling the European press was undoubtedly a mistake. It severed the confidence which ought to exist in a great crisis between the rulers and the ruled, and increased the distrust which the tardiness of their measures had till then inspired.

This distrust was greatly augmented by an incident which occurred the day following. True to the opinion expressed by Mr. Secretary Beadon to the members of the Trades' Association, on the 21st of May, to the effect that it was most unfair to the Native Army of Bengal to assume that all its regiments were disaffected:—notwithstanding that Mr. J. P. Grant, a member of the Supreme Council, had, early in June, recorded his opinion that at Bárrákpúr, sixteen miles from Calcutta, the Government had "as enemies three Native Infantry regiments and a half, of which one and a half are the very worst type we know":—in spite of the examples supplied by some stations in the upper provinces of the danger of allowing native regiments to retain their arms, and of the beneficial results which in others had followed their being disarmed:—Lord Canning had been resolute in allowing the regiments at Bárrákpúr, so graphically painted by Mr. Grant, to continue, armed, in the exercise of their duties. Before the Government had, on the 12th of June, accepted the

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The policy of
feigning con-
fidence.

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offers of the volunteers, Lord Canning was aware of the mutiny of the native troops at Banáras, at Alláhábád, at Lakhnao, in Rohilkhand, at the stations north of Kánhpúr; he knew that disarming at Láhor, at other stations in the Panjáb, and at A'gra, had been attended with beneficial results,—and yet he continued to permit the regiments quartered within sixteen miles of Calcutta to retain their arms !

State of
Calcutta at
the time.

What was the state of Calcutta at the time when the Governor-General persisted in this resolution? It cannot better be described than in the words, already quoted, of the ablest of Lord Canning's councillors, Mr. J. P. Grant. After recording in the language noted in the preceding paragraph his opinion of the native regiments quartered at Bárrákpúr, Mr. Grant added that the Government had, in addition to those "enemies," "one, two, or three (for no one knows) thousand armed men at Garden Reach" (a suburb of Calcutta), "or available there at a moment; some hundred armed men of the Scinde Ameers at Dum-Dum" (six miles from Calcutta), "half the Mahomedan population; and all the blackguards of all sorts of a town of six hundred thousand people." To encounter these enemies the Government had at their disposal, in Calcutta itself, a weak wing of an English regiment! A wing of another regiment, the 35th, was at Bárrákpúr, and a complete regiment, the 78th Highlanders, some miles beyond, at Chinsará. Those regiments were, in fact, detained near the seat of Government to guard the armed sepoys. For dis-

armed sepoys one-fourth of their number would have sufficed.

The fruits of this policy very soon showed themselves. Intended as a policy of conciliation,—to display confidence in quarters in which no confidence was felt,—it had the result of imparting boldness to those who had long been mutineers in heart, and who were watching only their opportunity. Lord Canning had accepted the offers to volunteer of the citizens of Calcutta on the 12th of June; he had passed the act, known thenceforth as the Gagging Act, on the 13th. The 14th was a bright, clear day, as bright as days are in India after the first rainy season has set in, and when no rain falls. It was a Sunday. That morning the church-goers attended service at the various churches at the ordinary hour of 11 A.M. In most of the churches nothing remarkable occurred. But those present at the garrison church in Fort William had their attention disturbed by the rolling sound of heavy *matériel* moving out of the Fort. One individual, who occupied a house in Chowringhee, the Park Lane of Calcutta, somewhat impressed by this unusual occurrence, thought he would endeavour to ascertain if anything had taken place to justify the movement. Accordingly, after the service was over, he, in accordance with the Sunday custom in Calcutta, went to make some calls. He called upon one of the Secretaries to Government. But nothing appeared out of its usual course, and he returned to his house with his curiosity unsatisfied. About two hours later, however, at 4 o'clock

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The natural
result of the
"feigning
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policy.

Calcutta on
the 14th of
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in the afternoon, he received a note from a gentleman who was living in the same house with the Secretary on whom he had called. In this note he was informed that the native regiments at Bárrakpúr had mutinied, and were in full march on Calcutta ; that the lives of the European inhabitants were in the greatest danger ; that he (the writer) begged him and his wife to proceed at once to his (the writer's) house, where they had a stone staircase and five good rifles ; further, that no time was to be lost.

The gentleman addressed declined to leave his own house. He even went outside to endeavour to ascertain the correctness of the information he had received. What he saw on that eventful afternoon he recorded on the spot. The impression the sight made upon him has never left him. The roof of his house commanded a view of the plain between Chowringhee and the Fort. Of the details which accompanied and which followed the scamper across the plain he had accurate knowledge, and, when he published his account of what occurred, he was prepared, as he is now prepared, to name, had he been called upon, the individuals to whom he referred. To the statement as he wrote it there is not a comma to add, nor from it is there a comma to be withdrawn. As an accurate picture of the events of that afternoon it is irrefutable.

The gentleman referred to thus painted the scene* :— “ It has been said by a great writer that

* Red Pamphlet, page 105.

‘there is scarcely a less dignified entity than a patrician in a panic.’ The veriest sceptic as to the truth of this aphorism could have doubted no longer, had he witnessed the living panorama of Calcutta on the 14th of June. All was panic, disorder, and dismay. The wildest reports were in circulation. It was all but universally credited that the Bárrákpúr brigade was in full march on Calcutta, that the people in the suburbs had already risen, that the King of Oudh, with his followers, was plundering Garden Reach. Those highest in office were the first to give the alarm. There were Secretaries to Government running over to Members of Council, loading their pistols, barricading the doors, sleeping on sofas; Members of Council abandoning their houses with their families, and taking refuge on board ship; crowds of lesser celebrities, impelled by these examples, having hastily collected their valuables, were rushing to the Fort, only too happy to be permitted to sleep under the Fort guns. Horses, carriages, palanquins, vehicles of every sort and kind, were put into requisition to convey panic-stricken fugitives out of the reach of imaginary cut-throats. In the suburbs, almost every house belonging to the Christian population was abandoned. Half-a-dozen determined fanatics could have burned down three parts of the town. A score of London thieves would have made their fortunes by plundering the houses in the neighbourhood of Chowringhee which had been abandoned by their inmates.”*

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* Sir John Kaye quotes the following description, given time at Calcutta, of the events

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"feigning
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policy at
Bárrakpúr.

There was some reason for the alarm. There is not a shadow of doubt that the native regiments quartered at Bárrakpúr had long been watching their opportunity, and that, noting the successive arrival of European regiments from Persia, from Pegú, and from Ceylon, they had, on the night of the 13th of June, resolved to mutiny the following day. Fortunately, some of the well-disposed among them betrayed the secret that night. An express was at once despatched by the Major-General commanding the division to order down the 78th Highlanders from Chinsará, whilst permission to disarm the mutinous regiments without delay was urgently requested from Calcutta. The Highlanders set off that night from Chinsará. Misled, whether purposely or

here referred to. He says were mostly Eurasians. In that the flight was "what this I am in perfect agreement with Dr. Mouat. No modern Herculaneum, had thing could exceed the courage been evacuated in broad daylight on the approach of a and steadfastness of the members of the mercantile and visible eruption from a neighbouring volcano." Dr. Mouat trading community. In his journal, written at the time, adds, "The whole line of the ghauts was crowded with fugitives, and those who could find no shelter on the ships, took refuge within the Fort, of which the squares, the corridors, all the available space everywhere, indeed, were shelter in the Fort, and thronged by many, who all full of rumours of the passed the night in their worst description from Dum-carriages." Since writing the Dum and Barrackpore." text I have seen Dr. Mouat. Colonel Cavenagh, however, He tells me that his remarks did not observe any unusual apply to the Christian population of the suburbs, who number of vehicles in the Fort.

otherwise may possibly be doubtful, by their guide, they wandered four miles out of their direct road, but recovering the track, a strong detachment of them arrived by daybreak in the station, weary and footsore, yet ready for any emergency. This prompt action entirely disconcerted the sepoys. They determined to defer the outbreak to a more convenient season. But the chance was not allowed them. The remainder of the 78th arrived during the day, and, the necessary permission having been received from the Government, the native regiments were at 4 P.M. paraded and disarmed in the presence of the wing of Her Majesty's 35th and of the 78th Regiment with loaded muskets, each on either flank, and of six 12-pounders in their front loaded with grape. They offered no resistance, but piled their arms in silence.

In Calcutta the night passed off tranquilly. But the following morning there was a new excitement. The list given by Mr. J. P. Grant in his famous minute of the enemies to public order in Calcutta will not have been forgotten. If prominently in this list figured the three and a half native regiments at Bárrákpúr, next in importance were enumerated the "one, two, three (for no one knows) thousand armed men at Garden Reach, or available there at any moment." Garden Reach was one of the suburbs of Calcutta, and the men alluded to were the followers of the deposed King of Oudh. Having, on the 14th, acted, so to speak, on Mr. Grant's first hint regarding the sepoys, the Government followed up that

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Arrest of the
King of Oudh.

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vigorous action by taking up his second recommendation on the 15th. And it is due to them to state that they performed a distasteful, though necessary, task with great prudence and delicacy. They rightly deemed that the best mode of rendering powerless the followers of the King of Oudh would be to deprive those followers of their natural leader. On the morning of the 15th of June, therefore, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Edmonstone, accompanied by a detachment of English soldiers, waited upon the King of Oudh and informed him that political necessities, and the fact that emissaries had made a mischievous use of his name, required that he should remove from Garden Reach and take up his residence in the Governor-General's house within Fort William. The King of Oudh behaved on the occasion with dignity and propriety. Having in the most solemn manner protested that, neither by word nor deed had he encouraged the mutineers, he declared himself ready to go wherever the Governor-General might think fit. He was then conducted to the Government House within the Fort. His late Prime Minister, Alí Nakí Khán, and a few other nobles were selected to bear him company. This action on the part of the Government excited no disturbance, and in its results it fully justified the ideas which prompted it. The unknown number of armed men at Garden Reach were by it rendered powerless for mischief.

Two days later, the officer selected by Lord Canning to assume temporarily the command of the Bengal Army, vacated by the death of General

Arrival of
Sir Patrick
Grant.

Anson, arrived in Calcutta. This was Lieutenant-General Sir Patrick Grant, K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army. Sir Patrick Grant was an officer of the Company's service who had made his way through the regimental grades to the command of a regiment, and from the command of a regiment to the General Army Staff, rising eventually to be Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army. He had served on the staff during the first and second Sikh campaigns. Circumstances, to which it is unnecessary to refer, had made him unpopular with the majority of the officers of the Bengal Army, but his many and varied services seemed to justify Lord Canning in regarding him as the man for the situation, and certainly to few soldiers was a greater opportunity ever offered of vindicating the judgment of the Governor-General. The weak centre line I have so often referred to was known to be in imminent danger. It was believed that there was yet time to avert that danger. According to the latest reports received by the Government the Madras Fusiliers had reached Alláhábád ; the 84th Regiment and a portion of the 64th had passed Banáras ; a considerable number of the 78th had already left Calcutta, and the remainder, and a wing of the 37th, were to start on the 20th. These united would constitute a force sufficient, with the artillery available, to strengthen the weak central line. Could that line be strengthened before it were actually rent it seemed possible that direct communication with Dehlí might be re-opened. And the Govern-

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His previous
career.

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ment had no information that the line had been rent.

To endeavour to execute this project, to reach Kánpúr before our troops there had been overwhelmed, was a task sufficient to stimulate the energies and to satisfy the ambition of any man. And this task was open to Sir Patrick Grant to select.

*His reasons
for not taking
the field.*

Sir Patrick Grant did not select it. The reasons which he gave for his decision proved that, up to the date on which it was made, the 22nd of June, neither he, nor the Members of the Government who approved it, had comprehended the full extent of the calamity which had fallen on the country ; that they still regarded the outbreak as partial in its effects and temporary in its nature. Those reasons were that “the Commander-in-Chief can most efficiently, and assuredly most expeditiously, control and direct all military movements now, *and the reorganization and regeneration of the Army hereafter,** if he has the advantage of being in personal communication with the head of the Government, if he learns the views of Government with respect to the innumerable questions which must constantly arise, and, which is highly important, if he is made acquainted with the mass of intelligence which may be expected to reach the Government from every quarter of the empire.”

It will be seen that, in the presence of actual and pressing danger, danger to be overcome at

* The italics are my own.

once if the empire was to be saved, the mind of Sir Patrick Grant was dreaming of "reorganization and regeneration." Surely the shortest way of accomplishing that dream was to act vigorously against the rebels who had rendered necessary the revision of the old system. The fact that the Commander-in-Chief himself was in the field would have increased the moral power of the army operating against the rebels, whilst in such a position the head of the Army would have exercised an authority such as could not be delegated even to the most trusted of his lieutenants.

As for the control and command of the army there was the fact that of the two armies, the Native and the European, the one had mutinied, the other was in the field. The presence of the Commander-in-Chief was naturally required with the latter. The routine work of ordering forward troops from Calcutta, of furnishing supplies and ambulances for the field force, could well be entrusted to the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army and his subordinates, who were on the spot. There, too, remained the Indian War Office, represented by the Military Secretary to Government and his assistants.

The reason given by the Commander-in-Chief for not placing himself at the head of the army in the field was, then, based upon premisses which were incorrect, and upon a general view of the situation which was erroneous. But another reason which Sir Patrick Grant recorded in the same State memorandum goes far to show that

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Unsoundness
of those
reasons.

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reasons.Justify the
decision to
remain in
Calcutta.

he did well in coming to the conclusion which he adopted.

"I may also observe," wrote Sir Patrick, "that it is quite impossible to conduct the multifarious duties of this large army without a numerous staff and extensive office establishment, requiring, when moving about the country, a complete regiment as an escort, and a large amount of carriage for their transport, neither one nor the other of which can be supplied under present circumstances."

This reason is decisive. Sir Patrick Grant was in command of the army employed to crush the mutiny. If he thought that he could not leave details to the tried officers on the general staff at Calcutta, whilst he should be marching against the rebels; if he considered that he must attend personally to petty matters of promotion and appointments at the same time that he should be directing all his energies against the enemy, and that, at so grave a crisis, when every European soldier was an object of importance, he would need a complete regiment to escort his papers, he was certainly quite right to stay where he was, and to detach another officer to command the army in the field.

The officer whom he selected for the post was Major-General Havelock.

The achievements of this officer belong to another section of this history. I purpose to continue here the account of the state of Calcutta up to the date of his departure from Alláhábád to relieve or to reconquer the weak central line.

On the 17th of June,—the day of the arrival in Calcutta of Sir Patrick Grant,—the Government received intelligence that General Barnard had, on the 8th, beaten the rebels at Dehlí. For a short time there was a hope that Dehlí itself had fallen—a hope so vivid that it induced Lord Canning, four days later, to despatch to Dehlí the requisition he had penned to the general on the 10th, to send down southward as large an European force as he could spare, with the least possible delay. But it transpired in a few days that not the fortified city of Dehlí, but the cantonments on the ridge only, had fallen into British hands. The siege was to follow; and to conduct that siege with any prospect of success, General Barnard, far from being in a position to spare troops, urgently needed reinforcements.

From other parts of India the news was on the whole unfavourable. At the end of the third week of June the Government were without news from Kánpúr and Lakhnao beyond the 4th. At Naogang, at Nímach, at Jhánsí, and at Jánpúr, they knew that mutinies had occurred; but they were without details. Dánápúr was safe; Banáras and Alláhbád had been made so in the manner already described. From A'gra they had good news up to the 10th. At A'zamgarh there had been an outbreak; and there were bad rumours from Rohilkhand.

The fourth week of the month, and the week succeeding, up to the 4th of July, added considerably to their knowledge. On the 3rd of July,

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The false
report of the
capture of
Dehlí

Unfavourable
news from
other quar-
ters.

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Government received information that the native troops at Kánpúr had mutinied on the 4th of June ; that they had been joined by Náná Dhúdú Pant, the adopted son of the last of the Peshwás, with all his armed following ; that Sir Henry Lawrence, and the Europeans at Lakhnao, had been gradually hemmed in by the rebels until they retained only the Residency, the Machí Bhawan fort, and the cantonments, but that all was well there up to the 30th of June ; that the troops of the Gwálíár Contingent had mutinied on the 15th of June ; that an uneasy feeling prevailed at Haidarábád ; that up to the 15th A'gra was safe, but that Bándah and other small stations had been occupied by the rebels. Such was the state of the intelligence up to the 3rd. The following day brought a letter from Sir Henry Lawrence, dated 10 P.M., the 28th of June. In that letter Sir Henry stated that "he had every reason to believe that the Kánpúr force had been entirely destroyed by treachery." Details, which in the end turned out in the main to be true, were added. But it was further stated that the intelligence was not believed either at Alláhábád or Banáras.

Such was the information possessed in Calcutta when General Havelock set out from Alláhábád to re-cement the broken central line. I must add a few words as to the circumstances which attended his appointment.

General Havelock. Major-General Havelock was Adjutant-General of the Queen's Troops in India. He had commanded a division during the Persian war, but on

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its conclusion, ignorant of the demise of General Anson and of his replacement as Commander-in-Chief by General Somerset, he had come round by steamer to Calcutta, and had been a fellow-passenger from Madras with Sir Patrick Grant. General Havelock had seen a great deal of service in India. In Barmá, in Afghánistán, in Gwáliár, on the Satlaj, he had established the character of being a thorough soldier. Quiet and retiring in his manners, he was not calculated to make an impression on those who judge only by outward show, but he had read and thought much, and his acquirements were solid and profound. Thin and spare of frame, he was yet gifted with a vitality which was proof against fatigue. He was not a talker, and many, perhaps, before the campaign then about to ensue, might have doubted his ability to command. But in this respect he bore a strong resemblance to the most capable of the Marshals of the first Empire, the illustrious Masséna, of whom Napoléon thus wrote :—" His conversation gave few indications of genius : but at the first cannon-shot his mental energy redoubled, and when surrounded by danger his thoughts were clear and forcible."

Such was the officer to whom Sir Patrick Grant delegated the duty of commanding in the field the forces which the Government had been able to collect. To take command of those forces General Havelock left Calcutta on the 24th of June. What he accomplished with his army, and how he accomplished it, has been already related. It rests for me here only to say that

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his position at Kánpúr, even after his victories, was, in the presence of the rebels in Oudh on his right, and the revolted Gwálíár Contingent on his left rear, in a military sense unsound and dangerous. It was not the smallest proof of his skill and daring that, notwithstanding this, deeming it in a political sense essential, he maintained it; and this, too, at a time when Mr. Beadon's line of six hundred miles—the line which maintained his communications with Calcutta—had been rudely snapped in twain.

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CHAPTER II.

WHILST the events recorded in the preceding chapter had been enacted in Calcutta itself, the state of affairs in Bengal and in Bihár had scarcely been of a nature to justify the jaunty confidence expressed by Mr. Beadon on the 25th of May. The first information that the line of six hundred miles was actually in danger of being broken was conveyed to Government on the 12th of June from Rohní, a station in the Santhál district, about three hundred miles from Calcutta. This station was the head-quarters of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, commanded by Major Macdonald, one of the best officers of the Bengal Army. This officer was taking tea in front of his bungalow on the evening of the 12th of June, in company with his Adjutant, Sir Norman Leslie, and the Assistant Surgeon of the regiment, Dr. Grant. During a pause in their conversation, Dr. Grant rose with the intention of entering the bungalow. In the act of rising, he noticed the stealthy approach of

Danger of
Mr. Beadon's
line.

Major
Macdonald
at Rohní.

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three men, apparently strangers. As he turned to point them out to his companions, the intruders rushed upon them with drawn swords. Unarmed and taken by surprise, the Englishmen could defend themselves only with their chairs. But before he could do even this Sir Norman Leslie was cut down. Major Macdonald was scalped and received two other wounds on the head. Dr. Grant also was wounded. It would have gone hard with both had the assassins persevered; but suddenly and most unaccountably they turned and fled.

As no symptom of mutinous disposition had appeared in the 5th Cavalry, and as Major Macdonald believed in the loyalty of his men, it was at first conjectured that the assassins were discharged sepoys. A few days later, however, a sowar confessed that they belonged to the regiment. They were at once seized, tried, and sentenced to be hanged. This sentence, Major Macdonald, with a courage which was great, though not rare, carried out in the presence of the entire regiment. A moment's weakness on his part would have been the signal for a general rising. Subsequent events proved that there was at the time an organised conspiracy in the regiment; that many had been aware of the plot to assassinate the three officers, that they "waited its success to rise." They were deterred at this critical time solely by the courage and determination of Major Macdonald.*

* Major Macdonald thus I never for a moment expected related the circumstances at to leave the hanging scene the time:—"To tell the truth, alive; but, I determined to

A comparatively trifling incident at Barhámpúr—caused by the action of a sowar of the 11th Irregular Cavalry, who not only released some deserters from the 43rd Native Infantry, apprehended by the police, but likewise incited the men of his regiment and of the 63rd Native Infantry to mutiny—influenced the Government to retain some European Infantry at that station. This measure would, I need scarcely point out, have been wholly unnecessary had the Government taken the precaution to disarm the native regiments.

But it was at the great station of Patná, the Mahomedan capital of the country east of Banáras, that the strain was most severely felt. This city, containing 300,000 inhabitants, a large proportion of whom were Mahomedans, is

do my duty, and well knew have had a dozen balls through the effect that pluck and de- me; so I seized a pistol, clap- cision had on natives. The ped it to the man's ear, and regiment was drawn out. said, with a look there was Wounded cruelly as I was, no mistake about, "Another I had to see everything done word out of your mouth, and myself, even to the adjusting your brains shall be scattered of the ropes, and saw them on the ground." He trembled, looped to run easy. Two of and held his tongue. The the culprits were paralysed elephant came up, he was put with fear and astonishment, on his back, the rope adjusted, never dreaming that I should the elephant moved, and he dare to hang them without was left dangling. I then an order from the Govern- had the others up and off in ment. The third said he the same way. And after would not be hanged, and some time, when I dismissed called on the Prophet, and on the men of the regiment to his comrades to rescue him. their lines, and still found my This was an awful moment: head upon my shoulders, I an instant's hesitation on my really could scarcely believe part, and probably I should it."

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Mutinous
incident at
Barhámpúr.

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situated on the right bank of the river Ganges, three hundred and eighty miles north-west of Calcutta, and ten miles east of the military station of Dánápúr.

Patná owed its importance partly to its traditions; partly to the fact that it was the capital of one of the richest provinces in the country; partly likewise to its being the head-quarters of the Wáhábís—the extreme Mahomedan party in India. It was ruled by a Commissioner, corresponding directly with the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. Subordinate to it and to its Commissioner were the districts of Gayá, to the south, with a chief town of the same name, fifty miles distant; of Sháhábád, comprising the country between the Ganges, the Karamnásá, and the Són, and having as its capital Arah, about thirty-five miles to the west of Patná; of Sáran, with Chaprá, forty miles to the north, as its capital; of Champáran, with Motíhári, as its chief station; and Tírhút, between Nipál and the Ganges, represented by the civil station of Mozaffarpúr. In these stations the magistrate represented the executive power.

Garrison of
Dánápúr.

The station of Dánápúr was garrisoned by three Native Infantry Regiments, the 7th, 8th, and 40th, by one company of European and one of Native Artillery, and by Her Majesty's 10th Foot. Dánápúr was the head-quarters of a division, and its divisional commander was Major-General Lloyd, an officer who had rendered excellent service in his day, and who, but four years before, had been selected by Lord Dalhousie to suppress the Sántháj

insurrection—a task which he had accomplished with judgment and discretion. His command at Dánápúr was extensive in its range. To the north it included all the country to the foot of the Nipál hills; to the east it reached Barhámpúr; to the south Hazáribágh and Rámpúr. The troops protecting this vast extent of country were, with one exception, massed at Dánápúr. That exception was the 12th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry, commanded by a most distinguished officer, Major Holmes. This corps was stationed at Sigaolí, about a hundred miles to the north of Dánápúr.

The province of which Patná was the capital, was, I have said, one of the richest in the possession of the English. It owed its importance partly to the fact that for several years it had been the chosen ground for the development of native industry by English landholders working with English capital; partly, and to a far greater extent, to the circumstance that the native landowners were, as a rule, men of ancient lineage and of large estates.

Before the arrival of reinforcements from Persia, Ceylon, and Barmá, the European regiment at Dánápúr was the only English regiment in the long line between Calcutta and Lakhnao. Having in view the extent of country it had to guard, its proximity to the influential city of Patná, to the fact that many of the native landowners of Bihár were men commanding a large following, it still seems strange that the expedient so successfully adopted at Láhor and other places—the expedient of disarming the native troops—was not early

Peculiarities
of the Patná
division.

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resorted to here. The postponement of such a measure necessarily chained the European troops to the station of Dánápur, leaving all the other districts in the Patná division to shift for themselves.

It was from no lack of knowledge of the danger of leaving arms in the hands of the sepoys, that the Government of India hesitated to give the order to disarm them. The Commissioner of Patná, Mr. William Tayler, had been unremitting alike in impressing his courageous spirit on the disaffected, and in keeping the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal well informed of the general aspect of affairs. As this gentleman's name will figure somewhat conspicuously in the following pages, it is fit that I should introduce him here.

Mr. William
Tayler.

Mr. William Tayler was a member of the Bengal Civil Service. He was a gentleman and a scholar, possessing great natural abilities which he had lost no opportunity of cultivating, an elegant mind, and a large fund of common sense. To these should be added the greater gifts, during a crisis such as that of which I am writing, of a nerve not to be shaken, a clear view, and a power to decide rapidly and correctly in difficult circumstances. In the prime of life, courteous in manner, loyal to his Government, ready to hear the opinions of all, yet resolved to act on those which best commended themselves to his understanding, he was just the man whom a Wellesley or a Napier would have detached as his lieutenant to command a difficult position.

Early detects
the sore spot.

The mutinous spirit displayed early in the year

by the sepoys at Barhámpúr, and later by those at Bárrákpúr, had not been unnoticed by Mr. Tayler. As the pro-consul of a province which had as its capital the city of Patná, the head-quarters of the chiefs of the Wáhábís, it had devolved upon him to watch every vibration in the political system, so strangely agitated since the beginning of the year. Mr. Tayler, with a forecast surer than that of Mr. Secretary Beadon, had detected in the action of the 19th Regiment of Native Infantry and in the scarce-concealed sympathy with that action of the regiments stationed at Bárrákpúr, the germs of a very contagious political disease, and he had deemed it not at all improbable that, if not wholly eradicated by the measures of Government, the disease might gradually spread upwards. Never for a moment did he believe in the "passing and groundless panic" theory of Mr. Beadon. But not even Mr. Tayler, astute and far-seeing as he was, had imagined that the contagion would be communicated, as if by magic, to the upper provinces, passing over the intermediate divisions, to attack the body politic, suddenly, in its very heart.

When, therefore, the catastrophe of the 10th of May occurred at Mírath, it took not less by surprise the Commissioner of Patná than every other official in India. But Mr. Tayler was equal to the occasion. He summoned the European inhabitants of the place to deliberate on the means to be adopted to avert the crisis from Patná. Rejecting the timid counsel offered him shortly before by the judge, —who then, or a little later, took refuge in the

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Is supported
by the Euro-
pean commu-
nity.

The first
crisis.

Mr. Tayler
meets it.

opium godown,—to despatch the Government treasure to Dánápúr and to be prepared on the first alarm to follow it thither, Mr. Tayler briefly stated to those present his information, his apprehensions, and his hopes, and then added that if they had confidence in him, he was prepared to assume the entire responsibility, and to act as he might consider necessary. In reply the Europeans present voted by acclamation confidence in their Commissioner. Thus armed, Mr. Tayler prepared for the inevitable emergency.

On the 7th June the crisis seemed to arrive. Intimation was received that evening from Dánápúr to the effect that the native regiments were in a state of excitement, and that a rise was apprehended that very night.

Mr. Tayler determined at once to make of his own house a fortress for the whole station. He drove to the nearest residents, and sent messengers to those further off, begging them to accept his hospitality during the crisis. In less than an hour his house was crowded by men, women, and children, from all parts of Patná. The house, however, was garrisoned by the Station Guards, who were all natives. Could they be trusted? Suddenly the discovery of a letter passing between them and the sepoys at Dánápúr showed Mr. Tayler that his guards were in league with the disaffected regiments.

Fortunately, a body of Sikhs newly raised by Captain Rattray, were then within forty miles of Patná. Mr. Tayler had sent expresses a day or two before to summon these men. They arrived at

the early dawn. For the moment, then, Patná was safe. The several residents returned to their homes.

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June 7.

Major-General Lloyd.

A full report of this threatened outbreak made to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal had not the effect of inducing the Government of India to order the disarming of the men from whom the outbreak had been apprehended. Major-General Lloyd, then commanding at Dánápúr, had passed all his service in a sepoy regiment. He had witnessed the fidelity of the native soldier under trying and difficult circumstances, and, fortified by the opinion of the several commandants of regiments, he still clung to his belief in their loyalty. He shut his eyes too closely to the fact that of the three native regiments under his command two had already shown a mutinous disposition. Like so many officers, good honest men, who had spent their lives amid the sepoys, he could not bring himself absolutely to mistrust them,—to recommend their disarming, equivalent, in his opinion, to their dishonour. His confidence in his own judgment was increased by the fact that on the 7th of June—about the period when so many other regiments had risen; when he had been positively informed that his regiments would certainly rise; and when an opportunity had been offered them of seizing some £200,000 of money belonging to the Government, as they believed, but slightly guarded—those regiments had remained passive. On the 2nd of June he had reported to the Government his belief that the regiments would remain quiet, “unless some

Trusts the
sepoyas.

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The Govern-
ment trust
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eral Lloyd.

great temptation or excitement should assail them," and five days later he reiterated the same opinion.

The Government, then, had before them the report of the Commissioner of the danger incurred at Patná on the 7th of June, and the opinion of the Major-General commanding the division that the native troops would remain quiet, "unless some great temptation or excitement should assail them." Having in view the composition of the native society at Patná, the isolation of the stations dependent upon it, the vast wealth of the province, the Government must, I think, be held guilty of fatuity in trusting, at such a crisis, to the chance that no great temptation or excitement would assail the sepoys. Neither at that time nor later would there have been any difficulty in disarming the sepoys at Dánápúr. The 10th Regiment was on the spot, and detachments of European troops were constantly conveyed past the station in steamers.

Defence of the
action of the
Government.

The only defence of the inaction of the Government with which I am acquainted, relating to this particular period, the first week of June, is to the effect that Lord Canning had "not merely to consider what was locally or individually best, but what was most generally conducive to the interests of those under his charge." It has been urged that the result of disarming might have been "dangerous in the extreme to our people in other parts of the country where sepoys abounded, and not a detachment of Europeans was to be seen": that the Governor-General "was looking anxiously for the arrival of fresh reinforcements when the

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Its weakness.

game would be more in his own hands ; but in the then destitute state of the Lower Provinces, it seemed to him and to the members of his Council to be sounder policy to temporise.* But these and similar arguments will not bear examination. Nothing that might have been done in the way of disarming could have produced results so disastrous as those which actually followed the inactive policy of the Government of India, and which I am now about to record. It may likewise be added that when Lord Canning had fresh reinforcements at his disposal, he still refused, in the manner hereafter to be described, to order the disarming of the sepoys.

To return to Patná. The report brought by Captain Rattray of the reception accorded to his Sikh soldiers by the inhabitants of the city and the districts in its vicinity, was not of a nature to allay the apprehensions which his profound acquaintance with the province had excited in the mind of Mr. Tayler. Those soldiers, he was informed, had been constantly reviled on their march towards Patná, taunted with the part they were taking, accused of being renegades from their faith, and asked whether they intended to fight for the infidel or for their religion. When they entered Patná the high priest of the Sikh temple in the city refused to admit them to the sacred shrine, and wherever they were seen they met the most palpable evidences of the hatred and contempt of the population.

Excitement of
the people of
Patná.

* Sir John Kaye, vol. iii. p. 65.

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Alarm in the
districts.

Splendid con-
duct of Mr.
Tayler.

Private inquiries which Mr. Tayler instituted at this time soon brought to his mind the conviction that secret mischief was brewing. He learnt, too, that conferences of disaffected men were held at night, though in a manner so secret and so well guarded, that proof of meeting was rendered difficult, the capture of the plotters impossible.

The alarm meanwhile was increasing. The judge of Patná, the opium agent, and some others, left their houses with their families and took refuge in the opium godown. It spread likewise to the districts. Mr. Wake, the magistrate of Arah, afterwards so distinguished for his gallantry in the defence of that place, wrote to Mr. Tayler on the 11th, informing him that many of the railway employés and other Europeans had run away from his district in a panic, and had taken refuge in Dánápúr.

Under these trying circumstances Mr. Tayler acted with vigour, with judgment, and with decision. He stood out prominently amongst his compeers. He hid nothing from his superiors. The details of the crisis through which his division was passing were, therefore, well known in Calcutta. And when post after post brought to the capital accounts of the risings at Banáras, at A'zamgarh, in Central India and in the North-Western Provinces, the question rose naturally and involuntarily to the lips:—"How is it that Patná is quiescent?" Patná was quiescent simply because one man, Mr. William Tayler, the Commissioner of the Division, was a brave and deter-

mined man, ready to strike when necessary, and incapable, even under the darkest circumstances, of showing hesitation or fear.

The metal of which his character was formed was soon to be further tested. The disaffection among the Dánápúr troops, and in the districts, being daily on the increase, Mr. Tayler directed the removal of the moneys in the treasuries of Chaprá and Arah into Patná, thus bringing the coin under his own eye. He controlled with a firm hand the movements in his six districts of the officials, some of whom had actually left their stations under the conviction of an impending attack. Every day the post and messengers brought him intelligence of disaffection on the one side, of apprehension on the other; of plots to murder, of plots to burn, of plots to rise in revolt. He was informed, moreover, that Kúnwar Singh, a powerful landowner, whose estates in the vicinity of Arah were peopled by a martial tenantry devoted to their chief, was making secret preparations to seize the first opportunity to revolt.

Mr. Tayler did not, at the moment, credit the reports about Kúnwar Singh individually. He was well aware that to all the disaffected nobles and landowners of the districts only two opportunities, or one of two opportunities, would prove sufficiently tempting. These were, the mutiny of the native regiments at Dánápúr, and the rising of the population of Patná. It was clear that a successful mutiny at Dánápúr would be instantaneously followed by the rising of Patná; equally

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so that a successful rising at Patná would precipitate the mutiny of the native troops. Mr. Tayler was, however, confident that if allowed by the Government unfettered action, he could maintain order in Patná so long as the native troops at Dánápur should remain quiescent. Thus, in his view, all, for the moment, depended on the quiet attitude of the sepoys.

Fails to impress his views on Major-General Lloyd.

So many symptoms, amongst others intercepted correspondence, seeming to show that the native troops were only watching their opportunity, it appeared to Mr. Tayler imperatively necessary that they should be disarmed with as little delay as possible. He endeavoured to impress his views in this respect on Major-General Lloyd. But in this he was unsuccessful. Major-General Lloyd held to the views I have already quoted, and declared repeatedly to Mr. Tayler that he was in direct communication with Lord Canning on the subject, and that he would carry the province through the crisis without resorting to the supreme measure of disarming.

The enormous difficulties of his position.

Mr. Tayler's position was rendered a thousand times more difficult by the fact that in addition to a disaffected city under his very eyes, to disaffected districts within ranges varying from thirty to a hundred miles, to disaffected landowners controlling large portions of those districts, he had within eight miles of his own door three native regiments, pledged, as their correspondence showed, to mutiny, and only watching their opportunity. It is difficult to realise the enormous responsibility thus thrown upon the shoulders of one man. Other

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positions in India were dangerous, but this was unique in the opportunities of danger which threatened it, in the number of the lives, in the amount of treasure, in the extent of country, devolving upon one man, almost unaided, to guard. Without a single European soldier, and with only a few Sikhs, at his disposal, Mr. Tayler was responsible for the lives of some hundreds of Europeans scattered over the province, for a treasury in his own city containing more than £300,000, and in the districts of still more, for opium of the value of millions, for his own good name, for the credit and honour of his country. And now all around was surging. Any moment might bring revolt and mutiny to his door.

I have said in my description of Mr. Tayler that he possessed great natural talents which he had cultivated. In the course of his reading he had not been slow to observe that in great crises, when two armies, or two political parties, are sitting armed opposite to each other, each watching its opportunity, success almost invariably inclines to the leader who struck the first blow. The time had now arrived for him to consider whether he was not himself placed in a position in which he would be justified in dealing at the disaffected chiefs a blow which would paralyze their movements—a blow not accompanied by bloodshed, but one strictly of self-defence. The measure he contemplated may, in one sense, be termed a measure of disarming. He was not strong enough, indeed, to disarm at the moment

Resolves to
strike the first
blow.

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the inhabitants of Patná by depriving them of their weapons, but he could disarm their counsels of wisdom by apprehending and confining their trusted leaders. It was a bold and daring idea, requiring strength of nerve and resolution to carry through; but the necessities were pressing, the dangers were threatening, a general rising in Patná might be fatal. Mr. Tayler resolved to anticipate those dangers, to render impossible or fruitless that rising, by acting in the manner I have indicated.

The principal
conspirators.

Accordingly he struck. Private information had satisfied Mr. Tayler that the chiefs of the disaffected natives were the Wáhábí Múlvís. These men were the leaders of the most bigoted Mahomedan party in the world, and as such commanded implicit obedience from the mass of Patná Mahomedans, holding in their hands the strings of the contemplated movement. Prominent amongst these Múlvís were three men, Sháh Mahomed Hussén, Ahmad U'llá, and Waiz-úl-Haqq. To seize these men openly would have provoked the outbreak which Mr. Tayler was careful to avoid. But it was necessary for the public peace that they should be secured. Mr. Tayler, therefore, requested their presence, and the presence of others, to consult on the state of affairs. When the conference was over he allowed the others to depart, but detained the three men I have named, informing them that in the then existing state of affairs it was necessary that they should remain under supervision. They politely acquiesced, and were conducted to a comfortable house near the

Mr. Tayler
arrests them

Sikh encampment where suitable accommodation had been provided for them.

The act of Mr. Tayler in arresting, without warning them that he intended to arrest them—in a word by enticing them to his house—men of whose guilt he had evidence amounting, in his mind, to certainty, and who, if left at large, would have so organized the outbreak that it should coincide with the rise of the sepoys—has been compared, in principle, to “the treacherous assassination of Sir William Macnaghten by Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan.”* It is difficult to apprehend how the writer could have mistaken the striking difference between the two occurrences. Mahomed Akbar and Sir William Macnaghten were representatives of two nations, the one at war with the other: at the conference at which they met, Mahomed Akbar had guaranteed in the most solemn and sacred manner the life of his guest. Yet Mahomed Akbar shot Sir William Macnaghten dead. Mr. Tayler, on the other hand, represented the governing power of the land; the Múlvís were the avowed subjects of that power; they were not Mr. Tayler’s guests; they went to his house to hear the voice of the Government they served; and that voice ordered them to remain in honorary confinement so long as the crisis might last. They were subjected to no humiliation: to no disgrace. Simply the power of endangering the lives of others was taken away from them.

This act occurred on the 19th of June. It was Follows up
the blow.

* Sir John Kave, vol. iii. p. 24.

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cism on this
act.

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followed up by the arrest of Múlví Méhdi, the patrolling magistrate of the city, strongly suspected of connivance with the disaffected. The next day, the 20th, the rank and file having been overawed by the seizure of their chiefs, Mr. Tayler issued a proclamation calling upon all citizens to deliver up their arms, within twenty-four hours, on pain of being proceeded against; and another, forbidding all citizens, those excepted who might be specially exempted, from leaving their homes after 9 o'clock at night.

Success of his bold action.

These several measures were to a great extent successful. The disaffected were deprived of their most trusted leaders; several thousand stands of arms were peaceably delivered up; nightly meetings of the conspirators ceased. As a first practical result, the judge, Mr. Farquharson, the opium agent, Mr. Garrett, and others, left their refuge at the opium godown, and returned to their houses. The second was the sudden diminution of the symptoms of disaffection throughout the districts under Mr. Tayler's orders.

Fresh discoveries of treason.

But the crisis was not over. Three days later a corporal of the native police, Wáris Ali by name, was arrested at his own station, in Tirhút, under most suspicious circumstances. Upon his person was found a bundle of letters implicating in the rebellious movement one Ali Karím, an influential Mahomedan gentleman, residing nine miles from Patná.

The chief criminal escapes—how?

Mr. Tayler at once despatched the magistrate of Patná, Mr. Lowis, to arrest this gentleman,

... a month of September.

But Mr. Lewis, listening to the voice of the native official who was to accompany him, resolved to act without the cavalry. The same friendly voice which had proffered this advice, warned Ali Karím of the magistrate's approach. When Mr. Lewis came in sight of his intended victim, the latter was mounted on an elephant. Mr. Lewis had at his disposal a small pony gig—and his legs. As Ali Karím turned at once into the fields, he was enabled easily to baffle his pursuer, and to escape.

The order which Mr. Tayler's bold measures had thus restored was maintained without interruption till the 3rd of July. The disaffected had been thoroughly cowed. In the interval, however, reports of the massacre at Sháhjahánpur, of the fall of Kánpúr, of Fathpúr, and of Farrakhábád, came to reanimate their hopes. The attitude of the sepoy regiments continued doubtful.

But on the evening of the 3rd of July the long threatened Patná rising occurred. Thanks, however, to the energetic measures already taken by Mr. Tayler, it occurred in a form so diluted that a continuation of the same daring and resolute policy sufficed to repress it. It happened in this wise. At the period on the 3rd already indicated, some two hundred Mahomedan fanatics, led by one Pír Ali, a bookseller, noted for his enthusiasm for his religion and his hatred of the English, unfurled the green flag, and summoning by beat of drum others to join them rushed, calling upon Allah, towards the Roman Catholic Church, situate in the very heart of the city. On the news of this movement reaching

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rising.

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Murder of
Dr. Lyall.

Mr. Tayler, that gentleman directed Captain Rattray, attended by the magistrate, to march down with 150 Sikhs, whilst for the protection of the residents he put into operation the same precautions which had been adopted on the 7th of June, he himself going in person to the houses nearest to his own.

Meanwhile, and before the Sikhs had reached the spot, Dr. Lyall, the assistant to the opium agent, hearing the uproar, and thinking that his presence might overawe the rioters, had galloped to the scene of action. As he approached the crowd several shots were fired at him. By one of these he was killed.*

The sight of a fallen European stimulated the fanaticism of the crowd, and produced on them the effect which the taste of blood arouses in a hungry tiger. They pushed onwards with renewed enthusiasm, their numbers being augmented at every step. In a very few minutes, however, they found themselves face to face with Rattray's 150 Sikhs. Between the opposing parties, far from sympathy, there was the hatred of race, the hatred of religion; on the one side the newly aroused fanaticism, on the other the longed for opportunity to repay many a covert insult. It can well be imagined what followed. There was not a moment of parley. The rival parties instantaneously clashed, and, in a few seconds, the discipline and bayonets of the Sikhs suppressed the long threatened Patná rising.

The rising
suppressed.

* His face was at once so mutilated that it could not afterwards be recognised.

The next day, and the day following, the city was searched for the ringleaders of the outbreak. Thirty-one were apprehended. Amongst these were Pír Ali, the actual leader, and Shekh Ghasítá, the confidential servant of Lútf Ali Khán, the richest banker in the city.

Of the thirty-one men who were apprehended, fourteen were tried and executed without delay. With them likewise was hanged the Wáris Ali referred to in a previous page.* Two—the two above-named—were remanded for further examination.

Facts seemed to speak strongly against them. It was clearly proved that Pír Ali was a main agent for promoting a crusade against the English; that for months he and the Shekh Ghasítá above-mentioned had engaged and kept in pay numerous men who should be ready, when called upon, to fight for their religion and the Emperor of Dehlí. But these operations had required a large outlay. Pír Ali was poor. His associate, Ghasítá, was the hand of the great banker. But though it might have been fairly presumed that the great banker was implicated, no proceedings were, for the moment, taken against him.

The two men, Pír Ali and Ghasítá, were tried Lútf Ali. and hanged. Lútf Ali, arraigned subsequently on the charge of harbouring a mutinous sepoy, and acquitted by the judge on the ground of insufficient evidence, was promptly released, and

* When taken to the gallows, this man called out in a loud voice, "If there is any one here who professes to be a friend of the King of Dehlí, let him come and help me."

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Capture and
trial of the
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shortly afterwards was welcomed and honoured as a martyr by the successor of Mr. Tayler!

But the outbreak was suppressed. It had been premature. As Pír Ali admitted, Mr. Tayler's strong measures had forced his hand and compelled him to strike before he was ready. But for those strong measures the conspiracy would have been silently hatched until the outbreak at Dánápur should have given it the signal for explosion.

Major Holmes.

Whilst Mr. Tayler, thus, in spite of the all but superhuman difficulties in his path, maintained order in the most disaffected city still under British rule in India, and in the districts immediately contiguous, Major Holmes, commanding the 12th Irregular Cavalry, acting in concert with him and pursuing the same system, prevented an outbreak in the frontier district of Sigaolí. It is true, indeed, that Major Holmes still believed in his native soldiers, and equally true that up to the moment of their actual outbreak—almost simultaneous with that at Dánápur—they had shown no symptom of disaffection. But this belief on the part of Major Holmes was so generally shared by the officers of the Bengal army, that it should attract no surprise. It was natural that the officers should believe in men with whom they had been associated twenty, thirty, and forty years; who had followed them unhesitatingly through the snows of Kábal; whose forefathers had served with goodwill in the expeditions against Egypt, and the isles of France and Bourbon; and who had protested against the indignity of being suspected. That was natural enough. But it

was not natural that the Government, raised above the passions and prejudices of regimental officers, should more than share their sympathies. With the far wider scope open to their view the Government possessed means, not available to the officers, of testing the truth of the lip-service so freely proffered by the men. It is impossible to say how much loss of life, how much misery, how much evil would have been avoided had the Government of India not refused to take from the native troops of the Dánápúr division the arms, which their own sepoy-trained Major-General had assured them, would be loyally used only if no great temptation or excitement should assail them !

Still, order was maintained. The means employed to assure that order, whilst they gained for Mr. Tayler the confidence of the English planters and traders throughout the province, were not at all to the taste of the Government of Bengal. Of that province, Mr. Halliday, of the Bengal Civil Service, was Lieutenant-Governor. It is scarcely to be doubted that if Mr. Tayler and Mr. Halliday could have changed places ; if the former had been Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and the latter Commissioner of the Patná division, whilst the affairs of Bengal would not certainly have suffered, the nature of the rule at Patná would have been widely different. I am unwilling to re-open wounds which have partly closed, but no sane man who was in Bihár at the time doubts that whilst the policy of Mr. Tayler, condemned by Mr. Halliday, saved Patná ; the policy of

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Contrast be-
tween Mr.
Tayler and
Mr. Halliday.

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concealing from the public view facts which it was of vital importance that the public should know,—of coquetting, so to speak, with armed rebels,—advocated by that gentleman, and employed so uselessly elsewhere, would, if followed, have played the game of the disaffected. The Patná rising, so easily suppressed by Mr. Tayler, would have been indeed a red day in the calendar of Mr. Halliday.

I repeat, under Mr. Tayler, order was maintained, under most difficult circumstances, in Patná. About Patná, then, so long as he should remain there, no apprehension was felt. But the case was not so with respect to Dánápúr. There, the sepoys remained armed and trusted. In spite of intercepted letters, of men occasionally caught in mutinous acts, the Government continued to trust to the chance that “no great temptation or excitement” would induce them to rise.

Far different was the feeling of the European community of Calcutta. These had important interests in Bihár, large districts of which were watered and fertilised by their capital. These interests seemed to depend entirely on the good behaviour of the sepoys. To many of them it was a question of wealth or poverty, to those on the spot of death or of existence. In Mr. Tayler they had absolute confidence. His measures had warded off one danger. But the other still remained, clear, vivid, threatening; ready to burst forth at any moment; safe to encounter no opposition capable of restraining it for an hour.

That the possibility of such an outbreak had

European
interests in
Bihár.

escaped the attention of the Government of India there is evidence to disprove. It may have been, as his latest apologist has asserted, that Lord Canning refrained at an earlier date from issuing a disarming order because he was waiting for “fresh reinforcements, when the game would be more in his own hands.” But in the early part of July those fresh reinforcements arrived. Not only so, but those very reinforcements, consisting of a wing of the 37th Foot and of the 5th Fusiliers, had received orders to proceed towards the north-west in steamers, touching at Dánápúr on the way.

Here then was the opportunity—the opportunity which would take from the Government the last excuse not to disarm the native regiments, unless they were prepared to avow that they would trust rather to the chance of the sepoys remaining quiescent.

The Government considered the question carefully and with attention. They arrived at a decision fatal alike to their prescience as statesmen, and to the true conception of the responsibilities of a great Government. They cast from their shoulders the entire responsibility. They would not order that the regiments should retain their arms; neither would they direct that they should be disarmed. They left the decision to Major-General Lloyd, commanding the Dánápúr division—the officer who had already reported his belief that the sepoys “would remain quiet, unless some great temptation or excitement should assail them, in which case, I fear, they could not be

Favourable
opportunity
for disarming
the Dánápúr
sepoys.

The Govern-
ment trans-
fer
their respon-
sibility to Ma-
jor-General
Lloyd.

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relied upon." The Government thus constituted Major-General Lloyd the sole judge as to whether such temptation or such excitement was likely to arise.*

This decision of the Government was not published, but was privately conveyed to the mercantile community of Calcutta. It failed to satisfy them. They saw that the responsibility had been only moved. It had been shifted from the shoulders of the Government to the shoulders of Major-General Lloyd. That officer was known to be opposed to disarming; to entertain a belief that he could carry those under his command through the crisis without having resort to any such means. In the opinion of the mercantile community, then, the decision arrived at by the

* The order of the acting should be limited to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Patrick Grant, speaking the voice of the Government, runs thus: "The first detachment of H.M.'s 5th Fusiliers left Chinsurah this morning, on flats towed by steamers, in progress towards Benares, and the remaining portion of the regiment will follow by the same means of transit to-morrow and Friday. If, when the regiment reaches Dinapore, you see reason to distrust the native troops, and you entertain an opinion that it is desirable to disarm them, you are at liberty to disembark the 5th Fusiliers to assist you in this object; but, it is imperatively necessary that the detention of the regiment

shortest possible period. If you decide on disarming, it should extend to all three regiments, and it should be carefully explained that it is merely a measure of precaution to save the well-disposed to be led to commit themselves by the machinations of designing scoundrels, some few of whom are always to be found, even in the best regiments. If resistance to authority is exhibited, the most prompt and decided measures for its instant repression should be adopted." The reader will observe that this letter contains no order, but simply throws the responsibility of ordering disarming on the Major-General.

Government seemed equivalent to a refusal to order disarming.

Impressed with the conviction of the certain evil which must follow a conclusion so adverse to their interests, to the interests of the province, and to public order, the merchants of Calcutta determined, as a last resource, to make, in the most temperate language, a personal appeal to Lord Canning. On the 17th of July, then, two days after they had been informed of the resolution at which the Government had arrived, the merchants solicited the Governor-General to receive from their body a deputation, charged with their ideas on the state of affairs in Tírhút and Bihár.

Lord Canning agreed to receive, and did on the 20th receive, the deputation. Its spokesman, a gentleman who carried with him the confidence of all Calcutta, began by pointing out how the mercantile interests were involved in the maintenance of peace and order; how both were threatened by the attitude of the native regiments at Dánápúr; how the disarming of those regiments would quiet the public mind and restore confidence; how that a most favourable opportunity for carrying out that measure then presented itself, inasmuch as the 5th Fusiliers, who had left Calcutta by steamer on the 12th, would reach Dánápúr on or about the 22nd; that they, disembarking, could very easily, in conjunction with the 10th Regiment on the spot, disarm the native regiments, and then, reembarking, proceed on their upward journey. Such were the points submitted in respectful

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The mer-
chants of Cal-
cutta remon-
strate with
Lord Canning.

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who is ob-
stinate.

Summary of
the action of
the Govern-
ment.

language by the spokesman of the deputation. Lord Canning, in a curt and ceremonious speech, refused to accede to its prayer.

The events that followed can only be regarded as the consequence of the decisions of the Government of India. These decisions may be thus briefly stated:—1st, a refusal to order the disarming of the Dánápúr brigade at the period when the troops south of Dánápúr were being disarmed, when those north of it were mutinying, and when the greatest disaffection in the city and in the districts close to Dánápúr were daily being brought to light; 2ndly, the rejection of the request of the merchants of Calcutta to order the disarming when the strength in Europeans had been greatly increased; 3rdly, the transfer of responsibility to an officer who was known to be opposed to the disarming of the native troops under his command.

I now proceed to relate the consequences of these decisions.

Major-Gen-
eral Lloyd
decides not to
disarm the
sepoy;

Major-General Lloyd was armed, we have seen, with the power, should he think fit, to detain the 5th Fusiliers at Dánápúr, and, acting with them and the 10th Regiment, to disarm the three native regiments of his command. Major-General Lloyd winced under this responsibility. He did not like it at all. He could not resolve to make use of the powers with which he was entrusted. When, therefore, on the 22nd of July, the main body of the 5th Fusiliers arrived off Dánápúr, he did not order them to disembark, he did not even detain them. They proceeded without delay on their way.

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But no sooner had they left than Major-General Lloyd began to doubt whether he had acted rightly. He could not call them back. But it happened two days later, whilst the Major-General was half regretting, half doubting, that two companies of the 37th Regiment arrived off the station. Major-General Lloyd at once directed the disembarkation of these men.

But he had not even then brought himself to the point of ordering disarming. Nor could he, even with these new troops at his disposal, persuade himself to direct the necessary measure. The responsibility thrust upon him by the Government pressed him down. Like all weak men, weighted with a burden to which their intellect and their nerve are alike unequal, Major-General Lloyd hesitated. In the midst of his hesitation he bethought him of a half-measure—a measure which, he believed, would render the sepoys powerless and yet save their honour. He decided to leave them their percussion-muskets, but to deprive them of their percussion-caps!

but to deprive
them of their
percussion
caps.

That the reader may clearly understand the danger with which such a measure was fraught, it is necessary that I should give a short description of the station of Dánápur, and of its military plan.

Dánápur lies ten miles from the city of Patná, eight from the civil station in which reside the European officials. The native town occupies the easternmost point of the station, that nearest to Patná. Close to the town is a large square, tenanted mainly by European troops. Adjoining

The station of
Dánápur.

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this on its western side is a smaller square in which are the better quarters of the European officers. Beyond this a few detached houses, and beyond these again, the lines or huts occupied by the sepoys. Further on still, at the westernmost point of the station, was the magazine, in which were stored, amongst other items, the percussion caps for the use of the regiments. To remove these caps from this magazine into the square occupied by the Europeans, the whole length of the native lines would thus have to be traversed. It would not be possible to conceal from the sepoys the nature of the measure which should thus be carried out. They would most certainly divine its reason. Surely, then, in deciding to deprive the sepoys of their percussion caps, Major-General Lloyd was placing in their way that very temptation, and arousing in their minds that very excitement, which, he had reported to Government, would almost certainly incite them to mutiny !

Having received only the permission, not the order, to disarm, and not being able to nerve himself to a measure of a character so pointed, Major-General Lloyd directed the carrying out of a scheme far less decisive and infinitely more dangerous. A parade of the European troops was ordered for the morning of the 25th; and it was directed that whilst the troops should remain in the great square, already referred to, two carts should be sent to bring into that square the percussion cap cases from the magazine.

The order was obeyed. The 10th Foot, two

companies of the 37th Regiment, and the company of European Artillery were drawn up on the morning of the 25th in the great square, and the two carts were despatched to the magazine under the charge of an officer and a small guard. The carts reached the magazine, were loaded with the cap-cases, and set out on their return. As they passed the lines of the 7th Native Infantry, the sepoys showed the greatest excitement. Those who were being paraded for guard summoned their comrades to join them in preventing the carrying off of the caps. Their officers, however, succeeded in pacifying them. The men of the 8th Native Infantry were less demonstrative. Those of the 40th even showed a disposition to oppose the angry demonstrations of the men of the 7th. For the moment the difficulty was tided over; the cap-cases were brought safely into the square, and the parade was dismissed. The General, perfectly satisfied with the manner in which he had solved the difficult question, betook himself on board a steamer, which had that morning arrived, to take luncheon.*

Possibly the success which had attended this delicate operation, whilst the European troops were standing in their ranks ready for action, induced the belief in the mind of Major-General Lloyd that it would be equally easy, or I must suppose still easier, to carry out another measure,

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Major-General Lloyd's
half-meas-
sures.

Their appa-
rent success.

* It does not seem quite no horse at hand, and was certain whether Major-General Lloyd went on board the steamer for the purpose of unching, or because he had unable, from gouty feet, to walk. But the point is immaterial. He was on board the steamer at luncheon time.

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still more delicate, still more likely to cause opposition, whilst the European troops should be in the barracks eating their dinners, and he on board the steamer partaking of his luncheon. Not satisfied with a great victory he wished to turn it into a decisive triumph. Before, then, going on board the steamer, he issued orders to the commandants to parade their regiments without arms, and to take from the men the caps in the regimental magazines and those in their actual possession.

A more difficult operation than that entrusted to the regimental officers of the native regiments can scarcely be conceived. Nor, in the presence of the manifestation of the 7th Native Infantry in the morning, is it possible to imagine how the Major-General could have believed that the sepoy would calmly surrender the one thing still in their own hands which made their muskets valuable. However, the order of the Major-General had to be carried out, and the regiments were paraded at 1 o'clock.

Consequences
of his resolve.

On the men falling in without arms the several commanding officers directed the native officers to collect the caps in pouch from each sepoy, explaining to them as they did so that the measure was one of precaution designed to save the well-disposed from being led away by the machinations of those bent on mischief. The native officers, who probably sympathised in a great measure with their men, might as well have spoken to the winds. The demand for the caps, was, in the 7th and 8th Regiments, the signal for mutiny. The

men rushed tumultuously to the bells of arms, seized their muskets, and began to fire on their officers. The 40th showed some hesitation, but, after a short period of doubt, they too were carried away by the example of their comrades.

Whilst this was happening, Major-General Lloyd was at his luncheon, and the European soldiers were at their dinners. The Major-General had previously arranged, however, that in the event of any disturbance two musket-shots should be fired in quick succession by the European guard at the hospital—a large building between the smaller square and the native lines, and commanding a good view of the latter. At half-past 1 o'clock the report of those shots informed Major-General Lloyd and the Europeans that the native regiments had mutinied.

No sooner was the signal given than the “assembly” sounded in the large square. The 10th Regiment turned out under Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick, two companies of the 37th under the senior captain present; the artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Huyshe. But there was no one to take the command. Major-General Lloyd states that he had previously given instructions how to act on an emergency to Colonel Huyshe, and that he considered that these orders would ensure the attack and pursuit of the mutineers by the European infantry and artillery. Uneasy at the quiescent attitude of the troops, he, at a later period of the afternoon, despatched one staff officer to order the guns to advance, and another

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to direct the officer commanding the detachment of the 37th Foot to place himself under the orders of Colonel Fenwick.

Whether the orders of the Major-General, given, it must be remembered, before the event, were sufficiently clear and precise, may be doubted. This at least is certain, that his absence from the parade-ground caused considerable delay in the advance of the troops. When at last they did move from their ground it was too late. No one knew where the Major-General was; neither the Commander of the 10th Regiment, nor the Commander of the battery of artillery, considered himself invested with power to act in the absence of the Major-General. And it was only when, after a prolonged delay, the two staff officers referred to hurried up from the steamer that the order to advance was issued.

Meanwhile, the mutineers, astonished at their easy triumph, and seeing that they were being disturbed only by some shots fired by the guard at the hospital, hastened to divest themselves of their red coats, to pouch all the caps in the regimental store, and to start off as fast as they could towards the river Sôn, in the direction of Arah. A few of them attempted to cross the Ganges; but the steamer, on board of which was the Major-General, effectually prevented this movement.

When, then, the European troops reached the native lines, they found that the sepoy's had already disappeared. They set fire to their huts, and then halted for orders. No orders came.

Are not
pursued.

The muti-
neers start
for Arah.

The Major-General was still on board the steamer, and no one cared to usurp his powers.

Such was the rising of Dánápur,—a rising long foreseen, and yet managed as though it had been regarded as impossible. Who was to blame? First and principally, certainly, the Government of India, which, though warned in a manner compared to which the hand-writing on the wall at Belshazzar's feast after it had been interpreted was a mystery, not only persistently declined to take upon itself the responsibility of ordering the disarming of the sepoys, but thrust that responsibility upon an officer unfit, mentally and physically, to bear it. Secondly, and only to a less degree than the Government, Major-General Lloyd himself, who, under the weight of the responsibility thrust upon him, preferred to a decided, though simple and easy plan, a scheme elaborate and delicate, certain to wound whilst likely to fail; and who, further, deprived that scheme of all possibility of success by absenting himself from the parade-ground at the critical moment, and by leaving the European troops without orders. Had Major-General Lloyd mounted his horse and led on the European troops when the signal of mutiny reached him, the mutiny would have been crushed in the bud, and the terrible consequences which followed would have been averted.*

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Reflections on
the event.

* General Lloyd states in a letter to Sir John Kaye, that or much, I thought I should be most useful on board the steamer with guns and riflemen. My stable was two miles distant, and being un-men, &c." But surely, at such

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Mutiny at
Sigaoli.

Precisely on the day on which these events were taking place at Dánápur, a bloodier tragedy was enacted at Sigaolí, the frontier station of the division. Here was quartered the 12th Irregular Cavalry, commanded by Major Holmes. I have said that Major Holmes trusted his men, and he showed the absolute trust that he felt in them. In dealing with a great crisis he went all the lengths of the great Lord Strafford. He was urgent for a "thorough" policy, for a prompt and sharp punishment for overt acts of treason and disaffection. Impressed with these views, he took the law into his own hands. He proclaimed, on his own authority, martial law in the five civil districts contiguous to his own station. Trusting absolutely, as I have said, his men, he sent them out in detached parties of from twenty to fifty all over these districts to overawe the disaffected and to maintain order. Every sepoy or mutineer caught in the act of rebellion he caused to be seized, tried by a court-martial, and, if found guilty, hanged. In all this he acted with the cordial approval of the Commissioner of Patná, for whom he had the highest admiration. It is probable that if the strain on his men had been eased a little earlier Major Holmes would have carried his district through the crisis. But the inaction of the Government with respect to the Dánápur regiments, and probably the knowledge that a concerted movement between them and the native a crisis, whilst a very delicate measure ordered by him was taken care not only to have his horse in cantonments, but in operation, Major-General Lloyd ought at least to have that it should remain saddled and accoutred at his very door.

landowners would soon come to maturity, were too much for his men. They determined to cast off the mask. On the evening of the 25th of July, then, four troopers suddenly attacked Major Holmes and his wife, a daughter of the heroic Sale, and killed them. The other Europeans in the station shared the same fate. The mutinous soldiers then plundered the treasury, and let themselves loose on the country, now at their mercy.

The fears of the mercantile community, expressed on the 20th of July to Lord Canning, were thus promptly realised. Lord Canning had on that date refused to order disarming. The troops, not disarmed, had mutinied, and on the 25th the richest province in India was at their mercy.

I now return to Patná. The event so long dreaded, so long foreseen, to guard against the effects of which so many precautions had been taken by the Commissioner, had now occurred. The native troops had revolted; Bihár was without force to resist them. Early in the day of the 25th, Mr. Tayler had received from Dánápúr intelligence which left on his mind no doubt that the crisis there was imminent. He at once summoned the residents to the protection afforded by his house. The residents had scarcely arrived when the sound of the firing of the two guns announced that the outbreak had occurred. Later in this day of suspense intelligence arrived that the mutineers had left the station, and that the European troops had not followed them. The direction

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Murder of
Major and
Mrs. Holmes.

How Mr. Tay-
ler met the
danger.

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taken by the native troops was unknown, but Mr. Tayler, guided by a true military instinct, determined at once to do all in his power to intercept them. He organized, therefore, a party of volunteers, and combining with them fifty Sikhs, fifty native police, and a small levy of horse, detached the party that night to Phúlwári, about eight miles from Patná, there to bivouac for the night. He sent intimation of this movement to Major-General Lloyd, with a request that he would detach a small body of the 10th Foot to co-operate with this party, should he have reason to believe that the sepoys had taken that route.

The dawn of the following day, however, disclosed to Mr. Tayler the evil which, at the moment, appeared the more formidable of the two—the mutiny of the 12th Irregulars, and the murder of their commandant and others. This event gave to affairs a most serious aspect. A whole regiment of cavalry was thus let loose on the country, and it was difficult to say in what quarter they would strike their blow. An absolute necessity was thus created that all the available means of defence should be concentrated. The detachment, then, was at once withdrawn from Phúlwári. The fate of Patná and of Bihár seemed now to depend upon the conduct of Major-General Lloyd. Should he have directed a rapid pursuit in force of the mutineers all might yet be well.

But at Dánápúr affairs had taken a very different turn. The native troops had, we have already seen, been allowed time to march clean away with their muskets and their ammunition.

Uncertainty
at Dánápúr.

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The European troops, after burning the native huts, had, in consequence of the absence of the Major-General, returned to their barracks. No one knew certainly the ultimate direction which the sepoy's would take. It was believed, however, that their passage across the Ganges having been prevented, they would march on Arah.

Here was an opportunity such as a real soldier would have clutched at—an opportunity of repairing every mistake, of atoning for all shortcomings. Dividing the district of Sháhábád, of which Arah was the capital, from that of Patná, and some ten miles south-west of Dánápúr, is the river Sôn, swollen at that season by continuous rain, and traversable only by boats, not then collected. Had Major-General Lloyd, on landing from the steamer that evening, at once detached a strong force of infantry and artillery in pursuit of the mutineers, he must have caught them *in flagrante delictu*, with an unfordable river in their rear.

But such action was far above the calibre of the mind of Major-General Lloyd. He has placed on record that probably a direct pursuit would not have been of much avail.* A dim idea of the use

Major-Ge-
neral Lloyd's
opportunity.

* His words are: "It is effectively followed by a small party of Europeans, they probably would not have been sent that night or next morning, but only a small party, in comparison to the strength of the mutineers, could have been detached; no guns could have gone, and as the mutineers avoided the road and kept to the fields, where they could scarcely have been

No will not
take it.

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which might be made of the Sôn river to stop the enemy prompted him, however, the following morning, to send some riflemen in a steamer up that river, but there was not sufficient draught of water, and the steamer and riflemen returned, having accomplished nothing. But before they arrived the Major-General had received information which diverted his thoughts entirely, for the moment, from an offensive movement, and directed them to the securing of the safety of his garrison by intrenching Dánápúr.*

The information referred to was to the effect that Kúnwar Singh, the great landowner mentioned in a previous page, whose estates lay in the vicinity of Arah, and along the banks of the Sôn, had raised his tenantry and was about to join the mutinous sepoys.

Kúnwar Singh, a Rájpút chieftain of ancient lineage, had been made an enemy of the English rule by the action of our revenue system. The action of this system, which he imperfectly understood, had reduced his means so considerably that some short time before the outbreak of the mutiny his estates had been placed in liquidation. Still, there was one case pending which, if decided in his favour, would go a great way towards recouping his losses. After the mutiny had broken out, and when Kúnwar Singh was eagerly watching the turn of events, doubtful as to the course which

* "That afternoon the General wrote to tell me he proposed entrenching Dinapore, it was joined by Koor Singh, and ascertained that the mutineers had gone off in a body towards Arrah, and it was apprehended by him that they might be return to attack Dinapore."—W. Tayler's "Patna Crisis."

Kúnwar
Singh.

he should pursue, the law courts decided this case against him. About the same time the supporting hand of Government was withdrawn from the management of his case.* Thenceforward his mind was made up. Old as he was, and he had seen eighty summers, he resolved to seize the first opportunity of striking a blow for his freedom. When he learned, therefore, that the sepoys at Dánápúr had successfully risen and were marching towards Arah, he resolved to co-operate with them with all his power.

This was the information which influenced Major-General Lloyd to stop, for the moment, any further movement, and to intrench himself at Dánápúr. But the Commissioner of Patná, to whom he had imparted his resolve, deprecated it with all the fervour of his daring and energetic nature. He implored the General to pursue the rebels immediately. He pointed out that there might be yet time to catch them before they could cross the Sôn ; that vigour and energy would yet retrieve the disaster.

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Mr. Tayler
throws him-
self into the
breach.

* It would appear that Kúnwar Singh had engaged, when withdraw all interference with his estates were placed in li- his affairs, and to abandon quidation, to raise a sum of the management of his es- £200,000 for the payment of tates." This decision of the his debts. Naturally some Board of Revenue was re- delay occurred in raising so garded by Kúnwar Singh, and large a sum ; the money, how- very naturally, as tantamount ever, was gradually coming to the sequestration of his in when the Board of Re- property. The course of the venue informed him, through Board of Revenue was strongly the Commissioner of Patná, objected to by Mr. Tayler,— that unless he should raise who even went so far as to pro- the whole sum within one test against it in a private letter month, they would recom- to Mr. Halliday—but in vain.

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Had Mr. Tayler been Major-General Commanding the Dánápur division, the disaster would have been retrieved promptly and effectually. But, in that case, there would have been no disaster to retrieve. As it was he could only advise.

Further information, to which I am about to refer, added force to Mr. Tayler's recommendations, and at last determined the Major-General to detach a force in pursuit of the sepoyos.

Troops are
sent to relieve
Arah.

July 27.

Intelligence that the sepoyos had crossed the Sôn and were besieging Arah caused the Major-General to detach, on the evening of the 27th, a body of 193 men belonging to the 37th Regiment, in a steamer. The commander of this steamer was directed to steam up the Sôn, and to land the troops at the point where the road to Arah joins the river. The instructions given to the troops were that they should, on being landed, proceed to Arah, and bring away the civilians there besieged. It happened, however, that the steamer, running on after the moon had gone down, stuck fast on a sand-bank. Major-General Lloyd then resolved to recall his troops and attempt nothing more. But Mr. Tayler succeeded in inducing him to change his mind. The Major-General, then, in consultation with the captain of a river-steamer but just arrived, directed that a party of 250 men from the 10th Foot, with 70 Sikhs and some volunteers, should leave Dánápur in the morning of the 29th, and, picking up on its way the flat attached to the steamer which had stranded, should convey the troops, the whole commanded

The Major-
General re-
solves to re-
call them.

Mr. Tayler
encourages
him to perse-
vere.

by Colonel Fenwick of the 10th Foot, up the Sôñ, to the point previously indicated.

Some difficulties raised by the commander of the steamer caused the reduction of the European force by 100 men. The remainder constituting too small a command for an officer of high rank, Colonel Fenwick remained behind, and Captain Dunbar of the same regiment took the whole body under his orders. The steamer, with her 150 Europeans and 70 Sikhs, taking also a few gentlemen volunteers, left Dánápûr amid the enthusiasm of the European population, picked up the detachment of the 37th Regiment, reached the appointed spot in safety, and began to disembark the troops at 2 P.M. Before recounting their further movements I must return to the revolted sepoys.

Those sepoys, leaving Dánápûr with their arms and accoutrements, had reached the banks of the Sôñ on the morning of the 26th. For want of means to cross the river they did not reach the opposite bank till the evening. In the interval the servants of Kúnwar Singh had been busy in collecting boats for the mass, whilst as many as could be conveyed crossed by the ferry. Before night had set in every man was on the opposite bank. Short was the consultation that followed. Kúnwar Singh himself was on the spot, and, under the influence of the advice of this honoured Rájpút landowner, it was decided to march on Arah, massacre the residents, and plunder the treasury. The subsequent movements of the little army would necessarily depend on circumstances, but it was an

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The expedi-
tion sets out.

The muti-
neers cross
the Sôñ.

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object with Kúnwar Singh to keep the sepoys, if possible, within the limits of Bihár.

A great portion of the expectations of the sepoys were realised almost at once. Having reached Arah, they released the prisoners from the jail (27th of July), plundered the treasury, and then set forth to slaughter the European residents. But in the attempt to prosecute this part of their scheme they met with an opposition on which they had not counted.

Arah.

Mr. Vicars
Boyle.

The residents of Arah, in fact, had not awaited in idleness the visit which they had deemed always possible, and which, since the 25th, had been certain. One of their number, Mr. Vicars Boyle, a civil engineer connected with the railway, had, from a very early period, regarded it as quite a possible contingency that the station might be attacked by the mutineers. He, therefore, despite the jeers of some, and the covert ridicule of others, had fortified the smaller of the two houses in his compound in a manner which would enable it, if defended, to resist any sudden assault. This house was a small detached building, about fifty feet square, having one storey above the basement, and surmounted by a flat roof. As soon as a message from Dánápur brought the information of the successful rise and departure of the sepoys, the residents resolved to take advantage of Mr. Boyle's prescience, and to defend themselves in his house against the enemy. Supplies of all kinds,—meal, wine, beer, water, biscuit, and sheep—had been gradually stored up by Mr. Boyle during the month.

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Additional means of defence were now provided. Ammunition was collected ; loopholes were drilled in the walls, and sand-bags were placed on the roof. At the same time, the front portion of the other and larger house in the same compound, about fifty yards distant from the improvised fortress, was entirely demolished, so as to prevent it from affording shelter to any possible assailants.

The European and Eurasian residents in Arah amounted in number to fifteen ; but there was besides a Mahomedan gentlemen, whose fate was joined to theirs.* With so small a garrison, a successful defence of Mr. Boyle's house would have been impossible. But with the prescience which, in those trying days, marked every act of the career of the Commissioner of Patná, Mr. Tayler had, in anticipation of the crisis, despatched to Arah fifty of Rattray's Sikhs. These men were on the spot, and they too cast in their lot with the English. The united garrison thus numbered nearly seventy souls, and these, when information reached them of the crossing of the Sôn by the sepoys, threw themselves, armed with their muskets, their guns, and their rifles,

Prescience of
Mr. Tayler.

* The garrison consisted of Mr. Delpeison ; Mr. Hoyle ; Mr. Littledale, the judge ; Mr. and Mr. de Souza. The Sikh Combe, the collector ; Mr. Herwald Wake, magistrate ; Mr. Colvin, assistant ; Dr. Halls, surgeon ; Mr. Field and Mr. Anderson of the opium department ; Mr. Vicars Boyle ; Syad Azimúdín Khan, deputy collector ; Mr. Dacosta ; Mr. Godfrey ; Mr. Cork ; Mr. Tait ; force consisted of a native lieutenant and two native serjeants, two corporals, forty-five privates, a water-carrier, and a cook. The charge of the defences was entrusted to Mr. Vicars Boyle, whilst Mr. Herwald Wake took the command in chief of the garrison.

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The mutineers
reach Arah.

The defence.

into the house of refuge, resolved to defend it to the very last.

Great, then, was the surprise of the sepoy when, having released the prisoners and plundered the treasury, they set forth to slaughter the Europeans, they found that their progress was stayed by the occupants of one small house. Still confident in their numbers, and elated by the success which had attended all their movements, they advanced unhesitatingly, and in unbroken order, towards the last refuge of their enemy. The garrison reserved their fire till the sepoy came within range, but they then let fly with so sure an aim that the rebels fell back surprised and disconcerted. These, changing their tactics, then dispersed into groups, and taking possession of the larger house commenced from it and from behind the trees near it, a continuous fire on the garrison. The commanding position and the artificial defences of the smaller house enabled the latter to return the fire with terrible effect. Not a sepoy dare expose his person. If he chanced to do so, a bullet from a musket behind the sand-bags on the roof was certain to find out his weak point.

Meanwhile, the sepoy had discovered that a portion of the garrison were Sikhs. They had some men of that nation in their own ranks. These were commissioned to use every possible argument to win over their countrymen. When the offer to share with them the plunder of the treasuries, of those sacked and of those still to be sacked, proved unavailing, threats of the door

which hung over them were freely used. The most earnest appeals to their nationality and their religion were alike rejected. Rattray's Sikhs remained loyal to the Government which gave them their salt.

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During the next day the rebels brought two guns to bear on the besieged edifice. From these they fired every possible kind of projectile on which they could lay hands. They riddled the walls of the house, but they did not lessen the courage of the garrison. A musketry fire, carefully husbanded, yet used unsparingly whenever a chance presented itself, told them, in unmistakeable language, that they were still defied. This did not, however, prevent the rebels from offering terms. Possibly the sepoys were acquainted with the story of Kánpúr. But this is certain that every evening a sepoy standing behind the pillar of the larger house, summoned the garrison, in the name of their general, a súbadár of the 8th Regiment Native Infantry, to surrender on conditions.

The following day, the 29th, the same tactics were continued, the enemy's guns being shifted from point to point so as to bear on the weakest point of the besieged house, but with the effect only of increasing the damage effected in the outer wall.

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At last the enemy succeeded in placing the largest of the two field-pieces on the top of the vacated house, and began to direct a fire on the smaller house as fast as they could collect or improvise cannon-balls. But nothing intimidated the gallant

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men who formed the garrison. When the enemy raised a barricade on the roof of the adjoining house, the besieged raised one still higher on their own. When provisions began to fail, a sally procured more. In fact all the means that courage, labour, daring, and energy could suggest were used to the fullest extent to baffle the enemy.

At midnight on that day, the 29th, the garrison were aroused by the sound of repeated volleys of musketry about a mile distant, in the direction of the Sôn river. For a moment hope suggested the idea that the garrison of Dánápûr was about to relieve them. But the hope flickered and died almost as soon as it had received life. The sound of the firing became more and more distant:—at last it ceased altogether. It was clear that the relieving party had been driven back.

Captain Dunbar's march.

We left that party, consisting of 343 Europeans, 70 Sikhs, and a few gentlemen volunteers, having just succeeded in effecting their disembarkation, at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 29th, on the point nearest to the station of Arah. The order was at once issued for the men to dine, when suddenly firing was heard from the advance-guard. It was ascertained that this firing had been caused by the presence of a body of sepoys on the banks of a wide and deep rivulet, about two miles distant, and upon whom the advanced guard had opened. On receiving the fire the sepoys retreated. Then, though pressed to stop and bivouac for the night, Captain Dunbar determined to push on at once. It is true his men were fasting; but it was a fine moonlight night, and both

officers and men were cheered by the news brought by the villagers that the garrison was still holding out, whilst the sound of the booming of the guns in the direction of Arah showed that our countrymen were still hardly pressed. Fifteen miles lay before the men, through a well-wooded country, traversed by an unmacadamized road, and heavy from recent rain. The dinners, then, were left uncooked, the rivulet was crossed, and when, about 7 P.M., all had disembarked on the other side, the column started, led by a native guide. The force marched on for about eleven miles without seeing any traces of the enemy. A few minutes later, however, a body of horsemen appeared in front of the advancing column, but before they could be fired at they had galloped off. It was now 11 o'clock, and the moon went down. Still hopeful and confident, the column pressed on till within a mile of Arah, no enemy in sight. Here Captain Dunbar called in the skirmishers, and moved on in column of march. He suspected nothing, when, suddenly, as the column was marching along the length of a dense mangrove on the right of the road, the grove was lighted up by a tremendous volley poured into the long flank of the column, whilst almost simultaneously a smaller volley from a group of trees in front struck down the leading files. Captain Dunbar and several officers were shot dead at the first discharge; the enemy was invisible; the firing was taken up from the other flank, and renewed from the quarters whence it had first proceeded. The Europeans, in their white summer clothing,

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He is surprised by the rebels.

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were splendid marks for the enemy. The confusion consequent upon the surprise was terrible ; the men were bewildered, and there was no one to give the command. The natural consequences ensued. On recovering from their surprise the men formed into groups and began to fire wildly in all directions often, possibly, on each other.

It is hard to say how many minutes this fatal disorder lasted, but at last the only possible mode of restoring order was resorted to. An officer managed to find a bugler, and, taking him to an enclosed field at a short distance from the grove, sounded the "assembly." The men promptly rallied round him. They were fortunate enough to discover in this field a disused and half-empty tank, the hollows of which would suffice to protect them to a certain extent against the enemy's fire. From this the firing was kept up, returned, however, with interest. The white clothing of our men still operated greatly to their disadvantage, whilst the sepoy, in a state of semi-nudity, fired from behind trees and walls.

Under these difficult circumstances the surviving officers held a council of war. They felt that with their dispirited and diminished numbers it would be impossible to reach Arah ; that they would be fortunate if they could fall back upon the Sôn. They resolved, then, to commence a retrograde movement as soon as the not then distant dawn should permit them to find the road.

The retreat. As soon as it was daylight the men formed up in order, and marched out on the Arah road. But the enemy had been as vigilant as they. Every

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point in their route—the ditches, the jungles, the houses—had been occupied in force. The British force marched straight onwards, returning, in a desultory manner, the fire which was poured upon them, but intent only on reaching the Sôn. The power of driving back the enemy was denied to them by the fact that no enemy was in sight. They were sheltered behind the trees, the copses, the bushes, the ditches, and the jungle. Occasionally, indeed, maddened by the sight of their comrades falling around them, the men constituting by accident the rear-guard formed up, faced about, and tried to charge. But there was no enemy to receive the charge. Five or six thousand men, the revolted sepoys and levies of Kúnwar Singh, kept themselves under the shelter offered by the natural obstacles of the country.

At last, after losing many of their comrades, the main body of the British force reached the banks of the rivulet, to cross which the previous night they had found boats ready to their hand. The boats were still there. During the night, however, the water had run down, and of all the boats two only were floating. These were promptly seized by the men in advance and pushed off. Then ensued a scene which it is impossible to paint in living words. It was a scene to which the imagination alone could do justice. There were the stranded boats on the bank of the river, the defeated soldiers rushing at them to push them further into the stream, the musket fire from the victorious sepoys, the cries of the wounded and dying, the disorder and confusion

Confusion
accompany-
ing it.

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naturally associated with a military disaster. It was a scene to call forth all that was manly and heroic, all that was mean and selfish. But whilst the first-named qualities were markedly visible, the latter were conspicuous only by their absence.

The difficulties already enumerated were added to by the fact that some of the boats caught fire. The losses the British troops here sustained probably exceeded those they had suffered during the retreat. Order was impossible. To push a boat into the stream, to climb into it, to help others in, was the aim of every man's exertions. But when boats would not be moved the chance of drowning was preferred to the tender mercies of the sepoy. Many stripped and rushed in, until at last the majority of the survivors found themselves in safety on the opposite bank.*

When the remains of the party mustered there, it was found that out of four hundred and thirteen men, only fifty had not been hit, and out of

* Many acts of daring were performed during the retreat and crossing. Mr. Ross Mangles, of the Civil Service, one of the volunteers, supported and helped along for five miles of the retreat a wounded soldier of the 37th, who, but for that support, would have been left to die. For this act of the volunteers, Mr. M'Donell, received the Victoria Cross. Another of the volunteers, Mr. M'Gilligan, received the same distinction for cutting the lashings of one of the boats, full of men, amid a storm of bullets, to which he was exposed from the opposite bank. Private Dempsey and another man of the 10th carried one of their officers, Ensign Erskine, who had been mortally wounded, for five miles to the boats. Lieutenant Ingelby, who had volunteered to command the Sikhs, was the last man to leave the shore. He plunged into the water, and was shot in the act of crossing. These are a few amongst the many instances of combined courage and humanity.

The survivors
reach Dána-
pur.

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fifteen officers only three were unwounded. Those survivors made their way sadly and disconsolately to the steamer. They were then conveyed back to Dánápur.

There the European population were awaiting their return in triumphant expectation. The possibility of disaster had not crossed a single mind. But when, as the steamer approached, no signs of life on board were visible, when the very captain and his subordinates seemed cheerless, and the silence was the silence of the grave, it began to be felt that, at the least, our losses had been heavy. It was not, however, until the steamer had moored off the hospital that the full truth was realised, that the conviction rushed to the mind of every Englishman in Dánápur, not only that our troops had suffered an overwhelming catastrophe, but that the little garrison of Arah was irremediably lost.*

The Englishmen garrisoning Mr. Boyle's little house at that place had, then, rightly interpreted the reason for the gradual lessening of the sound of volley-firing which had reached their ears at midnight on the 29th. Even if they had had any doubts these would have been removed by the arrival under their walls of a wounded Sikh, a member of the relieving force, who had managed to crawl to the house to tell the story of the disaster. The intelligence was black indeed, but its only effect on the hearts of the gallant members of the garrison was to steel them to resist to the bitter end. They at least believed in their coun-

The gallantry
of the Arah
garrison.

* Mr. Tayler's *Patna Crisis*.

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trymen. The story of the “leaguer of Arah” had spread, they were well aware, as far as the means of communication would admit. Many detachments of Europeans were passing up country. By whom these detachments were commanded they knew not. But they did know that the several commanders were Englishmen, and they felt confident that amongst the Englishmen in authority to whom the story of their plight might be conveyed, there would be at least one who, bound though he might be by the red tape of regulations, would yet laugh at responsibility when he should learn that his countrymen were in danger; who would possess the brain to conceive and the nerve to carry out a plan for their relief. They judged rightly; and yet they were fortunate, for it is not every day that nature brings to maturity the mould of a Vincent Eyre.

The rebels
 renew their
 attack.

Meanwhile the sepoys returned to Arah, red with the slaughter of our countrymen. If their victory had not increased the courage which now, as before, recoiled from an assault in masses on the besieged mansion, it had yet had the effect of stimulating their inventive powers. At one time they attempted to smoke out the garrison. With this object they collected and heaped up during the night, beneath the walls of the house, a large quantity of combustibles, and surmounting these with chillies—the raw material of the famous red pepper of India—ignited the mass. The effect would have been most serious had the wind only favoured the enemy; but the element was against them, and before it had injured the garrison, the

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pungent smoke was blown towards the hostile encampment. The same wind saved the garrison likewise from the putrid smell emanating from the rotting carcases of the horses, belonging to the garrison, which had been shot at the commencement of the siege. Mining was then attempted, but Mr. Wake met this device by a countermine. The gun raised to the roof of the larger house occasionally caused injury to a weak place in the beleaguered castle; but Mr. Wake and Mr. Boyle were there, and in a short time the place was made twice as strong as before.

After all these measures had failed, it seemed as though the garrison would be more likely to suffer from a deficiency of supplies than from the enemy's attacks. And, in truth, on the third day the supply of water began to run short. With unremitting vigour, however, the garrison within twelve hours had dug a well of eighteen feet by four. Four sheep rewarded one of their attempts at sallying out for supplies. The earth excavated from the well was used to strengthen the works on the roof. Cartridges were made from the powder which Mr. Boyle had been careful to store, and bullets were cast from the lead which he had laid in. Every means that energy could do, that skill could devise, and that valour could attempt, were successfully resorted to by that daring garrison, ably directed by Mr. Wake, Mr. Boyle, and Mr. Colvin.

The supplies
of the garrison
begin to fail.

But resources limited in extent must, sooner or later, come to an end. But for succour of an effective character the garrison would have been

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They are re-
lieved.

eventually forced—not to surrender—the possibility of such a catastrophe never formed part of their calculations—but to endeavour to force their way to some ford on the river Sôn. Happily the necessity to have recourse to so desperate a chance was spared them. On the morning of the 2nd of August, just one week after they had been shut up in their improvised fortress, a great commotion amongst the enemy gave warning that something very unusual was taking place. The hostile fire slackened early, and almost ceased during the day. But few of the sepoys showed themselves. Suddenly, towards the afternoon the sound of a distant cannonade reached the ear. Minute succeeded minute, and yet the sound seemed neither to advance nor to recede. All at once it ceased altogether. Some hours later and the absolute discontinuance of the fire of the besiegers gave to the garrison a sure forecast of the actual state of affairs. A sally made by some of them after darkness had set in discovered the positions of the enemy abandoned; his guns unguarded; a canvassed tube filled with gunpowder lying unused close to the mine which had reached the foundations of their fortress. It was clear then to the tried and gallant men who had so successfully defended themselves against enormous odds, that a deliverer had driven away their enemies, and that before many hours they would be able to render honour to the name of him who had so nobly dared to rescue them.

Vincent Eycr. Who was that deliverer? Amongst the many detachments which left Calcutta during the month

of July was one commanded by Major Vincent Eyre, of the Bengal Artillery. The detachment consisted of a company of European gunners, and a horse-battery of six guns. Major Eyre was an officer possessing natural ability improved by study, great determination, a clear head, and a lofty sense of duty. He had had great experience of men, had mastered all the details of his profession, was fit for any employment, but, like Dumouriez, he had reached the prime of life before the opportunity arrived which was to show the stuff that was in him. He had served during the first Afghánistán war, and had been one of those who had been selected by the British General as hostages* to be made over to Mahomed Akbar

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His previous career.

* A little episode in Eyre's perform any duty imposed history at this period deserves on him." On this incident to be recorded. On a previous the "Naval and Military occasion, the Afghán chiefs Gazette" of the day thus commented:—"Channing, in his eloquent and philosophic analysis of the character of Napoleon, has felicitously defined three orders of greatness, in the last of which he assigns a place to the great conqueror of Europe. Following the spirit of that great thinker, we cannot but recognise in Lieutenant Eyre's noble reply a higher tone of feeling than can be traced in the answers of either of his gallant comrades. Therefore, while we may award to the latter niches in the same order with Napoleon, our acquiescence in the sentiments of Dr. Channing leads us to hail in Lieutenant Eyre's conduct on this

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Khán. Subsequently he had been appointed by Lord Ellenborough to raise and to command a company of artillery for the newly formed Gwálíár Contingent. In 1855, Eyre had visited Europe. On his return to India, early in 1857, he had been sent to command a horse field-battery in British Barmá. Recalled thence with his battery, when the eyes of the Government of India were being opened to the gravity of the situation, Eyre arrived in Calcutta on the 14th of June. There he was kept for several days in a state of uncertainty, terminated only by his being ordered to leave with his battery in a steamer and flat, on the 10th of July, for Alláhábád.

July 25.

Steaming from Calcutta, on that date, Eyre arrived off Dánápúr on the afternoon of the 25th of July. Learning from a gentleman who had ventured in a small boat from the shore the catastrophe of that day, Eyre landed at 6 p.m., to offer his services to Major-General Lloyd. At his desire he disembarked three guns for the service of the Major-General until those sent after the mutineers should return,—an event which happened the same evening.

Arrives at
Baksar.

Re-embarking his guns the following morning Eyre proceeded up the Ganges towards Baksar. On reaching that place at noon, on the 28th, Eyre was informed that the three revolted occasion the lineaments of his country, or of mankind.” that *first* order—moral greatness—through which the soul to recognise the same lineaments of that first order in faltering trust in God in the conduct of Major Eyre on darkest hour, and is ever ready the occasion I am now re-to be offered on the altar of cording.

Dánápúr regiments were advancing by way of Arah, with the apparent intention of crossing the Ganges above Baksar, and that they had actually sent forward a party to secure the necessary number of boats. This information decided Eyre to detain the steamer and flat at Baksar to afford time to one of the detachments, which he believed to be steaming up behind him, to come up.

It must be borne in mind that Baksar was the head-quarters of a valuable Government stud, and that thirty miles above it lies Gházípúr, where was a branch of the same stud. There were no troops at Baksar, but Gházípúr was garrisoned by a strong native regiment held in check by only one weak company of the 78th Highlanders. Noting the importance of preventing the passage of the river by the mutinous sepoys, and observing no signs of the advance of the detachments he believed to be on their way, Eyre, on the morning of the 29th, hastened up with his battery to Gházípúr, landed two of his guns and his only subaltern for the protection of the place, and taking on board in their stead twenty-five men of the 78th Highlanders, returned that night to Baksar.

On reaching Baksar, Eyre discovered to his intense satisfaction that one of the detachments he had expected, consisting of 160 men of the 5th Fusiliers, commanded by Captain L'Estrange, had arrived off that place. Information leading him to be confident that our countrymen were still holding out at Arah, Eyre at once despatched a note to L'Estrange, proposing to join forces for

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Resolves to
attempt the
relief of Arah.

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Assumes
great respon-
sibilities.

an immediate attempt to relieve that station. L'Estrange promptly replied in the affirmative, stipulating only that Major Eyre should send him a written order to that effect, and should take upon himself the entire responsibility.

Eyre did not hesitate a moment. He despatched at once an official letter to L'Estrange, directing him to place himself and his men at his disposal. He took upon himself the further responsibility of requiring the captains of the steamers to place themselves unreservedly under his orders.

Early on the morning of the 30th, the guns and troops were disembarked, and arrangements were made for a march to Arah, about forty-eight miles to the eastward. At the same time one of the steamers was despatched to Major-General Lloyd with a letter informing him of the intended movement, and inviting his co-operation—for at that time Eyre was ignorant, not only of the defeat of Dunbar's force, but of the fact that any force had been sent to Arah.* The field

Strength of
his force.

* Major Eyre's letter was read by the divisional officer of the division, both dated dated the 30th. It reached the 31st, and despatched by Dánápur that night. It elicited from Major-General Lloyd the opinion, dated midnight on the 30th, that "the advance from Baxar towards Arra would have been useful had the attack on the rebels succeeded; as it is, the Buxar force is too weak to venture far from Buxar, and it should communicate with Dinapore." Two letters from the Assistant Adjutant-General of the division, both dated the 31st, and despatched by the same steamer, informed Major Eyre of the disaster at Arah; threw upon his own judgment and discretion the course he should adopt; warned him against expecting any co-operation from the Dánápur side; and advised the utmost caution. A letter dated the day following reiterated the same arguments. Major Eyre did not receive these letters till after he had left Baksar.

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force thus extemporised consisted of forty artillery men and three guns, one hundred and fifty-four men of the 5th Fusiliers, six officers, including Major Eyre, two assistant surgeons, and eighteen volunteers, mostly mounted, of whom three were officers, one a veterinary surgeon, and one the joint magistrate of Gházípúr.* The twenty-five Highlanders, whose presence might at any time be necessary at Gházípúr, were left behind at Baksar, with orders to take the first opportunity of returning to their station. Eyre appointed as his staff officer Captain Hastings, an officer whose acquaintance he had made only two days before, but by whose energy and enthusiastic support he had been greatly impressed. Much required to be done. There were no horses for the guns, and bullocks from the plough had to be impressed. Carts for the reserve ammunition and commissariat supplies had to be secured. In this work Major Eyre found an able and willing coadjutor in Mr. Bax,† the district magistrate. This gentleman likewise used successfully his influence to borrow from the Dúmrao Rájá four elephants for the conveyance of tents and bedding.

At 5 o'clock in the afternoon, however, all *Sets out.* preparations had been completed, and the column

* The names of the officers were : of the Artillery, Major Eyre and Assistant Surgeon Eleson ; of the 5th Fusiliers, Captains L'Estrange and Scott, Ensigns Lewis, Old-field, Mason, Assistant Surgeon Thornton ; of the volunteers, Lieutenant Wild, 40th Regiment, Native Infantry ; Captain the Hon. G. P. Hastings, Lieutenant Jackson, and Veterinary Surgeon Liddell ; the Civil Magistrate was Mr. Bax.

† Now Mr. Bax Ironside.

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First hears of
Dunbar's de-
feat.

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Presses on.

set out. But the roads were very heavy from recent rain, and the bullocks, unused to drag guns and heavily laden carts, not only moved slowly, but required frequent halts to enable them to move at all. Owing to the delays thus enforced, the day broke before the first encamping ground was reached.

Brief was the halt made here. The column pushed on after a short and hurried meal. When about twelve miles from Baksar a mounted scout was despatched. Pursued, wounded, and taken prisoner, he proved to be a free lance in the service of Kúnwar Singh. As the presence of this man proved that the enemy was on the alert, Eyre pushed on as rapidly as he could, and did not halt for repose till he had reached Shahpúr, twenty-eight miles from Baxar.

Whilst encamped at this place the tidings were brought to Eyre of the defeat and slaughter of Captain Dunbar's party. Here, too, he had further proof of the vigilance of the enemy, many of whose scouts were discovered. Eyre halted the early part of the day to refresh the cattle, but eager to rescue the garrison and to restore the *prestige* of our arms, he set out at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 1st, having now but twenty-two miles to traverse. After marching four miles, the column was checked by finding that the bridge over the nullah at Balaotí had been cut through and was impassable for guns and carts. In an hour, however, the mischief was sufficiently repaired, and the force pressed on to the village of Gújrájganj, on the further side of which it

bivouacked for the night, posting a strong guard to protect the bridge over the nullah near it, and which Eyre had been delighted to find uninjured.

At daybreak the following morning (2nd of August) the force resumed its march. It had not, however, cleared a mile beyond its camping-ground before bugle-notes were heard sounding the "assembly" in a wood which bounded the view about a mile ahead, and through which lay the direct road to Arah. The road between the position occupied at the moment by our men and the wood was bounded on either side by inundated paddy fields. Eyre at once halted to reconnoitre. The enemy now began to show themselves in great force, and not content with occupying the wood in front, to send out large bodies on either flank with the evident object of surrounding the Europeans. This movement on their part decided Eyre. Judging, and rightly judging, that this double flank movement must weaken the enemy's centre, he boldly pushed forward his men in skirmishing order, his three guns opening out to the front and on either flank. Under the pressure of this fire, the enemy abandoned his flank movement, and fell back on the position in front. It was the object of Eyre to force this. He, therefore, massed his three guns, and opened a concentrated fire on the enemy's centre. This had the effect of driving them from the direct path. Eyre then rapidly pushed on his guns, covering their advance by a continuous fire from the Enfield rifles of his infantry, and succeeded in making way through the wood before the enemy

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The mutineer
come to meet
him.

Eyre attacks
them.

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could again close his divided wings. Emerging from the wood the road became an elevated causeway, bounded on either side by inundated rice-fields, across which the baffled enemy could only open a distant fire. Their intentions thus frustrated, the sepoy's hurried round to oppose the advancing force at Bíbíganj, a village about two miles ahead, and situated on the opposite side of a river spanned by a bridge, which they had destroyed, and the approaches to which they had covered by breastworks.

The battle.

After driving the enemy from the wood, Eyre pushed on. When, however, within a quarter of a mile of the village of Bíbíganj he halted to refresh the men and cattle whilst he should reconnoitre the position. Finding that the bridge had been destroyed, that the direct approaches to the river had been covered by extensive earthworks, and that the sepoy's were occupying in force the houses in the village, Eyre, unable through his scouts to find a ford, determined to make a flank movement to the nearest point of the railway embankment, distant about a mile, and along which there was a direct road to Arah. He endeavoured to mask this movement by the fire of his guns which opened on the village, whilst the infantry and carts pushed forward in the new direction. No sooner, however, did the enemy discover this manœuvre, than they hastened in great numbers to intercept the force at the angle of a thick wood which abutted on the embankment, and which it was necessary that Eyre should pass.

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It was clear that the enemy would reach the wood first. But to increase the difficulties in the way of Eyre, they detached a portion of their force, the irregular levies of Kúnwar Singh, to harass his rear. They did this with such effect that when the British reached the wood they found it strongly occupied by the enemy, who opened at once from behind the trees a most galling fire. Eyre's position was now becoming critical. He must carry the wood or be lost. He halted his troops, formed them into skirmishing order, and opened fire from his infantry and artillery. But the numbers of the enemy and the cover afforded by the trees gave them a great advantage. During the hour which this combat lasted, the enemy twice charged our guns, exposed by the necessity of keeping the infantry in skirmishing order, but each time they were driven back by discharges of grape. At the end of the hour, Captain Hastings brought word to Eyre, who, having no subaltern, was compelled to remain with the guns, that the Fusiliers were losing ground, and that the position was becoming critical. Eyre upon this resolved to solve the question with the bayonet, and despatched Hastings with an order to L'Estrange to that effect. This order was promptly executed. The men hastily closing, rushed forward with a cheer—cleared the deep stream—here confined within narrow limits—at a bound, and charged impetuously an enemy twenty times as numerous as themselves. The enemy, taken completely aback, did not await the onslaught. They gave way

Severity of
the fight.

Eyre orders
a bayonet-
charge, which
decides it.

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Relief of Arah.

August 3.

The rebels
flee to Jagdís-
púr.

in the utmost disorder; the guns opened out on the retreating masses, and in a few minutes not a man of them remained to oppose the passage of the force.

An open road skirting the railway to within four miles of Arah was now available. Eyre marched along it. A little before nightfall, however, he came upon an impassable torrent. This forced him to halt. But he spent the night in endeavouring to bridge the torrent by casting into the stream large piles of bricks collected there by the railway engineers. In this way the stream was narrowed sufficiently to allow the construction across it of a rude sort of bridge formed from country carts. Over this, in the early morning, the infantry, guns, and baggage marched, and in little more than an hour afterwards the relief of the garrison of Arah was an accomplished fact. The sepoys, after their crushing defeat, had hastily abandoned their position in Mr. Boyle's larger house, and packing up their spoils, had fled precipitately to the jungle stronghold of their leader, Kúnwar Singh, at Jagdíspúr. Then it was that the gallant band, led with such skill and such daring courage, by the civilians Wake and Colvin, and by the engineer, Vicars Boyle—three names ever to be revered by Englishmen—discovered what manner of man he was who, serving a Government which up to that time had judged the conduct of its servants mainly by results, had assumed the responsibility of turning from his ordered course, of turning others from their ordered course, to endeavour, with a force

inferior in infantry by more than one-half to that which had already been ingloriously beaten back, to rescue his countrymen from destruction, to save Bihár and India from an impending great calamity.

To return to Patná. If the effect of the revolt of the Dánápúr sepoys, the mutiny of the 12th Irregular Cavalry, and the defeat of Dunbar's force, had been to neutralize all the prudent measures taken up to that time by the Commissioner of the Patná Division, the effect of Eyre's victory was to restore the confidence which the three events alluded to had so severely shaken. In taking, then, a comprehensive glance at the province of Bihár at this particular moment, we see, standing out from the mass, two prominent figures in whose presence all the others, the garrison of Arah alone excepted, are completely effaced. These two figures are Mr. Tayler and Major Eyre. In spite of unparalleled difficulties Mr. Tayler had, up to the 25th of July, saved Bihár. The Government of India and Major-General Lloyd then suddenly stepping in, neutralised to a great extent his stupendous exertions, and allowed the province to drift to the very verge of destruction. Major Eyre, dropping, as it were, from the clouds, warded off that impending destruction. Those who had caused the danger were thus blotted out from the public view. The wisdom and daring of Mr. Tayler, the energy and determination of Major Eyre, had atoned for the feebleness and timidity of the leaders who did not guide.

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Vincent Eyre
and William
Tayler.

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The interval
at Patná.

But there was an intervening period which, for the right understanding of the subsequent action of the Governments of India and of Bengal, it is necessary that I should notice. I mean the period which elapsed between the mutiny of the native troops at Dánápúr and Sigaolí and the relief of Arah by Major Eyre.

The mutiny of the native troops had been an event to try to the utmost Mr. Tayler's hold on the province of which he was pro-consul. He had heard the Major-General commanding the division talking seriously of intrenching himself at Dánápúr. There was no assistance, then, to be looked for from that quarter. In the other direction, his right-hand man, Major Holmes, had been murdered by his own soldiers, and to those soldiers, about five hundred in number, the lives of the Europeans and the treasures all over the province, might at any moment fall a prey. We have seen how Mr. Tayler behaved under these almost desperate circumstances; but he had posted to Major-General Lloyd to implore that officer to send out at once a force to attack the rebels. It certainly was not Mr. Tayler's fault that the force despatched at his earnest instigation should have been badly commanded and disgracefully beaten.

Enormous
difficulties of
Mr. Tayler's
position.

But the fact that that force was disgracefully beaten added enormously to the difficulties of Mr. Tayler's position. The chances that Arah would almost immediately fall seemed reduced to a certainty. What could fifteen Europeans and fifty Sikhs effect against six thousand trained

sepoys and a large body of irregular troops?* Granted even—in itself, if Eyre had been beaten, an impossible assumption, for the rebels would then have captured the guns necessary for their purpose—that the position at Arah was impregnable, the supplies of food and of powder were very limited. But for Major Eyre, the fears of every one in the province regarding the Arah garrison must have been speedily realised; and it was not given to Mr. Tayler more than to any one else to feel assured that amid the detachments steaming up the Ganges one would certainly be commanded by the very man for the occasion, by the Dumouriez, who, in the silence and solitude of Gwáliár, had trained himself to be prepared for any emergency. The defeat of Captain Dunbar's force, then, seemed to leave the lives and the treasures of Bihár more than ever at the absolute mercy of the revolted soldiery.

Now, for those lives and for those treasures, Mr. Tayler was responsible to the Government of which he was in Bihár the representative. The danger was great, the emergency was unparalleled. The rebel army led, as was known, by a powerful and influential landowner, flushed with victory, and provided to a certain extent with guns which had been exhumed from that landowner's estate, was awaiting only the fall of Arah to overrun the

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Great re-
sponsibilities
devolving
upon him.

* Amongst the sepoys slain that the three revolted Dáná-in the battle, Major Eyre púr regiments had been found men of nine different largely reinforced from other regiments, a sufficient proof quarters.

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Is devoid of
the means to
defend his
extended line.

province. The recent defeat had reduced the Dánápúr garrison to absolute inaction.*

Rumours from the district were rife to the effect that the Dúmraon Rájá, whose estates extended along the line of road from Arah to Baksar, had joined or was about to join the rebels in Patná, the local police were distrusted, the Sikhs were for the most part employed on guard duties; very few even of them were available for any purpose outside the station.

In four out of the five districts the means of defence were even less. These districts, as already stated, were known under the names of Sháhábád, Gayá, Sáran, Tirhút, and Champáran. Arah, the capital of the district of Sháhábád, was virtually in the possession of the rebels; at Gayá, also, the chief station of its district, there were indeed one hundred Sikhs and forty-five European soldiers; Mozaffarpúr, the chief station of Tirhút, was undefended, whilst Chaprá and Mótihári, the capitals respectively of the districts of Sáran and Champáran, had been abandoned by the European officials in consequence of the pressure of the mutineers.

It was at Gayá and Mozaffarpúr, then, that the greatest danger was to be apprehended. The position of these stations rendered them peculiarly liable to attack. They were exposed to the first

* On the 31st of July, the Assistant Adjutant-General not depend upon the co-operation of a force from Dá-nápúr division, in which the present letter to Major Eyre, warned him that he "must not admit."

brunt of the fury of the mutineers, and they had no sufficient means to resist them.

It must always be remembered that, at the period of which I am writing, the fall of Arah was considered certain. Equally certain, that a catastrophe of that nature would be promptly followed by a rising of all the disaffected through Bihár. The question which the Commissioner of Patná had to solve, then, was this: whether he should trust to the seemingly impossible chance of Arah being relieved, and, in that case, risk the lives of the officers under his orders, and the treasure under their charge; or, whether he should prepare himself to meet the coming danger, by drawing in his too widely extended line, and massing his forces in a central position.

Had Mr. Tayler been a timid or a vain-glorious man, he would have shrunk from the responsibility of withdrawing his officers from the positions assigned to them by the Government. But being cool and resolute, ready to assume responsibility when the public weal was endangered, and endowed with a remarkably clear vision, Mr. Tayler adopted the sensible course of directing the officials at Gayá and Mozaffarpúr to retire upon the central position of Patná.

Mr. Tayler well knew that, serving a Government which judged only by results, and which had already displayed a desire to judge him harshly, the responsibility which he was thus taking upon himself was enormous. But with the knowledge which he possessed, that Gayá was filled with men waiting only their opportunity

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The ques-
tion he had
to solve.

Mr. Tayler
draws in his
extended line

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to rise ; that the jail there alone contained eight hundred prisoners ready to commit any enormity ; that the fall of Arah would certainly prove the signal for an attack on Gayá, he felt that but one course was possible, and that course he adopted.

The order to the officials at Gayá and Mozaffarpúr authorised them to withdraw their establishments to Patná, bringing with them the coin in the treasury, unless by doing so their personal safety should be endangered.*

July 31.

This order was transmitted on the 31st of July, after Mr. Tayler had become cognisant of the disaster which had befallen Captain Dunbar's expedition.

Results at
Mozaffarpúr.

Mr. Tayler's order was acted upon with the best results at Mozaffarpúr. The residents there, utterly unprotected, and endangered further by the presence of a detachment of the 12th Irregular Cavalry, had been very apprehensive of a rising, and had some days before vainly implored Major-General Lloyd to detach a few European soldiers for their protection. They, therefore, hailed Mr. Tayler's order as their sheet-anchor. Having no troops to form an escort, they were

* The purport of Mr. Tayler's order could not be mistaken. It was clear that, in the presence of danger of an attack from an overwhelming body with which their small force should be unable to cope, Mr. Tayler took upon himself the responsibility of saving the lives of his subordinates, even at the risk of abandoning the money, if the attack should take place, or if, in the opinion of his subordinates, it should be so imminent as not to admit of taking the usual measures for removing the treasure. In a word he relieved his subordinates of the responsibility of uselessly sacrificing their lives in attempting to defend money-bags which they could not save.

unable to take the public money with them. They left it, therefore, in the treasury, and moved upon Patná. During their absence the detachment of the 12th revolted, and attacked the public buildings. The rebels were, however, driven away by the native officials and the police, who encouraged by the wealthy and influential Hindu traders and bankers of the place, the safety of whose property depended on the maintenance of British authority, remained loyal to the hand that fed them. When, a few days later, the European officials returned to the station, they found that order had been maintained in all the public buildings, and that the mutineers, baffled in their attempts upon the treasury, had vented their fury upon one or two private houses.

The case was far different at Gayá. At Gayá. Mr. Alonzo Money. The magistrate of that district was Mr. Alonzo Money. This gentleman had, three days before, recorded his opinion that, whilst nothing was to be feared from the townspeople, two causes of apprehension yet existed, viz., the inroad of any large number of the Dánápúr mutineers, and the approach of the 5th Irregular Cavalry. In any case he declared his intention to defend the station and the treasure to the utmost.

Two days subsequently to the despatch of this letter Captain Dunbar's detachment was surprised and beaten by the mutineers. Mr. Money received a letter informing him of this catastrophe the following day; but the messenger who brought that letter conveyed to him likewise an order from his Commissioner, Mr. Tayler, to fall

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Mr. Money
resolves to
abandon the
Government
treasure.

The abandon-
ment not war-
ranted by cir-
cumstances.

back with the European residents and troops upon Patná, bringing with him the treasure, unless by so doing the personal safety of the European residents should be endangered.*

On receiving these instructions Mr. Money summoned the European civil officers of the station to advise him as to the course he should follow. Unfortunately timid counsels prevailed, and there was no Tayler present to override them. In vain did some of the residents entreat Mr. Money to remain at the station till carts could be procured to convey the treasure. He would not. But, acting as he considered the emergency required, he decided to obey that portion of Mr. Tayler's order which directed a retirement on Patná,—but to abandon the treasure.

No sufficient explanation has ever yet been afforded as to this extraordinary abandonment. The station was not then threatened. Mr. Money had previously recorded his conviction that the forty-five Europeans, the hundred Sikhs, and the new police at his disposal, were more than sufficient to ward off danger on the part of the townspeople.† A company of the 64th Regiment was within a few miles of the place. Mr. Tayler's order had been written, Mr. Money could not fail to see, solely with reference to

* "Everything," wrote Mr. Tayler, "must now be sacrificed to holding the country, and the occupation of a central position."

† Mr. Money's words, dated 28th of July, were: "There is nothing, however, to be apprehended from the townspeople. They are surrounded by a new and strong police, and have a wholesome dread of the forty-five English, and one hundred Sikhs."

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danger to be apprehended from without—to the inevitable consequences of the fall of Arah. The instructions not to abandon the treasure unless the personal safety of the Europeans should be endangered, would justify its abandonment in case an attack should be made upon that treasure by irresistible force. It certainly conveyed no authority to abandon the treasure when it was yet unthreatened, when no danger was to be apprehended from the townspeople, before any attempt had been made to remove it, and when a sufficient body of troops to escort it was at hand.

However, Mr. Money, in consultation with the members of the station he had summoned, arrived, after due deliberation, at this decision. He and they and their escort started at 6 o'clock that very evening, leaving behind them a jail filled with prisoners, and eighty thousand pounds of Government money.

Some idea of the un-English character of this step would seem at a very early period of the retreat to have struck one of the members of the party. This was Mr. Hollings, of the opium department. As this gentleman rode further and further from Gayá the conviction continued to gain strength in his mind that he and his fellow-countrymen were committing a very disgraceful act. At last he could bear it no longer. He rode up to Mr. Money and imparted to him his doubts and his misgivings.

Mr. Money was the officer directly serving under the Commissioner of Patná, and the re-

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He repents
and returns.

Remarks on
Mr. Money's
vacillation.

Summons a
detachment of
the 64th Regi-
ment.

sponsibility of the retreat from Gayá, however much he may have acted upon the opinions of others, really lay with him. He had moved off the troops and the other residents, leaving behind him the Government money. But, now, the arguments of Mr. Hollings seemed to convince him that in so acting he had acted wrongly. Instead, however, of ordering back the troops—an act which lay entirely within his competence—Mr. Money determined to return to Gayá with Mr. Hollings, leaving the troops and the others to pursue their way.

No greater condemnation of the part he had taken in leaving the station could be pronounced than this thus passed by Mr. Money upon himself. His return, too, would appear, at first glance, a very Quixotic proceeding. If the money could not be saved, and the station could not be maintained, when Mr. Money had under his orders a force of one hundred and fifty Europeans and Sikhs, what could he expect to accomplish when aided solely by Mr. Hollings?

But Mr. Money after all risked but little. He was well aware that within easy call of Gayá there was a detachment of the 64th Regiment, and almost his first act after his return was to summon that detachment to join him. The question might perhaps be asked, why he had not summoned it before he abandoned the station?

Mr. Money found the station still quiet, but he was by no means at his ease. He distrusted the men who surrounded him. The distrust, however, did not inspire him with prudence. The following

morning he showed his hand to every native official by openly burning the Government stamped paper, thus proving to the natives of Gayá that he had returned solely to baulk them of their anticipated plunder.

Fortunately for Mr. Money before any open manifestation of the public discontent had taken place the company of the 64th returned (2nd of August). Mr. Money then feeling himself strong, collected carts upon which to load the treasure. On the 4th the treasure was loaded, and sent off under the guard of the 64th detachment. Mr. Money intended to accompany the party, but returning to his own house to save a few things of value he was suddenly startled by hearing the yells of the prisoners whom the native station guards had just then let loose from the jail. Mr. Money had but just time to mount his horse, fortunately kept saddled, and to join the detachment.

The question had arisen as to the direction which the convoy should take. Had Mr. Money decided to march upon Patná, he would yet, though in a clumsy and vacillating manner, have obeyed the instructions he had received from his official superior. But he would appear to have been misled by false reports as to the danger of traversing the short distance which lay between Gayá and that station. He decided, therefore, to move the Europeans, so urgently required in the north-west, from the field of action, and to undertake the far longer journey to Calcutta.* The

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August 1.

Resolves to
proceed to
Calcutta.

* Mr. Money reported to (August 3), brought a letter Government: "The next day to Captain Thompson" (com-

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August 4.

Mr. Money's
conduct from
first to last
inexplicable.

detachment, after repulsing outside Gayá the hap-hazard onslaught of the released prisoners, reached Calcutta unmolested.

It is clear from the above plain story that whilst the conduct of Mr. Tayler in directing a general concentration of his subordinates on Patná, in the face of the blow delivered at British *prestige* on the banks of the Sôn, was marked by a statesman-like prudence and a thorough comprehension of the vital interests at stake, the action of Mr. Alonzo Money was dictated by a vacillating spirit, and by an unstable and impulsive nature. It is clear that, if Mr. Alonzo Money had carried out literally the orders of his official superior, though he might have gained no sensational triumph, he would have brought the treasure from Gayá safely into Patná. Indeed it may be confidently asserted that, in saving the treasure even as he did save it, he carried out, though in a style peculiarly his own, Mr. Tayler's orders. To himself, as a free agent, history will accord no peculiar merit. He imperilled the success of his superior's schemes by abandoning the treasure when he quitted the station, in the face of the

manding the company of the tain Thompson he was now 64th), "written by an officer the principal authority in at Dinapore of his own corps. the district. I gave him my It contained these words in opinion that, encumbered with pencil, 'For God's sake look treasure, we were too weak to out. The 8th N. I. mutineers run the risk of meeting so have marched upon Gya, they large a body of mutineers, say, with one gun.' The news and recommended falling back of martial law proclaimed in on the Grand Trunk Road." all the Bahar districts reached In such a case, the opinion of us the same morning. I called the chief civil officer was another council, and told Cap- naturally decisive.

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orders he had received to bring it with him if he could do so without endangering the lives of his coadjutors ; he imperilled the success of his superior's schemes by returning with one companion to the station, after having advisedly denuded it of the European and Sikh troops ; and, finally, he disobeyed his superior's orders and risked the whole policy of the Government by taking down the treasure to Calcutta, instead of moving it to the adjoining station of Patná. Fortune greatly befriended him ; for Fortune changed a gross dereliction of duty, a disobedience to orders which would have subjected a soldier to a court-martial —into a sensational triumph almost unparalleled. For a very brief space, and in the eyes of a very small, though a very influential body of men, Mr. Alonzo Money became the hero of Bihár.*

Is wonderfully
favoured by
Fortune.

Let us see now how it was that he became so.

The Government of India and the Government of Bengal had been terribly frightened by the story of the successful revolt of the Dánápúr sepoys, and of the defeat of Captain Dunbar's detachment. The Government of India, mistaking severity for vigour, showed the extent of their terror by at once directing that their agent—the man upon whom they had cast the responsibility properly belonging to themselves—that Major-General Lloyd should be tried by a court-martial. That Government had their scape-goat handy. Mr. Halliday, representing the Government of Bengal, was in a different position. He had, in-

* For his conduct on this occasion, Mr. Money was made a Companion of the Bath.

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Mr. Halliday
before Eyre's
victory.

After.

deed, a score to settle with Mr. Tayler, because Mr. Tayler had maintained a bold and resolute front, and had preserved order in his province by measures not altogether approved of by the Lieutenant-Governor. But Mr. Tayler had been too successful to be touched. He had saved Patná. To remove him now, when Bihár apparently was at the mercy of the victorious mutineers, was not to be thought of—even by Mr. Halliday.

Suddenly, however, the scene changed. A God-like mortal shone through the mist, dispersed the black cloud, annihilated the revolted sepoys, removed all apprehension at once and for ever regarding the safety of Bihár, and left it free to Mr. Halliday to exercise to the fullest extent his undoubted right of patronage—and of revenge.

Major Eyre virtually reconquered lost Bihár. He restored the province to the position in which Mr. Tayler, unaided, had maintained it, until the Government of India and Major-General Lloyd had contrived to plunge it into danger. But in the short interval the Gayá episode had occurred. Whilst Arah was yet trembling on the verge of destruction, Mr. Tayler had issued the withdrawal order. Eyre saved Arah. But before the results of Eyre's great feat of arms had become known, Mr. Alonzo Money, first disobeying then half obeying the directions of his Commissioner, was, by his vacillating and impulsive action, converting a plain act of duty into a sensational drama, of which he, for a few brief moments, was the star-bespangled hero.

After.

For to Calcutta, immediately after the news of

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Eyre's great triumph, came, in a distorted and inaccurate shape, the intelligence of Tayler's withdrawal order. The danger was now over; the tears in the council-chamber of Belvedere* were dried up; a feverish exaltation followed. It was necessary that some proof should be given that energy had not died out in Bengal. Mr. Tayler's withdrawal order furnished the opportunity. Forgetting, or choosing not to remember, his transcendent services, the fact that he had never despaired of the safety of his division, that he had baffled the counsels of the mutineers, and had suppressed, unaided, the rising of Patná; that he had been the rock on which every hope in Bihár had rested; that he had cheered the despairing, stimulated the wavering, roused to action even the faint heart of the soldier; forgetting, or choosing not to remember, these great achievements, the Government of Bengal, acting in concert with the Government of India, seized upon his withdrawal order to dismiss Mr. Tayler from his post, to consign the saviour of Bihár, in the very morning dawn of the triumph which he had prepared, to signal and unmerited disgrace.

The Government of Bengal added insult to injury. Not content with suppressing the fact that Mr. Tayler had coupled with the order for the withdrawal of the officials from Gayá a direction that they should bring with them the treasure under their charge, unless by so doing their personal safety should be endangered, Mr. Halliday did not scruple to charge with being actuated by

Dismisses
from his post
the man who
saved Bihár.

* The seat of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.

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panic* the man whose manly bearing had been throughout an example to the whole of India. It would be difficult to produce, in the annals of official persecution, rife as they are with perversions of truth, a statement more gratuitous.†

* Mr. Halliday wrote on the 5th of August: "It appears from a letter just received from Mr. Tayler, that, whilst apparently under the influence of a panic, he has ordered the officials at all the stations in his division to abandon their posts and fall back on Dina-pore. * * * * Under these circumstances I have determined at once to remove Mr. Tayler from his appointment of Commissioner of Patna." It was on Mr. Halliday's report that Mr. Tayler was subsequently described by the Governor-General as "showing a great want of calmness and firmness"; as "issuing an order quite beyond his competency"; as "interfering with the military authorities." Mr. Halliday subsequently "explained" officially, that "panic was apparent on the face of Mr. Tayler's order, and specially from his urgent and reiterated advice, if not order, to Major Eyre, not to advance to the relief which saved Arah." With respect to this last charge it may be as well to state, once for all, that Mr. Tayler never addressed Major Eyre on the subject of the advance on Arah. What he did do was simply this. On the evening of the day on which Mr. Tay-

ler learned the defeat of Captain Dunbar and his detachment of upwards of 400 men, he received a letter from Mr. Bax, the magistrate with Major Eyre, informing him that Eyre at the head of 150 men was about to attempt the task in which Dunbar had failed, and asking his opinion. Mr. Tayler thereupon wrote to Mr. Bax, telling him of Dunbar's defeat, and expressing his opinion that it would be prudent if Major Eyre were to drop down in his steamer to Dánápur, take up reinforcements there, and advance thence on Aruh. Mr. Tayler did not even send this letter to Mr. Bax. He sent it *open* to Major-General Lloyd, that the General might forward it with such instructions as he might think fit to give. Who will deny that in thus expressing his opinion Mr. Tayler performed only a clear and imperative duty?

† Sir John Kaye has thus ably summarised the arguments on this point:—"On the whole, it appears to me, on mature consideration, that the orders issued by Mr. Tayler were not of such a character as to merit the condemnation which Government passed upon them. It is not to be questioned that up to the time

But the fiat had gone forth. Mr. William Tayler was dismissed from his post. His career

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of the mutiny of the Dinapore regiments, the whole bearing of the Patna Commissioner was manly to a point of manliness not often excelled in those troubled times. He had exhorted all his countrymen to cling steadfastly to their posts. He had rebuked those who had betrayed their fears by deserting their stations. His measures had been bold; his conduct had been courageous; his policy had been severely repressive. If he had erred, assuredly his errors had not leaned to the side of weakness. He was one of the last men in the service to strike his colours, save under the compulsion of a great necessity. But when the Dinapore regiments broke into rebellion—when the European troops, on whom he had relied, proved themselves to be incapable of repressing mutiny on the spot, or overtaking it with swift retribution—when it was known that thousands of insurgent Sepoys were over-running the country, and that the country, in the language of the day, was “up”—that some of the chief members of the territorial aristocracy had risen against the domination of the English, and that the predatory classes, including swarms of released convicts from the gaols, were waging deadly war against property and life—when he saw that all these things were against us, and there seemed to be no hope left that the scattered handfuls of Englishmen at the out-stations could escape utter destruction, he deemed it his duty to revoke the orders which he had issued in more auspicious times, and to call into Patna such of our English establishments as had not already been swept away by the rebellion or escaped without official recall. In doing this he generously took upon himself the responsibility of withdrawal, and absolved all the officers under him from any blame which might descend upon them for deserting their stations without the sanction of superior authority. It was not doubted that if there had been any reasonable ground of hope that these little assemblies of Englishmen could hold their own, that they could save their lives and the property of Government by defending their posts, it would have been better that the effort should be made. But their destruction would have been a greater calamity to the State than their surrender. It was impossible to overvalue the worth of European life at that time, and the deaths of so many Englishmen would have been a greater triumph and a greater encouragement to the enemy than their flight. It was the hour of our greatest

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in the Indian Civil Service was ruined by one stroke of the pen.

And yet this man had accomplished as much as any individual man to save India in her great danger. He had done more than Mr. Halliday, who recalled him; more than the Government which supported Mr. Halliday. With a courage as true and a resolution as undaunted as that which he showed when dealing with the Patná mutineers, Mr. Tayler has struggled since, he is struggling still, for the reversal of the unjust censure which blighted his career. Subsequent events have singularly justified the action which, at the time, was so unpalatable to Mr. Halliday. Mr. Tayler's denunciation of the Wáhábí leaders, treated as a fable by his superiors, has been upheld to the full by the discoveries of recent years.* It has

darkness and our sorest need. and gorged with plunder, upon We know now how Wake and Gya and other stations, carrying Boyle and Colvin and their destruction with them comrades in the 'little house' wheresoever they might go. held the enemy in check, and What the Commissioner then how Vincent Eyre taught both did was what had been done and the Sepoy mutineers and the what was being done by other Shahabad insurgents that authorities, civil and military, there was still terrible vitality in other parts of the country; in our English troops. Of it was held to be sound policy this William Tayler knew to draw in our scattered outposts to some central point of nothing. But he had palpably safety where the enemy might before him the fact of Dunbar's disaster, and he believed be defied. In this I can perceive no appearance of panic. If that nothing could save the Tayler had not acted thus, and little garrison at Arrah. The evil had befallen the Christian probabilities at the time were people under his charge, he that the Dinapore regiments, would have been condemned with Kower Singh and his a far severer condemnation followers, having done their work in that direction, would for so fatal an omission."

* *Vide Appendix A.*

been abundantly shown that, to his energetic action alone was it due that Patná escaped a terrible disaster. The suppressed words of the withdrawal order have been published to the world, and the charge of panic has been recognized everywhere as untrue.

It is a curious and a very remarkable fact that of the members of the Council of the Governor-General who supported at the time Mr. Halliday's action, two have, in later years, expressed their regret that they acted hastily and on incorrect information. "Time," wrote, in 1868, one of the most prominent amongst them, Mr. Dorin, "time has shown that he (Mr. Halliday) was wrong and that you were right."* Another, the then Military Member of Council, General Sir John Low, G.C.B., thus, in 1867, recorded his opinion : "I well remember my having, as a Member of Lord Canning's Council, concurred with his Lordship in the censure which he passed upon your conduct . . . but it has since been proved—*incontestably* proved—that the data on which that decision was based were quite incorrect! . . . I sincerely believe that your skilful and vigorous management of the disaffected population of Patná was of *immense* value to the Government of India,

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Recantation
of Mr. Taylor's
judges.

* "I can, of course, have no acquaintance with the subsequent progress of events, he wrote, in 1868, the gentleman would most likely have changed who was Lord Canning's private secretary in 1857, "what you have experienced; and if is a very sincere conviction, he had changed his opinion, that if Lord Canning had seen a man of his noble character the papers which you have now would have been forward to say to produce, and been made so, and to do you justice."

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and that in the last few months of your Commissionership, commencing with the arrest of the three Wáhábí conspirators, and the disarming of the greater portion of the inhabitants of Patná city, your services were of more vital importance to the public interests than those of many officers, both civil and military, during the whole period of their Indian career, in less critical times, who have been rewarded—and justly rewarded—by honours from the Queen; while your services, by an extraordinary combination of unlucky circumstances, have hitherto been overlooked.” It is not less remarkable that three ex-Governors and two ex-Lieutenant Governors of the presidencies and provinces of India have recorded similar opinions, whilst one gentleman, decorated for his distinguished conduct in the province of which Mr. Tayler was the pro-consul, has not hesitated to inform him that until Mr. Tayler should be rewarded for the conduct which saved the province, it would be too painful for him “to wear in your presence the decoration which I have so gratefully received from Her Majesty.”

Justice still
denied him.

His comrades in India, then, and the public generally, have rendered to Mr. William Tayler the justice which is still denied him by the Government which he served so truly and with such signal success. The ban of official displeasure still blights his declining years. Whilst his rival, decorated by the Crown, has been awarded a seat in the Council of India, he “who was right when that rival was wrong,” still remains in the cold shade of official neglect. Although with a

pertinacity which is the result of conscious rectitude Mr. Tayler has pressed upon each succeeding Secretary of State his claims for redress, that redress has still been, up to the latest date, denied him. It seems to be considered that the lapse of years sanctions a wrong, should that wrong in the interval remain unatoned for. We English not only boast of our justice, but, in the haughtiness of our insular natures, we are apt to reproach the French for the manner in which they treated the great men of their nation who strove unsuccessfully to build up a French empire in India. We taunt them with having sent Lally to the block, and allowed Dupleix to die in misery and in want. But, looking at our treatment of Mr. William Tayler, can we say that, even with the advantages which a century of civilization has given us, our hands are more clean? This man saved a province. In saving that province it is possible that he saved with it districts outside his own. Yet is he not, I ask, looking at the treatment he received, is he not entitled to use, if not the very words, yet the sense of the very words employed by Dupleix in 1764: "I have sacrificed," wrote three months before he died that greatest of Indo-French administrators, "I have sacrificed my youth, my fortune, my life, to enrich my nation in Asia My services are treated as fables; my demand is denounced as ridiculous. I am treated as the vilest of mankind." To this day the treatment of Dupleix is a lasting stain on French administration. I most fervently hope, for the credit of my country, that our children and our children's

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Can the lapse
of time sanc-
tion a wrong?

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children may not be forced to blush for a similar stain resting on the annals of England; that the French may never have it in their power to return the reproach which our historians have not been slow to cast at them. In the history of the mutiny there is no story which appeals more to the admiration than the story of this man guiding, almost unaided, a province through the storm, training his crew and keeping down the foe, whilst yet both hands were at the wheel, and in the end steering his tossed vessel into the harbour of safety. Character, courage, tact, clearness of vision, firmness of brain, were in him alike conspicuous. May it never descend to posterity that in the councils of England services so distinguished were powerless in the presence of intrigue!

BOOK VII.

CHAPTER III.

We left Major Eyre enjoying, on the early morn of the 3rd of August, the triumph of his decisive victory. It is difficult even to imagine a position more gratifying to a high-minded soldier than that which he then occupied. Of the dangers he had incurred in attempting the relief of Arah that to his life had been the least. He had risked his reputation as a soldier, his very commission as an officer; for he had turned aside without authority from his course. And now, he could scarcely exaggerate to himself the importance of the results of his daring. To have saved his fellow-countrymen was a great thing; but, for the interests of India it was greater still to have dealt a staggering blow at victorious rebellion, to have saved all Bihár from the fate which, but for him, would have overtaken Arah.

But even in that hour of triumph Eyre must have felt, and Eyre did feel, that his task was but half accomplished. A “staggering blow” may

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Eyre resolves
to follow up
the blow.

baffle a murderous onslaught, but unless the recipient of it be thoroughly disabled a renewal of the attack is always possible. So reasoned Eyre. The rebels whom he had baulked of their prey were still strong enough to return. His very departure would invite them. He felt, then, that he must follow up his victory and pursue the sepoys to the stronghold of the great landowner whom they had recognised as their leader.

The task was not easy. The roads were reported to be almost impassable ; the country surrounding the stronghold of Kúnwar Singh was described as inaccessible. But the events of the previous eight-and-forty hours had told their tale. The mental courage which had dared, the skill and gallantry which had carried to success, the march on Arah, had been marked and appreciated by the Englishmen who had followed Eyre. No men are more quick to discern noble qualities in a leader than the private soldier. It was a striking testimony to the hold which Eyre's conduct and character had taken on the minds of the men of the 5th Fusiliers, that when they heard that he was about to lead them across those impassable roads to an inaccessible stronghold, they were loud in their expressions of the confidence with which they would hail the order to move onwards.*

* In his report to Army stances, a feeling of doubt, if Head-quarters, Captain L'Es- not of apprehension, as to the trange, commanding the de- success of our expedition might tachment of the 5th Fusiliers, easily have pervaded troops less after describing the reported difficulties of the march, ad- confident than ours were in the judgment, talent, and cour- ded : "Under all the circum- age of our leader."

But before setting out on this expedition something yet remained to be done at Arah. The townspeople had unmistakeably sympathised with the revolted sepoys. Not a single voice had warned Captain Dunbar of the ambush into which he was leading his detachment. Some of the more prominent men of the city had even taken an active part against our countrymen. As a preliminary measure, then, Eyre disarmed the population. Men whose active aid on behalf of the rebels was indisputable were brought to trial. Throughout the district order was restored. At the same time Eyre communicated his intentions to the military authorities at Dánápur, and solicited reinforcements of at least two hundred more European troops and a supply of ammunition. He took advantage, likewise, of the number of volunteers flocking to his camp, to organise a corps of European volunteer cavalry, the command of which he conferred upon Captain Jackson, of the Stud Department. His wounded he sent in to Dánápur.

On the 8th of August Eyre was joined by two hundred men of the 10th Foot and five officers. Three days later a hundred of Rattray's Sikhs joined him. His total augmented force then consisted of three hundred and thirty European Infantry, thirty-six European Cavalry, one hundred and forty Sikhs, forty of whom were the Arah garrison commanded by Mr. Wake, and sixteen Volunteer Cavalry. With this force Eyre set out on the afternoon of the 11th, in the direction of Jagdíspúr, the hereditary stronghold of Kúnwar Singh.

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August 3-7.

Receives re-inforcements
and sets out.

August 11.

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1857.

August 11.
Kúnwar
Singh.

Meanwhile the troops under the orders of Kúnwar Singh had to a great extent recovered heart. The halt of eight days duration made by Major Eyre at Arah had inspired them with the belief that no further advance was intended by the English, and that they would be left unmolested in their stronghold. Impressed with this idea, Kúnwar Singh detached small parties in the direction of Baksar, to feel their way and to intercept any small bodies of Europeans whom they might meet. In this they were partially successful, and this success would probably have incited their leader to make a little later a movement in force in the same direction. But Kúnwar Singh was well served by the country-people. He was informed, almost as soon as they arrived, of the reinforcements which reached Eyre. He felt certain, then, as to the next move of the British force, and he resolved with the energy which formed so strong a feature of his character to meet it with his remaining available strength.

Calling in, then, all his detachments within reach he occupied, in considerable force, the village of Dálaor, about a mile and a half in advance of Jagdíspúr, and covered by a river. This village he caused to be entrenched. It was connected with Jagdíspúr by a very thick jungle, with the intricacies of which, however, his men were well acquainted.

Not content with occupying a position presenting difficulties to an assailant, and capable of being in a great measure masked, Kúnwar Singh was so ill-advised as to send a strong body of

His faulty
tactics.

cavalry and infantry across the river to occupy a village, Tolá Nárainpúr, on its left bank. It was this cardinal error which made his defeat certain. He had in the field altogether about five thousand two hundred men, of whom twelve hundred were sepoys.

Eyre had advanced towards Jagdíspúr the afternoon of the 11th. He marched eight miles, passing over *en route* his late battle-field, and encamped for the night on the banks of the Gaggar rivulet. Resuming his march with the early dawn he halted at 9 o'clock to refresh his men. At 10 o'clock he again advanced, and in half-an-hour detected the presence of the enemy in Tolá Nárainpúr. He at once sent forward his skirmishers, supported by a fire of grape. This fire forced the enemy in and about the village to discover themselves. Eyre then sent at them with the bayonet the detachment of the 10th, eager to avenge their comrades. The main body of the enemy stood their ground with great obstinacy, but were in the end driven across the river. Meanwhile the 5th Fusiliers, assisted by a field howitzer, had held in check the enemy's left, consisting of irregulars, horse and foot. These now simultaneously gave way. The river was crossed by our men, and an impetuous attack on the intrenchments of Dálaor placed that village almost immediately in their power.

Still there lay a mile and a half of thick jungle to be traversed. Eyre gave the enemy no time to recover themselves; but sending on his infantry in skirmishing order, forced his way through the

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August 11.

Eyre's victory
and capture
of Jagdíspúr.

August 12.

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August 12.

thicket, driving the sepoys before him. In their retreat the enemy left behind them two of their guns. Completely disheartened by the continuous advance of our men they scarcely attempted to defend their leader's stronghold, but fled, taking Kúnwar Singh with them, in the direction of Sahasrám. The battle had begun at half-past 10 o'clock. At 1 o'clock Eyre and his force were in possession of Jagdíspúr. The enemy lost three hundred men. The loss of the British amounted to six wounded.

August 14.

On the morning of the 14th Eyre detached a force to Jataorá, about eight miles from Jagdíspúr, to beat up the quarters of Kúnwar Singh,—but the wily chieftain had had good information, and had retired early. The house he had occupied there was, however, destroyed. A similar fate befell the palace and other buildings, notably the property of rebels, at Jagdíspúr and in its vicinity.

The campaign terminated with the victory at Jagdíspúr. Two days after it had been achieved, the Assistant Adjutant-General of the Dánápúr division wrote to inform Eyre that Havelock, then attempting to relieve Lakhnao, had been compelled to fall back; that the cry at Kánpúr was still for troops; and that he and those under his command were required to join a force then being collected at Alláhábád.

Eyre had accomplished his mission. His work was done. The mutineers had been driven from Bihár. He and his gallant comrades were then not at all unwilling to proceed to the part of India for which they had originally been destined,

**Is ordered to
Allahabad.**

and where they might hope to render fresh services to their country. Eyre, therefore, bade adieu to Arah on the 20th, and on the following day set out for Baksar *en route* for Alláhábád.*

Meanwhile events had been occurring in Calcutta calculated greatly to increase the means at the disposal of the Government for the suppression of the revolt.

On the 1st of August, Major-General Sir James Outram landed in Calcutta. The varied services of this distinguished officer at once marked him out for high command. The name of Outram had for years been a household word in India. A keen and successful sportsman, a quick-witted and energetic political officer, a hater and exposer of corruption, Outram had but recently figured as

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August 20.

Sir James
Outram.

* I may be pardoned for mutinous regiments of Dánápúr without a hope of relief; our river communication between Bengal and the Upper Provinces was in danger of being interrupted—a danger which imperilled the very existence of Havelock's small isolated force in the Doáb; and Bengal itself showed symptoms of a general rising. What a change had Eyre's little campaign effected! Arah relieved; the Dánápúr mutineers twice defeated and dispersed; Kúnwar Singh in full flight to the north-west; the district of Shahábád restored to order and tranquillity; and the route of the Ganges open for the safe transit of our steamers and troops."

of Arah were besieged by the

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AUGUST.

commander-in-chief of the expedition despatched in 1856 to the Persian Gulf. His success there had been prompt and complete. When, on the conclusion of peace with Persia, the regiments which had composed his expeditionary force had been detached rapidly to India, Sir James Outram had followed to Bombay. It would seem to have been the original intention of the Governor-General to re-employ him in the political post which had been bestowed upon him before the mutiny, that of agent to the Governor-General in Rájpútáná. The mutinies at Indúr, at Nasírábád, at Nímach, and the outbreaks in other parts of Central India had thrown that part of the country into disorder, and Lord Canning felt that a strong hand controlling a strong force would be required to re-establish authority. The state of the country, however, rendered it impossible for Sir James Outram to proceed alone from Bombay to his post in Rájpútáná; and he felt, moreover, that in the actual state of affairs his presence might be more useful to the Government in some other part of India. On arriving at Bombay, then, he at once telegraphed to the Governor-General for orders. Receiving no reply—for Lord Canning could not at the moment make up his mind—Outram cut the Gordian knot by steaming round to Calcutta. He arrived there, as already stated, on the 1st of August.

Meanwhile, Lord Canning had, on the 15th of July, determined to employ Sir James Outram in the command of an expeditionary force in Central India, and he telegraphed to Bombay to that

effect. But again he changed his views, and resolved to use his services to restore order in the country between Patná and Kánhpúr. Sir James Outram's arrival in Calcutta on the 1st of August coincided then with the latest wishes of the Governor-General.

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August.

The reader must remember that, on the 1st day of August, the only information possessed by the Government regarding Bihár was that Captain Dunbar's detachment had been beaten, that Arah was besieged, that the grand trunk road was unsafe, and that the entire province might at any moment be lost to them. From Kánhpúr they had information that Havelock was about to cross the Ganges with his small force, and to march on Lakhnao. Having regard to the fact that an entire province was arrayed in arms against him, his attempt did not seem promising. Altogether the look-out on the 1st of August was gloomy in Calcutta.

No sooner, then, had Sir James Outram landed, than Lord Canning felt that the man for the occasion had arrived. Four days later he appointed him to command the united Dánápúr and Kánhpúr divisions of the army, thus placing him in supreme military command of the country between the first of those stations and Lakhnao. Outram eagerly clutched at the offer. Like every true soldier, he was of opinion that "action, not counsel," was required. He started to assume his command the very day after he had been nominated to it, taking with him a mountain train of artillery, but no gunners to work it.

Is appointed
to command
the force des-
tined to relieve
Lakhnao.

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August.

Mr. Grant is
appointed to
administer the
central dis-
tricts.

The day prior to Sir James Outram's nomination, Lord Canning, feeling the extreme inconvenience of leaving the civil divisions of Banáras, Alláhbád, Kánhpúr, and other outlying districts, without a supreme administrative officer to control them—the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces being at the time shut up in A'gra—had given effect to a resolution at which he had arrived, to detach one of his councillors to Banáras to take up the lapsed authority in that part of India. His selection had fallen upon Mr. J. P. Grant. I have already alluded to this gentleman as the ablest member of the Council of the Governor-General. Mr. Grant was, indeed, a man of very remarkable ability. He had a clear and sound understanding, a quick and subtle brain, great independence, and great decision of character. If he had a fault it may have been that he did not always make sufficient allowance for men whose intellect was less vast and whose views were less sound than his own. He failed thus to rate at their full influence on the multitude opinions firmly advocated by others, but which he knew to be untenable. His prescience came thus to be mistaken for dogmatic assertion, his keen insight for conceit. But this slight defect, arising from want of European training, was overborne by the powerful intellect, the high and lofty ideas of one of the greatest members of the Indian Civil Service.

The despatch of an administrative officer of the first order to the civil districts north of Bengal had been further rendered advisable by the action

of the Government of India at the very end of July. On the 31st of that month there appeared in the Official Gazette a resolution of the Governor-General in Council directing the course to be pursued in dealing with mutineers who might be captured or who might surrender to the authorities. This resolution was much criticised at the time, and in England as well as in India it was very generally condemned. After a lapse of twenty years it is, perhaps, possible to bring to its consideration a calm and unbiassed judgment.

The avowed object of the resolution was to prevent the civil officers of the country from hastily resorting to and carrying too far measures of severity against the revolted sepoys, some of whom might, possibly, have been unable to withstand the influence of their comrades; some might have endeavoured to protect their officers; some might have merely revolted without murdering their officers; and some might have simply taken their way to their homes on the general revolt of their regiment.

To carry out this object, it was ruled in the resolution, first, that no native officer or soldier belonging to a regiment which had not mutinied should be punished, even as a deserter, unless he were found with arms in his hand. Such men, it was directed, should be made over to the military authorities, or, when such a step were impossible, should be kept in prison pending the orders of Government.

The second section provided for native officers and soldiers, being mutineers or deserters, belong-

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July 31.

Resolution in
Council re-
garding the
treatment of
mutineers.

Its object.

Its provisions

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July 31.

ing to regiments which had mutinied, but who had not murdered their officers. Such native officers and soldiers, when apprehended without arms in their possession, were to be sent to a certain fixed place, to be dealt with by the military authorities.

The third section dealt with mutineers or deserters who belonged to regiments which had killed a European officer, or who had committed some sanguinary outrage. Such offenders were to be judged by the civil power. In the event, however, of extenuating circumstances transpiring, the case was to be reported to the Government before the carrying out of the sentence.

These were the three principal provisions of the resolution. In the remaining portion of it Lord Canning dwelt very much upon the evil certain to arise by continuing to punish indiscriminately after a district or division had been brought into order, and after a sufficient impression had been made upon the rebellious and the disorderly.

Objections
made to it at
the time.

It was objected to this resolution that it was ill-timed ; that, issued when the struggle was still undecided, when the enemy still held Dehli, when our countrymen were besieged in Lakhnao, on the morrow, as it were, of the massacres of Fathgarh and Kánpúr, and whilst the fate of Bihár was trembling in the balance, it was calculated to encourage the rebels, to show them that, through fear of them, we were anxious to entice them back to their allegiance. It is possible that the strong dislike with which the resolution was regarded at the time was in a great measure attributable to

the want of confidence felt in the Government. Certainly, the provisions I have quoted were not only not objectionable, but the spirit in which they were conceived was worthy of the highest praise. They are not fairly liable to the condemnation that was passed upon them at the time. They do not condone mutiny or desertion. But—the public had no confidence in the Government. The order that, in certain circumstances, an appeal lay from the civil magistrate to the highest authority, roused suspicion. It was considered, moreover, that the very publication of such a resolution was a tacit rebuke to those who had carried out severe measures of retribution.

Examining the order after a lapse of twenty years all the objections to it made at the time fade away. The provisions it contained are wise and statesman-like.

Another measure contemplated by Lord Canning about this time filled to overflowing the measure of his unpopularity. The danger arising from allowing an entire population to carry arms had not been unremarked by the citizens of Calcutta. It was a danger obvious, and in many cases most pressing. On the 13th of July, then, the Grand Jury in their presentment suggested the disarming of the native population of Calcutta and its suburbs as a measure required for the preservation of peace and the prevention of crime. A disarming bill had for some time been under the consideration of the Government. The presentment of the Grand Jury stimulated their action regarding it. But the indignation of the

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Objections
combated.

The disarm-
ing order.

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Objections to
it at the time.

Calcutta public was intense when it was found that the measure of the Government applied the order to disarm to Europeans as well as to natives. It was in vain that it was pointed out that the act of the Government contained a proviso under which it was possible for any man to apply for a license to carry arms, and that it was not to be credited that such permission would be refused to an European. So profound was the mistrust of the Government that all argument was wasted. Again I have to record my conviction that the measure of the Government, accompanied by the proviso referred to, was a statesman-like measure. Any other, partial or one-sided in its limitations, would have been wrong in principle and might have been mischievous in action.

Lieutenant-
Colonel G. M.
Sherer.

Whilst in these terrible months of June and July the Government of India had had to encounter dangers at a distance from their own door, they were being preserved by the commanding officer of a native infantry regiment from a peril close at hand, and which, but for him, might have been serious indeed. The station of Jalpaigori, about three hundred miles from the capital, and in the direct route to the station of Darjiling, was garrisoned by the 73rd Regiment Native Infantry. The commanding officer was Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Sherer. This officer had passed nearly the whole of his Indian career in the Stud Department. His knowledge of horses was profound. In managing the quadruped he had learned, too, how to deal with his master. Transferred, according to the orders then in force,

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on his promotion to a Lieutenant-Colonelcy, from the superintendence of the stud at Baksar to the command of a native infantry regiment, having in the intervening period of thirty years forgotten all his drill, he very soon showed his officers that great natural ability is universal in its practical application, and that, whatever be the sphere assigned to him wherein to labour, a really capable man will always come to the front.

Colonel Sherer had not been long in command of his regiment when the mutiny broke out. His position was full of peril. His men were, so to speak, masters of the situation. There were no Europeans within easy reach of them. There were, too, traitors in their ranks. But there were also men who still trusted to the fortune of the British. It must be remembered, moreover, that to this regiment the new cartridge, regarded by others as the symbol of the Christianising intentions of the Government, had not been served out. The station, likewise, was far from the high road. Still, rumours, detailed reports, letters, emissaries, found their way from time to time into the regimental lines. Alarm succeeded alarm. Still Sherer and his officers were calm. They maintained a careful watch over the movements of their companies. At last there could be no doubt but that mischief was intended. Four of the most influential men in the regiment were indicated to Sherer as the heads of a conspiracy which would inevitably break out that or the following night. Sherer had them seized and tried. They were condemned to death. The sen-

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Dismisses
four mu-
tineers—from
the service.

tence, however, required the confirmation of the Major-General commanding the Presidency Division. It reached him when all was *couleur de rose* at Bárrákpúr and at Calcutta. The hearts of the Major-General and of the Commander-in-Chief were merciful. An order was transmitted to Sherer to “dismiss the offenders from the service.” Before this order could reach Sherer the horizon had darkened. The sepoys at Dánápúr had revolted; the Arah catastrophe had occurred. To temporize at such a crisis would be fatal. But Sherer had the order. He obeyed it—after his fashion. Commanding a parade for the following morning, he brought out the condemned sepoy and had them blown away from guns. The same day he wrote officially to the Major-General commanding the Presidency Division to inform him that, in obedience to his orders to dismiss the four condemned sepoy from the service, he had that morning dismissed them—from the muzzles of four loaded guns.*

This act of vigour had its effect. The rising was postponed. Two days later Eyre's victory deprived the disaffected of all hope of success, and Sherer, continuing a combined policy of watchfulness, conciliation, and firmness, brought his regiment safely through the crisis, their arms maintained, and their reputation unstained.†

Lord Elgin.

Very shortly after this episode, Lord Elgin, then the British Plenipotentiary in China, arrived

* I received these details from Sir George Sherer himself. Knight Commander of the Star of India.

† Colonel Sherer was rewarded.

in Calcutta (8th of August). He was conveyed by H. M.'s ship *Shannon*, Captain William Peel, having on board three hundred marines and one hundred of H. M.'s 90th Regiment. Three days later, the consort of the *Shannon*, the *Pearl*, Captain Sotheby, brought besides her crew two hundred more men of the 90th. From that moment the arrival of reinforcements was continuous, and the country south of Alláhábád was for ever out of danger.

But the arrival of the *Shannon* and the *Pearl* had a result more practical than the mere announcement that they had brought to Calcutta Lord Elgin and some three or four hundred soldiers would seem to imply. In the month of July, Major-General Thomas Ashburnham, who commanded the China expedition, and who had proceeded by way of Calcutta on his way to his destination, had written thence to Lord Canning to express his great desire to send him a naval brigade to keep open under all circumstances his communications with Alláhábád. In the same letter General Ashburnham had likewise expressed his conviction that Captain Peel would be a most admirable coadjutor in carrying to perfection a scheme of that nature. Lord Canning clutched at the idea thus propounded; Lord Elgin assented to it, and, as we have seen, he arrived at Calcutta on the 8th of August, prepared not only to give moral aid to the Government, but "to place Her Majesty's ships *Shannon* and *Pearl*, with their respective crews," at the disposal of Lord Canning.

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—
1857.
August 8.
Captain William Peel.
Captain Sotheby.

The Naval
Brigade.

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AUGUST 10.

ARRIVAL OF SIR
COLIN CAMP-
BELL.

Lord Canning, as I have said, clutched at the offer. On the 10th the two vessels were officially placed at his disposal. On the 18th Captain William Peel started for Allahábád with a naval brigade composed of four hundred men, six 68-pounders, two 24-pound howitzers, and two field pieces.

I must chronicle one more important arrival, and then quit Calcutta for the scenes of turmoil and action. In the last week of July the new Commander-in-Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, arrived in Calcutta. Lord Canning had recommended that the post he came to fill should be bestowed upon Sir Patrick Grant. But the Prime Minister of the day, Lord Palmerston, strongly held the opinion enunciated by Sir James Outram, that to suppress the Indian Mutiny action rather than counsel was required in a General. He, therefore, selected a plain blunt soldier, and sent him to Calcutta to assume the supreme direction of military affairs in India. The selection was extremely popular with the army, for Sir Colin had served on the North-West frontier, and had won the confidence and affection of officers and men.

THE LINE WHO
PRESERVED MR.
BEADON'S LINE
OF SIX HUNDRED
MILES.

Calcutta may now safely be quitted. Numerous reinforcements had made her secure. The crisis which had menaced Mr. Beadon's line of six hundred miles had been successfully surmounted. Many dangers had been overcome. Banáras had been threatened and restored to order; Allahábád had been snatched from destruction; Patná, Dánápúr, and Bihár, after a terrible trial had been

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brought again under the ægis of British protection. Who had saved that line? Not the Supreme Government, for the action of the Government in refusing to disarm the native troops had fomented the disorder. Not the Local Governments—the one shut up in A'gra, the other hair-splitting in Calcutta. No,—four names indicate the men who saved that line to the British. North of Bihár, Mr. Frederic Gubbins, of the Civil Service, the judge who virtually administered the great Hindú city, and Colonel Neill, whose prompt and resolute action stamped out rebellion whenever and wherever it raised its head. South of Banáras, Mr. William Tayler and Major Eyre. These are names to be honoured,—these are the subordinates who won the battle; the untitled upholders of the honour, the glory, and the fair name of England. They were alike the heads that devised, the hands that executed. Associated for ever with theirs, too, in their undying glory, as supports who maintained the over-burdened structure, will be the names of those whose sphere of action, though confined, was of vital importance,—the names of the members of that Arah garrison, most fitly represented by their three leaders, by Wake, by Boyle, and by Colvin.

BOOK VIII.

CHAPTER I.

IN the preceding chapters allusion has been made to the fact that the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces had been debarred from the execution of his administrative functions by the circumstance that he was shut up in A'gra. It has now to be shown what constituted the North-West Provinces, who and what kind of man was the Lieutenant-Governor, and how it had come about that he had been forced to take refuge in the famous fortress which had been one of the glories of the Moghol rule.

The North-West Provinces.

The provinces, named before the annexation of the Panjáb in 1849, North-West, and continuing subsequently to bear that title, comprehended the country lying between the western part of Bihár, the eastern boundary of Rájpútáná and the Cis-Satlaj States, and the northern line of the provinces comprised in the Central Indian Agency. They touched the Himálayas, included Rohilkhand, and ran into the Central Provinces below Jhánsí.

Within their limits were the imperial cities of Dehli and A'gra, the great Hindú city Banáras, the important station and fortress of Alláhbád, the flourishing commercial centres of Mírzápúr and Kánpúr. The rivers Ganges and Jamná rolled in majestic rivalry through their length. They were peopled by a race the majority of whom we had rescued from the sway of the Maráthás, and whose prosperity under our rule had enormously increased. Here, too, the descendants of the courtiers of Akbar and of Aurangzib still continued to live, if not to flourish. For them, as for the landowners in Bihár, the action of our revenue system had been fatal. Their doom had been signalled when the Maráthá supplanted the Moghol. It had been pronounced when the Frank ousted the Maráthá.

But the change which had been fatal to the descendants of the men who had gained their position at the Moghol court partly by the sword, but more often by intrigue, had been extremely beneficial to the toiling masses. From the time when Mahmúd of Ghazní had introduced the crescent as a sign of rule and domination in the country of the Hindús until the period when Lord Lake conquered the imperial city in 1803, the cultivators of the soil of the North-West Provinces had been in very deed hewers of wood and drawers of water. Gradually, under the fostering rule of the English they had been emancipated from this serfage, until, under the reign of Mr. Thomason, the immediate predecessor of the Lieutenant-Governor who ruled in 1857,

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Chapter I.

1857.
May.

Benefits
arising to the
cultivators of
the soil from
British rule.

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Chapter I.

—
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May.

Political
arrangement
of the North-
West Pro-
vinces.

Mr. John
Colvin.

they had attained a flourishing position; the rights of every village, and of every man in that village, being thoroughly understood and entirely respected.

The government of the North-West was divided into eight commissionerships, those of Banáras, Alláháhád, Jabalpúr, Jhánsí, A'gra, Rohilkhand, Mírath, and Dehlí. The provinces were but poorly garrisoned by European troops. In fact, when the mutiny broke out there was but one European infantry regiment, and one battery, at A'gra. The only other European troops were at Mírath.

The Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces was Mr. John Colvin. Mr. Colvin was a man of considerable ability; conscientious, painstaking, courteous, and amiable. He was animated by a thorough sense of duty, gave all his energies to the public service, and never spared himself. It is not too much to affirm that had his lot been cast in ordinary times his reputation as Lieutenant-Governor would have rivalled that of the most eminent of those who, before and subsequently, have held that office. But with all his ability, his experience of affairs, his devotion to duty, Mr. Colvin lacked that one quality, the possession of which is absolutely necessary to enable a man to buffet successfully against the storms of fortune. Mr. Colvin wanted, in a word, that iron firmness—that rare self-confidence—which enables a man to impress his will upon others. Supreme at A'gra, his was not sufficiently, during the mutiny, the directing mind. Surrounded by civilians of high standing, men of

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May.

ability and of consideration in the service, but holding, and tenaciously holding, theories regarding the mutiny diverse from his, although differing widely amongst themselves, Mr. Colvin allowed himself to be swayed too much by the views of others. It often happened that the course he had proposed to follow was a wiser course than that which he ultimately pursued. Owing possibly to the fact that the circumstances of the time differed widely from those to which he had been accustomed he almost always renounced his own ideas, and accepted the opinions pressed upon him by one or other of his advisers. Yet,—the responsibility of every action fell upon him.

It is possible that Mr. Colvin's earlier career was to a certain extent answerable for this defect in his character as a ruler in troublous times. He had been private secretary to Lord Auckland, when Lord Auckland was Governor-General of India. In all the arrangements which led to the Afghánistán war, with its delusive triumphs and its disastrous results, Mr. Colvin shared the responsibility with the Governor-General, of whom indeed he was believed to be the intimate adviser.* Up to the hour of the catastrophe he was jubilant regarding the success of the policy. But when the catastrophe did come, with its loss of human life, its lowering of British *prestige*, its humiliation

Mr. Colvin's
earlier career

* Sir John Kaye states that has been exercised by any Mr. Colvin was supposed to officer in the same subordinate position." "an influence far greater than

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to the national arms, it was a blow sufficient to destroy the convictions of a life-time, to change a man's nature. It is probable that, thenceforward, Mr. Colvin became less inclined to trust entirely to his own opinion, more ready to accept the suggestions of others.

The Mírath
mutiny a
surprise to
Mr. Colvin.

The disaffection displayed by the 19th Regiment of Native Infantry at Barhámpúr in the early part of the year, and the events at Bárrákpúr which followed, had not apparently been regarded by Mr. Colvin as indicative of any general plan of insurrection on the part of the native army. The rising at Mírath, then, on the 10th of May, took him entirely by surprise.

May 11.

Mr. Colvin received intelligence of the Mírath outbreak on the 11th of May. Further information leading him to believe that the mutineers had sacked Dehlí and were marching on A'gra, he summoned a council of war. As the seat of the North-West Government A'gra was the residence of many notabilities. There were members of the Board of Revenue, judges of the Court of Appeal, a brigadier, colonels, majors, and officers of lower grades. The scientific corps were well represented. Besides these were commissioners, magistrates, civil servants of degrees covenanted and unconvenanted, a Roman Catholic bishop, and two Protestant chaplains. The chiefs of this large society responded to Mr. Colvin's summons to what might be termed, without any decided misuse of its natural signification, a general council. Probably in the whole annals of the mutiny there never assembled a body of men whose opinions

He summons
a general
council,

at which the
opinions are
discordant.

were so discordant, so distracted, so baseless of any fixed principle of action. Mr. Colvin himself was in favour of abandoning the station of A'gra and taking up a position within the fort. Indeed, he not only announced this as his intention, but intimated that he had already issued the order for the native regiments to evacuate the fort, that the Christian population might take refuge within its walls. Against this course of action many of those present, notably Mr. Harington—an ex-judge of the Court of Appeal, but just then nominated member of the Legislative Council of India—and Mr. Drummond, the magistrate, loudly protested. As to the actual policy to be followed there were nearly as many opinions as counsellors. The information that the mutineers were marching on A'gra—information proved that same evening to be untrue—clouded the intellects of many. At last, however, a definite decision was arrived at. It was resolved to show a bold front to the enemy, to secure the fortress by a detachment of Europeans, to raise a volunteer corps, cavalry and infantry, and to hold a general parade of the troops the following morning, when the Lieutenant-Governor should deliver an address to the European and native regiments.

The troops stationed at A'gra consisted of one battery of Bengal Artillery, the 3rd European Regiment,* the 44th and 67th Native Infantry. On the morning of the 14th,† these were brigaded

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Resolves to
show a bold
front.

Harangues
the Euro-
peans,

* Now the 107th Foot. as the 13th; but that is evi-

† Mr. Colvin in his report dently a mistake. The gene-
to Government gives the date ral council was held on the 13th.

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May 14.

and the
sepoy's.

on their own ground. The Lieutenant-Governor, and the principal civil officers of the station were present. Mr. Colvin addressed the European soldiers first. He told them not to distrust their native fellow-soldiers, but with an inconsequence scarcely in keeping with his recommendation, added : “the rascals at Delhi have killed a clergyman's daughter, and if you have to meet them in the field, you will not forget this.” He then turned to the sepoy's. He told them that he fully trusted them, asked them to come forward if they had any complaints to make, and offered to discharge on the spot any man who might wish to leave his colours. “Prompted by their officers to cheer,” records a civilian of high rank, who was present on the occasion,* “the sepoy's set up a yell ; they looked, however, with a devilish scowl at us all.”

Mr. Colvin
does not yet
recognise the
magnitude of
the crisis;

That yell, and that “devilish scowl,” should have opened the eyes of the Lieutenant-Governor. He might have read in the symptoms thus displayed that the sepoy's of those two regiments, like the sepoy's of all the other regiments of the Bengal army, were but watching their opportunity. There were not wanting at the elbow of the Lieutenant-Governor men animated by the conviction that the rebellious movement had been concerted, that the sepoy's as a body were involved in it, that the time had passed by when phrases however neatly turned, and expressions of confidence however sonorous, could avail anything.

* *Notes on the Revolt of the* by Charles Raikes, Judge of North-West Provinces of India, the Sudder Court of Agra.

The Chief Engineer, Colonel Hugh Fraser, noting the signs of the times, had advised Mr. Colvin to distrust everybody and to recognise the emergency. In plain language he counselled a removal into the fort,—a removal not only of the treasure, the records, the women and children, but likewise of the Lieutenant-Governor and his staff. But Mr. Colvin, who but the previous morning had been led by his own instincts to order an identical action, had at this time fallen under the influence of other advisers. He saw not the significance of the “devilish scowls,” and regarded not the counsel of the engineer. He reported to Government his confident expectation that quiet would be maintained at A'gra; his opinion, that it was not by shutting themselves up in forts that the British could maintain their power in India.

But there was a potentate whose capital lay some seventy miles from A'gra who had taken a more accurate view of the situation. This was Mahárájá Jyají Rao Sindia, ruler of the Maráthá kingdom called generally after the name of its capital, Gwáliár.

Mahárájá Jyají Rao Sindia has afforded throughout his career a living example of the wisdom exercised by the paramount power in dealing generously with native princes. The history is remarkable. It happened in 1843, when the Mahárájá was a minor, that Gwáliár, worsted in a war which the intriguers who conducted its government had provoked, lay at the feet of the British. Many courses lay open to the then Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough. He might

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believes in
the possibili-
ty of main-
taining order.

Mahárájá
Sindia.

Wise action
of Lord Ellen-

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borough
regarding
Gwáliár in
1844.

annex it, as Lord Dalhousie, under precisely similar circumstances, did, six years later, annex the Panjáb. He might confiscate a portion of it, just as four years later Lord Hardinge acted with regard to Jalandhar. He might lay upon it a heavy contribution in the shape of money. But Lord Ellenborough was a prescient statesman. He did none of these things. On the contrary, he conceived that it might be possible by a generous treatment of the fallen State so to bind it to the British that it might become a source of strength to our empire. To the minor Mahárájá, of whose infancy his counsellors had taken advantage to provoke the war, Lord Ellenborough restored, then, the whole of his patrimony. But his army he disbanded. In place of it he raised another army, to be administered by British officers, but to be at the charge of the State of Gwáliár. He placed at the same time near the person of the Mahárájá a Resident, whose duty it should be to watch over and counsel the youthful monarch.

Excellent
results of his
policy.

This generous policy produced all the results which had been hoped for it by its author. The Mahárájá, as he grew up and studied the history of the past, recognised in the British Government the Suzerain to whom he was bound by considerations alike of gratitude and of interest. He resolved frankly to recognise their supremacy, and to take up the position assigned to him—that of being one of the main pillars of the British Empire of Hindústán. When, therefore, the Mírath revolt became known at Gwáliár, the

Sindia re-
solves to cast
in his lot with
the British.

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Mahárájá unhesitatingly resolved to cast in his lot with his Suzerain. The very fact of his being a native of India had given him a more complete insight into the secret reasons which prompted the revolt than could be claimed by any European. He was conscious that the dominant power was about to encounter a shock, which would tax all their resources, and which might terminate fatally for them.

At the very time, then, when the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces was congratulating himself, and was assuring the Supreme Government of his belief that the two native infantry regiments stationed at A'gra would remain quiescent, Sindia, well assured that the entire native army was undermined, was warning the political agent at his court that the disaffection was universal, and that the men of his own contingent would, sooner or later, follow the example of the regular army.

He recognises
the gravity of
the crisis.

The ideas which Mr. Colvin had apparently imbibed at this time regarding the mutiny had taken the shape of a conviction that, far from being caused by the spontaneous action of the sepoys, it was a movement prompted by the Court of Dehlí. He considered it, then, very important to enlist on the side of the British those races which, in former times, had been most antagonistic to the representative of the Moghol dynasty, and whose timely support might, at this critical moment, influence the sepoys. Of these there were two in close proximity to A'gra—the Maráthás represented by Gwáliár; the Játs, enthroned at Bha-

Mr. Colvin
applies to
Sindia and to
Bharatpúr
for aid,

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which is
given.

ratpúr. To both of these, then, Mr. Colvin applied at once for material assistance. The replies were favourable. Sindia at once despatched to A'gra a battery of six guns, commanded by Captain Pearson, and Captain Alexander's regiment of cavalry,—followed, a little later, by Captain Burlton's regiment. On the part of Bharatpúr Captain Nixon was sent to occupy the station of Mathurá with a detachment of infantry.

But this timely assistance in no way retarded the quick approach of the evil which had been fore-shadowed.

On the 21st news reached A'gra that the native troops at Aligarh had mutinied. By this revolt direct communication with Mírath was cut off. It deserves, therefore, to be recorded in full detail.

The station of Aligarh lies on the grand trunk road, not quite midway between the cities of A'gra and Mírath, being distant about eighty miles from the latter, and fifty from the former. It possesses a bastioned fort, well capable of defence, and memorable in Indian history as having been the scene of the first of the many effective blows dealt by Lord Lake at the Maráthá power in 1803. In May 1857, the fort was not occupied, but the station was garrisoned by four companies of the 9th Regiment of Native Infantry—a regiment which bore a very high character, and which, it was pretty generally believed, would prove faithful, even should all the others mutiny.

The events of the 10th of May, at Mírath, had naturally been reported at Aligarh; but the story had had no effect on the outward behaviour of the

Aligarh.

Effect pro-
duced there
by the Mírath
revolt.

News arrives
of the revolt
at Aligarh.

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men of the 9th. Rumours of disorder in the district having subsequently reached the commanding officer a detachment of the regiment was sent out to ascertain the truth. The detachment returned at the end of two days, having found the rumours greatly exaggerated. And although it was stated that as they marched through the town to the regimental parade-ground the butchers had endeavoured to work upon the minds of the sepoys and to induce them to revolt and shoot their officers, still the fact remained that they had not revolted, and that they had not shown the smallest sign of disaffection. On the contrary, both at that time and subsequently, the sepoys delivered up to their officers men who had entered their lines to seduce them from their allegiance.

Apparent
calm attitude
of the sepoys.

It happened, however, that one of the men thus delivered over to justice was a Brahman who had acted as the agent of some villagers in the neighbourhood. This man had imagined a plot, whereby, under cover of the noise and excitement of a simulated marriage procession, the European officers might be murdered, and the money in the treasury, amounting to about £70,000, secured for the revolters. The Brahman, caught in the act, was tried by native officers, and condemned to be hanged on the evening of the same day, the 20th. On that evening the native troops were drawn up, and in their presence the sentence was read to the condemned prisoner. The latter was then taken to the gallows, the rope was adjusted, the cart was taken away. During the whole of

Incident of
the Brahman.

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May 20.

The spark
which ignited
the powder.

these proceedings the sepoys had maintained their usual passive demeanour. Suddenly, however, one of their number, bolder than his comrades, stepped forth from the ranks, and pointing to the dangling corpse, exclaimed : “Behold a martyr to our religion !” This exclamation touched in the heart of the sepoys a chord which had till then lain dormant. As if struck by the wand of a magician, these men—who had passed the sentence and had assisted at the execution—broke out into open mutiny. They dismissed their officers, unharmed ; but they compelled them and all other Europeans at the place to quit Aligarh.* They then plundered the treasury, opened the gates of the jail, and went off bodily to Dehlí.

Balandshahr.

This occurred on the 20th of May. There were detachments of the same regiment, the 9th Native Infantry, at Balandshahr, at Etáwá, and at Mainpúrí. To these stations information of the revolt at Aligarh, promptly conveyed, produced the natural result. At Balandshahr, the outbreak was attended by no violence. The sepoys simply plundered the treasury and went off. The case was different at Mainpúrí and at Etáwá.

Mainpúrí.

Mainpúrí lies seventy-one miles to the eastward of A'gra. The detachment of the 9th Native

* Amongst these were Lady Europeans, led by Mr. Wat-
Outram, wife of Sir James son, C.S., took the road to
Outram, and their son, Mr. Agra, escorted by a party of
Francis Outram, of the Civil the cavalry of the Gwálíár
Service. Lady Outram suc- Contingent. Their adventures
ceeded in reaching Agra in belong to a part of this history
safety, and without molesta- yet to be related.
tion. Mr. Outram, and other

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Infantry at this place was commanded by Lieutenant Crawford. Information of the revolt at Aligarh reached the station the evening of the 22nd. Mr. Power, the magistrate, who received it, at once consulted the Commissioner, Mr. Arthur Cocks, as to the course to be followed. These two gentlemen decided to send all the ladies and children into A'gra and meanwhile to march the sepoys out of the station in the direction of Bhaogaon. The detachment of non-combatants set off very early the following morning under charge of the assistant magistrate, Mr. J. N. Power. This gentleman escorted the ladies and children one stage. There he placed them under charge of a faithful Mahomedan who saw them safely into A'gra. Mr. J. N. Power, on their departure, returned to Mainpúri.

Mr. J. N.
Power escorts
the non-com-
batants to-
wards A'gra,
May 23.

and returns.

Meanwhile, the officers of the 9th Native Infantry, Lieutenants Crawford and de Kantzow, were endeavouring to induce their men to march out of the station. The sepoys set out, but on reaching the limits of their parade-ground, they refused to proceed further; and breaking out into mutiny, warned their officers with menaces to depart—some even going so far as to fire at them. In the confusion that followed the officers were separated from each other. De Kantzow dismounted, and Crawford, unable to see him for the tumult and believing he had been killed, galloped back to warn the civilians of the mutiny, and to announce his own intention of riding for A'gra.

The sepoys at
Mainpúri
mutiny.

Crawford found assembled Mr. Arthur Cocks

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Devotion
of the two
Powers, of
Mr. Kellner, of
Dr. Watson,
three ser-
jeants, and
a clerk.

Loyalty of
Rao Bhowáni
Singh.

Daring and
presence of
mind of de
Kantzow.

the Commissioner, Mr. Power the magistrate, Dr. Watson the civil surgeon, and Mr. Kellner a missionary. After a short consultation, Mr. Cocks, declaring that no one was bound under the circumstances to remain at Mainpúri, started off. Mr. Kellner, Mr. Power, and his brother,—who just then returned from escorting the non-combatants,—refused, with a noble devotion to duty, notwithstanding the reports of musket-firing which reached them from the parade-ground, to quit the station. In this resolve they were joined by Dr. Watson, as well as by three serjeants of the Road and Canal Departments, Mitchell, Scott, and Montgomery, and by a clerk, Mr. Glone. The first cousin of the Rájá of Mainpúri, Rao Bhowáni Singh, with a small force of horse and foot, agreed at the same time to stand by Mr. Power.

Meanwhile, de Kantzow, dismounted, had been opposing to the mutinous sepoys a firm and courageous will. He implored them, he upbraided them, he threatened them. Muskets were levelled at him in vain. The courageous attitude of the solitary officer, endeavouring to recall to duty men whose hearts told them they were doing wrong, overbore for the moment physical force. Not, indeed, that he entirely mastered the sepoys. But they did not kill him. They still rushed on madly towards the treasury, bearing with them their earnestly gesticulating, madly imploring lieutenant. Arrived at the iron gates of the treasury de Kantzow made one last appeal. Turning suddenly from his own sepoys, he threw

himself on the loyalty of the civil guard of thirty men, posted to protect the Government money. They responded; they rallied round him; the officials of the jail added their efforts; and for the first time since the actual outbreak on the parade-ground the torrent was stemmed.

Even more,—it was stopped. Not, indeed, at the instant. De Kantzow, with a wisdom beyond his years, avoided precipitating a conflict. He forbade the civil guard to fire, but drew it up to oppose a resolute front to the halted sepoyes, whilst with all the energy of an excited nature he again implored these not to add plunder and murder to mutiny. For three hours his arguments, backed by the physical efforts of the civil guard, kept the rebels at bay.

The iron gates to the last resisted all the efforts made to force them. It is possible that, unaided, de Kantzow might even have persuaded the mutineers to withdraw. But help, not in numbers but in influence greater than his own, brought about this coveted result. When almost exhausted by his efforts he was joined by Rao Bhowáni Singh, deputed by the magistrate, Mr. Power.* The arguments of this gentleman added to those of de Kantzow were successful. The sepoyes agreed to withdraw provided that the Rao should accompany them. He did this, and the Treasury was saved. The sepoyes, after plunder-

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He checks the
mutineers.

and keeps
them at bay.

Is oppor-
tunely joined
by Rao Bho-
wáni Singh.

They save the
treasure.

* Mr. Power was anxious convey to Mr. Power, that the to join de Kantzow, but he sepoyes were yelling for his was assured by that officer, life, and that he, de Kantzow, in a few lines he managed to was gradually quieting them.

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Lord Canning graciously acknowledges the service rendered by de Kantzow.

ing their lines and other buildings, left the station. Their repulse and departure restored order and confidence throughout the city and district of Mainpúri.

The gallantry, the devotion, the cool daring of Lieutenant de Kantzow were not allowed to pass unnoticed by the Government. Lord Canning wrote to the young subaltern an autograph letter in which in vivid and touching language he described the impression which his conduct had made upon him. "Young in years," he added, "and at the outset of your career, you have given to your brother soldiers a noble example of courage, patience, good judgment, and temper, from which many might profit." None will deny that the encomium was well deserved; that an act such as that I have recorded merits to be treasured up in the archives of a nation's history!

It remains to be added that the revolted sepoys went off to Dehlí, and that de Kantzow, left by their departure without employment, was at once placed in command of a body of police for special service in the district.

Etáwá.

The scene at Etáwá was more tragic and bloody than that just recorded. Etáwá lies seventy-three miles south-east of A'gra, and about a hundred miles north-west of Kánpúr. It was garrisoned by one company of the 9th Regiment of Native Infantry. The chief civil officer was Mr. Allan Hume, the magistrate and collector. The assistant magistrate was Mr. Daniell. On receiving intelligence of the events at Mírath and at Dehlí Mr. Hume had organised patrolling parties to watch

Mr. Hume
organises

the roads, to intercept, if possible, any small detached parties of mutineers, and at all risks to debar them free access to the station. On the night of the 16th of May the patrols fell in with, and brought in as prisoners, seven troopers of the 3rd Cavalry, a regiment which had mutinied. They had, however, omitted to deprive these men of their arms, and the troopers, brought face to face with the native infantry drawn up at the quarter-guard, suddenly levelled their carbines or drew their swords, and assaulted the European officers on duty. The guard instantly turned out, and in the *melée* that followed five of the mutineers were killed. Of the two who escaped one was shortly afterwards captured.

Three days later, the patrols stopped at Jaswantnagar, ten miles from Etawá, a large cart containing several revolted troopers, all belonging to the 3rd Cavalry, and well supplied with sabres, pistols, and carbines. This time the patrols attempted to disarm their captives ; but attempting it without due precaution they paid dearly for their rashness. Pretending to deliver up their arms the troopers fell suddenly upon their captors and shot them down. Having done this they took up a position in a Hindú temple near at hand, small, but of great strength, the approach to which lay along a grove with walls on either side.

Prompt intelligence of this untoward event was conveyed to Mr. Hume. That officer, accompanied by Mr. Daniell, proceeded to the spot, followed by some troopers and foot police. A glance at the

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patrolling
parties.

The want of
caution dis-
played brings
on the crisis.

Mr. Hume
and Mr.
Daniell at-
tempt to
meet it,

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but unsuc-
cessfully.

The muti-
neers, how-
ever, retire.

The detach-
ment at
Etáwá, muti-
nies,

May 23.

temple showed Mr. Hume the strength of the position. The approach to it was thoroughly commanded by the carbines of the enemy. The inhabitants of the neighbouring village showed likewise a strong disposition to aid the troopers, for they not only opened communications with them, but sent them a supply of food and ammunition. To storm the temple by a front attack was dangerous, but it was the only possible course, unless the honour of the day were to be conceded to the troopers. This was not to be thought of, so Mr. Hume and Mr. Daniell, summoning the police to follow them, advanced boldly to the assault. But one man answered to their call. He was killed, Mr. Daniell was shot through the face, and Mr. Hume thought it then advisable to renounce an undertaking which never had a chance of success. Supporting his wounded friend, he gained his carriage, and returned to Etáwá. That night, the troopers, fearing lest a more formidable attack should be made upon them, evacuated their position.

The fourth day subsequent to this event the detachment of the 9th Native Infantry at Etáwá mutinied. The ladies and children, accompanied by the civilian officers, and by some native officers who had remained staunch, retired in safety to Barpúra, a police station on the road to Gwáliár. Etáwá was sacked, the treasury was plundered, the prisoners were released from the jail, anarchy was inaugurated. The reign of terror, however, was not of long duration. On the evening of the 24th, a regiment of the Gwáliár contingent, the 1st

Grenadiers, reached Barpúra. The following morning this regiment marched on Etáwá, and restored order. For the moment, British authority was again supreme, though no one dared conjecture how soon or how late the restorer might become the persecutor !

Whilst the spirit of disaffection was thus spreading from station to station Mr. Colvin was cherishing the hope that even a majority of the sepoy's might still be amenable to reason. He believed that whilst the ringleaders had deliberately set the Government at defiance, others had been induced to follow them solely by fear of the consequence of not following them ; that to inaugurate a policy of general severity towards all, because of the misconduct of a few, would precipitate a general insurrection of the native army. But if, he argued, means of escape, by a proclamation of pardon, should be opened to all who could properly be admitted to mercy, it would gladly be seized by those who had no heart in the business. Impressed with these views, which, it would appear, were shared by all about him, by soldiers as well as by civilians, Mr. Colvin, without awaiting the sanction, for which he applied, of the Supreme Government, issued, on the 25th of May, a proclamation giving effect to the views just stated. He was catching at a straw, but, in the sea of difficulties in which he was struggling, there was positively nothing more tangible at which the hand could grasp !

Mr. Colvin's proclamation was disapproved of, on several grounds, by the Government of India,

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but order is
soon restored.

Mr. Colvin
determines to
offer a golden
bridge to the
well-disposed
sepoy's.

Issues a pro-
clamation
giving effect
to his views.

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It has no
effect.

Events which
followed on
its issue.

who substituted for it another of their own composition. There was really little substantial difference between the two, and both were useless. In point of fact, the time had not arrived to issue proclamations of pardon. Mr. Colvin's offer was well meant, but, though the proclamation was sown broad-cast over the province it failed to bring in a single penitent sepoy. The straw at which he had clutched crumbled in his hand.

Mr. Colvin's proclamation was issued on the 25th of May. On the 30th, three companies of native infantry which happened to be at Mathurá, only thirty-five miles from A'gra, belonging to the two regiments stationed at A'gra, suddenly mutinied, shot down one officer, wounded another, plundered the treasury, fired the houses of the English, released the prisoners from the jail, and went off to Dehlí. This was the first practical answer given by the sepoys to Mr. Colvin's proclamation.

The Bharat-
púr troops
mutiny,

But the Rájá of Bharatpúr had, as I have shown, despatched a detachment of his troops, under Captain Nixon, to aid the British at Mathurá. When the three companies at that station mutinied on the 30th, the Bharatpúr detachment was occupying a position at Hódal, a small town lying between Mathurá and Dehlí, thirty-seven miles north of the former and only sixty from the latter. Being on the high road, it was the place of all others to be occupied with advantage by a body of men wishing to intercept troops marching from Mathurá on Dehlí. So at least reasoned, on the morning of the 31st, Mr.

1857.
May 31.and drive
away their
British
officers.

Harvey, the Commissioner of A'gra, who was with the Bharatpúr troops ; so reasoned Captain Nixon, who commanded them. A position was accordingly marked out and the troops were ordered to take it up. But here occurred an unexpected difficulty. The sepoys of the Rájá of Bharatpúr not only refused to obey, but they warned the British officers to depart. The rebellion, then, was not confined to sepoys in British pay. It was becoming hourly more national.

Remonstrances, threats, entreaties, were alike useless. It was not, however, until the guns were turned upon the group of some thirty Englishmen, who were present, that these yielded reluctantly to the mutineers. A few minutes after their departure, the shouts of the sepoys, and huge bonfires caused by the burning of their tents and the few bungalows built for Europeans, showed that the mutiny had been consummated. The officers escaped with difficulty and after many perils to Bharatpúr.

The intelligence of the mutiny at Mathurá disturbed the calculations and destroyed the hopes of Mr. Colvin. That mutiny had been the act of the men whom he had harangued on the 14th, and amongst whom his proclamation had been most freely circulated. It had been their own unadulterated work ; conceived by their own brains, neither prompted from outside, nor produced by contact with other regiments. It became evident then, even to Mr. Colvin, that other means than those which he had employed

Effects of
the mutiny at
Mathurá on
Mr. Colvin.

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May 31.

would be necessary to put down "this daring mutiny."

The intelligence of the mutiny at Mathurá reached Mr. Colvin at midnight of the same day on which it occurred. The bearer of it was Mr. Drummond, the magistrate. At the time when the first "general council" was held at A'gra Mr. Drummond had been of opinion that the disaffection was partial, and that our policy should be to appear to trust everyone. It was Mr. Drummond who had most strenuously opposed Mr. Colvin's policy of retiring within the fort. But Mr. Drummond's views were altered now. Far from endeavouring to restrain the action of the Lieutenant-Governor he had now to stimulate it. Mr. Drummond, then, when he woke Mr. Colvin with the news of the Mathurá disaster, pointed out to him the necessity it had created of at once disarming the regiments at A'gra. And when Mr. Colvin, only half-convinced, seemed inclined to hesitate, the magistrate called attention to the fact that any sudden outbreak on the part of the sepoys would probably result in the liberation of the prisoners from the jail, with its consequent disorder and possible disaster. Then Mr. Colvin hesitated no longer. The order was at once issued for a general parade the following morning.

He resolves
to disarm the
A'gra bri-
gade.

At dawn of day on the 31st of May the troops were drawn up on the A'gra parade-ground. There was Captain D'Oyley's battery, the 3rd Europeans, and the two native regiments—these so posted as to be under the fire of the Euro-

peans. The Brigadier—Brigadier Polwhele—an officer of the Indian army—then directed the commandants of the native infantry regiments to order arms to be piled. The order was given. “There was a moment of hesitation, a look of discontent. The officers sternly reiterated the order. Silent and sullen, the sepoys obeyed—piled their arms, and marched off to their lines. The 44th and 67th Regiments, whose colours had waved from the Indus to the Brahmapútra, were no more.” *

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Disarms
them.

Fuller effect was now given to the carrying out of the resolution passed at the general council regarding the organisation of volunteers, horse and foot. The class appealed to, composed of clerks in the public offices, pensioned soldiers, Eurasians, tradesmen, independent gentlemen, responded freely to the call. A body of infantry was formed for the protection of the station itself, whilst Horse Volunteers were enrolled to guard and escort to the fort the women and children in case of a sudden rising, and to afford aid to fugitives from neighbouring stations.

Raises volun-
teers.

Notwithstanding the disarming of the sepoyes the mind of Mr. Colvin was far from easy. The country around A'gra was in a blaze. Direct communication with the districts to the north-

Difficulties of
Mr. Colvin's
position.

* Raikes's *Notes on the Revolt*. Mr. Raikes adds: “On the European regiment when examining the musquets, in church, to rush upon the many were founded loaded guns, and then to shoot, plunder, and burn, from one end well known, that on this very of Agra to the other.”

Sunday morning. the sepoyes

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west had been cut off in the last week of May; that with Calcutta was severed the first week in June. In the capital of his own provinces the Lieutenant-Governor was isolated. One by one the towns and districts around him fell away from his grasp. The disbanding of the sepoys, and the presence of a regiment of European infantry and of a battery of European artillery, had for the moment saved A'gra. But A'gra was within seventy miles of the capital of the greatest of the Maráthá rulers, faithful himself to the British, but whose troops, levied in the recruiting ground which had supplied the British native army, were not to be perfectly trusted. A'gra again was the natural and historical point of attack for the contingents of the native princes of Central India,—and, however favourable might have been Mr. Colvin's opinion of the native princes, the example of Bharatpúr had led to the inference that their contingents sympathised with the mutineers.

Mr. Colvin's position, then, even after he had, by disbanding his two native regiments, removed the immediate danger, was extremely critical. Every day events were passing beyond his control; his power to initiate was disappearing; it was becoming more incumbent upon him to shape his action so as to meet the manœuvres of others. The initiative in fact had passed into the hands of the rebels.

The initiative
passes into
the hands of
the rebels.

The Gwálíár
contingent.

The danger nearest to him was that which might come from the Gwálíár contingent. I have stated in a preceding page that immediately after

the outbreak at Mírath Sindia had placed a considerable body of troops of his contingent, commanded by British officers, at the disposal of the Lieutenant-Governor. But these men were the brothers of our sepoys, allied to them by caste, by religion, by sympathy. Sindia not only did not trust them, but he had warned the British political agent at his Court, Major Charters Macpherson, that they would inevitably seize their opportunity to follow the example set them at Mírath and Dehlí. Major Macpherson, an officer of a stamp especially fostered by the East India Company, thoroughly acquainted with the natives of India and trusted by them, pointed out then to the Mahárájá, that, holding the convictions he had expressed regarding the men of his contingent, it would become him to show the sincerity of his attachment to his Suzerain by placing his body-guard, Maráthás of his own kindred or caste, at the disposal of the Lieutenant-Governor. To this proposal Sindia had acceded, and the body-guard had been sent off to A'gra. Later events were to show that not even the comrades and kinsmen of the Mahárájá had been able to escape the infection.

The Gwálíár contingent was composed of four field batteries of artillery, a small siege train, two regiments of cavalry, and seven of infantry, aggregating eight thousand three hundred and eighteen men. The greater portion of the force was stationed at Gwálíár, under the command of Brigadier Ramsay, with outposts at Sipri and A'gar.

The cantonment at Gwálíár was occupied by

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Sindia sends
his body-
guard to
A'gra

Policy of
having the

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May.

Ladies at
Gwaliar.

They are sent
to the Resi-
dency,

but ordered
back to can-
tonments.

Forebodings
of disaster.

the officers of the contingent, their wives and families. It may excite surprise that with the avowed conviction of the Mahárájá regarding the degree of confidence that could be placed in the soldiers of the contingent—convictions shared by his Prime Minister, Dinkar Rao ; by the Resident, Major Macpherson ; and communicated, it must be presumed, to the Lieutenant-Governor—the ladies and children should not have been placed in security, whilst yet there was time to remove them. - The subject had not been neglected. The Mahárájá himself had, so early as the last week of May, suggested the removal of the ladies and children from cantonments to the Residency, which was beyond the city, and about five miles from the cantonments. It so happened that, on the 28th of May, in consequence of a strong impression that the sepoys would rise that night, the ladies did actually spend a night there, protected by a portion of the Mahárájá's own guard. Well would it have been if they had been allowed to remain, or if they had been sent to A'gra ! But on receiving a remonstrance from the native officers, affirming the excellent disposition of their men, and protesting against the slur which had been cast upon them by the transfer to the protection of the Mahárájá of the ladies and children, the Brigadier recalled the latter to the station.

Though confidence had disappeared the illusion was maintained. Almost every post brought in vain to Gwaliar convincing proofs that of all possible illusions this was the most baseless.

With rumours of the wildest character from the North-West there came from places nearer at hand accounts in detail the truth of which was apparent. Now it was that the troops at Ajmír and at Nasírbád had mutinied, and had made their way to Dehlí; now, that their example had been followed by the Nímach garrison; now, that the province of Rohilkhand had risen; now, that there had been a massacre at Jhansi; and now, that the panic had even reached Calcutta. From Kánpúr, from Alláhbád, and from the stations in their vicinity, the absence of news gave birth to even more sinister forebodings.

Such was the life from day to day in Gwálíár during the first fortnight of June 1857. It was a life of terrible suspense, of pressure on the nervous system, difficult to endure.* “Suspense,” has declared a great writer, “suspense is agony, but decision may be despair.” There were some of our countrywomen at Gwálíár, one certainly of the fairest and most gifted amongst them, to whom it was allotted to pass through the suspense to succumb in the end to the ruthless and too cruel decision. At one time during that fortnight it had been almost resolved to send the ladies in

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Chapter L

1857.
June.

The terrible
suspense.

* “We live in a state of it), as we were determined not dreadful uncertainty,” writes to die without a struggle. Mrs. Coopland (*A Lady's Escape from Gwalior*). “My husband seldom undressed at night, and I had a dress always ready to escape in. My husband's rifle was kept loaded (I learned to load and fire

Oh! the misery of those days! None but the condemned criminal can know what it is to wait death passively; and even he is not kept in suspense, and knows he will be put to a merciful end.”

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1857.
June 12.

Reaches the
verge of de-
spair.

The crisis at
Gwálíár.

June 14.

to A'gra, and a proposal to that effect had been made to the Lieutenant-Governor. The idea that he would accede to this plan kindled some hope in the minds of those most interested. But on the 12th that hope was blighted. A telegram from Mr. Colvin directed that the ladies were not to be sent into A'gra until mutiny should have broken out at Gwálíár.*

At last the crisis came. It was Sunday, the 14th of June. The Europeans in Gwálíár had attended the service of the Church in the morning, passing on their way many sepoys loitering about the road. During the day fuller details of the Jhánsí massacre had been received—details but ill-calculated to dispel the gloom that hung over the station. The prevailing idea in the minds of the residents as they read those details was that the same fate was reserved for themselves,—“for now they were more than ever isolated, revolted provinces on three sides of them, and the telegraphic communication with

* *A Lady's Escape from Gwalior* by Mrs. Coopland. With admirable good sense Mrs. Coopland indicates the fatal error of thus keeping ladies and children in a dangerous position. “Before this,” she adds “my husband had often wished to send me to Agra; but he would not desert his post and I would not leave him. I have often thought since that had I done so he might have escaped, by riding off unimpeded by me; many unmarried officers having es-

caped in this way. When the mutinies first began, if all the ladies and children at the numerous small stations had been instantly sent away to Calcutta or some place of safety before the roads were obstructed, their husbands and fathers would probably have had a better chance of escape. Instead of which, the lives of men, women, and children were sacrificed, through the efforts to avoid arousing the suspicion of the troops.”

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—
1857.
June 14.

Begins by an
act of incen-
diarism.

A'gra severed." * Suddenly, about midday, the alarm was given that one of the bungalows was on fire. This circumstance, the unvarying precursor elsewhere of a rising, warned the residents that their hour had arrived. But they had prepared themselves for a crisis of that character.

Waterpots had been stored up in readiness. On the alarm then being given the occupiers of the several thatched houses had their roofs well saturated. But the wind was high, incendiaries were creeping about, and there were some houses not at the moment occupied. The fire speedily spread to the Mess-house and thence to a large swimming bath-house adjoining it. These and the bungalow first attacked by the flames were burnt to the ground. But the further progress of the fire was then arrested. The wind fell, precautions had been taken, every European was on the look out, and the day had not waned.

Few, however, doubted as to the course events would take as soon as darkness should set in. A little incident confirmed the already too certain conviction. Mrs. Coopland, the wife of the

* "My husband laid down death-stroke. The dread calm and tried to get a little sleep, of apprehension was awful. he was so worn out. He had We indeed drank the cup of just before been telling me bitterness to the dregs. The the particulars of the Jhansi massacre, too frightful to be repeated; and we did not know how soon we might meet the same fate ourselves.

"I hope few will know how awful it is to wait quietly for death. There was now no escape; and we waited for our

could not have borne the horrible suspense."—Mrs. Coopland.

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—
1857.
June 14.

Keen insight
of Mrs. Coop-
land.

The mutiny
breaks out.

chaplain of Gwáliár, relates* that on that afternoon she and her husband went for a drive. “We saw scarcely anyone about, everything looked as it had done for days past; but as we were returning, we passed several parties of sepoys, none of whom saluted us. We met the Brigadier and Major Blake, who were just going to pass a party of sepoys, and I remember saying to my husband, ‘If the sepoy don’t salute the Brigadier the storm is nigh at hand.’ *They did not.*”

The instincts of Mrs. Coopland were true. The storm was nigh at hand. That night, immediately after the firing of the evening gun—9 P.M.—the sepoy of the Gwáliár contingent rose in revolt. They fired the lines, sounded the alarm, and rushed from their huts in tumultuous disorder, discharging their loaded muskets. The officers, as in duty bound, galloped down to the lines in the vain endeavour to recall their men to order. They were met by murderous volleys directed at them. Captain Stewart commanding a battery of artillery was severely wounded, and afterwards when a prisoner was deliberately shot dead. The return of his riderless horse to the house-door conveyed the sad news to his wife. She herself, fair and bright as the Morning Star, did not long survive him. She, too, was shot dead, and her boy with her. The sepoy spared her little girl. Major Hawkins, also commanding a battery, Majors Shirreff and Blake, commandants of infantry regiments, shared the same fate.

* *A Lady's Escape from Gwalior.*

Dr. Kirk, the superintending surgeon, was discovered in the place in which he had sought refuge and was killed before the eyes of his wife.* Mr. Coopland, violently separated from his wife, who was spared, was murdered.† Others managed to escape; but of the fourteen British officers present that morning at Gwáliár one half were slain. With them likewise, three women and three children, and six sergeants and pensioners.‡

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June 14.

Its fatal re-
sults.

* Then poor Mrs. Kirke, dared not come in, as they with her little boy joined us. She had that instant seen her husband shot before her eyes; and on her crying: ‘Kill me too!’ they answered, “No; we have killed you in killing him. Her arms were bruised and swollen; they had torn off her bracelets so roughly; even her wedding ring was gone. They spared her little boy, saying, “Don’t kill the butcha (child); it is a missie baba (girl).” Poor child; his long curls and girlish face saved his life. He was only four years of age.”—Mrs. Coopland.

† “We all stood up together in the corner of the hut” (to which they had been conveyed by Mr. Blake’s faithful Mahomedan servant, Mírza); “each of us took up one of the logs of wood that lay on the ground, as some means of defence. I did not know if my husband had his gun, as it was too dark in the hut even to see our faces. The sepoy then began to pull off the roof; the cowardly wretches

‡ Mrs. Stewart was the only lady killed; but with her her boy and her European nurse. The wife of a warrant officer was also killed. The officers murdered were Dr. Kirk, Ma-

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The survivors
find their way
to A'gra.

Those who escaped, men, women, and children, made their way as best they could, some in parties, one or two almost singly, into A'gra.* Their sufferings were great. The agony of that terrible night weighed upon them long afterwards. The widowed wife, the orphaned child, the bereaved mother, were indeed bound to each other by the sympathy of a common sorrow. But until A'gra was reached danger seemed still to threaten them all. They, the survivors, could derive little satisfaction from the fact that their dear ones had been shot down solely because the Government had been afraid to show mistrust of the sepoys. Their present condition was the result of that simulated reliance. They felt, then, as they had felt before, that the timely withdrawal of the ladies and children would have at least given the officers a chance of escape. But now all was over. The murdered husbands had died in the performance of rigorous duty. The wives, the children, who had perished, had been the holocausts of a policy, timid, irrational, even provocative of disaster. In deciding to have recourse to such a policy the impress of a strong character had been painfully wanting.

Intelligence of the Gwáliár mutiny reached A'gra on the 15th. Following it came likewise the information that the Mahárájá, and his able minister, Dinkar Rao, still loyal and true, would

join Shirreff, Blake, Hawkins, through the Dhólpúr country, Captain Stewart, Lieutenant the Rájá of which was pro-Proctor, and the Reverend Mr. Coopland. his provision of conveyances

* Many of them came and escort.

use every means in their power to restrain the over-charged aspirations of their followers and their sepoys. But graver events were at hand. Central India had risen; Rohilkhand had risen; and it was soon seen that the safety of A'gra was imperilled from without. It will be my duty now to recount the nature of these perils, and then to describe the mode in which they were met by the ruling powers of the North-West Provinces.

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June 15.

Risings all
about A'gra.

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THE events which were occurring at the period at which we have arrived at Alláhábád, Kánhpúr, Banáras, and in the Mírath division have been already related. From those quarters there came no light to A'gra. From others, within and without the circle of the North-West Provinces, issued those menacing demonstrations which forced at last a decisive policy on the Government. These have now to be noticed.

In writing the history of the mutiny in the North-West Provinces, it has to be borne in mind that three central positions stand out, each distinct from the others, and each attracting to itself separate attacks, unconnected with the others. These three central positions were A'gra—the point aimed at by the mutineers on the right bank of the Jamná—by those, in a word, issuing from Central India :—Kánhpúr, connected henceforth intimately with Oudh :—and Dehlí, attracting the rebels from Rohilkhand and the

Three central
points in the
North-West.

northern part of the Doáb. To preserve, then, unbroken the narrative of the events affecting A'gra as a main central point, it is necessary that I should leave for a future chapter the stations and districts on the left bank of the Jamná, and endeavour to concentrate the attention of the reader on Bandalkhand, Central India, and on Rájpútáná.

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The town of Jhánsí lies one hundred and forty-two miles south of A'gra. It is the capital of the province of the same name. The history of this province has been peculiar. Amid the general plunder and robbery which accompanied the break-up of the Moghol empire under the successors of Aurangzib, a portion of Bandalkhand belonging to the dominions of the Rájá of Urchá had been appropriated by one of the Maráthá officers serving under the Péshwá, and to him confirmed by *sanad*. The territory so appropriated, containing nearly three thousand square miles and a population of about a quarter of a million, was called after the chief town within its borders, Jhánsí. As long as the power of the Péshwá lasted the Maráthá officer and his successors ruled Jhánsí as vassals of that prince. But on the downfall of the Péshwá in 1817 the territories possessed by him in Bandalkhand and elsewhere were ceded to the British. Amongst these territories was Jhánsí, the ruler of which, known under the title of Súbádár, accepted the protection of the British, and agreed to pay an annual tribute of seventy-four thousand rupees of the currency of his State. In return the British

Its early his-
tory

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Government declared him hereditary ruler of the country. The name of the Súbádár with whom this arrangement was concluded was Rám Chand Rao. Fifteen years later the British Government, to mark their approval of his rule, exchanged his title of Súbádár for the higher rank of Rájá. Rám Chand Rao enjoyed his new dignity for three years and then died without issue (1835).

The Rájá had died, and had left no direct heir, natural or adopted. But in the guarantee given eighteen years before the State had been declared to be hereditary in his family. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the British Government to acknowledge as Rájá the member of that family nearest in relationship to the deceased. Ultimately the choice fell upon Rao Ragonáth Rao, his uncle.

This man was incapable and a leper. After three years of unpopular rule he died, and the throne became again vacant.

There were several claimants to succeed him. Their pretensions were examined by a commission appointed by the Governor-General of India, and after a long interregnum all but one were pronounced invalid. The excepted claim was that of Bábá Gangádhar Rao, brother of the deceased. He, therefore, was nominated Rájá.

Meanwhile the revenues of the country had been falling. During the reign of the leper there had been practically no government. Everywhere disorder had been rampant. Bábá Gangádhar Rao was not the man to remedy this state of things. He, too, was an imbecile, and it was

Disputes regarding the succession.

conjectured that under his sway, disorder, far from being checked, would be increased tenfold.

Under these circumstances, the British Government stepped in as the paramount power and resolved to carry on the administration of the country by means of British agency. To the Rájá an annual allowance was granted, and he was informed that the government of the country would only be made over to him when it should appear that he was fit to conduct it properly.

That happy period arrived in 1843. By the exertions of the British officers the country had been restored to more than its former prosperity. It was then made over to the Rájá, subject to a small cession of territory in commutation of the annual payment previously made for the support of the Bandalkhand legion.

Bábá Gangádhar Ráo ruled Jhánsí for eleven years neither very wisely nor very well. He died in 1854 without heirs. He was the last male descendant of the family to which the British Government in 1817 had guaranteed the right of succession. The Governor-General of the day, Lord Dalhousie, was of opinion that the treaty of 1817, whilst it did guarantee the right of succession to the members of a certain family, gave no right of adoption, after the disappearance of that family, to the widow of its latest representative. He was fortified in this view by the opinion of the commission appointed by Lord Auckland in 1848, and which had unanimously rejected the pretensions of all the claimants excepting one. And now that one had died, childless. Lord

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British
agency intro-
duced.

The Rájá re-
stored.

He dies with-
out heirs.

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—
1857.

Jhánsí is declared a lapse.
Anger of the Rání.

Dalhousie, therefore, in spite of the protestations of the widow of the deceased Rájá, declared the State of Jhánsí to have lapsed to the paramount power.

This happened in 1854. The three years which had passed between that date and the period of which I am writing had in no way reconciled the Rání to a policy which she regarded as unjust to herself, and insulting to the family of her late husband. On the contrary, the year 1857 found her brooding over her griefs and panting for revenge.

The British Government regarded her anger and her remonstrances with careless indifference. They did what was even worse, they added meanness to insult. On the confiscation of the State, they had granted to the widowed Rání a pension of £6000 a year. The Rání had first refused, but had ultimately agreed to accept this pension. Her indignation may be imagined when she found herself called upon to pay, out of a sum which she regarded as a mere pittance, the debts of her late husband.

Bitter as was her remonstrance against a course which she considered not less as an insult than as a fraud, it was unavailing. Uselessly she urged that the British had taken the debts of the late ruler with the kingdom of which they had despoiled her. Mr. Colvin insisted, and caused the amount to be deducted from her pension. Other grievances, such as the slaughter of kine amid a Hindú population, and the resumption of grants made by former rulers for the support of Hindú

The British
Government
takes no pains
to mollify her.

1857.
May.

temples, whilst fomenting the discontent of the population with their change of masters, formed subjects for further remonstrance; but the personal indignity was that which rankled the most deeply in the breast of this high-spirited lady, and made her hail with gratitude the symptoms of disaffection, which, in the early part of 1857, began to appear amongst the native soldiers of the hated English.

The garrison of Jhánsí was composed entirely of native troops. There was a detachment of Garrison of Jhánsí in 1857. Foot Artillery, the left wing of the 12th Regiment of Native Infantry, the head-quarters and right wing of the 14th Irregular Cavalry. Jhánsí is a walled town, overlooked by a stone fort surmounted by a round tower. The cantonments lay outside, and at a little distance from the town. Within their limits was comprehended a small fort, occupied by the artillery and containing the treasure-chest, called the Star Fort. The troops were commanded by Captain Dunlop, of the 12th Native Cavalry. The political and administrative officer was Captain Alexander Skene.

The account of the events at Mírath on the 10th of May produced the effects which might have been expected on the mind of the Rání of Jhánsí. Her hopes at once revived. From the doors of her palace there started at once confidential servants towards the sepoy lines. These returned with reports fully responding to her highest hopes. The time so eagerly longed for was approaching. Her task, then, was to lull the English into security. It would appear that in

The Rání is encouraged by the Mírath revolt.

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1857.
May.

Throws dust
into the eyes
of the offi-
cials,

the political officer, Captain Skeno, she had soft material to work upon. She succeeded so well in impressing the mind of this gentleman with a conviction of her loyalty, that she obtained from him permission to enlist a body of armed men for her own protection from any attack from the sepoy! This permission obtained, she rapidly invited the old soldiers of the State to rally round her, at the same time that she secretly caused to be unearthed heavy guns which had been buried at the time of her husband's death.

Meanwhile, Captain Skene, utterly unconscious of the impending danger, was reporting to his Government his confidence in the state of affairs at Jhánsí. Neither from the native soldiers of the Company, from the levies of the Rání, nor from the nobles of Jhánsí, did he apprehend the smallest disturbance. Captain Dunlop and his brother officers were almost equally trustful. Reports were made to them from time to time regarding the difficulty felt by spies in their attempts to enter the lines of the men. The fact that difficulty should have been experienced was, in their eyes, a sufficient proof of the fidelity of the sepoy. Besides, Captain Dunlop trusted the irregular cavalry, and he felt satisfied that with their aid he could suppress in the bud any outbreak on the part of the other native soldiers.

who trust
her, and the
sepoy.

Incendiariism
at Jhánsí.

The burning of the bungalows occupied by the English officers at Jhánsí, the invariable precursor of a rising, did not disturb the serenity of Captains Skene and Dunlop. A fire, which occurred on the 1st of June, was attributed to accident. But

1857.
June 5.The sepoys
seize the
Star Fort.

on the afternoon of the 5th of June an event occurred the bearings of which it was impossible to mistake. A company of the 12th Regiment of Native Infantry, led by one of its native sergeants, and cheered on by the native gunners of the battery, marched straight into the Star Fort, and announced their intention to hold it on their own account. Captain Dunlop rushed instantly to the parade-ground, accompanied by his officers. The remaining four companies of the regiment professed themselves highly indignant at the conduct of the rebellious company, and they and the cavalry declared they would stand by their officers. The following morning they were paraded. They repeated their protestations. Captain Dunlop was then proceeding to prepare measures to bring the revolted company to reason. Whilst engaged in these preparations at the quarter-guard of his regiment he was visited by Captain Skene, and by his assistant, Captain Gordon. After these had left him, Dunlop wrote some letters and posted them himself. But on his way back from the post office he was shot dead by his own men.

In fact the preconcerted day had arrived. The capture of the Star Fort on the 5th had simply been a feeler to test the officers. Finding on the following morning that these were as credulous as they had been the preceding day the sepoys resolved to strike at once. The afternoon of the 6th, then, the Ráni, escorted by her new levies, came from her palace, and went in procession towards the cantonment. As she issued from the town, a Múlla called all the true

The affair de-
velops into
mutiny.

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CHAPTER II.

1857.
JUNE 6.

The muti-
neers kill
their officers.

Some officers
occupy the
larger fort,

believers to prayers. This was the signal. The cavalry and infantry at once rose in revolt.

They met Captain Dunlop, as already stated, on his return from the post office, and shot him dead. With him, another officer, Ensign Taylor. The Irregular Cavalry scoured the plain with loaded carbines in pursuit of others. The sergeant-major, Newton, was their next victim. Then Lieutenant Turnbull, of the Survey, an officer of the highest promise, who, however, did not succumb until he had made his assailants pay dearly for their treachery. Lieutenant Campbell, the only officer with the irregular cavalry, was wounded, but being well mounted, he succeeded in reaching the larger fort in safety.

Meanwhile, Captains Skene and Gordon had returned to that larger fort. There also were the wife and two children of the former; Lieutenant Burgess, of the Survey Department; Dr. McEgan, 12th Regiment of Native Infantry, and his wife; Lieutenant Powys, of the Canal Department, his wife and child; Mr. W. S. Carshore, collector of Customs, and his family; Mr. T. Andrews; Mr. R. Andrews and family; Mrs. Browne and her daughter; Mr. Scott and family; Messrs. Purcell, two brothers; two brothers Crawford; Mr. Elliot, Mr. Fleming, and others in the subordinate departments of the Government, chiefly Eurasians, and whose names I have been unable to ascertain. The total number, including women and children, was fifty-five.

The sepoy having killed all the officers on whom they could lay hands marched with loud

shouts towards the fort overlooking the town. But Captain Skene and his comrades had not been inattentive spectators of the scene in cantonments. They had bestirred themselves with the instinct of self-preservation to defend their position. Rifles had been distributed ; the ladies told off to cast bullets and to cook ; piles of stones had been heaped up behind the gates, and positions allotted to each member of the garrison. When, therefore, the rebels approached the fort, they were received with so well directed a fire that they fell back in confusion to prepare renewed efforts for the morrow.

The resource now available to the besiegers lay in the guns which the Rání had unearthed. During the night these, and the smaller *matériel* from the cantonment, were placed in position. On their side, too, the English had held a council of war. A successful defence seemed impossible. Guns, provisions, a continued supply of water, were all wanting. It was decided, then, at that council to send three of the garrison under a safe-conduct to treat with the Rání for the retirement of the men, women, and children within the fort, to a place of security in British territory.

On the morning of the 7th, Messrs. Andrews, Scott, and Purcell, issued from the fort. They were almost immediately seized by the rebels, and conveyed by them to the palace. The Rání by this time had become thoroughly intoxicated with the success that had been achieved. Declaring that “she had no concern with the English swine,” she ordered the three prisoners to be taken to the Rissaldar, commanding the Irregular Cavalry, for

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which they
prepare for
defence,

and repulse
the sepoys.

Send three
envoys to
treat with
the Rání,

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who has them
killed.

The rebels
renew their
attack,

but are re-
pulsed.

The garrison
discover tra-
itors within.

orders. This was equivalent to their death-warrant. The Englishmen were then dragged out of the palace. Mr. Andrews was killed before its gates by a native who was supposed to harbour a grudge against him; the two others were despatched beyond the walls of the town.

The rebels then renewed their attack on the fort but again without success. The guns had not been brought up. On the following morning (the 8th) this operation was attempted, and soon after daybreak a brisk cannonade was opened against the walls. But whether from want of skill, or from defect in the guns, not a single brick was displaced by the fire.* A stray shot, however, carried off Captain Gordon. The fire of the musketry from the fort did, meanwhile, a great deal of execution, and the rebels were deterred from approaching too near to its gates.

Hope was now beginning to dawn upon the fated garrison, when, as if the overwhelming force outside was not a sufficient foe to contend against, they discovered treachery within the fort. Certain native servants had been admitted for the performance of menial offices. Two of these men, in concert with the rebels outside, were found in the act of opening the door of a secret passage communicating with the town. Lieutenant Powys, who discovered them, shot one man dead, but was himself cut down by the other. Captain Burgess avenged him in a second and the two traitors were laid prone side by side in a ditch.

* Narrative of a native of the Collector of Customs Bengal attached to the office at Jhánsí.

This attempt frustrated, the garrison attempted to open communication with Nagód and Gwáliár. But the bold men (Eurasians) who attempted to carry out this resolve were intercepted and killed. Provisions now began to fail; ammunition was becoming scarce—assistance from outside seemed impossible. Despair seemed to clutch at the smallest chance of escape. Just at the moment one seemed to present itself. The Ráni and the sepoys had been baffled by the unexpected resistance offered. What if it should continue? What if these Europeans had supplies of which they knew nothing? Their own guns had failed: assault was dangerous; would it not be advisable to get these bold men into their power by soft promises, and then to make away with them?

This idea, so consonant to the principle of Asiatic warfare, had no sooner been entertained than it was acted upon. The Ráni sent messengers to the fort under a flag of truce, demanding a parley. Captain Skene responded. The native messengers then declared that the Ráni wanted only the fort; that if the Europeans would lay down their arms and surrender the position they held they should be escorted to some other station. These terms having been affirmed by the most solemn oaths, Captain Skene, on behalf of the garrison, acceded to them. They seemed indeed to offer the only chance of life. The members of the garrison then laid down their arms, and walked out of the fort.

Then commenced the last act of the drama. No sooner had the Europeans issued from the

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June 8.

The Ráni
offers terms.

which are
accepted.

Massacre of
the garrison.

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June 8.

fort than the rebels fell upon, bound them, and carried them to a garden, called the Jókan Bágh. Arrived there, they were halted near a cluster of trees. The word then passed that the Ressaldar had ordered them to be massacred. The prisoners, disarmed and bound, were then ranged in three lines, the first containing the adult males, the second the adult females, the third the children. Then, suddenly, the head native official of the jail raised his sword and cut down Captain Skene. This was the signal. The murderers then went to work, each armed with a lethal weapon. The captives were pitilessly hewn down. Not a man, woman, or child, survived that afternoon's butchery.

Such was the massacre of Jhánsí. A doubt has been raised as to the complicity of the Rání in the atrocious deed. But it must be remembered that not only was it the Rání who had instigated the slaughter of the three envoys sent by Captain Skene the morning after the investment, but it was she who profited by the slaughter. She wished to be rid of the English that she might seize the principality which she considered to be rightfully her own, and she hesitated not at the means by which they were moved from her path. What followed the massacre? For a moment it seemed very doubtful whether the Rání and the revolted sepoys would not quarrel about the division of the spoil. The latter even threatened to bring upon the scene an illegitimate relation of the late Rájá as a rival. But the Rání was a very clever woman. The sepoys had their price, and she

The Rání
bribes the
sepoy,

was prepared to pay it. She wanted the title,—they the coin. She gave them the coin. Whereupon they proclaimed her Rání of Jhánsí. She proved herself a most capable ruler. She opened a mint, fortified the strong places, cast cannon, raised fresh troops. Into every act of her government she threw all the energy of a strong and resolute character. Possessing considerable personal attractions, being young, vigorous, and not afraid to show herself to the multitude, she gained a great influence over the hearts of her people. It was this influence, this force of character, added to a splendid and inspiring courage, that enabled her some months later to offer to the English troops, under Sir Hugh Rose, a resistance which, made to a less able commander, might even have been successful.

The right wing of the 12th Regiment of Native Infantry, the left of the 14th Irregular Cavalry, and a detachment of native Artillery,—constituting in fact a moiety of the force located at Jhánsí—were, during this period, stationed at Naogáng, about two hundred miles eastward of Jhánsí. The station was commanded by Major Kirke, of the 12th Native Infantry. At Naogáng perfect confidence reigned up to the 23rd of May. On that day, however, a sepoy reported the presence in the lines of a suspicious character. The report of the sepoy caused considerable excitement. It related to natives of Bandalkhand, men not connected with the sepoys, who were supposed to harbour a design to massacre the British officers. By some the story was credited,

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and is pro-
claimed Rání
of Jhánsí.

Her great
abilities.

Naogáng.

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—
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Precautions
taken by the
authorities.

News arrives
from Jhánsí.

by others it was disbelieved. It had, however, this apparently most gratifying result that the sepoys manifested towards their officers a warmth of affection which touched to the quick those who were the objects of it.

During the week that followed, although many circumstances occurred well calculated to rouse suspicion, the confidence of the British officers never wavered. They slept every night in their lines, and took every opportunity of showing unlimited trust in their men. But on the 30th of May reports of intentions expressed by the native gunners to rise were again rife. Four men, proved to be implicated in this plot, were dismissed from the station, and subsequently to that night Major Kirke took the precaution to have the guns of the battery brought in front of the quarter-guard of the 12th Regiment.

Quiet now seemed to be restored. On the morning of the 5th of June the men of four companies of the 12th even volunteered to serve against the rebels. Those of the 5th company were about to express a similar wish, when suddenly an express arrived from Jhánsí, written by Captain Dunlop, with the information that the artillery and infantry at that place had mutinied. This intelligence caused great excitement amongst the native soldiers, but it elicited from them, especially from the infantry, enthusiastic expressions of fidelity to their officers.

Quite assured regarding his men, Major Kirke at once took steps to open communications with Jhánsí and Lalatpúr. For four days nothing

occurred to disturb public order. On the 9th, however, the news of the mutiny of the four companies of the 12th at Jhánsí and of the murder of Captain Dunlop and Ensign Taylor reached the station. The following day brought tidings still more disastrous. The native magistrate of Maoránpúr wrote that morning to Major Kirke to inform him of the murder of every European in Jhánsí, and that he had received an official order to the effect "that the Rání of Jhánsí was seated on the throne, and that he was to carry on business as hitherto."

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June 9.

Further in-
telligence
from that
place.

The effect of this news was electric. At sunset of that day as the guards were being paraded three Sikhs of the 12th Regiment came to the front, shot the native sergeant-major through the head, and seized the guns. The English sergeant-major, fired at ineffectually, fled to the mess-house to warn the officers. The latter hurried down to the lines. But by this time the farce of loyalty had been played out. The officers arrived in time only to see their sepoy's, the cavalry troopers, and the artillerymen, in full revolt.

The sepoy's
at Naogang
mutiny.

In vain were these adjured to remain faithful. The *furore* was on them. There was nothing, then, for the Europeans and their families to do but to retire, if retirement were still possible. They attempted it, accompanied by a number, increased ultimately to eighty-seven, of their men who still remained faithful.

The story of that retirement has been written by four of the survivors. It is a story of misery and suffering hardly to be surpassed. First it was

The British
leave the
station.

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June 9.

decided to move on Chatarpúr, but in the darkness of the night the fugitives took by mistake a road which branched off to Garáolí. This mistake saved them. The mutineers, counting upon their choosing the Chatarpúr road, followed the fugitives, after they had plundered the station, in that direction. Other rebels had been sent to occupy different points in the main line of retreat, and they, too, were waiting for the disheartened Europeans. The mutineers, finding these men on the road, and learning that our countrymen had not passed, retraced their steps. The fugitives, meanwhile, making mistake after mistake as to the road, still pressed onwards, and were fortunate enough to reach Chatarpúr by a circuitous route, unmolested, by daybreak the following morning.

Are well received at Chatarpúr.

Chatarpúr was the capital of a small State governed by a Rání. This lady behaved well and loyally. Though pressed by her Mahomedan advisers to follow the example set at Jhánsí, she rejected their counsel, and showed her intention to defend the English to the utmost of her power.

The fugitives halted at Chatarpúr the 11th and 12th. On the last named day, two officers, Captain Scott and Lieutenant Townshend, were sent into Naogáng to reconnoitre the state of affairs there. Strange to say these two Europeans succeeded, by the simple discharge of their guns, in re-asserting British authority there for the few hours they remained. They returned, however, the same evening.

The fugitives left their hospitable quarters at Chatarpúr on the night of the 12th, and marched in the direction of Alláhbád. Hearing, however, on the 16th, of the mutinies at Bandá and Hamirpúr, they changed the route on the 17th to Kalingarh. That night they found their progress stopped by bandits who occupied a pass it was necessary they should traverse. The bandits demanded money. The British officers wished to force the pass. The faithful sepoys, assenting at first, recommended in the end that the money should be paid. It was paid. But next morning before daybreak, as our party was preparing to move on, the bandits commenced a fire upon them. The faithful sepoys began to fire wildly in return, but with the exception of ten or twelve, they speedily dispersed. All attempts to rally them were vain. The fugitives were now deserted. One of their number, Lieutenant Townshend, fell shot through the heart. The others, returning the bandits' fire, moved as best they could in one direction—whither they knew not. Fortunately the road they had taken led to the hospitable territory of Chatarpúr. Across the border the bandits did not follow them, and though some villagers fired at them, they reached the village of Kalrai at 3 P.M.

Not all of them, however. Townshend had been shot through the heart; Major Kirke and Mrs. Smalley, and a native, had succumbed to sun-stroke or apoplexy. The women and children had been brought on with the greatest difficulty. The officers had given up their horses, and on these the

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June 16.

Their suffer-
ings after
leaving
Chatarpúr.

Their losses.

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June 17-18.

**Are terribly
reduced in
number.**

non-combatants had been laden like so many sacks. On that day and on those that followed many of these poor creatures perished, and had to be left by the wayside.

There was no safety for the English at Kalrai. The majority of them—for some, and all the Eurasians, elected to remain behind—pushed on to Mahóba. By this time the party was reduced to seven officers, one sergeant, two civilians, three women, two children,*—with nine horses amongst them. The other Europeans had either been killed, had died, or had stayed behind at Kalrai.

The fugitives moved on again on the 20th of June; but they were attacked on their way and dispersed. The subsequent sufferings which some of them endured were extraordinary. Dr Mawe, Lieutenant Barber, Lieutenant Ewart, and Mrs. Smalley's child, died of sunstroke or fatigue. Sergeant Kirchoff, assaulted by the villagers, was left for dead, but ultimately escaped. Captain Scott saved Mrs Mawe's child, carrying it in front of him whilst Mrs. Smalley sat behind. The villagers, especially those in British territory, were found generally most hostile. But for the generous kindness of the Nawáb of Bandá and of the Rání of Azigarh not one of the fugitives would have escaped. The Nawáb and the Rání did more than protect them in their States,—they used every means in their power to assuage the hostility of the villagers. To them alone was it

**Further
sufferings.**

Reach Banda.

* Their names were, Captain Mawe and child, Mr. Harvey Scot, Lieutenants Ewart, Kirke, Mrs. Smalley and child, Barber, Jackson, Remington, Sergeant Kirchoff and wife, and Franks, Dr. Mawe, Mrs.

due that a remnant of the party which had fled from Naogáng succeeded ultimately in reaching territory still possessed by the British.*

Reference has been made in the preceding narrative to the generous conduct of the Nawáb of Bandá. But Bandá was itself a military station. There was quartered a detachment of the 56th Regiment of Native Infantry. These men, in correspondence with their brethren of the 12th, were equally tainted. Learning betimes of the successful outbreak at Naogáng they followed its example. Rising on the 14th of June, and making common cause with the troops of the Nawáb, they plundered the treasury and went off to join their comrades. The Nawáb was able to save the lives of the officers. He extended the same protection to the Europeans who had escaped from Hamir-púr, and to those likewise who had fled across the Jamná from Fathpúr. The time, however, was to arrive when the Nawáb, like Sindia and the Hindú princes of Rájpútáná, would find himself unable to contend any longer against the excited passions of his followers. True, however, to his liege lord, he extended hospitality and protection to every European fugitive as long as he could do so, and when the insubordination of his troops rendered it impossible for him to afford them further protection, he had his guests safely escorted to territory still owning the British rule.

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1857.
June.

Generous
conduct of the
Nawáb of
Bandá.

* There are most interesting narratives of these events Kalrai, forty-one persons, by Captain Scott, Mrs. Mawe, drummers, buglers, and their Lieutenant Jackson, Sergeant families, ultimately reached Kirchoff, and Mr. Langdale. Bandá in safety.

198 FIDELITY OF THE 50TH NATIVE INFANTRY.

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June.

Fidelity of
the 50th N.I.

There was one station in Bandalkhand, and only one, in which the native troops stationed did not mutiny. This was the station of Nagód. The regiment there quartered, the 50th Native Infantry, stood firm to the last, fourteen men in the whole regiment having alone shown symptoms of disaffection. Nor was the misconduct of these men displayed until a later period (27th of August).

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MORE important in their results on the general situation were the occurrences taking place about the same time in the States of the native princes in Central India and Rájpútáná. I have narrated a portion of these under the head of Gwálíár. It is necessary now to invite the attention of the reader to the larger remainder as yet untold.

The acting representative of the Governor-General at Indúr, the capital of the dominions of Holkar, and the head-quarters of the Central Indian Agency, was Colonel Henry Marion Durand. Colonel Durand was one of the most remarkable of the remarkable men for the production of whom the East India Company was famous. Endowed with a clear head, a comprehensive grasp of affairs, a quick and keen vision, a singularly retentive memory, and an energy that nothing could tire, Durand could not escape distinction. Anywhere, and under any circumstances, he would have attained it. Seldom has

Colonel
Durand.

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His character.

there served in India a man who could do all things so well ; who could successfully apply to so many diverse subjects his vast talents. He was equally at home in planning a campaign, in giving, as he did give, the soundest advice to a Commander-in-Chief, after an indecisive action, such as that of Chillianwálá, and in devising schemes for the improvement of the complicated revenue system of the North-West Provinces. Nor did his private character belie his conduct as a public officer. Large hearted, full of sympathy for the suffering and the oppressed, he had unsparing scorn and contempt for those only whom he believed to be false, to be treacherous, to be corrupt, to be time-serving. For a man of that class, when once he had found him out, Durand had no pity. But the true man, however poor, however neglected by Fortune he might be, always received from Durand support, encouragement, and sympathy. This remark applies alike to Colonel Durand's relations with natives and with Europeans. It is not true that he had a scorn for Asiatics as Asiatics. He had scorn for corrupt Asiatics, as he had scorn for corrupt Europeans. But in his mind the colour of the skin weighed not at all. With him honesty was honesty, falsehood was falseness ; and wherever he detected these opposite qualities, he loved or despised the possessor, whether he were Asiatic, or whether he were European.

**His constant
struggle with
Fortune.**

It is a remarkable fact that throughout his long career in India—a career extending over forty years—Durand owed nothing to Fortune. On the

contrary, his life was a constant struggle against the efforts of the blind goddess. She made his path hard and difficult. He rose to one of the highest positions in India,—the Lieutenant-Governorship of her most important province—in spite of envy, in spite of calumny, in spite of the thousand and one indirect obstacles which can be and are used to thwart the upward career of an able and honest man, who, connecting himself with no party, dares to have the courage of his opinions. There have been epochs in Indian history when it has been possible for men without brains to rise very high indeed. Servility, complaisance, a cautious reticence, a suppression in fact of one's inner consciousness, are sometimes found useful and are often rewarded. But Durand scorned the backstairs path. He always spoke exactly what he thought, always acted as he believed to be right, regardless of consequences. This manly action made him many enemies, and these enemies thwarted him, as enemies in high places can thwart a man true to his own convictions. That he succeeded in spite of them was due partly to his indomitable strength of will, partly to the fact that in times of pressure and adversity Governments find themselves forced to replace the smiling sycophant by the skilled workman.

His hatred of intrigue.

His manliness.

Colonel Durand belonged to the Engineers. Yet, so great had been his capacity, and so comprehensive his intellectual range, that he, then a Lieutenant of Engineers, had been selected in 1838 for the post of Secretary to the Board of

His earlier career.

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Revenue of the North-West Provinces. He had accepted this post when he was invited to accompany the army which was to march under Sir John Keane into Afghánistán. He threw up his civil appointment, joined that force, and was one of the two officers who blew in the gates of Ghazní thus admitting the storming party. His health requiring a change to England, he had returned to India with Lord Ellenborough in 1841 in the capacity of aide-de-camp. Before landing in Calcutta Lord Ellenborough had promoted the aide-de-camp to be private secretary. Durand held this office during the brilliant Indian career of Lord Ellenborough. On the recall of the latter by the Court of Directors he was appointed Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces. Then came into play those arts which incompetent rulers employ to get rid of men, subordinate to them in position, but in every other respect their superiors. Charges, frivolous in themselves, and subsequently proved to be utterly unfounded, were trumped up against Durand. He was removed from his Commissionership. He returned to England with the justificatory pieces in his pocket; convinced the Court of Directors, convinced the Board of Control, and went back to India with an order from the President of that Board that he was to receive an appointment equal to that of which he had been unjustly deprived. But Lord Dalhousie was then Governor-General of India. Lord Dalhousie did not like Durand. He offered him an appointment in the Panjáb so inferior to that he was

Cabal against
him.

How he met
it.

Returns to
India.

entitled to expect that Durand unhesitatingly refused it. He re-entered upon his duties as a military Engineer, joined the army then fighting in the Panjáb, was summoned to the councils of war held by Lord Gough after Chillianwálá, and aided by his practical advice in ensuring the victory of Gújrát. An account of this campaign from his pen enriched shortly afterwards the pages of the *Calcutta Review*. After the annexation of the Panjáb Durand accepted from Lord Dalhousie the post of political agent at Bhopál. His labours of years here were most useful. He formed the mind of the Bégam; taught her those golden lessons of true and honest dealing as a ruler, from which she profited so much afterwards; and showed her, from the examples of the Mahomedan rulers of India, the material advantage a sovereign reaped from the prevalence of the knowledge that he was to be believed on his own word. Severe illness drove Durand to England in 1854. His appointment at Bhopál lapsed to another, and he returned at the end of 1856 to the corps of Engineers. But shortly afterwards, Sir Robert Hamilton, the agent for the Governor-General at Indúr, having decided to take furlough to Europe, Lord Canning sent Durand to act for him. Thus it happened that when the Mutiny broke out in 1857, Colonel Durand was the representative of the Government of India at the court of Holkar, and had political charge of Central India.

Colonel Durand took up his office at Indúr on the 5th of April. At that time all was quiet in

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Joins the
army in the
field.

Becomes
political agent
at Bhopál.

Is forced by
ill-health to
visit England.

Appointed the
Governor-
General's
Agent for
Central India.

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April 25.

Earliest
warnings of
the mutiny.

Central India. The excitement which had prevailed in Bengal regarding the greased cartridges had not penetrated to Máu,* nor even to Indúr. On the 25th of April, however, a sepoy of the 30th Native Infantry was apprehended in the act of conveying a treasonable message to the Darbár of Ríwá. There is no doubt that he was one of many sent by the several regiments to ascertain the temper and sentiments of the native courts. From this time an uneasy feeling began to prevail throughout Central India—a feeling brought to a climax by the mutiny of the 10th of May at Mírath.

To understand the position of Colonel Durand when the news reached him of the revolt at Mírath it is necessary to define the nature of the territory of which he had political charge, its extent, its resources, and its position with regard to other States, Native as well as British.

Central India.

Central India comprised the Native States in subsidiary alliance with the British Government of Holkar, of Sindia, of Bhopál, of Dhár, of Diwás, and of Jaorá.

Its geogra-
phical posi-
tion.

The dominion of Sindia may be roughly stated to comprise the territory bordered by the river Chambál to the north and north-west, severed on the east by the river Sind from Bandalkhand, and, further south, by the Bétwá, from the British possessions. Between it and the British territories due south, lies Bhopál, divided from the

* Máu is the British military existing road, south-west of station between thirteen and Indúr.
fourteen miles, by the then

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May.

latter by the river Narbadá. To the west of Bhopál is the dominion of Holkar, comprising likewise a portion of the country south of the Narbadá, and reaching nearly to the Táptí. This dominion is, so to speak, pressed in by its neighbours. Its capital, Indúr, lies in a tract of country separated from the remaining part of the dominion by the independent State of Diwás to the north and north-east, and by the independent State of Dhár to the west. On the north it is hemmed in by the south-western limits of the dominion of Sindia, whilst, separating it again from its northernmost districts, is Jaorá, nominally a fief of Holkar, but really independent. To the north of Jaorá, again, the dominion of Holkar thrusts its head into Rájpútáná, by which it is surrounded on three sides.

It will thus be seen that of all the dominions under the Central Indian Agency, that of Holkar was the least compact. Hemmed in on three sides by Native States, its various component portions were isolated from each other, likewise by Native States. Each of these had its own troops. First in order may be named Gwáliár, possessing a force of 8,000 men, disciplined and led by European officers. The main body of this force was at Gwáliár itself, but it had detachments at Siprí; further south still, at Gúna; and, on the very borders of Holkar's territory, at A'gar. Thirty miles from A'gar was Méhidpúr, the headquarters of the Málwa contingent, a small force comprising a regiment of infantry, a battery of artillery, and some cavalry, likewise officered by

Military occu-
pation of Cen-
tral India.

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The purely
native force
there.

Its position
with respect
to British
territory.

Garrison of
Máu.

British officers. Immediately to the north of Méhidpúr lies Jaorá, and to the north of that again, and on the high road to Dehlí, are the stations of Nímach and Nasírábád, garrisoned by troops of the regular army.

The purely native force in the dominions of Jaorá, of Dhár, and of Diwás, was contemptible in point of numbers and efficiency, but to the east of Indúr, and about a hundred miles from it, was the Bhopál contingent, a body of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, commanded by British officers, and stationed at Síhor. To the east and north-east of this, again, were native troops of the regular army, in the Ságár and Narbadá territories and in Bandalkhand.

It will thus be seen that Indúr was completely cut off on three sides from the British territory by native troops and native contingents. On the south, indeed, rather more than thirteen miles distant from it, and about five-and-twenty miles north of the Narbadá, lay the British station of Máu, garrisoned by the 23rd Regiment of Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel Platt, a wing of the 1st Cavalry, under Major Harris, and Captain Hungerford's battery of Artillery, having European gunners but native drivers. Thus, if Indúr was isolated, Máu was still more so. For while, to the north of it, Indúr was occupied by a large native force under the personal direction of Holkar himself, to the south it rested, so to speak, in the air, no British troops intervening between it and the military stations in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies.

It is clear, then, that, in the event of the mutinous contagion spreading to Central India, the maintenance of order in the country north of the Narbadá depended entirely on one of two contingencies. The first of these was, naturally, the early fall of Dehlí; the second, the advance of reinforcements from the south. In view of the latter contingency, the paramount importance of maintaining, at all risks, the line of the Narbadá will at once be recognised.

Crossing the Narbadá below Indúr, and running right through the territories under the Central Indian Agency to a point on the Chambál directly north of Gwálíár, ran the direct road from Bombay to A'gra. Not only was this road invaluable as a postal and telegraphic line,* but it was absolutely necessary as a military road, constituting, as it did, the direct route by which troops from the south could advance. The importance of maintaining this line, more especially the portion of it south of the Narbadá, cannot be over-rated. Its weak points were those where it was commanded by the troops stationed at Méhidpúr and at A'gar, and where it passed through stations held by troops belonging to the Gwálíár Contingent, such as Siprí and Gwálíár, and where it traversed Dholpúr.

At Indúr, for the protection of the treasury and other public buildings, was a detach-

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Political considerations
which affected
Central India.

The line of
the Narbadá.

Weak points
of that line.

The troops at
Indúr.

* There was, in 1857, no direct telegraphic line between Madras and Bombay pre-
sidencies could be effected was Madras and Calcutta, and the that by Agra and Indúr.—
only circle by which tele-
graphic communication with Central India in 1857.

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CHAPTER III.

1857.
May.

Policy of
Colonel
Durand.

ment of the Málwa contingent, two hundred strong. These were the only troops stationed there when the news of the mutiny of the 10th of May at Mírath reached the Residency.

Colonel Durand received this intelligence on the 14th of May. He comprehended at a glance its importance. He saw that it was but the first act of a very tragic drama. But his duty was clear to him. To maintain his own position at Indúr as long as it could be maintained; to sever all intercourse between the native troops of the regular army and the soldiers of the native contingents; to secure the Narbadá, and the important road I have described; to re-assure the native princes under his superintendence:—these were his first considerations, and he set himself at once to act upon them.

Summons
troops from
Sirdárpúr
and Bhopál.

It happened that, in addition to the troops I have mentioned, there was a regiment of Bhils at the station of Sirdárpúr, near Mandlésar, about forty miles from Indúr. The Bhils are men who have no caste prejudices, and who, reclaimed from a wild life by the British, had always proved good soldiers. Durand sent at once to Sirdárpúr for two hundred and seventy of these men. Believing, too, that of all the contingents, those who had been raised at Bhopál were the least likely to waver in their fidelity, he ordered up a strong detachment of cavalry and infantry and two guns from that place. These troops, using every expedition, reached Indúr on the 20th of May. Colonel Durand being precluded, as an officer in political employ, from exercising military

duties, the command of these detachments, and the arranging for the protection of the Residency, devolved upon Colonel Stockley of the Bhil corps.

They arrived just in time. The native troops in Mau had not escaped the contagion of the disease by which the entire native army had been infected. Not only were they, at this very time, ripe for revolt, but they had even debated whether it would not be advisable to make at once a dash for the scene where their brethren were fighting, by way of Indur. Conscious that such a move was possible, that, under certain circumstances,—such, for example, as the presence in the ranks of the native troops of a master mind,—it was certain, Durand had made every preparation to meet the contingency. In consequence of his requisition Maharajah Holkar had supplied him with cavalry * to form pickets on the roads. From the same source he had received half a battery of guns and three companies of infantry. These had been posted so as to command the approaches to the Residency. A certain number of troopers were kept always in the saddle. Yet, after all, if the attempt had been made, the chances of the English at Indur would have been poor. For the question *quis custodiet ipsos custodes* had not then been solved. A few days later it was solved, not exactly to the credit of the *custodes*.

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Chapter III.

1857.
May 14.

Mutinous
disposition of
the troops at
Mau.

Durand ac-
cepts a guard
of Maharajah
Holkar's
troops.

* The cavalry furnished by at Indur, the Maharajah was Holkar were never considered requested to remove them, trustworthy. When, there- and to send them on distant fore, Colonel Travers arrived duty. This was done.

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Chapter III.

1857.
June.

Colonel Tra-
vers arrives
and assumes
command at
Indúr.

Gloomy in-
telligence
from the
outer world.

Durand is
perfectly con-
scious of the
danger of
his position.

In the middle of June a further detachment of cavalry from Bhopál, under their commandant, Colonel Travers, arrived at Indúr. The command of the entire force round the Residency devolved, then, on Colonel Travers, as the senior officer. This onerous duty could not have fallen to a more gallant soldier or to a truer-hearted man. To him was then committed the military care of the Residency, and it is only just to record that not a single precaution was neglected to ensure the safety of its occupants against the effects of a sudden rising.

For some short time prior to the arrival of Colonel Travers affairs had appeared to move more smoothly. From the outer world, however, there came intelligence which more than ever convinced Durand that, unless a decisive blow should be struck speedily at the heart of the rebellion, the drain upon his resources would be hard to meet. Thus, disquieting rumours from Nasírbád and Nímach; the more than doubtful behaviour of detachments of the Gwáliár contingent; the receipt of a letter from the officer commanding that contingent expressive of his distrust of their loyalty; intelligence that emissaries from the native regiment at Máu had been discovered tampering with the men of the Bhopál contingent:—these reports, the one following the other in quick succession, were more than sufficient to satisfy Durand that, literally, he and his were standing on a quicksand. It is true that their feet still rested on the treacherous surface, but every wave of the tide, every effort of the feet to extricate themselves,

made the position more perilous, the danger more apparent.

This, in fact, was the case when, on the 1st, Durand received intelligence of the mutiny at Nasirabad; on the 6th, of that at Nimach. The information which reached Durand could not be hidden from the regular troops at Mau. The head-quarter wing of the cavalry regiment there stationed had just mutinied at Nimach. How would the men of the other wing, and the men of the infantry regiment, receive the news? Should they revolt, would the European battery be able to disperse them? Should they make a rush for Indur, would the troops of Holkar oppose them or unite with them? These were questions on the solution of which depended, not only the lives of the Europeans, but the maintenance of British authority in Central India.

For a moment it seemed as though the native troops at Mau were about to prove an exception to their comrades, that amid the faithless they would be faithful. Reports, indeed, to their discredit were rife. It was openly stated that they were in league with the troops of Holkar, and that, strong in that alliance, they intended to master the guns at Mau, and then march on Indur. But they showed no outward sign of ill-will or of disaffection. Never were they more respectful; never more fervent in their protestations of loyalty.

Durand was not taken in. He saw through it. As he wrote to Lord Elphinstone, "it was all moonshine." But to him there was still a glimmering

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Chapter III

1857.
June.

Possibility
that the
disastrous
news might
affect the
troops at
Mau.

but they are
apparently
not affected
by it.

Durand is not
taken in.

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CHAPTER III.

1857.
JUNE.

The one hope
on which he
depends.

General
Woodburn's
column.

The column
is diverted to
Arangábád.

of hope. Though the news of the revolt at Nímach was followed by that of the mutiny of the cavalry of the Malwá contingent—pushed up, contrary to Durand's orders, into contact with the mutineers—accompanied by the murder of their officers ; though reports arrived of the massacre of the Europeans at Jhánsí, with its accompanying horrors ; and though, last and most fatal of all, intelligence was received of the revolt of the bulk of the Gwáliár contingent at Gwáliár itself, Durand still hoped. There was a chance, and apparently a good chance, that he might yet override the storm, that a ray of sunshine might yet harden the treacherous soil.

This chance lay in the march of a column despatched to Mái from the Bombay Presidency under Major-General Woodburn. It was the approach of this column, consisting of five troops of the 14th Dragoons, a battery of artillery, a company of sappers, and a native regiment, that had caused hesitation in the minds of the native garrison at Mái. It was the approach of this column that gave a degree of confidence to Durand. Had it only pushed on Central India would have been saved from a great calamity.

It happened, however, that General Woodburn's column was suddenly diverted to another point. Disturbances had broken out at Arangábád. It was believed that on the suppression of those disturbances depended the fidelity to British interests of the troops of the Nizám, and that, therefore, at any sacrifice, they must be suppressed. General Woodburn, then, turned off to

Arangábád. He suppressed the disturbances there, but, having suppressed them, did not move forward. He remained at Arangábád, halted, I must suppose, in deference to superior orders. To compensate, as far as he could, for the alienation of this force, the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, ever zealous for the public service, was seeking the means of equipping another column for the relief of Central India.

The hope, then, so promising, apparently so well grounded, was destined to prove delusive. Even before it had utterly flickered away there had come tidings sufficient to daunt the most stout-hearted, but which did not daunt Durand. The northern portion of the great road between A'gra and Bombay had, he knew, been lost when the troops at Jhánsí, and when, subsequently, the Gwálíár contingent had mutinied. But now he learned that his communications were still further threatened; that the troops at Jabal-púr, at Lalatpúr, and at Ságár, were on the verge of mutiny; that throughout Bandalkhand the natives were rising, and that the temper of the troops in Mái was becoming daily more uncertain.

But in these desperate circumstances there suddenly appeared in the north-west the reflection of a light sufficient, had it been real, to calm all apprehensions. Just at the time when Durand received information that General Woodburn had crushed the rising at Arangábád the report reached him that Dehlí had fallen. This was the blow at the heart which would have paralysed

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1857.
June.

Durand's one
hope is thus
disappointed.

Another
hope glim-
mers on the
horizon.

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CHAPTER III.

—
1857.
JUNE.

intending mutineers—this the light which would have diffused its cheering ray into every corner of the Empire. It was not Durand alone who heard the report. It had crept into the counting-houses of the native bankers and been whispered in the furthest recesses of the bazaars. The quieter demeanour of the lower classes of the population showed how markedly the confirmation of the rumour would have affected the course of events.

The hope
proves delu-
sive.

JULY 1.

even worse
than delusive.

The conse-
quence.

But it proved to be a will o' the wisp—to be premature—to be untrue. Not to Durand, in the first instance, came the denial of the rumour. Certain information that the intelligence was false reached a banker of the city. He refused to disclose to Durand the nature of the information it was known he had received. But a little later it came to Durand direct. On the morning of the 1st of July a letter from A'gra, dated the 20th of June, was handed to him. From this he learned for the first time that the previous report regarding the fall of Dehlí was untrue, that, up to the 17th, the British, forced to remain on the defensive, had been repeatedly attacked; that they had with difficulty held their own; and that the General commanding had determined to suspend all offensive movements pending the arrival of reinforcements.

The communication from A'gra was placed in Colonel Durand's hands about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 1st of July. About half an hour later he sat down to condense its contents into a letter to be despatched to the Governor of Bombay when he was startled by the sudden discharge of

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July 1.

the three guns in the Residency enclosure.* A second later and one of his official servants rushed in to report that the whole place was in an uproar. Durand rose and walked hastily to the steps of the Residency. The scene that met his gaze left no doubt upon his mind. The crisis, so long and so skilfully averted, had come upon him.

Before I recount the measures taken by the Agent and the Commander of the force round the Residency to avert this sudden danger, I propose to describe that place and its environs, and to show how the troops under the orders of Colonel Travers had been posted.

The Indúr Residency is a double-storied house built of stone,† in an open enclosure, about four hundred yards to the north of the Khán river, flowing in a north-westerly direction towards the city of Indúr, from which the Residency is two miles distant. In the same enclosure are

The Indúr
Residency.

* In his letter to Holkar, dated the 3rd of August, Durand stated that the attack began at twenty minutes to 9.

† Major Evans Bell (*Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor*) implies that the Residency was not made defensible. But the following description of that building will show how impossible it was to make it proof against cannon shot. Not only was the Residency built of stone, but in the lower storey it is entered by from twenty-four to thirty glass and Venetian doors, incapable of resisting even a

kick. The chief entrance to

the upper storey is from outside, by a handsome flight of stone steps. The glass and Venetian doors on this storey

are as numerous as those

below, but are larger.

It was impossible to throw up earthworks in front of the Residency, for the simple reason that there was no earth wherewith to make the works. The Residency stands upon ground not having an inch of soil in depth. Even for the small flower-beds in front of the building, earth had to be brought from a considerable distance.

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July 1.

Its situation
with respect
to the city,
the bazaars,
the river, and
the road to
Máu.

The location
of the troops.

bungalows for the assistants to the Agent and other buildings and bazaars. Within its circumference, in fact, was comprised the entire civil station of Indúr. It is an open park-like place surrounded by groves and gardens. Immediately on its western front runs the road to Máu. This, passing the Residency, crosses the Khán river about four hundred yards to the west by south-west of that building. To the south-east of this road are thickly wooded groves and gardens ; but immediately to the west of it, and, in some instances, bordering it, were bazaars and a number of native buildings of various sorts. These extended for a considerable distance on either side of the road leading to the city. Not more than a hundred yards intervened between the eastern-most of these buildings and the Residency. In and about these were located the native troops, three companies of infantry, and three field guns, sent by Holkar to protect the Residency.

To the north of that building, and still nearer to it, was the stable square, in the immediate vicinity of the post-office, the telegraph office, and the treasury. Here was the cavalry picket. Round about it were the camps of the Bhopál cavalry, one hundred and fifty strong, the infantry of the Bhopál and Méhidpúr contingents, numbering about four hundred men, and the detachment of Bhíls, two hundred and seventy strong. Of all these detachments the cavalry was the most remote from the Residency.

They are
engaged in

On the morning of the 1st of July neither were these men nor their officers under the smallest

apprehension of a rising. The men were scattered about in undress; some were bathing; some were cooking their food. The native officers and non-commissioned officers had just come up to transact their morning business at the orderly-room. Colonel Travers himself, in conversation with some of them, was on the point of entering that room. Suddenly they were all startled by the same artillery fire and the same tumult which had drawn Durand to the steps of the Residency. A moment's glance sufficed to show them that the rebels were upon them.

Who were these rebels, and who set them on? The rebels were the men of the three companies of Holkar's army, and the gunners of Holkar's three guns, posted for the protection of the Residency in the buildings between it and the city, and distant from it, at the nearest point, only a hundred yards. To these men, a little after 8 o'clock, a man named Saadat Khán,* an officer in

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their ordinary occupations,

when they
are suddenly
attacked,

by the troops
of Mahárájá
Holkar,

headed by
Saadat Khán.

* In a work recently published, *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor* (Major vernor-General's Agent at Evans Bell), Saadat Khán is Indúr, thus described him officially in 1874: "Saadat Khan was a man of weight in Indur in 1857; his father was commandant of cavalry, in which he was known as Resaldar. The Customs Department was also under his control." The fact is that Saadat Khán, although influential with the Mahomedans, did not occupy a position of authority, nor was he in favour with the Darbár. Major Sir Henry Daly, sub-

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July 1.

Murder of the
Christians
not in the
Residency.

Holkar's cavalry, followed by eight troopers, coming from the direction of the palace, galloped, shouting: "Get ready, come on to kill the sáhibs; it is the order of the Mahárájá." Saadat Khán was followed at a distance by the rabble of the town, eager for blood and for plunder; for the word had gone forth that Durand was about to remove into Máu the treasure,* amounting to £150,000 in silver, which he had guarded in a strong building, erected by the Government for the purpose, close to the Residency. Others of the same class mingling with Darbár soldiers had rushed to seek out the Christian population who had remained in their own homes or in their offices, unprepared for and not expecting the sudden murderous onslaught which was to lay them low.†

* Major Evans Bell states, kept secret from the officers, as I understand him (*Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor*, page 89), that Durand

had given orders for the removal of the treasure to Máu on the 1st of July. But there are reasons for believing that no such order was issued. The Treasury Guard was under the orders of Colonel Travers. On Colonel Travers it would have devolved to furnish the escort for the treasure. Now Colonel Travers received no order whatever on the subject. Not a cart, not even a camel had been obtained. The Treasury was closed. Had Durand intended to remove the treasure, the fact could not have been

+ Lieutenant-General Travers, V.C., C.B., states (*The Evacuation of Indore*), that the number of the English population, men, women, and children, murdered by these ruffians amounted to thirty-nine. In a work recently published, *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor* (Major Evans Bell), it is stated that this statement is erroneous, that the murdered were only twenty-five in number, and that of these only two were Europeans. But the Agent to the Governor-General in 1874, Major-General Sir Henry Da-

The Darbár troops thus appealed to by Saadat Khán turned out at once. They were not taken by surprise. Their commandant, Bans Gopál, admitted subsequently that his men had been demoralised. Certainly neither he nor any other officer made the smallest attempt to check the outbreak. On the other hand, no men could have shown themselves more ready and eager for mischief. They at once began to shout vociferously as they formed up, whilst the gunners placed their three guns in position, and opened fire on the picket of cavalry.

Such was the sight and such were the sounds that met Durand and Travers about half-past 8 o'clock that morning. Sudden as was the outbreak it found the two men cool and collected. Travers, who, I have said, was at the moment talking to his native officers, hastened to the picket in the stable-square, ordered the troops to turn out and the guns to be placed in a position to open fire on the rebels. The men, surprised;

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July 1.

The troops
sent to guard
the Residency
join in the re-
volt.

Colonel
Travers.

ly, K.C.S.I., writing officially to the Government in that year (10th of September), reports as follows (para. 5) : " It was recorded in the Durbar Diary of July 1857, that Saadat Khan, after the attack on the Residency on 1st of July, which resulted in the slaughter of British subjects, European and native, women and children, in all, 39," &c. It would thus appear that the only mistake made by Lieut.-General Travers is in the use of the adjective " English." That thirty-nine persons were massacred by the rebels is clear. Not less so, that these thirty-nine persons were British subjects. It is no exculpation of the brutality of the assassins to state that of the total number only two were full-blooded Europeans and the remainder half-breeds, or Eurasians. The numbers given by General Travers are those attested to by the Durbar records, and quoted as indisputable by the highest British authority on the spot.

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Turns out the
men.

Traitors in
his ranks
attempt to
baulk him,

but notwith-
standing he
leads a gal-
lant charge on
the enemy's
guns.

which he
captures;

but is not
supported.

His charge,
however, is
opportune
and useful.

half-stupified by the suddenness of the attack, showed at first no hesitation. But while they were turning out, Travers, having caused the men of the picket to mount, rapidly conducted them to a point whence they could most advantageously charge the enemy's battery. He then attempted to form them up to charge. But here, likewise, treason had done its work. The native officer of the picket had been "got at." And though the picket was three times formed for attack, three times did this man break the formation from the rear. This action threw the men into confusion. Two opposite feelings seemed to contend in them for mastery. But to stand still was fatal. Travers felt this, and feeling it, notwithstanding that success seemed hopeless, he gave the order to charge. Gallantly leading, he charged home, and though followed by but five of his men, he drove away the gunners, wounded the inciter of the mutiny, Saadat Khán, and for a few moments had the guns in his possession. Had he only been properly supported this charge would have been decisive. But not only was he not supported, but he and his five men were exposed to the fire of the enemy's infantry, now drawn up in order. For a moment, indeed, that infantry seemed inclined to waver; but when they recognised the small number of the men who had followed Travers, they re-gathered heart and continued, formed up, their musketry fire.

The gallant charge of Travers had not, however, been useless. It had given time to Durand to make hasty preparations for the defence of the

Residency, to the gunners to place the guns in position, to the officers to turn out and form up their men. Durand, too, had utilised the few minutes at his disposal to write a letter to Colonel Platt, commanding at Mau, telling him that he had been attacked, and requesting him to send Captain Hungerford's battery to his aid.

Durand had just come out with this note in his hand when he met Travers returning from his charge. He gave Travers the note, with a request to forward it at once. Travers entrusted the important missive to a trooper on whom he believed he could depend. But he felt even then that absolute confidence was to be placed in no native soldier, and he more than doubted whether the letter would be delivered.

Meanwhile the enemy, recovering from the effect of the spirited charge of Travers, moved their guns round the left flank of the barracks into the open ground, with the intention of taking up a position for a front attack on the Residency. To meet this, Travers pushed forward his two guns two hundred yards to the right front of the Residency, and directed the gunners to open a concentrated fire on the enemy's supports. The guns, well served by two serjeants, Orr and Murphy, and by fourteen native gunners, who had remained faithful, at once opened out with effect, disabling one of the rebels' pieces, and forcing their infantry to retire. Again was a splendid chance offered to the garrison. A charge in force now would have decided the day. The Head was there to see the opportunity, the Hands

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Durand
writes to Mau
for Hunger-
ford's battery

The enemy
recover from
the effect of
the charge
of Travers:

who, how-
ever, again
forces them
back.

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A golden
opportunity
of deciding
the day,

is frustrated
by the re-
fusal of the
native troops
to act.

Travers re-
news his at-
tempt to
charge,

but in vain.

The infantry
also refuse to
fight.

were there that might have seized it, but the Hearts that should have animated those hands were cold and lifeless. In a word, the cavalry, who could have gained the victory, would not. They came up in excellent formation, but despite the efforts of their officers and of Durand they melted away. Twenty-five or thirty of them galloped off at once to Sihor, filling the air with cries that the Europeans were being massacred. The greater number remained helpless, panic-stricken, afraid of each other. The Hindús and Sikhs amongst them suspected the Mahomedans, and the Mahomedans suspected the Hindús and Sikhs. Divided into parties they scattered themselves over the enclosure, seeking the best available shelter from the enemy's fire, passive spectators of an assault which with union and heartiness they might have prevented.

Still conscious of the possibilities before him, and maddened by the refusal of the Bhopál men to seize them, Travers ordered Captain Magniac to ride after the men and to do his utmost to bring up a dozen or even half a dozen to attack the battery still lying defenceless in the open. But again he was disappointed. The men would not respond to his call.

Baulked by the behaviour of the cavalry, Travers turned to the infantry feeling, like Eyre at Arah, that a bayonet-charge would yet save the day. But here again he was disappointed. The two hundred men of the Méhidpúr contingent absolutely refused to fight. Of the two hundred and seventy men of the Bhopál contingent only

about twelve showed signs of obedience. The rest levelled their muskets at their officers, and drove them off. They declined even to lift a finger on behalf of the British. The Bhíls allowed themselves to be formed up but would not act.

Still the defence was not abandoned. It was determined to bring the Bhíls—the only troops not in open mutiny—under cover. They were accordingly brought inside the Residency in the hope that they might be prevailed upon to discharge their pieces at the enemy when sheltered by stone walls. But, meanwhile, the rebels, finding that no advantage had been taken of their first check and rightly conjecturing that our troops had refused to fight them, had completed their artillery movement, and were pouring in many directions a fire of round shot and grape. Under the influence of this fire the Bhíls were completely cowed, refused even to discharge their pieces, and abandoning their posts at the outer windows, crowded into the centre rooms. The rebel infantry was forming up, evidently with the intention of taking advantage of the effect of the fire of their guns. To defend the Residency there now remained, besides the fourteen faithful native gunners, eight combatant officers, two doctors, two sergeants, and five Europeans * of the telegraph department. Under their charge were eight

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Even the
Bhíls refuse
to discharge
their pieces.

The number
of defenders
is reduced to
a handful,

* One of them was Post-slaughter which they had es-
master. All, however, were caped, to use their arms.
unable, either from alarm or They did not fire a single
from being unnerved by the shot.

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too few to
continue the
contest.

The "loyal"
cavalry deter-
mine to retire.

Summary of
the situation.

ladies and three children. The forces were too disproportionate for the contest to continue longer, unless succour should arrive. The enemy's officers were calling on their men to assault, and their ranks were rapidly filling. The position seemed desperate.

At this crisis, the few cavalry who had remained huddled up, passive and inactive, behind the Residency, sent a message through their officer, Captain Magniac, that they were about to consult their own safety, further defence being hopeless; that if they did not then move, their retreat would be cut off, and they begged that this last chance might be taken of saving the women and children.

I pause for a moment to ask the reader to take a glance at the position. Let him imagine a large stone house, occupied by seventeen Englishmen and fourteen faithful natives, with two guns for its defence, attacked by about six hundred trained sepoyes, swelled by the constantly augmenting rabble of the city* :—the besieged embarrassed, moreover, by having eleven women and children to protect, and encumbered and threatened by having nearly five hundred mutinous troops within the range of their defence—troops who, if they acted at all, would act against them. But this is not all. The assailants occupied the buildings and roads all about the Residency. But

* The six hundred trained ~~tingent~~ infantry who, just sepoyes were composed of about about this time, fairly went two hundred of all ranks of over to the rebels. Holkar's men, and the con-

there was besides a body of native cavalry, willing to protect the Europeans from actual assault if they would abandon the Residency and retreat, but unwilling to stir hand or foot in defence of that building. But now this body of cavalry was being out-flanked. It was threatening to ride off. Should it go, its place would inevitably be occupied by the enemy, and the Residency would be attacked on four sides.

This was the position. How was Durand to act? Could he cut his way through the enemy? He and the other men might have done so; but they would have exposed to certain death the women and the children. As a body, the civil portion of the Europeans were unarmed. They had escaped to the Residency with their bare lives. No valid assistance then was to be looked for from these. To remain was impossible. Could the attack be resisted there were no supplies—even water would have failed the garrison. Could Durand wait for Captain Hungerford's battery from Mau? He had written for it at a quarter to 9 o'clock. It was then half-past 10, and there was no sign of its approach. In any case it was impossible it could arrive before half-past 12,—and then the enemy would be concentrated to receive it, whilst the last hope of saving the women and children would have been lost. Under these circumstances there was really but one course to pursue. On this all were agreed, Durand as well as Travers; all the other officers as well as Durand and Travers. They collected then the little garrison, and placing the ladies on

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Courses
which might
be open to
Durand and
Travers.

Of these only
one really
feasible.

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They eva-
cuate the Re-
sidency.
Mahárájá
Holkar.

Was he loyal
or disloyal?

gun-wagons, moved out of the Residency, covering their rear with the cavalry, ready to follow the Europeans though not to fight for them. It was then half-past 10 o'clock.*

But where, all this time, it may be asked, was Holkar? Where was Captain Hungerford's battery? These are the questions I now propose to answer.

Few matters have been more debated than the conduct of Holkar at this critical period. There are those who believed then that he was disloyal, who believe still that he was a watcher of the atmosphere. There are those, on the other hand, who consider that his loyalty was unimpeachable, and that the doubts cast upon that loyalty, culminating as they have in the denial to him of a practical expression of the complete satisfaction

* Major Evans Bell (*Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor*, page 99), has laid some stress on the fact that no one was killed during the withdrawal from the Residency. I have communicated on this subject with Lieutenant-General Travers, V.C., C.B., and I append his reply. "The Residency," writes General Travers, "stands upon the shoulder of slightly rising ground which falls away towards the enemy's position and the river, and, rounding the shoulder, slopes in the other direction for some distance. The ground is open and smooth, and by keeping the building as long as possible between the fugitives and the enemy's artillery, a considerable advantage was gained. Indeed, by holding the cavalry as an additional screen, the enemy's attention was withdrawn, and he was delayed in bringing his guns into action. What damage was done by his fire I cannot say. We could not possibly know what natives composed our mixed party. I myself can only speak to one man, an European or Eurasian—a clerk, I believe—whose head was taken off by a round shot. He fell in a little jungle, and might not have been discovered had not his horse stood by the corpse."

of the paramount power, similar to that bestowed upon his compeers, are a standing insult to his family and to his name.

In writing history, sentiment is, or ought to be, excluded. The historian has to deal only with facts. It is not very germane to the point at issue to inquire whether Durand disliked Holkar, or Holkar disliked Durand. It may even be admitted that Durand did not admire the character of Holkar; and that Holkar, regarding Durand as a *locum tenens* only, as one who would shortly make way for the man whom he really cared for, took no special pains to conciliate Durand. But there is unquestionable evidence to prove that up to the 1st of July Durand did believe in the loyalty of Holkar. I have been assured by a distinguished officer,* present with him throughout this critical time, and who enjoyed his confidence, that up to the time of the outbreak Durand constantly insisted that Holkar must know the strength of England too well to be other than loyal. That there was cordiality between the Agent and the Prince may well be doubted; but Durand gave a positive proof † that he trusted Holkar when he accepted from him, for the protection of the Residency, three companies of his troops and three of his field-guns. That he should withdraw that confidence pending ex-

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Considerations not
germane to
the question

* Lieutenant-General Travers, V.C., C.B. magazine was almost empty of artillery ammunition.

† I may mention another proof. A very few days before the mutiny, Holkar represented to Durand that his

Without inquiry or question Durand had him supplied from the Māu magazine at once.

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planation, when those troops and those guns fired on him, without any apparent prohibition on the part of Holkar, was, to say the least, a very natural proceeding.

But to return to the region of facts. What was Holkar's conduct on the eventful 1st of July?

It is only due to the Mahárájá to state the explanation which he himself gave.

The explanation of his conduct given by the Mahárája himself,

For some time past Mahárájá Holkar had felt the control of his troops slipping out of his hands. Only the day before the 1st of July some of his men had assumed so mutinous an attitude that he provided them with carriage and supplies in order to rid Indúr of their presence. It is not at all surprising that this should have been so. Under the trying circumstances of that trying period the most popular sovereigns could not command the obedience of their followers when they called upon these to act against their strong inner convictions. The loyalty of Mahárájá Sindia, in 1857-58, has never been questioned. Yet his own clansmen turned against him rather than fight for the British. There can be no question but that the troops of the native princes did sympathise deeply with the mutinous sepoys, and did regard their cause as their own. At Indúr, moreover, in 1857, there was a strong Mahomedan faction, scarcely less hostile to Holkar than to the British. Holkar, himself, prior to the 1st of July, had shown that he was well aware of the disorder fomenting around him. He had candidly told Durand that he mistrusted his own

troops. Taking the above facts into consideration, the circumstances, that the day prior to the mutiny he had sent away from Indúr his most uncontrollable troops, that the leader of the assault on the Residency was a prominent member of the Mahomedan faction, I think it sufficiently established that on the 1st of July his mutinous soldiers took the bit into their mouths, and acted without his knowledge and in spite of him.

But the part of Holkar's conduct, which, up to the present time, has seemed the most to require explanation, is that which relates to his action whilst the attack on the Residency was proceeding. In the explanation which he offered at the time the Mahárájá stated that the confusion had been too great to allow of any communication being made to the Residency; that on learning what had happened, he was preparing to set out for that place, when he was stopped by the intelligence that all was over. Now, the first discharge of grape into the Residency took place between 8 and 9 o'clock; the garrison evacuated the Residency at half-past 10. What was Holkar doing during those two hours? There is no doubt but that he was aware of the nature of the events which were taking place. Before 9 o'clock, Saadat Khán, blood-stained and wounded, had ridden into his presence to report that he had attacked the Residency, and wounded a *sáhib*. What, then, was he doing?

Here again we are met with opposite opinions. On the one side it is hinted, if not asserted, that he was watching the turn of events, not caring to

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makes it
clear that his
troops acted
in spite of
him.

Why did not
Holkar come
to the Resi-
dency?

The supposi-
tion that he
was watching
the turn of
events.

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is combated
by his sup-
porters

successfully.

interfere on behalf of the British, until it was certain that their sun had not set. On the other, it is declared that in acting as he did, he was unswerving in his loyalty to British interests; that had he mounted his horse and ridden to the scene of action, his presence would have sanctioned the mutiny, and given stability of action to the revolted soldiery; that in any case he would have been powerless to control them.*

I cannot but consider that there is force in this argument. Having regard to the fact that his army had slipped from his control, it is certainly possible, I think, that Holkar's presence on the scene might have been misinterpreted by the soldiery, and might have inspired them with the moral force of which, actually, they were in want. It is certainly true that Durand sent a letter to Holkar. But it is not less an ascertained fact that Holkar did not receive it. The messenger who carried it, alarmed, made for his own house, taking the letter with him. The passive attitude of Holkar, then, certainly proves nothing against him. It is perfectly reconcilable with absolute want of sympathy with the mutineers. To gauge what were his real wishes, it is necessary to inquire into his conduct subsequent to the evacuation of the Residency.

On this point, I find a general agreement as to the facts combined with a marked difference with respect to the conclusions. It is not denied that Saadat Khán rode up, wounded, to Holkar's

His conduct
subsequent
to the eva-
cuation.

* *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor, Major Evans Bell.*

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Suspicious
elements in
that conduct,

palace whilst the conflict was going on, and told Holkar that he had wounded a *sáhib* and had attacked the Residency. It is not denied that, though Holkar managed at the time to place that rebel leader in confinement, Saadat Khán was free a few hours later, and actually entered with his family into occupation of the Residency. It is asserted on the one side, and I cannot find it denied on the other, that Holkar remained in his palace till the third day in constant communication with the mutineers; that he then visited the Residency, and conversed with Saadat Khán, with Bans Gopál—the commandant of the infantry which had led the attack—and with the Súbadár of the 23rd Native Infantry, whose hand was red with the blood of his commanding officer.

Of these three facts, the only one apparently incriminating Holkar is the last. And his conduct here has been explained. It is but fair to the Mahárájá to state that explanation in the very words of his advocate.* “On the 4th of July, mounted, and spear in hand, he (Holkar) confronted the mutineers boldly at the Residency. They received the Mahárájá at first respectfully, but afterwards reminded him of the martial character of his ancestor, Jeswant Rao, and reviled him as a degenerate Holkar. He absolutely refused his countenance, and rejected all their demands.” The visit of Holkar to the Residency is, therefore, entirely consistent with

have been
satisfactorily
explained.

* *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor*, Major Evans Bell.

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It is clear
that he pro-
tected Euro-
pean fugi-
tives,

at the risk
of his life.

His further
conduct on
the day of
the mutiny.

The members
of his Darbár

the theory that he had lost control over his troops, and that they acted without his orders and in spite of him.

It is, too, in my opinion, clearly made out that the Mahárájá, on the day following the assault, refused the threatening demands of the mutineers from Máu to deliver up the Europeans and other Christians who had taken refuge in his palace.* He states himself that he offered to them his own person rather than the heads of those under his protection. It may be said that this proves only that Holkar had not fully decided to go against us, that he was aware that the European battery held Máu. But in judging his conduct as a person accused of complicity with the mutineers this action is a strong point in his favour.

Another point, not less strong, perhaps even stronger, is the fact, that on the 1st of July, the very day of the mutiny, Holkar sent in to Máu, by the hands of Ganpat Rao, his agent at the Residency, a letter addressed to Colonel Platt to inform him of the mutiny, and stating that his own troops had refused to act against the mutineers. On the same day he wrote also to the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, telling him of what had occurred. He wrote also that evening to Durand, protesting his innocence, and begging that the march of General Woodburn's force might be hastened as much as possible. It deserves further to be stated that none of the influential members of the Darbár, none of

* This protection was ac-peans, seven Eurasians, and knowned by three Euro-some native Christians.

the Mahárájá's kinsmen or associates, joined in the attack on the Residency.

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are free from complicity.

The deci-
sion must be
favourable
to Holkar.

Looking at the question as a whole, I am of opinion that Holkar was free from complicity with the mutineers; that his soldiers had slipped out of his hands; that his presence amongst them on the 1st of July would have been misinterpreted; and that subsequently he did his best to serve the British interests. But it must be admitted that, at the time, his conduct bore a very suspicious appearance. It must not be forgotten that, although Durand sent him a letter by the hands of a messenger, that messenger never appeared at the Palace; that his own troops, led by his own officer, Bans Gopál, attacked the Residency; that Durand had reason to believe that his retreat on Mandlésar was prevented by the occupation by Holkar's troops of the Simrol pass. These circumstances could not but seem most suspicious to the Agent on the spot, thus attacked and thwarted. Whilst, then, Holkar must be acquitted of complicity with the rebels, the conduct of Durand in refusing to hold confidential intercourse with him until the Government of India should clear him from the suspicions attaching to his conduct must be upheld and justified.

Though the facts justified the conduct of Durand at the time.

It is time now to turn to Máu. Colonel ^{Máu.} Durand's letter to Colonel Platt, the commandant of the 23rd Native Infantry and of the station, despatched from Indúr at a quarter to 9, reached Colonel Platt about 10 o'clock. Colonel Platt instantly gave orders to Captain Hungerford,

Captain
Hungerford's
battery,

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leaves at
noon.

Hungerford
hears of the
evacuation,

and returns.

Futility of its
proceeding
further.

The troops at
Máu mutiny.

commanding the battery, to set out for the relief of the Residency at Indúr. The battery,—why, has not been explained,—was not ready to leave Máu before noon. It then advanced on the Indúr road at a trot. It had reached the village of Rao, half-way between the two stations,* when Captain Hungerford learned that Colonel Durand and the British residents had left Indúr, and had not taken the road to Máu. Hungerford at once turned about, and galloped or cantered back to Máu, arriving there at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.†

It is clear from this statement that Captain Hungerford's battery could not have reached Indúr, if it had continued the journey at the rate at which it was going, before 3 P.M.—equally clear from the narrative I have given of the events at Indúr, that Colonel Durand and the garrison could not have held out for the four and a half hours which would have elapsed between his departure and the arrival of Captain Hungerford. Further, it is tolerably certain that Captain Hungerford's battery, arriving at any hour after the complete investment of the Residency, driven by native drivers, unsupported by cavalry or infantry, would have been unable to hold its own against the large force of all arms, which it would have found at Indúr. However, Captain Hungerford returned to Máu. The same evening he took his battery within the fort. That night, the regular

* Major Evans Bell speaks road which existed in 1857, it of the distance between the was more nearly fourteen than Residency and Indúr as being thirteen miles.
ten miles. It is so now by † Colonel Durand to Lord the new road. But by the Canning's Private Secretary.

troops in Máu, in conformity with the arrangement made with their brethren in the service of Holkar, broke out into revolt. They began, as usual, by firing the mess-house. Their colonel, Colonel Platt, and their adjutant, Captain Fagan, having gone down to the lines to reason with them, they shot them both dead. The cavalry troopers, likewise, killed their commandant, Major Harris. The other officers escaped with their lives.

On the first sound of the mutiny, Colonel Platt had called upon Captain Hungerford to turn out with his battery. Captain Hungerford proceeded to respond to the call, but by the time he arrived on the parade-ground the mischief had been done and no enemy was to be seen. Nothing fell upon his vision but the blazing bungalows till then occupied by the officers. In this perplexity Hungerford directed fire to be opened on the lines. Then poured forth the sepoys, liberated from restraint. They pushed on to Indúr, effected a junction with the mutineers at that place, and subsequently made their way to Dehlí.

Hungerford then held the chief authority at the station. Occupying the fort which commands the military road from Bombay and the low country to the highlands of Central India, he was able to render excellent service. During the absence of Durand, he assumed the post of representative of the Government of India at the court of Holkar. The real authority, however, still remained with Durand whose course I now propose to follow.

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Hungerford
drives the
mutineers
from Mau,

and assumes
charge of the
Central In-
dian Agency.

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The evaca-
tion of the
Residency.

Consider-
ations regard-
ing the line
of retreat.

Insurmount-
able diffi-
culties in the
way of a re-
treat on Máu,

We left Durand with the garrison, the women, and children, evacuating the Residency at half-past 10, on the memorable 1st of July. Travers made a last effort to induce the infantry of the two Contingents to make but one charge. These men, however, had by this time become so infused with the mutinous spirit that the attempt proved dangerous and useless. He managed, however, to collect the greater portion of the Bhopál cavalry, and though these refused to charge, they assumed an attitude sufficiently threatening to prevent pursuit. The next point to be considered was the direction in which they were to retire.

The natural line of retreat was on Máu. By that road alone was it likely that assistance could come. A letter had been despatched for that assistance at a quarter to 9. That letter could scarcely have reached Colonel Platt before 10. It was just possible that Hungerford might be starting.* But it was equally possible, and more probable, that the letter might not have reached Máu. At a time when the native cavalry all over India were falling away by hundreds, it would have been hazardous to carry out a military manœuvre, the safe execution of which depended on the fidelity of one solitary trooper.

Still in war something must be risked, and Durand and Travers were alike prepared to accept the chance that Hungerford had started to meet them. But there was an insurmountable difficulty to the retreat on Máu. In my description of the Residency, I have shown that the road

* In point of fact he did not leave Máu till noon.

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to Máu passed near that building on its western front, and at a distance of about four hundred yards from it crossed the Khán river. I have shown, likewise, that it passed by the cluster of buildings occupied by Holkar's troops. When the Residency was evacuated, not only was the entire length of that road in their possession, but their right rested upon it, a few yards in front of the bridge and completely covering it. Had the men of our Contingents made one charge the enemy's right might have been forced back and the bridge secured. But—as has been already stated—the cavalry refused to act; the infantry, when appealed to by Travers, threatened his life. The timely devotion of a sepoy alone saved him. To move artillery without supports close to and in face of an enemy flanking the moving body is, in war, impossible. For four hundred yards the retreating party would have been exposed to the fire of an enemy elated by victory. The attempt to cross that bridge would, then, have been fatal to the entire party. Nor was it possible to cross the river itself above the bridge—for it had steep banks and was not fordable. I may add, with confidence, that even had the bridge been forced, the difficulties of the retreating party, harassed by a formidable enemy, would not have been lessened.

But there was another bridge across the Khán, higher up, and beyond the Residency garden. This might certainly have been crossed. But having crossed it where would the party have been? To gain the Máu road they would have had to move for about six hundred yards by the

by the regu-
lar road.The other
road equally
out of the
question.

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road on the left bank of the Khán—the only other traversable road. To the point where that road meets the Máu road the rebels were nearer by three parts of the whole distance to be traversed than were the ladies and the garrison. That is to say, the rebels, crossing by the lower bridge, were about a quarter of a mile distant from that point, whilst the garrison, leaving the Residency, would have to traverse more than a mile to reach it. Surely to attempt that road by the upper bridge would have been to draw rather too large an order on the blindness of an enemy reeking in slaughter, and flushed with victory!

Another reason for not attempting the Máu road was based on the disinclination of the remaining cavalry to follow it. Their hearts were in their homes and with their families. Their homes and their families were at Sihor—and Sihor was the goal of their hopes.

Durand and Travers were forced then, most unwillingly, to renounce the idea of a retreat on Máu. The impossibility of reaching that station being clear to them it devolved on Durand to decide the direction in which to retire. In connection with this point a plain duty, he conceived, lay before him.

I have already alluded to the Bombay column halted at Arangábád. Under the circumstances of the case, attacked by Holkar's troops, with, as he undoubtedly believed at the time, the sanction and concurrence of Holkar, driven out of Indúr, cut off from Máu, it seemed to Durand to be his plain duty, at any and every sacrifice,

Disinclination
of the native
troops to go
to Máu.

Durand and
Travers re-
nounce the
idea of Máu.

Reasons
which actu-
ated Durand
in his choice
of a line of
retreat.

to make his way to that column and urge its immediate advance. He could not help believing Central India to be in the utmost peril; nor that the only mode of saving, or of promptly recovering it, lay in the immediate advance of Woodburn's column. He resolved then to push on towards that column by way of Mandlésar.

The party started then on the Mandlésar road. But, after proceeding some distance, Travers found it might be within the range of possibility to communicate with Hungerford. It had occurred alike to Durand and himself that it was just possible that Hungerford's battery had started; that it would push on to Indúr, and that Hungerford, embarrassed by native drivers, might find himself in difficulties. To relieve Hungerford, then, Travers wrote to him two notes, stating that Durand had evacuated Indúr, and was endeavouring to effect a retreat by the Simrol pass. The notes were despatched, each by the hand of a trooper, in the hope that, finding his way across country, one at least would reach Hungerford.

The troopers had not long started when reports from many quarters reached Durand that the Simrol pass was occupied by the cavalry and artillery of Holkar. These were, he was told, the very cavalry and artillery whom Holkar, to be rid of, had furnished with carriage and supplies. Durand, nothing daunted, resolved to force this pass. But again he was baffled by his following. The Bhopál cavalry were willing enough to follow the English residents to their own homes at Sihor, and to protect them from

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Attempts
to move on
Mandlésar.

The Simrol
pass is re-
ported occu-
pied by Hol-
kar's troops.

The Bhopál
cavalry re-
fuse to at-
tempt to
force it.

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Durand com-
pelled to re-
tire on Sihor,

assault on the road ; but they were not prepared to run any risk to escort them anywhere else. They positively refused to attempt the Simrol pass. They declared that they would go only to Sihor, in the first instance—thence to any station that might be named. No resource was left, then, to Durand but to retire upon Sihor. It was a bitter alternative, for it removed him from the line by which General Woodburn would have to advance. The distance, too, was long and wearisome for the ladies and children. More than that, it appeared to be surrounded by danger. The reception of the fugitive party at Sihor was by no means assured. Durand could not be certain that the Bégam of Bhopál would be able to withstand the severe pressure that he well knew was put upon her, or that she would be able to restrain her excited Mahomedan subjects.* But there was no help for it. Could he have seen his way to the Bombay column, *viâ* Máu, it is obvious he would have taken it. He could then have left his wife, then suffering, and the other ladies, in safety at Máu, whilst he should proceed on his journey to the south. But the evidence is overwhelming that such a movement was impossible. Forced, then, to take the road to Sihor, he proceeded by rapid marches to that

* General Travers, V.C., think their last hour had thus writes :—" When we come. The women and children reached Ashta " (in Bhopál dren were dismounted from territory), " on the 3rd of July the guard drawn up ready for action, when a messenger arrived to announce it across our road, and the crowd with it, made many It was a relief."

place, and arrived there on the 4th of July with the guns and the Europeans who had left the Indúr Residency on the morning of the 1st of July.

I have occupied many pages in treating this interesting episode in the great Indian mutiny, but the widely diverse views disseminated, since his decease, regarding the conduct of the principal actor, have imposed upon me the necessity of making my narrative of the events which happened at Indúr as clear and as precise as possible. It has been more than insinuated that Durand needlessly abandoned his position; that he might have retired on Mau; that he was quite unequal to the occasion. Such charges, if made anonymously, might have been left to be disposed of by the judgment of those who knew Durand in India. But they have assumed the garb and the title of History. It was necessary, therefore, that their baselessness should be made clear by History. And no one will assert that, for such a purpose, the narrative of the events at Indúr in these pages is too long.

What, in fact, in a few words, was the conduct so carped at, but, in reality, so noble and meritorious, of Colonel Durand, in those dark days which intervened between the 14th of May and the 4th of July 1857? That conduct has been clearly, fairly, and briefly summed up in a manner which cannot be improved upon. "Without the aid of any European force," summarises the writer of *Central India in 1857*, "he had succeeded in maintaining himself at Indúr for six weeks after

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July 4.

which he reaches the 4th of July. Reason why the story of Indúr has occupied so much space,

will be generally accepted as sufficient.

Summary of Durand's conduct.

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July 4.

the outbreak at Dehlí, by isolating the contingent troops, and playing them off against the regulars. When, contrary to his wishes, the two were allowed to come into contact, the fidelity of the contingents gave way, and, gradually, the circle of insurrection closed upon Indúr. At last, driven out of the Residency by a combination of treachery and cowardice, he made a good, soldierly retreat, in the face of overwhelming masses, veiling his weakness by a show of force, and marched into Sihor without the loss of gun, standard, or trophy."

He proceeds
to Hoshang-
ábád,

Such was the conduct of this noble representative of the English race up to the 4th of July. His subsequent action neither belied his reputation, nor conduced less to the security of British interests in Central India. Arriving at Sihor, Durand stayed there but one day, and then started off for Hoshangábád, on the southern bank of the Narbadá, in the hope of being able to communicate with General Woodburn. At Hoshangábád he heard of the mutiny of the regular troops at Máu, and of their departure from that station, held, thenceforward, in security by Hungerford's battery. Secure, then, of Máu, Durand was anxious that Woodburn's force should make safe the line of the Narbadá, and thus interpose a barrier "between the blazing north and the smouldering south." But here he met with an unexpected difficulty. Mr. Plowden, the Commissioner of the Central Provinces, under the impression that the rising at Máu had been fatal to all the Europeans stationed there, was urging

urges the ad-
vance on Máu
of Woodburn's
column.

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General Woodburn to throw up the line of the Narbadá, and to march on Nágpur. Durand strongly protested against the adoption of a course of action which would have roused Central India against us. He wrote to the Government of India; he wrote to Mr. Plowden; he wrote to General Woodburn. He even authorised the officers commanding military posts to disregard any orders they might receive to abandon their positions on the Narbadá. But he did more. Keenly sensible of the necessity for prompt action, of the delays entailed by correspondence, and of the value of enforcing his arguments by his personal presence, Durand started for Arangábád, where he believed Woodburn's column still to be On his way, the gratifying intelligence reached him that his urgent requisitions for the advance of the column had been successful; that General Woodburn had returned to Púna in bad health; that Brigadier Stuart had succeeded him, with orders to push on at once, and that the column was on its way to Máu *viâ* Asírgarh. To Asírgarh, then, Durand hurried. His presence was a tower of strength. He impressed his own energy on every one present with the force. There were no further delays. Pressing onwards, the column traversed the pass of Simrol on the 1st of August, and entered Máu on the following day, just in time to escape the difficulties the rainy season, which began that night, would have entailed upon them. The line of the Narbadá was saved.

In this rescued position, for the present, I

Joins that
column at
Asírgarh,and accom-
panies it to
Máu.

244 HOW CENTRAL INDIA AFFECTED A'GRA.

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must leave Central India, to glance at the condition of affairs in the bordering States of Rájpútáná, and then to record how the action in the Native States affected Mr. Colvin and A'gra.

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RA'JPU'TA'NA'—the country of the Rájpúts—com- *Rájpútáná*
 prises eighteen native states,* seventeen of which
 were ruled by Hindús of the purest blood—the
 eighteenth, Tonk, by the Mahomedan descendant
 of the famous freebooter, Amír Khan. To most
 of these States was assigned a political officer, but
 the chief of all these, the Governor-General's
 Agent for the general control of Rájpútáná, was
 Colonel George St. Patrick Lawrence, brother of
 Sir Henry and of Sir John Lawrence.

To Colonel George Lawrence had been allotted *Colonel George Law-*
 many of the great qualities of his famous brothers. *rence.*
 He was high-spirited, conscientious, decided, a
 lover of truth and justice, frank, and straight-
 forward. He had seen a great deal of service.
 As a cavalry officer he was much appreciated. As

* These states are Udai- raulí, Kishngarh, Dholpúr,
 púr or Mewár, Jaipúr, Bharatpúr, Alwar, Bikanír,
 Jodhpúr or Márwár, Búndí, Jaisalmír, Siróhí, Dongarpúr,
 Kotá, Jhálawar, Tonk, Ka- Banswári, and Partábgarh.

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His earlier career.

Is appointed
to act as
Agent for
Rájpútáná.

The Rájpút
dynasties
favourable
to British
supremacy.

a political he had greatly distinguished himself during the arrangements which followed the conquest of Afghánistán. After the murder there, which he witnessed, of the envoy, and the annihilation of our army, he had shared the captivity of Eyre, of Colin Mackenzie, and of the last survivors of General Elphinstone's army. Employed in the most responsible position at Pasháwar after the first Sikh war he was taken prisoner by the Afghán allies of the Sikhs during the second. Released after the peace conquered at Gújrát he continued to give to the Government able and conscientious service in the political department, latterly at Méwar in Rájpútáná. In March 1857, on the transfer of his brother Sir Henry to the higher post of Chief Commissioner of Oudh, Colonel George Lawrence was appointed to act for Sir James Outram as political agent to the Governor-General for the whole of Rájpútáná.

In conformity with the prevailing custom Colonel Lawrence moved in the month of April to Abú, a mountain in the Siróhí territory about five thousand feet above the sea. All was quiet then in Rájpútáná. Under the fostering suzerainty of the British the Rájpút dynasties had been, during the preceding forty years, gradually recovering from the wounds inflicted upon them by the House of Taimúr, and from the severer gashes they had suffered from the Maráthá marauder and Pindárí plunderer. They were now protected, and they and their subjects were gradually reaping the benefits of that most efficient protection. If any of the officials holding high political and

administrative office under the Government of India had reason to regard with a light heart the future as affecting his duties and his charge that official was the Agent to the Governor-General in Rájpútáná.

Colonel Lawrence went to Abú in April, then, with serenity and confidence, nor had he any reason to feel uneasy until the account of the mutiny of the 10th of May at Mírath roughly startled him. The intelligence of this event reached Abú the 19th of May. Colonel Lawrence at once comprehended its importance in all its bearings. His long connection with the native army had not mastered a judgment naturally keen and searching. He saw that the Barhámpúr mutiny, the Bárrákpúr outbreak, the Mírath rising, were no isolated acts due to some local grievance, but that each of these constituted a scene in one and the same tragedy. He saw at a glance, in fact, that the whole army was contaminated.

His first thought directed itself naturally to the province under his charge. What, in fact, was the condition of Rájpútáná? Its population numbered ten millions of men subject to protected kings: it comprised an area of a hundred thousand square miles; within that area were five thousand native troops of all arms, belonging to the British army, all of whom, Colonel Lawrence, in his inmost heart, knew, would take the first favourable opportunity to mutiny: within that area, excluding some twenty sergeants attached to the native infantry regiments, there was not a

Book VIII.
Chapter IV.

1857.
April.

Colonel Law-
rence hears
of the mutiny
at Mírath.

The condition
of Rájpútáná.

BOOK VIII.
CHAPTER IV.

1857.
May.

The troops at
the disposal
of Colonel
Lawrence.

The arsenal
at Ajmír,

is garrisoned
by disaffected
troops.

Is now rein-
forced by
other dis-
affected
troops.

single European soldier fit for duty. The nearest station held by English troops was the station of Dísá, in the Presidency of Bombay, about a hundred and fifty miles from Abú.

Such then was the position—a province inhabited by ten million natives, guarded by five thousand ill-disposed soldiers, presided over by a Colonel in the British army with some twenty or thirty British officers at his disposal, watching the certain approach of the wave of mutiny! It was a position to test the stuff that was in a man! How did Colonel Lawrence meet it?

One of the first thoughts that occurred to him was that the arsenal at Ajmír must at all hazards be secured. Ajmír is a strip of British territory in the heart of Rájpútáná having as its capital the ancient and famous city of the same name. Close to this city, and commanded by the heights outside it, was an old and dilapidated fort, and within the fort was an arsenal capable of furnishing a siege train of great strength, guns, muskets, and ammunition; and containing a large quantity of specie.* This arsenal was, when the mutiny broke out, under charge of the light company of the 15th Regiment of Native Infantry, a regiment notoriously disaffected. But, after the bad news from Mírath, the military authorities at Nasírábád, acting on a curious principle, somewhat analogous to that of setting a thief to catch a thief,† had strengthened the light

* *The Mutinies in Raj-* began, in consequence of the *pootana*, by Iltudus Prichard. news from Meerut, the grena-

† "When the excitement dier company of the 15th

1857.
May.

company by adding to it the grenadier company of the same regiment. The arsenal at Ajmír, containing the *matériel* for the whole of Rájpútáná was, then, when the news of the Mírath outbreak reached Colonel Lawrence, under the protection of two companies of a native regiment which all but its own officers knew to be disaffected.

It was most important to place this arsenal as soon as possible in secure hands. As quick as thought, then, Colonel Lawrence despatched a requisition to the officer commanding at Dísá to despatch a light field force to enable him at the same time to assure the safety of the arsenal and to overawe the regular native troops at Nasírábád. The force was despatched, but before it could arrive, the Commissioner of Ajmír, Lieutenant-Colonel Dixon, acting on the inspiration of a dying man—for he survived but a few days—had made the arsenal safe. This officer, feeling, as Colonel Lawrence felt, that the caste question was a most important factor in the movements of the native army—that it was in fact the question of the hour—bethought him of the regiment, of which, in fact, he was

Colonel Law-
rence sum-
mons Euro-
pean troops
from Dísá.Colonel
Dixon's
happy in-
spiration,

Native Infantry was sent, rison; but the grenadier company was generally supposed to reinforce the light company in the foot, in reality to act as a check upon it. This may appear a curious arrangement to some of my readers, as, if the protection of the fort was the object aimed at, it could scarcely be attained by doubling the strength of a traitorous gar-

cessarily to reinforce the company was generally supposed to be less tainted, or rather, I should say, more free from suspicion than the rest, and, in those days, we were all deceived alike.”—*The Mutinies in Rajputana*. The author belonged to the 15th Native Infantry.

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Chapter IV.

—
1857.
May.

and Carnell's
promptitude,

save the
arsenal.

Colonel Law-
rence raises
a second bat-
talion of
Mairs.

commandant, raised for civil duties and appertaining exclusively to Rájpútáná, composed entirely of low-caste men, of men who had no sympathy with the Brahmanical prejudices of the regular army. This regiment was the Mairwárá battalion, quartered at Bíáor, a little place southwest of Nasírbád on the Dísá road. Without the delay of a single day Dixon ordered Lieutenant Carnell, his second in command, to march at once with a hundred men of his battalion upon Ajmír. Carnell replied by acting with the most praiseworthy promptitude. Making a forced march of thirty-seven miles, he surprised the sepoys before they had concerted their plans with their comrades at head-quarters. The new arrivals at once took charge of the arsenal, and the regular troops were sent back to Nasírbád.

This movement saved Rájpútáná.* The low-caste Mairs continued to the end faithful to their European lords. To show his appreciation of their good service and their loyalty Colonel Lawrence raised on his own authority a second battalion from the men of their tribe. Subsequently he did even more. He recommended that both battalions should enjoy all the privileges of regular native regiments, and this recommendation was agreed to.

To return. Colonel Lawrence, secure, on learning of Colonel Dixon's successful action,

* It cannot be doubted the city, Rájpútáná would that if the arsenal at Ajmír have been lost for the time had fallen into the hands of —Prichard's *Mutinies in Raj*—the mutineers, and with it, *pootana*, pages 39, 40.

BOOK VIII.
Chapter IV.

1857.
May 23.

He addresses
the native
princes of
Rájpútáná.

regarding the arsenal and important position of Ajmír, turned his attention to the native princes with whom he was officially connected. Feeling that it was above all thing necessary to maintain before their eyes a sovereign position, and to insist upon their fulfilling the duties which protected princes owed to the paramount power, Colonel Lawrence on the 23rd issued to them a proclamation. In this proclamation he called upon them to preserve peace within their borders, to concentrate their troops on the frontiers of their respective States, so that they might be available to aid the British, to show zeal and activity in dealing with any body of rebels who might attempt to traverse their territories. Whilst thus requiring the co-operation of the native princes Colonel Lawrence warned the commandants at the several stations to act with promptness and vigour, and he made the request to the Government of Bombay, that any European troops, returning to Persia, who might be required for service in the North-West Provinces, should be sent to A'gra *via* Gújrát and Rájpútáná.

The two military stations garrisoned by the native regular army, in the province under Colonel Lawrence's control, were Nasírábád and Nímach. The regiments and batteries at these stations being entirely native it was not to be expected, and Colonel Lawrence did not expect, that they would escape the general infection. Hence the precaution he had taken to send to Dísá for troops. It was a wise and prudent precaution, but unfortunately the troops could

Nasírábád
and Nímach
are gar-
risoned
wholly by
native troops.

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Chapter IV.

1857.
May 23-28.

The disposi-
tion of the
Nasirábád
garrison.

not march so quickly as the rumour which heralded their approach. Before they could arrive the mischief had been accomplished. They were able, however, to a great extent to repair it.

The garrison of Nasirábád consisted of the 15th and 30th Regiments of Native Infantry, a battery of native Artillery, and the 1st Bombay Lancers. Reports regarding the bad disposition of the men of the 15th had been circulated in the station very soon after the arrival of the news of the Mírath outbreak. But their officers considered these reports greatly exaggerated, believing that although their men might follow the lead of others, they would not show the way. The result showed that they were mistaken.

Precautions
there taken.

In consequence of the prevalent rumours every possible precaution for the safety of the station had been taken. The cantonment was patrolled every night by parties of the 1st Lancers—believed to be faithful—the guns were kept limbered up and loaded with grape. But about 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 28th of May some men of the 15th suddenly rushed to the guns, with loaded muskets, and declared themselves in revolt. The guns almost simultaneously opened fire. The officers galloped down to the lines and attempted to bring their men to reason, but in vain. Muskets were pointed, in some cases fired, at them, and they were warned to be off. The 30th Regiment, which till then had remained quiescent, apparently in a state of hesitation, joined the revolters about 4 o'clock. There still remained the Lancers. These at least would remain true.

The sepoy
there mutiny.

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Chapter IV.

1857.
May 28.

Disaffection
of the ca-
valry.

In this belief the infantry and artillery officers joined them, hoping with them to charge the rebels. They did charge. But the guns loaded with grape opened upon them. The men had no heart in the business. I have said that they charged. But it would have been more correct to state that they made several feints to charge. They never rode home. One of the officers, Newbery, who did charge home, was cut down and hacked to pieces, Captain Spottiswoode also was killed, and two officers, Captain Hardy and Lieutenant Lock, were badly wounded. Then it was that, feeling all their efforts useless, the officers resolved to retreat and accompany the ladies to Bíáor. These had been sent outside the cantonments when the first shot was fired. There the officers found them, and escorted them all that night and till 11 o'clock the next morning to their destination. There was but one casualty —Colonel Penny of the Lancers dying of heat apoplexy on the road.

The officers,
ladies, and
children are
forced to
evacuate
the station.

Nímach lies about a hundred and fifty miles Nímach south of Nasírábád. The troops at this station consisted of the 72nd Regiment of Native Infantry, the 7th Regiment of the Gwáliár contingent, and a wing of the 1st Bengal Cavalry. Sudden firing of houses, reports from the lines, and the unwonted presence of strangers, had foreshadowed for some time past a rising at this station. Yet the men loudly protested their fidelity and their indignation at the conduct of their brethren. All remained quiet till the 3rd of June. That day full information was received of

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Chapter IV.

1857.
June 3.

The rising
there.

The officers
escape to
Udaipúr.

Colonel Law-
rence starts
for Bíáor.

He is nomi-
nated Briga-
dier-General.

the events at Nasírbád on the 28th. That night about 10 o'clock the firing of two guns announced to the officers that the men had risen. Fortunately at Nímach there was a fortified square which had been prepared as a place of refuge in case of an emergency. Its defence, however, had been entrusted to the men of the 7th Regiment of the Gwáliár contingent. The officers on the first sound of the mutiny rushed to this square, and found the left wing of that regiment entering it, whilst the men of the right wing were lining the ramparts. The officers spoke cheerfully and encouragingly to the men. These promised fidelity, many declaring that they would rather die than surrender. Delusive were their promises. At 4 o'clock in the morning the sepoy's guarding the fort mutinied, despite the protestations of their officers, and filed out to join their comrades in the plunder of the station. No officers lost their lives, but there were some hair-breadth escapes. The wife of a serjeant and her three children were murdered before they could reach the fort. Ultimately the Europeans succeeded in making their way to Udaipúr. The rebels burned all the houses in the station but one, plundered the treasury, and made, by way of A'gra, for Dehlí. Their operations on the rear of our force there, and their sudden assault on A'gra, will be related presently.

Intelligence of the mutiny at Nasírbád reached Colonel Lawrence at Abú on the 1st of June. He started at once for Bíáor so as to be close to the scene of action. On his arrival at Bíáor he found

himself nominated Brigadier-General in command of all the troops in Rájputáná. Almost his first act was to direct the repair of the dilapidated fort* of Ajmír, and to store it with provisions. But a general can do nothing without an army, and at the moment of receiving his grade General Lawrence had not fifty European soldiers at his disposal. The native regular troops had mutinied and had taken themselves off. The contingent corps attached to several of the native courts were, as a rule, not to be trusted. Unlike the men of the Mairwárá battalion they were composed of Hindús—with whom food is a religion.

But very soon the results of the earlier inspirations of General Lawrence began to manifest themselves. On the 12th of June there arrived at Nasírbád the force for which he had made a requisition on Dísá. This force consisted of four hundred men of Her Majesty's 83rd; the 12th Bombay Native Infantry; and a troop of European Horse Artillery. He at once ordered a hundred men to Ajmír to reinforce the Mairs stationed there. General Lawrence then made that

Book VIII.
Chapter IV.

1857.
June 1-12.

His scanty
resources.

Troops from
Dísá arrive.

Re-occupa-
tion of Nasír-
ábád,

* It should be stated that of this post to the Mahomedans on the summit of the hill commanding Ajmír, and commanding the shrine, the chief priests of which had satisfactorily proved that it was another and a smaller fort, close to a shrine held in veneration by the Mahomedans. Not having at his disposal a sufficient number of men to guard the fort, General Lawrence entrusted the defence to the end, performing the garrison duties with zeal and fidelity till the danger had passed away.

BOOK VIII.
CHAPTER IV.

1857.
June 12.
and of
Nimach,

by Euro-
pean troops.

The lieu-
tenants of
General
Lawrence.

place his head-quarters, making constant visits, however, to Bíáor and Nasírábád.*

After the revolt of the native troops at Nímach, General Lawrence had caused that place to be occupied by detachments from the contingents of Méwa, Kotá, and Búndí. He had no choice, for at the moment no other troops were available. A few indications, however, soon showed him that these men were as little to be trusted as were their brethren in the line. He took, then, an early opportunity of replacing them by a detachment from the troops but just arrived from Dísá.

But it was impossible for General Lawrence to be everywhere; it was impossible that he should be able to demonstrate personally to all the native sovereigns and chieftains with whom he was officially connected that the knell of British rule had not sounded; it was impossible for him to enact at each native capital the policy which had been so successful at Ajmír. And the effect of all these impossibilities ultimately made itself felt. A narration of these events belongs to a subsequent period of this history. It will be suffi-

* "During June and July only guard. When at Ajmír I resided alternately between I never once allowed the Ajmír, Bíáor, and Nasírábád as I deemed my pre- routine of civil duties to be interrupted, but held open sence necessary at each place court, almost daily visiting with reference to my military the city, where, although fierce as well as civil and political and sullen faces were always duties. My head-quarters to be seen, I was always treated were, however, at Ajmír, ed with the greatest respect." where I resided in the Daolat —*Forty Years Service in India*, Bágh, close to the city, with a by Lieutenant-General Sir native officer's party of the George Lawrence. Mairwárá batalion as my

1857.
Juno.

cient here to state that whilst General Lawrence by his personal exertions and prompt action saved the great arsenal of Ajmír and recovered the two military centres of Nasírábád and Nímach, his lieutenants at Jaipúr, at Jodhpúr, and at Bharatpúr, nobly seconded his efforts. It will be necessary to devote some lines to their action.

The agent at Jaipúr was Major William Eden, an officer possessing ability, firmness, and discretion. The reigning Rájá of Jaipúr, Mahárájá Rám Singh, owed his throne, his education, it might almost be said his life, to the British. He had been extremely well educated, was naturally intelligent, and, being well acquainted with the history of Rájpútáná during the later days of Moghol sway and the entire period of Maráthá oppression, he was profoundly convinced that his own safety, the permanence of his rule, and the prosperity of his subjects, were bound up in the maintenance of the British suzerainty. The tale of the oppressions and tyrannies suffered by his ancestors and their subjects during the short period which had elapsed between the withdrawal of that suzerainty and its restoration—the period between 1804 and 1818—was still fresh in the minds of the prince and of his people. Major Eden then experienced no difficulty with the Mahárájá. He was as eager to show his loyalty as Major Eden was to demand it. The same spirit animated his people generally. Unhappily it was not so with his army. The sepoys composing it had come, for the most part, from the recruiting grounds which had supplied the British native

Major Wil-
liam Eden.Rám Singh,
Rájá of Jai-
púr.His reasons
for being
attached to
British over-
rule.

Book VI^{II}.
Chapter IV.

1857.
June.

His loyal
feeling is not
shared by
his troops;

who refuse
to wage war
for the Eng-
lish.

Jódhpúr.

Rájá Takht
Singh.

His mis-
government.

army, and they were influenced by the same feelings of distrust and hostility. Here, too, as at Gwáliár, as at Indúr, it was plainly shown that when the fanaticism of an oriental people is thoroughly aroused, not even their Rájá—their father as all consider him, their god as some delight to style him—not even their Rájá can bend them against their convictions. Five thousand of the Mahárájá's troops were indeed put into the field :—they even marched towards the districts of Mathurá and Gúrgaon with the avowed mission to maintain order and re-establish civil government. But it quickly appeared that if the maintenance of order and the re-establishment of civil government were to involve the necessity of fighting the revolted sepoys, the Jaipúr troops would neither maintain the one nor re-establish the other. Like the Sihor cavalry, they were prepared to defend European fugitives, but they would not wage an aggressive warfare. Their views in this respect having been practically established, the five thousand Jaipúr troops were recalled to their own territory.

At Jódhpúr, the agent was Captain Monck-Mason, highly-gifted, energetic, daring, and possessing tact and judgment. The position of Jódhpúr was peculiar. Its Rájá, Takht Singh, transferred in 1843 from the throne of I'dar to that of Jódhpúr, on the failure of hereditary issue in the family of the deceased ruler of the latter State, had not succeeded in conciliating the respect or the affections of his subjects. He had shown himself avaricious, careless of affairs,

1857.
June.Places a
small con-
tingent at th
disposal of
the British.

difficult of access. Many of his thákúrs, or nobles, were extremely ill-disposed towards him; some were in veiled, others even in open rebellion. The Mahárájá himself had no love for his Suzerain. Still he was not blind to the fact that, in the state of ill-feeling that existed between him and his nobles, it behoved him to cling to the British as his surest anchoring ground. He placed, therefore, a small contingent—two thousand men and six guns—at the agent's disposal. Up to the end of June, then, matters looked well in Jódhpúr. The events that succeeded belong to a subsequent period of this history.

At Bharatpúr, the agent was Major Nixon. Bharatpúr. The prompt action of the Darbár of the minor Rájá, and the mutiny of the troops of this principality, have been already related.*

At Alwar there was no political agent. The Alwar. Ráo Rájá, Bénéi Singh, at once placed a small contingent at the disposal of the British. His death, however, almost immediately afterwards, and the complications that ensued in his own State, rendered the proffered aid for all practical purposes nugatory.

There remains to be noticed Udaipúr, the Udaipúr. most ancient and the most venerated of all the States of Rájpútáná. The name of the Ráná was Sarúp Singh. He, like the Rájá of Jodhpúr, was not on good terms with his nobles. The British agent at this court was Captain Showers. When the news of the Mírath mutiny reached Rájpútáná, Captain Showers was at Abú, with other officers,

Captain
Showers.

* *Vide page 154.*

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Chapter IV.

1857.
June.

Disapproval
of his con-
duct by
Colonel Law-
rence,

and its con-
sequences.

Summary of
Colonel Law-
rence's con-
duct in Ráj-
pútáná,

the guest of Colonel Lawrence. Captain Showers was ordered to leave Abú and to return to his post at Udaipúr. In the opinion of his chief, however, his movements in that direction were not sufficiently rapid. Nor did his subsequent proceedings meet more with General Lawrence's approval, and at a later date that officer was under the necessity of reporting to the Government Captain Showers's "repeated acts of disobedience and defiance of his authority." The ultimate result was the removal of Captain Showers from political employment; the immediate consequence, a jar in the communications which it was necessary that the Agent for the Governor-General in Rájpútáná should maintain with the staff of officers through whom he worked with the native princes.

I have endeavoured thus briefly to describe the condition of Rájpútáná up to the end of June, 1857. We see the shock of the mutiny broken, the great arsenal saved, the principal native chiefs confirmed in their loyalty, by the vigorous and decided action of Colonel Lawrence. It is true that the regular regiments located in the two military centres had revolted. But Colonel Lawrence had recovered those centres. In Rájpútáná, in a word, defiance had been met by defiance, force by force. Events proved this principle to be a sound one. Compare the instant relief of the regular garrison at Ajmír by troops who could be trusted, with the hesitation to show doubt evinced at A'gra, Alláhábád, Banáras,

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Chapter IV.

—
1857.
June.

which was
saved by his
promptness,
decision, and
foresight.

Dánápúr, and Bárrákpúr. The first-named policy saved British interests without imperilling a single life; the second led through a sea of slaughter to the same results. Had Rájpútáná risen, it is difficult to see how A'gra could have held out, how our force before Dehlí could have maintained its ground. And that Rájpútáná did not rise is due to the prompt, decided, and far-seeing action of Colonel George St. Patrick Lawrence.

The mutinous regiments are hurrying out of Rájpútáná. It is time now that I should bring back the reader to the fortress which they **are** hoping to surprise and capture.

BOOK VIII.

CHAPTER V.

A'gra in the last fortnight of June.

THE events recorded in the three preceding chapters affected, more or less intensely, the situation at A'gra. That situation was becoming, towards the latter end of June, difficult to maintain. During that month the entire country on the right bank of the Jamná, on which the city stood, had pronounced against the British.

Its gradual isolation.

Nor were any reassuring signs visible on the left bank. There, where the light of day was not entirely shut out, the lurid flame of insurrection alone was visible. In a word, towards the fourth week of June, the capital of the North-West Provinces had become entirely isolated. But her worst days had not even then dawned upon her.

Reception of the fugitives from Gwáliár.

The mutiny at Gwáliár had occurred on the 14th of June. During the following days the fugitives had been gradually arriving at A'gra. They were received there with all the kindness and consideration due to suffering humanity, their

vants were supplied, and their comforts were attended to. Up to this time the idea of retiring within the Fort had not again been mooted. The defence of the station had been entrusted to the volunteer levies, and these had latterly been placed under the command of an officer in active service, Major Prendergast. Besides these were the regular European troops before alluded to, numbering altogether about six hundred and fifty fighting men.

In addition to these defenders was another body in whom the Lieutenant-Governor, Mr. Colvin, and the magistrate, Mr. Drummond, were unhappily disposed to place confidence. These were the native police, the leading spirits of whom were, to a man, Mahomedans.* If the evidence of those who were at A'gra, and who enjoyed opportunities of noting the conduct of these men, is to be trusted, the confidence reposed in them was entirely misplaced. They were in communication with the several bodies of mutinous men on the right bank of the Jamná. It was in response to their entreaties that these latter turned their steps towards A'gra. They harassed and opposed the officers who were engaged in vacuating the fort; they intercepted communication with the world outside A'gra; and they showed in various ways, unmistakeably to all except to Mr. Drummond and the Lieutenant-Governor, that they too were waiting their opportunity.†

Meanwhile, towards the end of the third week

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CHAPTER V.

—
1857.
June.

Disposable
troops at
A'gra.

Mr. Colvin
and Mr.
Drummond
place confi-
dence in the
native police,

who are un-
trustworthy.

Rumours
from outside.

* Raikes's *Notes on the Revolt.*

† Ibid.

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Chapter V.

1857.
June.

of June, the rumour gradually filled the air that the regular troops who had revolted at Nîmach and at Nasirabad, recruiting their strength by taking up stray revolted bodies in their course, were marching direct upon Agra. Every item of ascertained information pointed to the conclusion that the rumour was true. The strength of the force was then estimated to be about two thousand six hundred men with twelve guns.

Mr. Colvin
authorises
retirement
within the
fort,

The confirmation of this rumour decided Mr. Colvin. Certain now that the rebels were approaching Agra, with the intention of attacking it, the Lieutenant Governor felt how his position would be hampered by the necessity of defending the non-combatant population of a large and straggling station. At the end of June, therefore, he authorised the retirement within the fort of the helpless members of the Christian population. But, whilst he did this, he, with a fatuity which is inexplicable, forbade the transfer to the place of refuge of "any property beyond the sort of allowance which a French Customs' House officer at Calais or Marseilles passes under the term of a *sac de nuit*."* This extraordinary prohibition entailed subsequently "the loss and destruction of books, furniture, archives, records, public and private, and the ruin of hundreds of families."† The victualling of the fort was, however, pushed on from this time with greater earnestness than before.

but limits
the amount
of property
to be stored
there.

The rebels
reach Fath-
pûr-Sikri.

It was but time that measures of precaution

* Raikes.

† *Ibid.*

1857.
July 2.

should be taken. On the 2nd of July the rebel army had reached Fathpúr-Sikrí, only twenty-three miles from A'gra. Further measures now became necessary. I shall endeavour to describe, as clearly and succinctly as I can, those which were adopted.

I have already stated* that native troops from Gwáliár had been despatched to A'gra by Mahárájá Sindia, on the requisition of Mr. Colvin, as soon as the intelligence of the Mírath outbreak had been received. These troops had been sent out to endeavour to restore order in the A'gra and Aligarh districts and were no longer at A'gra.† Subsequently a detachment of the Kótá contingent had arrived and had been retained at the capital. Besides these there was at the same place, under the command of Saifúlla Khán, a native civil officer of high character, a body of about six hundred Kiráolí matchlockmen and three hundred Bharatpúr horse, with two nine-pounder guns. Lieutenant Henderson of the 10th Foot acted as the agent of the Lieutenant-Governor with this force.

As soon as it was known that the rebel army was at Fathpúr-Sikrí a disposition was made of these two bodies of men by which they should command the flanks of a force marching on A'gra from the west. The detachment of the Kótá contingent was brought into the cantonment, whilst Saifúlla Khán's levies were ordered to the neighbourhood of Sháhganj, four miles on the

Disposition
of the native
troops and
levies at and
near A'gra.Changes
made on the
approach of
the rebels.

* Page 154.

† Their operations will be detailed in the next chapter.

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1857.
July 3.

Mr. Colvin is
forced by
sickness to
resign tem-
porarily his
office.

road to Fathpúr-Sikrí. This disposition took effect on the 2nd of July.

On the following morning there happened an event which took the supreme power out of the hands of the statesman who had up to that time directed it. Mr. Colvin was threatened with an apoplectic attack. If his measures had not been successful, his task, it must be admitted, had been most difficult. He had at least maintained his post at the helm and had done his best. Throughout a most trying period he had displayed great personal courage, an unselfishness not to be surpassed, whilst his kindness of heart and sympathy with suffering had endeared him to all with whom he had come in contact. Feeling himself, for the time, incapable of the direction of affairs Mr. Colvin made over charge of the Government, by warrant, the same day, to three officers—Mr. E. A. Reade, Brigadier Polwhele, and Major Macleod.

Mr. E. A.
Reade.

Major
Macleod.

Brigadier
Polwhele.

Mr. Reade was the senior member of the Board of Revenue. He was a man of considerable capacity, and possessed judgment and energy. Major Macleod of the Engineers, Mr. Colvin's Military Secretary, had served with credit in the first Afghánistán campaign, and had a high character in the army. Brigadier Polwhele was the officer commanding the station. As it is action which is the truest test of the stuff which is in a man, and as the action of Brigadier Polwhele against the mutineers is now about to be recorded, I prefer that the reader should draw his own conclusions regarding his character from that action.

The day following the nomination of this Council active measures were taken for the defence of the place. Feeling that the prisoners in the large jail might in the impending attack be released, and that their presence within our defences would be most undesirable, the Council had the able-bodied men removed from the prison to the opposite side of the river and there set free. The pontoon bridge close to the fort, by which rebels from that side might cross was broken down ; the native Christians were all brought into the fort ; the two nine-pounder guns with Saifúlla Khán's force were removed to the magazine ; at the same time, orders were transmitted to the officer commanding the Kótá contingent to march out and attack the advancing rebels.

The first three of these measures were carried out successfully and with good effect. The two last produced a crisis—a crisis, which, whilst it materially diminished the number of fighting men at the disposal of our countrymen, yet cleared the air. When Lieutenant Henderson, for instance, reached the camp of the Kíraolí and Bharatpúr levies and required that the guns should be returned to the magazine, great excitement was manifested. But no open opposition was shown, and by a mixture of tact and firmness the guns were brought in. That night, however, Saifúlla Khán reported that he could no longer depend upon his levies ; that the Bharatpúr horse had deserted, and that the Kíraolí men were disengaged by the removal of the guns, and would

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Active mea-sures of the new Council.

The native levies not to be depended upon.

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Mutiny of the
Kótá con-
tingent.

not fight. Prompt action followed this report. Saifúlla Khán and his levies were ordered to leave Sháhganj, and to start at once for Kíráolí. They obeyed that night.

Even before the guns had been taken from these levies the Kótá contingent had mutinied. The order to them to advance had been designedly a tentative order—a test of their fidelity. It did test it—and to some purpose. No sooner had the men received the order to march than the leading spirit amongst them, a native sergeant, shot down the European sergeant in charge of the stores. This was the signal. Firing hastily at their European officers, happily without effect, the men rushed off to join the rebels. They were in such a hurry that a loyal gunner, by name Mathurá, had time to spike the guns, whilst their European medical officer, Dr. Mathias, aided by his servants and others, strewed in the sand their powder, ammunition, and case shot.* The most serviceable portion of their armament was thus rendered useless. A party sent out from A'gra brought the guns to the fort.

Mr. Colvin
enters the
fort and
resumes his
authority.

On the evening of that day, the 4th of July, Mr. Colvin entered the fort. An improvement in his health enabled him to resume his authority. The movement into the fort had become absolutely necessary, the behaviour of the native troops who formed the two wings of the British force having left the station quite exposed. Still

* *Official narrative of events authority in the Agra district attending the outbreak of dis- in 1857-58 by A. L. M. Phil- turances and the restoration of lipps, Magistrate of Agra.*

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Mr. Colvin changed his residence with great reluctance and under the pressure of his advisers. He could not but see, however, that the advance of the enemy had made Brigadier Polwhele, for a time, master of the situation. And Brigadier Polwhele wished to have his hands entirely free.

The time for military action had indeed arrived. A strong picket of the volunteer cavalry, posted at Sháhganj, notified to the Brigadier, on the morning of the 5th, the approach of the enemy. The question as to whether the British force should wait to receive the rebels in A'gra, or whether it should go out and meet them, had previously been debated. Brigadier Polwhele had had to consider whether, having under his orders the only European force available between A'gra and the Bombay Presidency on the one side, and between A'gra and that forming at Alláhábád on the other, he would be justified in courting an engagement with an enemy about eight times as strong in numbers as he was, and in which defeat might be fatal. He felt that with his European force he could maintain the fort of A'gra against all comers. To attempt to defend the station, without advancing, was impossible. Was he justified in risking his force, and possibly the loss of the fort, by advancing to meet the enemy in order to save the station of A'gra from destruction?

Brigadier Polwhele was a brave man. Beset by advisers, he had seemed at first to incline to a policy of defence, but when, on the morning of the 5th, he received the information that the

Approach of
the rebels.

Considera-
tions before
Brigadier
Polwhele.

He decides to
meet the
enemy.

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Wisdom of his
resolve.

Numbers of
the opposing
forces.

enemy was advancing upon A'gra, his soldierly instincts at once asserted themselves. He determined, on his own responsibility, to go and meet them.

It was a wise and prudent resolve. The history of India shows us that there is but one plain and simple mode of beating Asiatics, and that is to move straight onwards. Their numbers may overwhelm a general if he tries to manœuvre, but a steady advance is irresistible. It will be seen that Polwhele lost the battle of Sassiā because he did not sufficiently bear in mind the truth of this radical principle.

The enemy's force had received considerable reinforcements at Fathpúr-Sikrī. It consisted now of about four thousand infantry, fifteen hundred cavalry, and eleven guns.* To meet these Brigadier Polwhele could dispose of five hundred and sixty-eight men of the 3rd European Regiment, one battery with sixty-nine Europeans, including officers, and fifty-four native drivers, fifty-five mounted militia, and fifty officers and civilians who had taken refuge in A'gra. The European Regiment was commanded by Colonel Riddell; the Artillery by Captain D'Oyly. In the disposition of battle, however, the battery was divided,—Captain D'Oyly taking three guns on

* In his official report, Brigadier Polwhele states that, from the most accurate information he was able to gather, the enemy's force consisted of the 72nd Native Infantry; the 7th Regiment Gwaliar contingent; 4th and 6th troops 1st

Light Cavalry; four troops of cavalry of Méhdipúr contingent; part of the Kótá contingent; one troop of horse artillery; and one horse field battery; altogether more than five thousand men.

the right flank—an equal number on the left being commanded by Captain Pearson.

The British force left the A'gra parade-ground about 1 o'clock. It took the road to Fathpúr-Sikrí and moved along it till it reached Bégam Samru's walled gardens. On arriving at the village of Sháhganj, a halt was sounded to wait the return of the reconnoitring parties. These came in about half-past 2 o'clock with the information that the enemy were in strength at the village of Sassiah, about a mile distant. The force then advanced, but, after clearing the village of Sháhganj, it quitted the road, and forming up in the order indicated, the infantry in line in the centre, with the guns and a handful of cavalry covering either flank, inclined to the right over a sandy plain. Marching across this the enemy were descried. Their infantry appeared to be posted in and behind the village of Sassiah. Their artillery likewise was on either flank, but their guns were screened by rising ground, forming natural breastworks, and by thickly planted trees. Their cavalry was massed in considerable strength behind both flanks.

The English force continued to advance to within half a mile of the enemy's position when the latter opened out with a fire from their left battery. Brigadier Polwhele then, halting his men, ordered the Europeans to lie down and the guns on either flank to return the fire. Owing to the screened nature of the enemy's position it soon became evident that their guns could not be silenced without an advance being made. In a

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The British
force ad-
vances to
Sháhganj.

The enemy are
described.

They open
fire,

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and make
excellent
practice.

Captains
D'Oyly and
Pearson urge
an advance,

but without
success.

Probable
reasons in-
fluencing the
Brigadier.

short time they acquired the exact range and made such excellent practice that they exploded two tumbrils, and dismounted one of the guns in the half battery on the left, besides inflicting severe loss amongst the horses and drivers.

All this time our infantry were lying down. Captains D'Oyly and Pearson finding that their ammunition would soon be running low had sent repeated messages to the Brigadier reporting the fact, and urging him to attack the village with his infantry. The enemy, far from being checked, had been encouraged by the success of their guns to throw out skirmishers and to threaten our flanks with their cavalry. It had been for some time evident that if we were to confine ourselves to an artillery duel we could not beat them. Still, for two hours, the Brigadier seemed content to hold his own with the guns.

And yet, in continuing stationary, he was simply courting disaster. At any period within those two hours Brigadier Polwhele was in a more favourable position than Eyre had enjoyed in his fight near Arah. On that occasion Eyre, after pounding his enemy until he found that pounding alone would not win the day, had let loose his infantry upon him. He did not wait till his caissons had been exhausted, till every shot had been fired away! But this is just what Brigadier Polwhele did do! The fact is, that, tenderness for the lives of the only European infantry available for the defence of A'gra had made him over-cautious. His men were comparatively safe, there, lying down. He could not

make up his mind to give, in sufficient time, the order to advance! Fatal caution! Lamentable oblivion of the history of former wars! It needed but an onward movement of that thin red line to drive the enemy out of the village. The guns would then have completed their discomfiture. But minute succeeded minute, and our infantry still lay, prone and motionless, on the ground.

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Inaction of the
infantry,

till too late!

Brigadier Polwheel was yet considering whether the time had arrived to give the order to advance, when the explosion of another tumbril in the half battery on our left warned him that it had all but passed. That explosion was greeted by the enemy with a frantic shout of joy. Their cavalry, emerging in order from behind the village, swept round the left flank to the rear of our force, and from that point made a desperate charge at the disabled guns. Calm and collected, Captain Pearson wheeled round one of his guns and awaited their approach. The company of the 3rd Europeans nearest him rose likewise, and wheeled to face them. A volley of grape and musketry greeted then the enemy as they charged through the guns shouting and waving their swords. They did not stop to complete their work.

Charge of the
enemy's
cavalry,

but are driven
off.

Almost immediately after the incident just related one of the enemy's horsemen was seen to approach our right flank, as if to ascertain our condition there. The horseman returned and made his report. At once about two hundred of the enemy's cavalry advanced with the evident intention of charging Captain D'Oyly's half-battery. At this sight Captain Prendergast, who

They attack
the right
flank.

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Gallant
charge of
Prendergast.

The artillery
ammunition
is exhausted,

when the
Brigadier
orders the
advance.

D'Oyly's
splendid
conduct.

commanded eighteen mounted volunteers, could not contain himself, but with his small following charged the two hundred. As a manœuvre to stop the enemy's advance this gallant charge was effective, but in other respects it was disastrous. In the hand to hand conflict which followed, our horsemen lost more than one-third of their number. Had the enemy not shown abject cowardice not one of our men would have escaped.

More than two hours had elapsed. Captain D'Oyly now reported that his ammunition was all but exhausted. Then, and then only, did the Brigadier give the order to advance. The result showed how decisive would have been the movement had it been made earlier. Our infantry started to their feet, moved forward, and though suffering severely from the enemy's guns and from the fire of marksmen stationed on the roofs of the houses, gallantly forced their way into the village. One of the enemy's guns was captured and spiked. But our loss in this advance had been severe. The gallant D'Oyly, whose horse had been shot under him early in the day, was mortally wounded by a grape-shot whilst endeavouring to right one of his guns. Lifted on to a tumbril he still continued to direct the fire of his battery. The spirit of the soldier was still strong within him. Careless of his own sufferings, his duty to his guns, his corps, his country, mastered every other thought. Overcome, at last, by intense pain he turned to the man nearest him and said; "They have done for me now; put a stone over my grave and say that I

died fighting my guns."* He died the second day after in the fort.

In the village itself Major Thomas of the 3rd Europeans, a brave and accomplished officer, was mortally wounded. Many men fell with him. Every house, lane, and gateway was disputed. At last the enemy were driven out. It required now but the support of artillery to complete the victory. But here the fatal result of the delay in the advance became apparent. There was not a single round of ammunition left.

To continue the contest with small arms was useless, for the enemy, though driven out of the village itself, still occupied detached houses whence they continued to pour a heavy fire on our men. D'Oyly was mortally wounded; Pearson, with the other half battery a complete wreck, had lost his only subaltern, Lamb, early in the action, and had suffered so severely in men and horses, and by the desertion of his native drivers with the spare horses, that he could not make a pretence of assisting. Meanwhile the enemy attributing to the right cause the silence of our guns, and gathering courage, began to make a strong demonstration with all three arms. For all practical purposes we had only infantry to oppose to them. The village could not be held by infantry alone. It would have been easy to cut off our communications with the fort. Our object besides was to defeat the rebels:—failing that—to guard the fortress of A'gra. A retreat then seemed

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Our losses in
the village.

Fatal conse-
quences of the
delay in ad-
vancing.

* "If glory be a distinction, leveller." — Napier's *Penin-*
for such a man death is not a sular War.

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The force
retires on
A'gra,

in good order.

Pearson tries
to save his
gun.

The enemy,
wanting am-
munition,
move on
Dehlí.

the only possible course, if indeed even this were possible.

The retreat was ordered. It was a keen disappointment to all. There was not one, even amongst the privates, who did not feel that the day had been lost by bad generalship; that an early advance would have gained the victory. They showed the stuff that was in them when the enemy's horsemen seemed disposed to contest their retreat. Waiting calmly till the enemy approached, somewhat hesitatingly, within musket range, they then delivered a volley which made many a horse riderless. Again and again the rebel cavalry tried the same manœuvre, but always with a similar result. The fire from the rebel guns, which had been at first alarming, now gradually slackened, and from the fact that in the last round they fired copper coins, it was inferred that they too had run short of ammunition.

Meanwhile Pearson had made superhuman exertions to mount and get away his disabled gun. But horses, drivers, men, and time alike failed him. It did not, however, adorn the enemy's triumph, for it remained on the ground and a day or two later was brought into the fort.

Baffled by the result of their attempts to charge, and, probably, by the failure of their ammunition, the rebels as they followed marked their triumph by setting fire to every building they reached. Returning then to Sháhganj, they took there a hasty meal, and set off that very night on the road to Dehlí. They reached the imperial city on the 8th of July, and were received there

with a grand salute in honour of their victory of Sassiah.

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The villagers
“improve”
our defeat.

The beaten little army reached the fort as the day was closing. They had lost in killed forty-five, in wounded and missing, one hundred and eight of their number. Before the survivors entered, the blaze, advancing from house to house in the cantonments and civil station, had told the non-combatants and ladies within the fort how the battle had been appreciated by the natives. Hordes of villagers who had watched the contest from afar had at once dispersed to burn and to plunder. The previously released prisoners, and their comrades, now set at large, joined in the sport. All night the sky was illuminated with the flames of burning houses, and a murmur like the distant sea told what passions were at work. It was a magnificent though sad spectacle for the dispirited occupants of the fort.

During the two days following disorder was rampant in and outside the fort. The city, the cantonments, the civil lines were ruthlessly plundered. Of all the official records those only of the revenue department were saved. Even these were secured by the unauthorised action of a high official—Mr. E. A. Reade. The others were burned with the buildings in which they were stored. At the same time the King of Dehlí was proclaimed in the city.* The rabble,

The city and
the station are
plundered.

and the King
of Dehlí is
proclaimed.

* “On the morning after the battle the town crier, at the that accompanied the crier order of Morád Ali, Kótawál, was composed of most of the proclaimed the reign of the leading Mahomedan police King of Dehlí through the officers attached to the Kót-

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Loyalty of
Rájárám.

who had at first wondered at our inaction after battle which, if we were beaten in it, had at least caused the enemy to move off to Dehlí, soon began to attribute it to fear, and to take advantage of it accordingly.

But there were men amongst them of a higher stamp who knew us better. One of these, by name Rájárám, a resident in the city, managed on the evening of the 7th to have conveyed to the magistrate within the fort a note in which he informed him that there were no rebel troops in A'gra; that the confusion which reigned was the work of the rabble; and that the entry of the magistrate into the city with a sufficient force would restore order.

Mr. Drummond restores order in the station.

An intimation of this nature was quite sufficient to stir to action a man possessing the energetic character of Mr. Drummond. The following morning he issued from the fort, escorted by a company of Europeans and some guns, made a circuit of the principal streets and of the station, and proclaimed the restoration of order and British rule. Then, too, he became for the first time aware of the manner in which the rabble had vented their fury upon the Christian population who had hesitated to avail themselves of the protection of the fort. It happened that whilst the great bulk of the European and Eurasian inhabitants had taken advantage of that protection,

wáli headed by the Kótwlán of any respectability was himself, and followed by a crowd of inferior grades and rabble: there is no reason to suppose that a single Mahome-

in any way engaged or accessory to this proceeding."—Mr. Phillipps's *Narrative*, already referred to.

there had been men of the latter class, born in India, natives in habits, in modes of thought, in everything save religion, who preferred to confide in the friendship of their native friends. These had been sought out and slaughtered. At the same time too some Europeans on their way to the fort had been intercepted and murdered. The number of both these classes who thus fell outside the fort amounted to twenty-two.*

The restoration of order in the fort followed Mr. Drummond's action in the town. The natives of the lower class, prompt to appreciate decision, returned as if by magic to their duties. Prior to Mr. Drummond's triumphant tour through the city, there had been a great dearth of servants in the fort; but the day following small shopkeepers flocked in with provisions; domestics of every

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July 8.

Order also
revives in the
fort.

* Of these fifteen were men, four were women, and three were children. Most of them were slaughtered by our own rebellious police. Amongst them were Mr. Hubbard, Professor of literature, Agra College; Mr. Hare, an old and paralytic man, and his son; Mr. Christie; Major Jacobs; Mr. and Mrs. Dennis; Mr. and Mrs. Derridon and their three children. A curious circumstance is related in connection with the murder of these last, illustrative of the fidelity, so often evinced during the mutiny, of native servants to their masters. Mr. and Mrs. Derridon and three children were murdered at the door of their house by a gang of Mahomedans. They had three other children and a Mahomedan nurse. Whilst her master and mistress were being killed this nurse was severely wounded. But with rare fidelity she carried two of the other children to the Kotwali, and watched over their safety there. They were made over to Mr. Drummond as he rode through the city on the 8th. The third surviving boy, aged twelve, escaped by creeping through the legs of the assassins, and alone traversed the city in safety till he arrived at the fort.—Phillipps's *Narrative*.

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Life in the
fort.

Difficulties
which had at
first to be
overcome.

grade were eager to renew or proffer service. The battle of Sassiah had at all events cleared the air. The natives had seen the utmost the rebel troops could accomplish; and their faith in British ascendancy revived.

Now began that long life in the fort of A'gra,—so tedious for soldiers, so conspicuous for the display of those splendid qualities which render a noble woman in very deed a ministering angel. The story has been told in graceful and touching language by one, herself a widowed fugitive from Gwálíár,—from whose account of the tragedy there I have already quoted*—and whose own sufferings never made her forget the griefs and necessities of others. There are some points in it which demand a place in History.

As soon as the restoration of order outside the fortress had been completed arrangements were made to provide for the necessities of the Christian population within. In addition to the residents of A'gra there were congregated there fugitives from many stations. The majority of these had lost all their property. Some had reached A'gra only with the clothes which they wore. A not inconsiderable proportion were children. It was difficult to provide for these all at once. For, it must be remembered, the non-combatant population of A'gra had been prohibited, prior to the mutiny of the Kótá contingent, to take with them into the fort more than the contents of a small hand-bag. Nor had this

* *A Lady's Escape from Gwalior*, by Mrs. Coopland.

state of things been wholly remedied by the removal of Mr. Colvin and the civilians to the same protection. No one had seriously contemplated the defeat of our troops at Sassiāh. Our force had marched out of the station the better to defend the station. No one had anticipated the actual result. The blaze of the burning bungalows which announced it gave to many, then, the first intimation that the bulk even of their wearing apparel had been lost to them for ever.

But notwithstanding these and other more serious losses the love of order, of arrangement, and of comfort so characteristic of the British nation quickly manifested itself.

The first necessity had been to set apart one of the buildings as a hospital for the sick and wounded. At first a barrack was selected for this purpose. At a later period the Motí Masjid, or Pearl Mosque, was also appropriated to the same object. This building, built entirely of a beautiful creamy white marble, was well fitted to be used as a hospital on account of the cloisters and cells by which its inner court was surrounded. These, formerly inhabited by priests and devotees, were now made over to those suffering from their wounds, their privations, or the climate. The civilians of A'gra were lodged in the small apartments ranged along three sides of the beautiful garden near the Díwán-i-Kháss, or the hall of nobles. For others, fugitive ladies and children, huts, separated the one from the other by grass screens, silky, strong, and flexible, were arranged in the stone gallery, twelve feet wide, the roof supported

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Preparations
for the recep-
tion of the
sick and
wounded,

of the
civilians,

the ladies and
children,

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the officers,

the priests
and nuns,

the soldiers,

the shop-
keepers,

and the Eur-
asians.

on arches, which runs round the Díwán-i-A'm, the hall of audience of Akbar.* To the senior officers and their families were allotted small tiled houses near the Mótí Masjid. Separate houses were also made over to fugitives of distinction. For officers of a lower rank tents were pitched on a large green plot near the same building. The Roman Catholic Archbishop and his ecclesiastical staff were similarly accommodated. To the nuns and their numerous pupils were assigned the sheds or store-rooms where the gun-carriages had stood.† The Protestant chaplains had comfortable quarters, and the missionaries lived in the Palace garden. To the unmarried soldiers were assigned one set of barracks, whilst the married with their families occupied another set. These latter had saved their furniture and lived in comparative comfort. Those of the Europeans most to be pitied, in point of accommodation, were the merchants and shopkeepers. They had to content themselves with erecting small grass huts on the archways and tops of buildings. The Eurasians were still less comfortably provided for. They had to find an abiding place "anywhere."‡

* The officers who had the room or storehouse into a allotting of the quarters (a chapel and fitted it up martask that was no sinecure) had vellously well with crucifixes, appointed to us each one arch, altars, and candlesticks."—A which we divided as I have *Lady's Escape from Gwalior*. before described. The tem- † I have taken these details porary partitions of grass from Mrs. Coopland's book. were so thin you could hear Regarding the Eurasians she every word uttered in the next writes: "The half-caste, or division."—A *Lady's Escape* 'Kala Feringhees,' as the natives call them, who are un- from *Gwalior*.

‡ "They turned one large charitably said to have the

The total number of Europeans in the fort in July amounted to one thousand nine hundred and eighty-nine. Of these one thousand and sixty-five were men, the rest women and children. In addition there were three thousand eight hundred and fifty-six Eurasians and Natives.

So much for the accommodation. In the course of a few days the various habitations came to be classified as "blocks" alphabetically arranged. This was the first dawn of order and arrangement. Several of the archways or vestibules within the fort were about the same time converted into shops; one into a post office. In the shops were sold the European stores which had escaped the savage instincts of the rabble. For some days no butcher's meat was procurable; but after the restoration of order in the city this defect was partly remedied, and the residents were supplied by the Commissariat Department. As time went on the natives began to bring in from outside fowls, eggs, and butter.

But if the accommodation was rough and the privations were for a long time great, there were those who were prevented by no personal suffering from devoting themselves to the wants of others. Before even the men wounded at the battle of Sassiah had been deposited in the first improvised hospital, mattresses, pillows, and quilts,

vices of both different races 'square' just beneath our balcony:—"the balcony of the were in immense swarms and Diwán-i-Am) "the rest lived had to accommodate them- in holes, tyronnels, or on selves anywhere. A large tops of buildings all over the number of them lived in our fort."

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The total
number in the
Fort.

Further ar-
rangements
for supplies.

Devotion of
the ladies to
the sick and
wounded.

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which the ladies had been preparing for the event, had been arranged on hastily manufactured wooden cots. The ladies then formed themselves into a committee to assist the doctors in ministering to the wounded. At the request of the senior medical officer, Dr. Farquhar, one lady, Mrs. Raikes, undertook to preside over this committee. The ladies were then divided into watches, and to these watches certain hours during the day and night were apportioned. To avoid teasing the men by too much nursing a small separate room was made up for the lady nurses. From this, at stated times, they issued and went their rounds distributing tea, jelly, soda-water, coffee, and soup, or helping to dress the wounds of the patients under the orders of the medical officers.*

Meanwhile the Government stores within the fort were opened for the supply of clothing to those who most needed it. By degrees tailors were admitted from outside, and though the demeanour of these and other domestics was not

* Raikes's *Notes on the Return of the ladies*, modestly volt. Mr. Raikes adds the asked permission to invite following tribute to the feeling conduct of the British and society of Agra to an soldier. "For weeks that the ladies watched over their charge never was a word said by a soldier which could shock the gentlest ear. When all was over, and when such of the sick and wounded that recovered were declared convalescent, the soldiers, in order, as they expressed it, to show their gratitude for the con-

duct of the ladies, modestly volt. Their nurses and all the gentry and conduct of the British and society of Agra to an entertainment in the beautiful gardens of the Taj. There, under the walls of the marble mausoleum, amidst flowers and music, these rough veterans, all scarred and mutilated as they were, stood up to thank their countrywomen who had clothed, fed, and visited them when they were sick."

always respectful, they showed yet the same regard as of yore for the punctually paid monthly stipend.

It is gratifying to be able to record that the charity and devotion to the cares and sorrows of others displayed in the A'gra fortress knew no differences of religion. There was no place for the display of narrowness on the one side or of bigotry on the other. I have been particular in the inquiries I have made on this subject and the result of these has been to convince me that in their several spheres Catholic and Protestant strove to their utmost to do their duty to their neighbour.

The Civil Government all this time existed, but for all purposes of defence and provisionment the administration was in the hands of the military. Subsequently to his defeat at Sassiah Brigadier Polwhele had, by express orders from the Governor-General, been removed from command.* His place was taken by Colonel Cotton. Vigorous measures were speedily inaugurated. The defences of the fortress were strengthened and increased; numerous guns were mounted on the ramparts; the want of garrison artillerymen was supplied by the enlistment of promising Eurasians to form gun detachments; from the same class volunteers were called and selected and trained to serve as drivers; the powder magazines were covered by mud ramparts to protect them alike against treacherous attack and against the chances

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July.

Charity known
no creed.

Brigadier Pol-
whele is
removed.

Measures
taken by his
successor.

* This order, dated 26th of July, was received in Agra on the 5th of August.

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—
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August.

Dangers to
which the
garrison were
exposed.

of being shelled. It must be recollected that all this time the Gwáliár contingent, possessing numerous field guns and a heavy battering train, was within seventy miles of A'gra; that its leaders were constantly boasting that they would attack A'gra; and that they were with difficulty restrained by Mahárájá Sindia. Inside the fortress was Major C. Macpherson, the agent for the Governor-General at Sindia's court. His communications with Sindia were daily. The nature of them led the garrison to believe that they were always liable to an attack from that formidable contingent. They could not be certain that the loyalty of the Mahárájá and his minister would for ever be able to restrain the soldiers. And this uncertainty, whilst it added no little to the difficulties of the garrison, hastened the completion of defensive preparations.

The Commissariat Department.

Amongst these was the provisionment of the fortress. The cares of the Commissariat Department in this respect were greatly lightened by the influence exerted by a character well known in Indian history, Lálá Jotí Pershád, a contractor whose successful provisionment of the army during the Afghán, the Sikh, and the Gwáliár wars had gained him a great and deserved reputation. A bazaar was established immediately outside the fortifications and quickly assumed the proportions of a regular market.

An expedition
organised and
sent to
Aligarh.

By degrees it began to be considered possible to organise an expedition for the relief of the neighbouring districts. Of these Aligarh, commanding the direct road to Dehlí, was the most

important. Colonel Cotton, accordingly, equipped a small force composed of three companies of Europeans, three guns, thirty of the volunteer cavalry, and a few trustworthy native mounted levies. Major Montgomery, the Brigade Major, commanded the force, whilst the volunteer cavalry were led by the gallant de Kantzow, famous for his conduct at Mainpúri. Leaving A'gra on the 20th of August the force reached Aligarh on the 24th. They found the rebels, consisting of a large body of Gházís or fanatics, and a detachment of the 3rd Cavalry, in the occupation of a walled garden. It was difficult to ascertain the precise position of their main body, but some of their cavalry having been noted outside and on the left of the enclosure, de Kantzow was directed to dislodge them. De Kantzow did not require more explicit instructions. Addressing a few words to the volunteers he placed himself at their head and led them straight at the enemy. The rebels watched the approach of this handful of Europeans without flinching till they were within shot. They then raised their carbines and fired. A second later, and without waiting to ascertain the result of their volley, they turned their horses heads and fled. Meanwhile the Gházís emerging from the enclosure had attacked our infantry. A considerable number of them, dressed in garments white as the driven snow, suddenly dashed from the enclosure, flourishing their scimitars aloft, and crying out "Religion!" "Victory!" rushed on the advanced skirmishers of the Europeans. They fought with so furious a desperation and with so

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1857.
August 20.

August 24.

The rebels
there are
defeated.

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—
1857.
August 24.

frantic a rage that it became necessary to bring up the guns to bear upon them. Then they retired, and our infantry, dashing after them completed the overthrow. The Gházís and their allies were driven out of Aligarh.

This was the last operation on anything like a large scale in which the A'gra force was engaged until after the fall of Dehlí. But before relating the manner in which that "crowning mercy" was achieved it is necessary to turn to the events which were happening during this period in the districts on the left bank of the Jamná—events less affecting A'gra than the operations in the vicinity of Lakhnao and of Dehlí.

Mr. Colvin's
health fails.

During a great portion of this period Mr. Colvin still continued to administer the duties attaching to his high office. But he was no longer the strong man hoping for the prompt repression of the rebellion that he once had been. It was not alone the revolt that had broken him. The uprooting of convictions deeply held and long clung to was indeed a blow hard to bear. But it was rather the sense of his inability to restore order in his own provinces; the forced isolation to which events condemned him; the compulsory inaction; that preyed most deeply upon him. Of the fine courage, the devotion to duty, the earnest consideration for others which had characterised his career there never was the smallest abatement. These noble qualities shone brightly to his very last hour. Warned by his medical advisers that continued attention to the details of office would be fatal,

that he required perfect rest of body and mind, Mr. Colvin refused, nevertheless, to relinquish the smallest of the duties attaching to his high office. He felt that it would ill become the captain to leave the deck of his ship when she was drifting on to a lee shore, the breakers almost in sight; that ill as he was, it was his duty to set an example; and that as he must die some day, it was better that he should die in the performance of duties for which he yet had strength rather than seek to prolong his existence by casting his cares upon another.

Few will question the nobility of soul which prompted Mr. Colvin to direct the course of the State-vessel to the very last. It has been thought that he might perhaps have advantageously consented to leave some of the minor details to his subordinates. But when Mr. Raikes, a judge of the Court of Appeal at A'gra, writes, so late as July, that if he wanted a sword or pistol from the magazine Mr. Colvin's counter-signature was necessary, he only exposes the red-tape system of administration which flourished then, and which probably flourishes still, in other countries as well as in India. He exposes a system which was then ingrained in the country. It was but a brick in the wall of Indian administration. The reform of the system was necessary but it could scarcely have been undertaken during the mutiny. It was not routine duties of this nature that affected Mr. Colvin. The real pressure which broke him down has been already indicated.

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August.

He continues,
nevertheless,
to perform the
duties of his
office.

Faults of the
red-tape
system.

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1857.
September.
Mr. Colvin
dies.

September 9

Tributes to
his memory.

"Early in September," writes Mr. Raikes in his journal, "Mr. Colvin asked me to prepare a plan for the restoration of the Police in the North-Western Provinces, and I submitted a note on the subject; on the 7th I called to talk over the matter, but found the Lieutenant-Governor too ill to attend to business. On Wednesday, the 9th, to our great sorrow he died, and on the next day I, as pall-bearer, paid my last tribute of respect to his memory. After ruling over the fairest provinces of India in her palmiest days he died without secure possession of an acre of ground beyond the Fort, and his body was interred within the walls."

Thus died in the performance of his duty, before the dawn of the triumph of which he never despaired, the brave, true-hearted, and noble Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces. Whatever failings or prejudices he may have had they are all obliterated by the recollection of the earnestness, the single-mindedness, the devotion to duty that characterised him in a most critical period. He was sustained to the last by the consciousness that "he had not shrunk from bearing the burden which God had called upon him to sustain;" by the conviction that he had performed his duty to his God and to his country, and that he had ever striven to have a conscience void of offence towards God and Man. His demise was deeply felt by all with whom he was connected by private friendship or by official ties; and the Government of India only gave utterance to a feeling that pervaded all classes when by a noti-

fication in the Official Gazette it paid a just tribute to his name and memory.*

* The following is the text than usually valuable to the of the notification refered to:

"It is the melancholy duty of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council to announce the death of the Honourable John Russell Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces.

"Worn by the unceasing anxieties and labours of his charge, which placed him in the very front of the dangers by which, of late, India has been threatened, health and strength gave way; and the Governor-General in Council has to deplore with sincere grief the loss of one of the most distinguished amongst the servants of the East India Company.

"The death of Mr. Colvin has occurred at a time when his ripe experience, his high ability, and his untiring energy, would have been more

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"But his career did not close before he had won for himself a high reputation in each of the various branches of administration to which he was at different times attached, nor until he had been worthily selected to fill the highest position in Northern India; and he leaves a name which not friends alone, but all who have been associated with him in the duties of Government, and all who may follow in his path, will delight to honour.

"The Right Honourable the Governor-General directs that the flag shall be lowered half-mast high, and that seventeen minute guns shall be fired at the seats of Government in India upon the receipt of the present notification."

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In the first chapter of this Book I have described the mutiny of the 9th Regiment of Native Infantry cantoned in detachments at the stations of Aligarh, Mainpúrī, Etáwá and Balandshahr. It remains now to give an account of the subsequent occurrences in the districts represented by those stations, and in the districts adjoining, and of the action of the mutinous feeling in the important province of Rohilkhand.

I propose in the first instance to take the reader back to the station of Aligarh. The mutiny at that station, occurring on the 20th of May, has been already related.* Intelligence of this disaster had reached the Lieutenant-Governor on the 21st. Mr. Colvin at once organised an expedition to hold the line. Acting under his orders, Captain Alexander, commanding 1st Irregular Cavalry Gwáliár contingent, sent by Sindia to aid

Despatch of
Sindia troops
to the dis-
t. 21st.

* Page 155.

in maintaining order, detached Lieutenant Cockburn, with two hundred and thirty-three troopers, on the 13th, to Aligarh. Cockburn, making forced marches, reached that place on the 26th.

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1857.
May 26.

He arrived in time to protect and to escort to Hátrás, a walled town twenty-two miles distant, the Europeans who had till then maintained their position in the vicinity of Aligarh. At Hátrás, however, about a hundred of his men, principally Mahomedans, rebelled, and after having vainly attempted to invite their comrades to join them, rode off to stir up the villagers in the districts. But Cockburn, though his party was reduced to one hundred and twenty-three men, resolved to be even with his revolted troopers. Receiving information that they had been joined by about five hundred villagers, and that these were organising a system of plunder and murder, Cockburn formed a plan by which to entrap them. He procured a curtained bullock cart, such as native women generally travel in. Inside this cart he placed four troopers with loaded carbines, and drew the curtains. He then sent the cart on the road towards the rebel camp, he following with his main body under the shade of some trees. No sooner did the rebels see the cart than they dashed forward to secure the lady whom they imagined to be inside. The troopers behind the curtains waited till the foremost men approached, when they discharged their carbines with fatal effect. Hearing the discharge, Cockburn and his men dashed forward, killed forty-eight of the surprised foe, and dispersed the remainder.

Some of them
mutiny at
Hátrás.

Cockburn out-
manœuvres
the rebels.

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June.

The detach-
ments of the
Gwáliár con-
tingent
mutiny.

July 1.

An action like this was, however, but a transient gleam of sunshine. To aid in pacifying the districts, Mr. Colvin had ordered thither, likewise, detachments of the 2nd Cavalry, under Captain Burlton and Lieutenant Salmond, and Captain Pearson's battery, of the Gwáliár contingent. Lieutenant Cockburn's detachment had also been strengthened by the main body of his regiment, the 1st, under Captain Alexander. Up to a certain point, the men belonging to these several arms and detachments behaved perfectly well. Gradually, however, as the villagers rose on every side, the pressure became too much for them. On the 1st of July, the 1st Cavalry, then at Hátrás, mutinied. The men showed no ill-feeling towards their officers, but simply told them they must go. When hundreds with arms in their hands issue orders to units, the units must obey. Alexander and the officers with him had, then, nothing for it but to ride for A'gra, a journey they successfully accomplished. The following day, the men of the Artillery, under Pearson, and those of the 2nd Cavalry, commanded by Burlton, and then stationed at Sánsí, seven miles beyond Hátrás, incited by letters from their comrades at that place, likewise rose in revolt, and intimated to their officers that they no longer required them. Pearson, Burlton, and Salmond did all that men could do to keep their men true, but in vain. The men insisted on joining their comrades at Hátrás. The cavalry started off the following morning for that place, their officers still accompanying them. There they effected a junction

1857.
July 3.Courage and
coolness of
Captain
Pearson.

with the 1st Cavalry, and once again, and in a peremptory manner, insisted that their officers should leave them. Burlton, Salmond, and the surgeon, Dr. Dalzell, at once then took the road to Agra. Shortly afterwards, Pearson, who had clung to his battery, arrived with his mutinous gunners. The only other European with him was his staff-sergeant. Pearson found the two regiments of cavalry drawn up as if on parade. He rode up to them, received their salutes, questioned them about their officers, and was told they had left for Agra. He then calmly and coolly rode down their ranks, speaking to the men he knew, and exchanging greetings with the native officers. His position was full of peril. At any moment he might have been shot down. An imprudent gesture, a sign of alarm, would have been fatal to him. But Pearson was equal to the occasion. He continued his ride down the ranks coolly, followed by his sergeant, mounted on his second charger; nor did he change his pace till the line had been well cleared. He and the sergeant then put spurs to their horses. A little beyond the village they overtook the cavalry officers. The whole then rode on, hiding by day, and reached Agra in time to share in the disaster of the 5th.

The officer
escapes to
Agra.

It is remarkable that the men made no attempt to molest them! Most remarkable when the fact is taken into consideration that the foot-soldiers of the same contingent evinced the most blood-thirsty feelings towards their officers! Can there be any significance in the fact that the cavalry

Were the Ma-
homedans less
blood-thirsty
than the
Hindus?

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Chapter VI.

—
1857.
July 3.

The district
volunteers.

soldiers were mostly Mahomedans, whilst nineteen-twentieths of the infantry men were Hindús?

Meanwhile, some well-mounted volunteers had been doing good service in the districts. Composed of civilians, of officers whose regiments had mutinied, of clerks in public offices, of planters, of shopkeepers, all animated by but one feeling, their first act had been to relieve a body of six or seven of their countrymen, besieged by the rebels in an indigo factory. They then pushed on to Aligarh, where they were joined by Mr. Watson, the magistrate, a man of remarkable courage, and by others. But they were not strong enough to dominate the rebellious villages, and gradually fell back on Ágra. Twelve* of them, however, disdaining a retreat so rapid, remained behind occupying a factory about five miles from Aligarh. But resolute as were these men, they, too, were forced to retreat when the Gwáliár cavalry had mutinied. On the concentration of the volunteers at A'gra, they were employed as pickets on the Mathurá road to watch the approach of the Nímach brigade. How they behaved towards that brigade has been already related.

It will thus be seen that the efforts of the Government of the North-West Provinces to stay the plague in the districts lying on the left bank of the Jamná, between Dehlí and A'gra, had signally failed. In the more northerly districts, and in

* Cocks, Watson, and Outram, geon; Castle, Hine, Burkin-C.S.; Saunders and Tandy, young, and Harrington; En-planters; Stewart Clarke, sur-signs Marsh and Oliphant.

They fall back
on Á'gra.

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June.

Rohilkhand, rebellion had been even more rampant and more successful.

Although the troops in Rohilkhand rose in revolt a few days earlier than did those in the more northerly districts, the plan of the narrative, leading southwards to Káhnpúr and Lakhnao, renders it necessary that the latter should in the first instance be considered. I therefore propose to carry the reader with me to the districts known as Saháranpúr and Mozaffarnagar, to descend thence through Rohilkhand to Fathgarh.

The station of Saháranpúr was, before the Saháranpúr. mutiny, essentially a civil station. It was situated on the bank of a small stream, about two miles from the city of the same name, and which was the capital or chief town of the district, also called Saháranpúr. The population of the town amounted to about forty thousand—many of them Mahomedans, with rather a bad character for turbulence. In the earlier portion of the present century Saháranpúr had been one of the frontier stations of the British territories. To guard it a rather strong fort had been built on its northern face. But to such an extent did confidence in their star override in those days all suggestions of prudence in the British mind, that on the extension of our frontier the fort had been converted into a civil jail, whilst the Stud Department had been allowed to run up the ditches and mud walls of their paddocks so close to its ramparts that it would have been easy from their cover to pick off the defenders of the place.

Description
of the civii
station,

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1857.
May.

and of its
population.

Importance
of its situa-
tion.

When the mutiny broke out at Mírath the European male population of Saháranpúr, including clerks, numbered only six or seven persons. The Eurasians were scarcely more numerous. There was over the treasury a native guard of some seventy or eighty sepoys, commanded by a native officer, and furnished by the 29th Native Infantry at Morádábád. The civil jail guard, numbering about a hundred men, in addition to their duties over the jail, furnished guards to the civil officers' houses. Throughout the district, likewise, was scattered the ordinary police force, amply sufficient in times of peace * to repress the disorder of a population numbering even nearly a million souls.

The situation of Saháranpúr was still important. It was the point whence the road led to Dérá and to the hill stations of Masúrí and Lándáur ; it was contiguous to Rúrkí, from the canal establishments of which the army before Dehlí was largely supplied with men and materials for forwarding the siege ; and it was the seat of one of the Government studs. Yet now the entire district, comprising likewise the Engineers' College, the canal workships and costly aqueducts, seemed to be at the mercy of the sepoys and the disaffected natives, for there were no European troops who could be summoned with any hope that the call would be responded to. There were indeed European troops at Mírath, some seventy miles distant. But, until after the fall of Dehlí, timidity bordering upon panic, selfishness utterly neglect-

* Robertson's *District Duties during the Revolt.*

ful of the general public weal, ruled with fatal effect the military counsels at that station.

Fortunately there were men at Saháranpúr whose bold spirit and ready resource supplied the place of soldiers. The magistrate, Mr. Robert Spankie, was an able public servant, full of energy and mental power. His lieutenant, Mr. Dundas Robertson, joined to a manly and energetic nature a clear head and a coolness not to be surpassed. A fit associate with these was Lieutenant Brownlow, of the Engineers, cool, daring, enterprising, and resolute. With such men at Saháranpúr there was yet a glimmering of hope that the crisis might be surmounted.

The news of the outbreak at Mírath reached Saháranpúr on the evening of the 14th of May; that of the massacres at Dehlí on the following day. At a meeting convened by Mr. Spankie it was decided to hold the station, but to despatch the women and children to Masúrí. This arrangement was carried out at once. As soon as possible after the departure of the ladies, those of the gentlemen of the station who had remained behind * determined to unite and occupy one house. The clerks and Eurasians, invited to join them, showed at first some disinclination, but in a day or two they changed their minds and acceded to the proposal.†

Space will not permit me to detail in full the preliminary dangers which threatened these few bold men. Now, it was the mutiny at the not

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Mr. Robert
Spankie.

Mr. Dundas
Robertson.

They send the
non-com-
batants to
Masúrí.

Dangers that
threatened
Saháranpúr.

* Two quitted it, ostensibly to escort the ladies.

† *District Duties during the Revolt*, page 25.

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Zeal and
energy dis-
played by Mr.
Robertson.

Disaffection
amongst the
sepoy's.

Mr. Robert-
son holds his
ground not-
withstanding.

distant station of Mozaffarnagar ; now, it was the approach of two mutinous companies of the sappers and miners ; now, a combination of the villagers to attack them. This last-named danger, a very serious one, was warded off by acting on the principle, so conspicuous during the mutiny, that "boldness is prudence." Instead of waiting for the intended onslaught, Mr. Robertson, enlisting in his cause some influential and well disposed landowners, anticipated it, attacking and capturing the conspirators. Continuing to pursue this policy, Mr. Robertson, taking with him a few of the 4th Lancers (native) ; a detachment of the 29th Native Infantry, and some police ; proceeded to the most important and the most disaffected parts of the district to assert British authority. By a combination of tact and daring Mr. Robertson accomplished a great deal. He soon ascertained, however, that the landowners sympathised with the rabble, and that the fact that rebellion, not plunder, was their object, would make his task extremely difficult. Further success, he felt, would depend on the fidelity of the sepoys. But soon amongst these appeared the usual symptoms of disaffection. On the 30th of May, Mr. Robertson had been joined by two companies of the 5th Regiment of Native Infantry. These mutinied on the 3rd of June. But Mr. Robertson still continued his noble efforts in the cause of order ; nor, though the detachment of the 29th Native Infantry revolted on the 11th of July, did he, or his superior, once relax their hold on the district. This was still virtually British

when the fall of Dehlí removed from the native mind the calculations which till then had inspired them to resist.

At the civil station of Mozaffarnagar, about midway between Saháranpúr and Mírath, the native guard over the treasury was furnished by the 20th Regiment of Native Infantry, quartered at Mírath. This regiment took a prominent part in the famous outbreak of the 10th of May. It was not to be expected, therefore, that the detachment would abstain from following the example thus set. For three days, however, it did abstain. Nor did the sepoys composing it make any demonstration until the British magistrate on the spot had given a signal proof of his belief in the collapse of British rule. That official, Mr. Berford, with a precipitancy as unworthy as it was rare, closed the public offices on the receipt of the bad news from Mírath. He subsequently took refuge in a small house in the town, withdrawing the guards posted over the jail for his own personal protection. The consequence of this abnegation of authority was the rise of the district. Landowners and peasants alike believed that the sun of British rule had set, never to rise again. Every man who had a grievance, the plunderers by profession, the plunderers by opportunity, seized the golden chance. Nor were the sepoys then backward. They broke open the treasury, carried away all they could convey away, and marched for Morádábád. The balance fell to the townspeople and district revolters. There was no one to prevent or to

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Mozaffar.
nagar.

Mr. Berford.

The popula-
tion rises,

and the
sepoys
mutiny.

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Rohilkhand.

The garrison
of Baréli.

Excitement
at that
station.

The reasoning
of the sepoys.

remonstrate with them. Authority had disappeared with Mr. Berford.

But the risings in the northerly portions of the North-West Provinces were trifling compared with those in Rohilkhand. The principal station in Rohilkhand was Baréli. Here were cantoned the 8th Irregular Cavalry, the 18th and 68th Native Infantry, and a native battery of Artillery. The brigade was commanded by Brigadier Sibbald. Baréli was likewise the chief civil station in Rohilkhand, being the head-quarters of the Commissioner. The Christian population, including Eurasians, somewhat exceeded one hundred in number.

The uneasy feeling amongst the native troops, which had manifested itself so strongly in Bengal in the month of March, gradually travelling up country, had reached Baréli in April. During that month the men of the infantry regiments there stationed questioned their officers regarding the new cartridges, and asked pointedly whether it were true that those cartridges were greased with the fat of the cow and of the pig. The reply given by the officers was apparently satisfactory, for the excitement created by the rumour almost at once subsided. But the introduction into the regiments of the new musket drill again roused suspicion. The natives of India are essentially conservative in their views. The case for innovation must be very clearly put to convince them. The sepoys at Baréli, their minds prone to suspicion, could not then understand the reason why, for any military purpose, a new

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musket or a new musketry drill should be necessary. "We and our fathers," they said, "have conquered Hindústán with the present musket; what is the use of a new one?" They continued, however, to practise the new drill, and, when taught singly, even touched the cartridges, though with evident dislike.

Up to the beginning of the second week of May the men when drilled together, by companies, had been taught only the new bayonet exercise. But in the second week it was deemed advisable to instruct them in the new system of ball-practice. The experiment began with the grenadier company of the 18th Native Infantry. But only one round per man was served out.

It happened that an arrangement previously considered—by which the guns of the battery were to be moved from their actual position to another close to the practice-ground*—had taken effect early on the very morning on which it had been decided that the men of the grenadier company of the 18th Native Infantry should make their first experiment with the new ammunition. To the minds of the sepoys, already over-excited, this change in the position of the guns was a

Their minds
prone to sus-
picion.

* The real object was to which it was considered ad-
place the guns under the visable to adopt. The Súba-
charge of the 8th Irregular dár of the Artillery, whose
Cavalry. They were in fact tearful protestations in favour
regularly confided to that of this measure excited the
corps. It will be seen in the sympathy of many, subse-
text that subsequently they quently assumed the command
were withdrawn, and restored of the rebellious brigade.
to their own men. This re- His name was Bakht Khán.
storiation was a part of the He eventually commanded in
feigning confidence policy chief at Dehlí.

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Panic caused
by the change
in position of
the guns.

new revelation. The conviction flashed upon their minds that the guns had been shifted with the sole object to coerce them into using the obnoxious cartridges. This, too, accounted for the fact, which at the time had seemed so strange to them, that only one round of balled ammunition had been served out to each man. They would thus be formed up on the practice-ground, they argued, practically defenceless, commanded by the guns. The suspicion, equal to conviction, spread to the entire regiment. The Grenadier company had already set out. A considerable number of the men of the other companies ran then to the artillery lines to upbraid the gunners with thus aiding the attempt to take away their comrades' caste ; but the bulk of them, gloomy, anxious, but determined, waited in their lines the booming of the guns, or the return of the grenadiers. When these appeared, unharmed, the excitement for the moment cooled.

News of the
Mírath mu-
tiny.

Only, however, for the moment. The same day brought to the station news of the mutiny at Mírath, of the disaffection of the districts round Baréli, and of evil dispositions manifested by the native regiment stationed at Morádábád.

Colonel Colin Troup

This was on the 14th. The Brigadier, Sibbald, was absent on a tour of inspection. His place was temporarily occupied by Colonel Colin Troup, a gallant and distinguished officer. Colonel Troup had not been an indifferent spectator of all that had been going on in the native army during the preceding two months. But experienced as he was, shrewd, clever, and dis-

cerning beyond most of the old officers of the Company's army, even Colonel Troup had not detected the radical cause of the disease he was called upon to combat. He believed that it could be cured by persuasion, by an unbounded display of confidence, by, in fact, treating the sepoys as one would treat naughty children, by assuring them that all previous offences would be condoned, if they would behave well for the future. In a word, he was a believer in Mr. Beadon's theory of "a passing and groundless panic."

But Colonel Troup did not the less take every possible measure to meet an emergency which he foresaw might at any moment arrive. Of all the regiments under his command he believed most implicitly in the 8th Irregular Cavalry. The antecedents of that regiment gave him reason for his belief. Not only was it a splendid regiment, well manned, well horsed, and well commanded, but it had but a very short period before come forward at a critical period to show its readiness to proceed wherever the interests of the British service might demand its presence. When, in 1852, the 38th Regiment of Native Infantry had refused to proceed to Pígu, on the ground that the caste of the men would be ruined by a sea voyage of eight days, the 8th Irregulars had volunteered to sail thither. Taken at their word, they marched from Hánví to the port of embarkation, a distance of a thousand miles, without losing a single man from desertion. Proceeding by sea to Pígu, they not only rendered there most excellent service, but made themselves remarkable

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is in favour of
persuasive
measures.

The 8th Irre-
gular Cavalry;

their favour-
able antee-
dents.

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Captain A. M.
Mackenzie.

for their discipline and their intelligence. Their native officers were men of good family, given to manly and intellectual pursuits, and proud of their regiment and their service.

The acting commandant of this regiment was Captain Alexander Mackenzie. Captain Mackenzie had been some years with the 8th. He had served with it as adjutant and as second in command. He was devoted to his regiment, gave to it his undivided care, and was unsurpassed in all the qualities of a commanding officer. He was well supported by his second in command, Lieutenant Becher.

Up to the period at which my narrative has arrived the conduct of this regiment had been most exemplary. Colonel Troup, then, looking at its antecedents and at its actual behaviour, had reason to regard it as his mainstay in case of an outbreak.

Colonel Troup
doubles the
strength of
the 8th Irre-
gulars,

sends the
ladies to the
hills,

It was, I have said, on the 14th of May, that the evil news from the outer world reached Baréli. Colonel Troup at once directed that the strength of the regiment he most trusted should be doubled; he wrote to the civil authorities requesting them to place under his orders all the sowars, or horse patrols, in their districts; he recalled all officers from leave; and he recommended that the ladies and children, in fact all the European women and children, should be sent off to the hill station of Nainí Tál.* Large cavalry pickets were thrown out, and the Ir-

* The ladies, women, and Tál escorted by a detachment children were sent off to Nainí of the 8th Irregular Cavalry.

regulars were kept ready to turn out at any moment. At the same time Colonel Troup paraded the brigade, and addressing the men assured them that they had nothing to fear as long as they continued to behave themselves; that no new cartridges were coming, and that if any should come, he would destroy them on the parade-ground in their presence. On the following day, the 16th, further to allay the suspicions of the men, he had the guns moved back to their former position.

But the evil was too deeply rooted. Notwithstanding all Colonel Troup's efforts the suspicions were not allayed and confidence did not return. For some days, indeed, the sepoys continued to perform their duties with precision, but they were, whether in the lines or on guard, always in a state of excitement. This excitement was fed by the evil-disposed of the city, by sepoys from Mírath, from Dehlí, from Firózpúr, and especially by intriguers from the districts instigated by one Khán Bahádur Khán, a pensioner of the Government, and the heir of the famous Rohilla chief, Háfiz Rahmat.*

Brigadier Sibbald returned to Baréli on the 19th. From that date till the 29th, no material change occurred in the state of affairs. The brigadier confirmed and carried out all Colonel

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May 15.

and endeavours to remove the suspicions of the sepoys.

Causes working against him.

* Háfiz Rahmat was the hádur Khán received one pension as the descendant and ruler of Rohilkhand. He was heir of the last ruler of the defeated and slain in 1774 in Rohillas, another as a retired civil officer of the British Government at Katrá. Khán Ba-

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May 20.

Forewarnings
of mutiny.

Troup's arrangements. The attempts at "management" on the part of the British, the suspicions, the excitement, the sullen determined mien, combined with rigid performance of duty, on the part of the sepoys, continued. But on the morning of the 29th, Colonel Troup received a note from Mr. Alexander, the Commissioner, informing him that it had come to his knowledge that his, Colonel Troup's regiment, the 68th Native Infantry, intended to mutiny that day. Colonel Troup had but just perused that note when the native sergeant-major of his regiment ran breathless into his presence to tell him that whilst bathing in the river that morning, the men of both regiments, the 18th and 68th, had sworn to rise at 2 P.M. and murder their European officers.

Colonel Troup
prepares for
the crisis.

Colonel Troup acted at once as the emergency required. He warned the officers of the three regiments and of the artillery; informed the brigade major, Captain Brownlow, of the notices he had received, and recommended him to ride off at once to report the information to the brigadier, fixing the lines of the 8th Irregular Cavalry as the place of rendezvous for all.

It was about 1 o'clock in the day when Captain Mackenzie received the order to turn out his regiment. In a very few minutes the men were in their saddles, and certainly, as far as appearances went, no men could have displayed a more loyal spirit, or a greater readiness to do their duty, than did the men of the 8th Irregulars. The regiment continued mounted for two hours.

Loyal spirit
of the 8th
Irregulars.

In the interval, whether from the attitude of the cavalry, or from some other reason, the men of the infantry changed their plans. The rising was postponed.

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The behaviour of the 8th Irregulars had justified Colonel Troup's confidence. On this apparently crucial day not a symptom of disaffection had been manifested by a single trooper. Yet—curious fact—on the evening of that day, Colonel Troup received from a sure authority information that the men of that regiment were not absolutely to be relied upon; that they had sworn not to act against the infantry and artillery, though they would not harm or raise a hand against any European. The horizon was becoming darker.

Colonel Troup receives a private warning that the 8th are not to be relied upon.

The night of the 29th, the day and night of the 30th, were passed in excitement on the one side, in watchfulness on the other. Colonel Troup did not doubt now but that the outbreak was a question, not of days, but of hours. Few of the other officers shared his opinions. The brigadier, the brigade-major, the officer commanding the 18th, the officer commanding the battery, all believed that the storm would pass over. Captain Mackenzie, whilst sharing Colonel Troup's opinions regarding the other regiments, had still faith in his own men. It would have been strange had it been otherwise, for up to the 31st of May the fidelity and devotion of the 8th Irregulars and their officers had alone kept down revolt.

He feels the crisis upon him.

On the morning of the 31st the crisis came. It was heralded by the usual attempt at incendiaryism, Captain Brownlow's house having been

The crisis comes.

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First mani-
festation of
the sepoys.

Their actual
preparations
and resolves.

They mutiny.

The officers
make for the
rendezvous.

fired in the small hours of the morning. The only other warning given was that conveyed by the behaviour of the men on the treasury guard, who had snatched from a native official a letter he was carrying to the fort, torn it up in his face, and abused him. This was the first serious impropriety committed by the native soldiers at Baréli. These two occurrences put many on their guard. Still all continued quiet in the lines, when just at 11 o'clock, the report of one of the battery guns, followed by a volley of musketry and the yells of the sepoys, warned everyone in the station that the crisis was upon them.

The rising in fact had been thoroughly organised by the sepoys. Parties had been told off to murder each officer. The hour fixed was 11 o'clock on that Sunday, the 31st. No sooner had the regimental gongs struck eleven strokes than some sepoys of the 68th rushed to the guns and poured in a volley of grape into the houses nearest to their lines. Small parties carrying with them their muskets went off to each separate bungalow ; the remainder rushed out in a mass to burn, to kill, to destroy.

The warning of which I have spoken had induced many officers to have their horses saddled, and to hold themselves ready for immediate action. The rendezvous was the lines of the 8th Irregulars. To reach those lines some had to gallop across the infantry parade-ground exposed to volleys of grape and musketry. Others, ignorant of the previous occurrences of the morning, and, therefore, not warned, were forced to

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Brigadier
Sibbald is
shot.

take refuge in the city. The brigadier, mounting his horse on the first discharge of the battery guns, rode off at once, but was shot in the chest as he was making for the rendezvous. Other officers shared the same fate, some at the time, some later.

But whilst all are hastening to the rendezvous, the reader must outstrip them, and see what Captain Mackenzie and his regiment were doing there.

At 10 o'clock that morning a Hindú Rissaldar of his regiment had reported to Mackenzie that

Action of
Captain Mac-
kenzie.

some of the Hindús of his troop, while bathing, had heard the sepoys of the 18th and 68th say that they intended to rise that day at 11 o'clock, murder every European—man, woman, and child—in the place, seize the treasury, and open the jail. Similar reports had been so prevalent during the preceding fortnight that Mackenzie was justified in not giving implicit credence to this. But, as a measure of precaution, he sent orders to his native adjutant to warn the native officers commanding troops to have their men ready to turn out at a moment's notice. He also imparted the information by letter to Colonel Troup. Then Mackenzie, Becher, and the surgeon, Dr. Currie, had their horses saddled; they breakfasted; and then donned their uniforms so as to be ready for immediate action. These operations had scarcely been completed, when the brigade-major, Captain Brownlow, rushed in with the information that the row had begun. Almost simultaneously the fire of

He and his
officers pre-
pare for
action.

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He turns out
his men;

rides to
hasten the
movements of
the left wing;

sees the right
wing go off;

gallops after
them;

the battery guns and the discharge of musketry came to confirm his story. Colonel Troup followed almost immediately. Mackenzie and Becher at once mounted their horses and rode down to their lines to turn out the men. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd troops of the 8th, forming the right wing, were soon drawn up in front of their lines facing the station. But it seeming to Mackenzie that the troops of the left wing showed unusual delay, he proceeded amongst them to hasten their movements. Meanwhile, the confusion was every moment increasing. From all parts of Baréli officers, civilians, and others, were running and riding into the lines for protection. The artillery and infantry were keeping up a constant and rapid fire on the fugitives, whilst all around bungalows were beginning to smoke and blaze. Keeping his head cool all this time, Mackenzie, gallantly aided by Becher, had turned out the troops of the left wing, and was getting them into order, when happening to look round, he saw the troops of the right wing go "Threes right," and move off at a trot to the right and rear of the lines. Digging his spurs into his horse Mackenzie quickly headed the wing, halted it, and asked by whose order they had moved. The Rissaldar, commanding the 1st squadron, replied that Colonel Troup had given the order. Upon this, Mackenzie rode on to Colonel Troup, who had moved ahead in company with some officers and civilians, and asked what he proposed to do. Troup, who by the death of the brigadier had become the senior officer in the station, replied that he proposed to

retire on Nainí Tál. Mackenzie, still feeling sure of his men, earnestly requested permission to be allowed to take his regiment back and try and recover the guns. Troup replied that it was useless; but yielding at last to Mackenzie's urgent pleadings he consented in these words: "It is no use, but do as you like."

The fact was that Colonel Troup, influenced by the information he had received on the night of the 30th of May and the impression then formed having been strengthened by the delay of the left wing to turn out, entirely mistrusted the 8th Irregulars. Mackenzie, on the other hand, whilst thoroughly believing in them, felt satisfied that the order given to them by Colonel Troup to follow the Europeans to Nainí Tál was the one order which would try their fidelity to the utmost, as the carrying it out would impose upon them the necessity to leave all their property, and, in some instances, those for whom they cared more than for their property, at the mercy of the rebels. There can be no doubt now that the information on which Colonel Troup acted was partly true. There were traitors amongst the 8th Irregulars. Prominent amongst these was the senior native officer, Mahomed Shaffí. This man had been gained over by Khán Bahádur Khán, and had in his turn done his best to gain the men. Yet it is to be regretted, I think, that Mackenzie's arrangements were interfered with before the temper of the men had been actually tested. The movement to the right, and the remonstrance

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obtains
Colonel
Troup's per-
mission to
attack the
mutineers.

Diversity of
the influences
operating
upon Troup
and upon
Mackenzie.

Mahomed
Shaffí.

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Mackenzie
betrayed by
Mahomed
Shaffí.

Does not at
once realise
his perfidy.

Brings up the
right wing.

with Colonel Troup, lost many precious moments at a most critical period.

The value of a few moments was never more clearly demonstrated than on this occasion. Whilst Mackenzie had been talking to Colonel Troup, the left wing had been drawing up in line. The moment they were quite ready, the traitor, Mahomed Shaffí, watching his opportunity, gave the order to the men of the wing to follow him, and at once rode towards the cantonment. Mackenzie heard the tramp of their horses' feet the moment after he had received Colonel Troup's permission to do as he liked. He did not at once realise the cause of their action, for almost simultaneously with it arose the cry that they had gone to charge the guns. Mackenzie at once addressed the men of the right wing, and told them he was going to take them to recover the guns. The men received the intelligence with apparent delight, and followed Mackenzie—accompanied by Mr. Guthrie, the magistrate, and some officers *—at a steady trot to the parade-ground. On arriving there they found the left wing drawn up, apparently fraternising with the rebels. It was necessary to bring them back, if possible, to their allegiance, so Mackenzie leaving his right wing under charge of Becher, rode up to them and addressed them. Whilst, however, in the act of speaking, and after the men had shown a

* Their names were Captain Warde, 68th Native Infantry, Captain Kirby and Lieutenant Lieutenant Hunter, 18th Native Infantry. Captain Fraser of the Artillery; Captain Paterson and Lieutenant

disposition to follow him, there arose from the magazine of the 18th Native Infantry—the point where the mutinous sepoys were massed, and where a gun had been placed—a cry summoning all the sowars to rally round the Mahomedan flag and to uphold their religion, “otherwise,” shouted the speaker, “the Mahomedans will be forced to eat pork, and the Hindús beef.” At the same time a green flag was hoisted. The cry and the sight of the flag arrested the favourable disposition of the men of the left wing, and Mackenzie finding his efforts with them hopeless, rode back to the right. Here, however, a new disappointment awaited him. The men of this wing had felt the influence acting on the left, and had begun to steal off. By the time Mackenzie returned men to the number of about one troop alone remained. Amongst these were most of the native officers. With so small a body it was hopeless to charge, and it was almost certain that an order to that effect would not have been obeyed. Mackenzie retired then in the direction taken by Colonel Troup and the others. As he passed his regimental lines more men dropped away, and before he had gone half a mile, the number of the faithful was reduced to twenty-three, of whom twelve were native officers!* They overtook Colonel Troup, and

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Passionate appeal of the mutineers to the 8th Irregulars:

who all go over to the rebels,

except twenty-three.

* It is due to these twenty-three men to place on record that though every possible temptation was held out to them to desert the Europeans not one of them yielded to it. Amid many trials they remained faithful, and managed to do excellent service. The Rissaldar, Mahomed Nazím Khán, not only left all his property, but three children

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The Euro-
peans reach
Nainí Tál.

The rebel
rule is inau-
gurated at
Baréli

his party twenty-three miles from Baréli. Troup was warm in his acknowledgments. In truth he never expected to see them. "Thank God," he exclaimed to Mackenzie, as the latter rode up, "I feared you had gone to certain death." The retiring party now united, proceeded without a halt to Nainí Tál, accomplishing the distance, sixty-six miles, in twenty-two hours.

On the departure of the fugitives for Nainí Tál the rebel rule was inaugurated at Baréli. Every European house but one had been burnt down. Khán Bahádur Khán was proclaimed

behind, to obey the call of officers that the opinion of the duty. Mackenzie's orderly, a officer commanding the brigade Mahomedan, rode throughout to which they belonged should the retreat of sixty-six miles be added. In his report on Mackenzie's second charger, the events recorded in the a magnificent Arab, on which it text Colonel Troup thus wrote: would have been easy for him to "In justice to Captain Mac- ride off. But he was faithful, kenzie and Lieutenant Becher and when the horse Mackenzie I consider it my duty, how- was riding dropped dead, the ever much they like others orderly at once dismounted may have been deceived by and came on on foot. These their men, to state that in my men had their reward when opinion no two officers could the regiment was re-organised, have behaved better towards, and they redeemed, on the 6th or shown a better or more of April 1858, the good name gallant example to their men of their regiment, being com- than they did. I was in mended for the "marked daily, I may say hourly com- gallantry" they displayed at munication with them, and I Harhá in Oudh under the have great pleasure in stating command of Captain Mac- that from the very first to the kenzie.

In the text I have recorded the performance of the many a plain and unadorned state- harassing duties required of ment of the conduct of Captain them." Colonel Troup fur- Mackenzie and Lieutenant ther recommended them to Becher on this trying occasion the favourable notice of the It is but just to both those Commander-in-Chief.

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Viceroy of Rohilkhand. His vice-royalty was baptised with blood. The two judges, Messrs. Robertson and Raikes; the deputy-collector, Mr. Wyatt; Dr. Hay, Mr. Orr, Dr. Buck, and three other civilians; all the merchants, traders, and clerks, and all the women and children who had not quitted the station, were murdered. Most of these were judicially slaughtered—slaughtered, that is to say, by the express order of the new viceroy, and many of them after having been brought into his presence. Exposed to this terrible ordeal, cast by ruffians at the feet of this greater ruffian, the English race still asserted itself. The new viceroy was told to his face that though he might water his new throne with their blood, it would yet take no root in the ground; that though he might find it easy to slaughter unarmed men, women, and children, British power would yet assert itself to crush him.

by the
slaughter of
the English.

The better to assure the mastery and to rid himself of all rival claimants Khán Bahádur Khán took the earliest opportunity to persuade Bakht Khán, the súbadár of artillery before alluded to, and who had assumed the title of Brigadier, to lead the sepoys to Dehlí, furnishing him with a letter to the king. He even made a show of accompanying him. But it was only a show. He returned from the first stage to Baréli, fortified his house, and, adding sacrilege to murder, destroyed the tomb of Mr. Thomason, whilom Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, to build with the materials, after the manner of the princes of the House of Taimúr, a

Khán Bahá-
dur Khán.

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June.

Causes the
British rule
to be re-
gretted.

Sháhjahán-
púr.

The sepoys
there are not
distrusted.

But they
mutiny,

and attack
the English
when at
church.

mausoleum for himself. He at the same time enlisted all the Mahomedans who would carry arms, and with their aid, began to oppress and plunder the rich Hindús. The latter began very soon to regret the overthrow of the British rule.

On the very same day on which the tragedy I have recorded was being enacted at Baréli, events not less startling were taking place at Sháhjahán-púr, but forty-seven miles distant. There was but one native regiment at Sháhjahán-púr, the 28th Regiment of Native Infantry. The news of the Mírath outbreak, arriving about the 15th of May, had not caused less excitement at this station than elsewhere. But whilst the residents, and especially the officers, continued to trust the sepoys, they looked for an outbreak on the part of the notoriously turbulent population. Little, however, occurred at the time to cause apprehension. But as day after day passed and rebellion seemed to be gathering head unchecked all about them, the sepoys began to display a behaviour not entirely consistent with duty. Still, however, their officers believed that the bulk of them were loyal.

This belief was roughly and suddenly dispelled. The 31st of May was a Sunday. Many of the residents and officers had gone to church. They were still at their prayers when the sepoys of the 28th rushed upon them.

On hearing the tumult the chaplain went to the door of the church to meet the mutineers. He was at once attacked, but escaped for the moment with the loss of his hand severed by a

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May 31.

sword stroke. He was subsequently killed by some villagers. Mr. Ricketts, the magistrate, whose vigilance had attracted towards him the peculiar hatred of the mutineers, received a sword cut. He then attempted to escape to his house but was cut down about thirty-five yards from the vestry door. Mr. Labadoor, a clerk, was killed in the church. His wife, his sister-in-law, and the bandmaster of the regiment, escaped for the moment, but eventually met a worse fate. Another clerk, a Mr. Smith, stole away, but was tracked out and killed.

The scuffle at the door of the church and the attack upon those who first presented themselves to the mutineers had given time meanwhile to the other officers and ladies present there to improvise a defence. Captain Lysaght, Mr. Jenkins, and others, succeeded in barring the chancel doors against their assailants. These, happily, had brought with them no muskets, only swords and clubs, and so mistrustful were they, that on observing the approach of one solitary officer, Captain Sneyd, armed with a gun, they made at once for their lines to get their muskets.

The gentlemen had, before this, placed the ladies in security in the church turret. Hardly had they done this when the sepoys went off in the manner described, and almost immediately afterwards their domestic servants, faithful in this extremity, arrived at the church, bringing with them their masters' guns and rifles. The English then ventured to open the doors. They found not only the horses and carriages, which

The English
barricade
themselves.

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May 31.

Slaughter in
the canton-
ment.

had brought them to church, still at the door, but clustering round about a hundred sepoys, principally Sikhs, who had hastened up to rally round and to defend their officers. For the moment they were safe.

Meanwhile the cantonments had been a scene of tumult and bloodshed. When one party of the mutineers had rushed to the church another had fired the bungalows and sought out the Europeans. The assistant magistrate was killed in the verandah of his court whither he had fled for refuge. Captain James, in temporary command of the 28th, was shot on the parade-ground whilst trying to reason with his men. In reply to his arguments they asserted that they were not after all such great traitors, inasmuch as they had served the Government faithfully for twenty years. As he turned away in disgust they shot him. The mutineers allowed Dr. Bowling, the surgeon of the regiment, to visit the hospital unmolested, but, on his return, after he had taken up and placed inside his carriage his wife, his child, and his English maid, they shot him dead and wounded his wife. She managed, however, to reach the other fugitives at the church.

There, now, were assembled all the Europeans remaining alive. What were they to do? It was a terrible extremity. But desperate situations require desperate remedies, and the only sensible course seemed to be to make for the residence of the Rájá of Powái—across the Oudh frontier, though but a few miles distant. Thither accord-

The fugitives
take refuge
with the Rájá
of Powái.

1857.
May.

ingly they proceeded, and there they arrived the same day. But their reception was unfavourable. The Rájá declared his inability to protect them and refused them shelter. Mr. Jenkins, the assistant magistrate, who was one of the party, wrote at once to Mr. Thomason, the Deputy Commissioner of Móhamdí, in Oudh, to inform him of the events at Sháhjahánpúr, and to beg him to send all the available carriage to enable the fugitives to reach Móhamdí. Mr. Thomason received the letter that night and complied, as far as he could, with the request. At Móhamdí the fugitives arrived, in a terrible plight,* two days later. But they were not saved. Their subsequent adventures form one of the saddest episodes in the Indian mutiny.

Midway between Baréli and Sháhjahánpúr, though not in a direct line, and some thirty miles from the former, lies the civil station of Badáon. The magistrate and collector of this district, which took its name from the station, was Mr. William Edwards. Mr. Edwards had served as Under Secretary in the Foreign Department during the rule of Lord Ellenborough. A man of observation and ability he had marked how, during the fifteen years preceding the mutiny, the action of our revenue system had gradually ruined the landowners of the country and broken up the village communities. Under the action of that revenue system landed rights and interests, sold

Badáon.

Mr. William
Edwards.

* "Sad was the appearance much difficulty and toil reach of the poor Shajahanpore thus far."—*Narrative of the fugitives on their arrival at Shajahanpur Mutiny and Mass-Mohundi; weary and with sacre. naked feet did they with*

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—
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May.

Effect of our
revenue sys-
tem.

for petty debts, had been bought by strangers who had no sympathy with the people. The dispossessed landowners, irritated and discontented, smarting under the loss of their estates, looked upon the British Government as the author of their calamities ; whilst the peasantry, connected with these landowners for centuries, bestowed upon them all their sympathy, reserving their hatred for the strangers—and for their patrons, the British.

The social state in Rohilkhand having been gradually growing to this point it can easily be conceived that when the mutiny broke out in the North-West Badáon was ripe for revolt.

Isolated posi-
tion of Mr.
Edwards.

Mr. Edwards was well aware of the dangers which awaited him in his isolated position. He was alone at Badáon. As soon as the revolt at Mírath had disclosed to him the nature of the impending catastrophe he had sent his wife and child to Nainí Tal. He remained alone—well aware that the population all around him was discontented, that the company of sepoys who guarded his treasury was not to be trusted, that the police would join in the scramble which a signal from Baréli would inaugurate. To oppose an insurrection on the part of these men Mr. Edwards had no resource beyond his brave and resolute heart.

His solitary
resource.

On the 29th of May Mr. Alfred Phillipps, the magistrate of I'tá, a station in the A'gra districts on the right bank of the Ganges, rode into Badáon. He was on his way to Baréli to demand help from thence, his own districts being in a state

Mr. Phillipps
rides into
Badáon.

of insurrection. Mr. Edwards told him that help was not to be looked for from Baréli as he had himself asked it in vain. But two days later information reached Edwards that the important town of Bhilsia was about to be attacked by the rebels. To allow this place to fall without an effort was not to be thought of. Edwards decided then to make another appeal to Baréli. The answer was favourable. He was promised a company of sepoys under a European officer. Joyfully he was expecting these, when, on the 1st of June, he received information that the entire Baréli brigade had mutinied, and that revolt reigned at that station.

Mr. Edwards received this information early in the morning. He imparted it to Mr. Phillipps, who, realising at once the failure of his mission, started at once to return to his district before the roads should be barred by the rebels. Very soon after Mr. Phillipps's departure Mr. Edwards was joined by two indigo planters, the Messrs. Donald, and by a patrol, Mr. Gibson. These expressed their resolution to accompany him whithersoever he might go. But at the moment Mr. Edwards had no mind to go anywhere. The sepoys had not yet broken into revolt, and their commandant, on receiving the intelligence from Baréli, had voluntarily assured Mr. Edwards that he and his men would defend the treasury confided to them to the last man. That very evening, however, they rose, and being joined by a party from Baréli and by the released jail-birds of the place, began to plunder and destroy.

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May.

Edwards asks
help from
Baréli.

June 1.

News arrives
of the mutiny
at that sta-
tion.

The troops
and popula-
tion rise in
revolt.

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—
1857.
June 1.

Mr. Edwards
and three
others flee.

Their wander-
ings.

They reach
Fathgarh.

Mr. Edwards
takes refuge
at Dharam-
púr.

There was now nothing for the four Englishmen but flight. Their numbers, far from being a protection, were an embarrassment, for, with the districts all around them surging, concealment, difficult for one or two, would be almost impossible for four. But there was no help for it. The four Englishmen, accompanied by an Afghán servant of Mr. Edwards and by an orderly—a Sikh, Vazír Singh—both true men, rode at once for their lives. During the first few days, they galloped from village to village, quitting it, or remaining, as they found the natives hostile or the reverse; often forced to flee when most in need of food and rest. They crossed the Ganges two or three times, tracing out a zig-zag path in the hope of avoiding danger. Ultimately, with the loss of one of their number, they reached Fathgarh. But Fathgarh, on the eve of revolt, was no abiding place for fugitive Europeans. Mr. Edwards himself wished to make for Kánpúr, or even for A'gra. Both these routes having been pronounced impracticable, he and his companions determined, in pursuance of the advice of his friend, Mr. Probyn, the Collector of Fathgarh, to join Mrs. Probyn and her children, then at Dharampúr, the fortified residence of a friendly native, Hardéo Baksh. Mr. Edwards reached that place on the 10th of June and found collected there many Europeans. Most of these, however, returned to Fathgarh. Mr. Edwards, Mr. and Mrs. Probyn and their children, remained at Dharampúr, and ultimately—after the party had undergone terrible troubles and privations, the weaker and more

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Shares the
fortunes of
the Probyn's.

delicate of its members having been forced to lie for weeks concealed "in a wretched hovel, occupied by buffaloes, and filthy beyond description, the smell stifling, and the mud and dirt over our ankles,"—they reached Kánpúr. They arrived at that goal of safety on the 1st of September, just three calendar months after Mr. Edwards had left Badáoñ.

Meanwhile at that place rebel rule had been inaugurated. The authority of Khán Bahádur Khán was acknowledged, and the sepoys, after having rifled the treasury, were persuaded to march to Dehlí. Thanks to the prevision of Mr. Edwards, the rifling of the treasury was unusually unproductive, that gentleman having refused, with a view to possible eventualities, to receive the instalments of revenue due from the land-holders.

Morádábád lies forty-eight miles north-west of Morádábád. Baréli. In 1857 it was garrisoned by one native regiment, the 29th Native Infantry, and by half a battery of native artillery. It was likewise the seat of a civil district, with judge, magistrate and collector, assistant magistrate, and civil surgeon.

The news of the mutiny at Mírath reached Morádábád on the 16th of May. No immediate result was apparent; but on the evening of the 18th intelligence reached the authorities in the station that a small party of the 20th Regiment of Native Infantry—one of the regiments which had mutinied at Mírath—was encamped, fully equipped and with a large quantity of treasure,

Rebels arrive
in its vicinity.

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May 18.

The temper
of the 29th
Native Infan-
try is tested;

apparently
satisfactorily.

Possible
doubts are
not enter-
ained.

in the jungle, on the left bank of the Gorgan river, about five miles from the station.

The opportunity was considered a good one for testing the loyalty, always loudly professed, of the men of the 29th Native Infantry. Accordingly, a company of that regiment, commanded by Captain Faddy, was ordered for duty that night. The night was pitch dark, but as a surprise was intended that circumstance was in favour of the British. At 11 o'clock, Captain Faddy set out, preceded by thirty horsemen and accompanied by his subaltern and some civilians. On approaching the Gorgan river Faddy halted his infantry, and ordered the cavalry to take up a position to cut off the enemy's retreat. As soon as this movement had been satisfactorily accomplished he dashed on to the enemy's encampment with his infantry, overpowered their sentries, and roughly woke them from their slumbers. The darkness was so great that friend could only be distinguished from foe by the flash of the fire-arms. Owing to this the bulk of the insurgents managed to steal off, with the loss, however, of all their arms and horses, ten thousand rupees in coin, eight prisoners, and one man killed.

So far the men of the 29th would seem to have stood the test well. It has indeed been asserted that they did not exert themselves as much as they might have done, and that had their heart been in the struggle, they might have prevented the escape of so large a number of the insurgents. Such was not, however, the opinion of their officers at the time. At the best it can

only be conjecture, for the pitchy darkness of the night was quite sufficient to account for the escape of the dark-skinned mutineers, roused suddenly from slumber.

It would appear, however, that the mutineers themselves did not consider that the hearts of the men of the 29th Native Infantry were very much incensed against them. For, the very morning following the surprise just narrated a few of them, escaped from that surprise, came into the station and boldly entered the lines of the 29th! But, again, the 29th displayed a loyal resolution. The native sergeant who was leading the rebel sepoys was shot down and the remainder were taken prisoners. It being considered unsafe to lodge the prisoners in the quarter-guard they were sent to the jail. It happened, however, unfortunately, that the native sergeant who had been shot had a near relation in the 29th, and that this near relation was a man of some influence in the regiment. No sooner had this man discovered who it was who had been slain than he collected about a hundred men, the worst characters in the regiment, led them to the jail, stormed it, and released not only the men of the 20th but the six hundred prisoners lodged there!

But the bulk of the regiment was still true. On hearing of the raid against the jail the officers turned it out, and the men displayed the greatest alacrity in responding to the call made upon their loyalty. A number of them followed the Adjutant, Captain Gardiner, in pursuit of the rioters and the escaped convicts,

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They stand a
second test.

Some evince
a mutinous
spirit.

But the main
body con-
tinues loyal.

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May 19.

and actually succeeded in bringing back a hundred and fifty of them. The civil authorities co-operated with the military in this well-timed expedition, and are entitled to share in the credit due to its success. Subsequently more of the insurgents were caught. Some even returned of their own accord. But this was only the 19th of May. The crisis, far from having been surmounted, was still looming in the future. On the 21st the authorities discovered that a number of Mahomedan fanatics from Rámpúr* had collected on the left bank of the Rám Gangá, opposite the town of Morádábád, had hoisted the green flag, and were in communication with the evil-disposed men of the town. In the town itself the threatening effect of this demonstration was manifest at a glance. The shops were all shut, the streets were deserted, the doors of the houses were barred.

Another crisis arrives.

Mr. Cracroft
Wilson's ener-
getic mea-
sures

It was patent to all that unless this demonstration were encountered with a firm and resolute hand the British cause was lost. The judge, Mr. Cracroft Wilson, called upon the military authorities to aid him. The aid was given. Setting out then with some sowars and with two officers and a company of the 29th he attacked and dispersed the fanatics. One of the latter, levelled at Mr. Wilson's head a blunderbus loaded with slugs. Mr. Wilson seized it in time. The fanatic then drew a pistol from his belt; but before he

* Rámpúr, the capital of a eighteen miles to the east of mediatised Afghán chief, Ma- Morádábád.
homed Yúsuf Ali Khán, lies

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could discharge it a sepoy of the 29th knocked him down. That night the chief of the evil-disposed party within the town was killed by the police.

Two days later, the 23rd, another incident came to try alike the English and the sepoys. On that day intelligence arrived that two companies of sappers and miners, laden with plunder and fully equipped, were approaching the station. Instantly two companies of the 29th Native Infantry and sixty sowars were warned for duty. Captain Whish, who commanded the party, took with him two guns and marched out on the road by which the enemy were to advance. But intelligence of his march had preceded him. The rebels, not caring to encounter him, crossed the river and made for the Terai. The joint magistrate, however, tracked them with four sowars, and kept them in sight till the detachment came up, when, without the semblance of a struggle, they laid down their arms. Previous experience having demonstrated the impolicy of bringing any prisoners into Morádábád, these men were deprived of their arms their ammunition their money and their uniform and were turned loose.

is success-
fully encoun-
tered.

The good conduct of the men of the 29th Native Infantry in these expeditions had nursed the hope that they might remain staunch and loyal to the end. But it is easy now to perceive how, in the times that were approaching, it was all but impossible that this should be so. The districts around them were surging. Every day they were seeing and talking with men who

Causes which
were working
on the sepoys.

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appealed to the sentiment lying nearest to their heart—to their religion and their caste ; who told them how it was the deliberate intention of the British Government to violate the latter ; who pointed to the sufferings and privations their brethren were enduring in the sacred cause ; and who appealed at the same time to the baser passions of cupidity and ambition. Morádábád was but forty-eight miles from the larger station of Baréli, and we have seen what was passing at Baréli during the last two weeks of May !

News arrives
of the mutiny
at Baréli.

Until the 2nd of June, however, the sepoys of the 29th Native Infantry performed their duty loyally and well. But early on the morning of that day it was known throughout Morádábád that rebellion was triumphant at Baréli. The judge and the magistrate had received that intelligence at 2 o'clock in the morning by the hands of a special messenger from the Nawáb of Rámpír.

Effect of the
news on the
sepoy's.

The effect of this intelligence upon the sepoys of the 29th Native Infantry and upon the townspeople was prompt and significant. No one doubted but that a crisis was at hand. The men were sullen, sarcastic, and even rude in their manner ; the towns-people defiant and disrespectful. Mr. Wilson's energetic proposal to them to follow their officers to Mírath with their colours flying, taking guns and treasure with them, was met with derision. They had decided for themselves the part to be taken.

They throw off
all disguise.

The following morning they threw off all disguise. They began by refusing to all but the Europeans admission to the building in which

the public moneys were deposited, on the ground that the fanatics from Rámpúr might return to attack it.

The civilians seeing the treasure thus beyond their control, thought it would prevent a general disturbance if it were so disposed that the sepoyes could take possession of it without opposition. They accordingly had it placed, the sepoyes quietly acquiescing, upon tumbrils, and formally made it over to the treasury guard. The magistrate, Mr. Saunders, seized the opportunity to destroy as many as possible of the Government stamps in store as he could lay hands upon. The amount of the money made over to the sepoyes was but £7,500. They were greatly disappointed at the smallness of the amount. In the first burst of their fury they seized the native treasurer, dragged him to the guns, and threatened to blow him away unless he would disclose the place where the remainuder had been concealed. Captain Faddy and Mr. Saunders rescued the man from his impending fate. But when Mr. Wilson and Mr. Saunders were about to ride off a few of the disaffected men levelled their pieces at them and ran round to prevent their escape. Some of the native officers, however, reminding the men of the oath they had taken to spare the lives of the Europeans, induced them to lower their muskets and to desist.

Simultaneously with the seizure of the rupees the sepoyes deliberately appropriated the opium, and all the plate-chests and other property consigned for security to the Government treasury.

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They take
possession of
the money in
the treasury,

and the other
property of
the Govern-
ment.

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June 3.

The English
evacuate
Morádábád.

Fate of those
who re-
mained.

Rohilkhand
under Khán
Bahádur
Khán.

The police had ceased to act. The rabble were beginning to move. There was but one course to pursue, and that was to save for future service lives which, at Morádábád, would have been uselessly sacrificed.

The English started, then : the civilians and their wives, accompanied by a native officer and some men of Irregular Cavalry, who happened to be there on leave, for Mírath ; the officers and their families for Nainí Tál. Both stations were reached without loss of life.

Those who chose to remain behind, principally Eurasians, clerks in offices, were not so fortunate. An invalided officer, an Englishman, Lieutenant Warwick, and his wife, a native Christian, were killed. Mr. Powell, a clerk, was wounded. But he, and some thirty-one others, purchased immunity from further ill-treatment by embracing the Mahomedan faith. Their subsequent fate is uncertain ; but it is believed that but few lived to hear of the fall of Dehlí.

With the mutiny of the troops at Morádábád Rohilkhand passed nominally under the sway of Khán Bahádur Khán, the descendant of its last independent ruler, and a pensioned civil officer under the British. I say, nominally, for his authority was never thoroughly established. His sway, in fact, was the sway of disorder. It can best be described by using a proverb familiar to the natives : “The buffalo was the property of the man who held the bludgeon.” A social condition was inaugurated, not dissimilar to that which prevailed throughout Maráthá India at the

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close of the last century. Unarmed sepoys, if in small parties, were certain to be set upon by villagers armed with clubs, and plundered—often murdered. Pious Brahmans, telling their beads, were suddenly assaulted and murdered by Mahomedan stragglers, for the sake of the brass vessels in which they cooked their food. The landowners, dispossessed under the action of the British revenue system, resumed their lands, but in many cases, they, and the farmers generally, especially the Mahomedans, exercised the authority they thus acquired, or of which they were possessed, with so much severity that no peaceably disposed man would dare to venture beyond the limits of his village, even in the daytime. If he travelled at night the greatest secrecy and precaution had to be observed.

The social
life

was insecure.

Such was the social life in Rohilkhand under native sway in 1857. Nor was the political condition of the province more flourishing. Over the Thákurs, or barons, the authority of Khán Bahádur Khán was for a long time disputed. These Hindús were just as greedy of plunder as had been the sepoys, and they rejoiced for the moment at the sudden acquisition of power to attack villages and towns. But from some cause or other they and their followers were very badly armed—their weapons consisting mainly of bludgeons and matchlocks, antique in form, and rusty from long disuse. Their power, then, was not equal to their will. Badáon, thrice threatened, successfully resisted them. They had no guns. They were, therefore, unable to combat the trained

The political
life

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was unsatisfactory.

The people long for the return of the British.

troops of the native viceroy. Whenever these trained levies marched against them and beat them, they, their relatives, and their followers, experienced no mercy. Mutilation and murder followed defeat, and confiscation followed mutilation and murder. Sometimes stories of these atrocities induced several Thákurs to combine, but never successfully. Badly armed and untrained, the peasantry whom they led, even when they obtained a transient success, dispersed for plunder. In the end they were always beaten.

It is scarcely surprising, if under these circumstances, the hearts of the rural population began after a time to yearn for their old rulers. It was in vain that, in a boastful proclamation, Khán Bahádúr Khán denounced the English as liars, as destroyers of the creeds of others, as confiscators of property. In the recesses of their own houses the peasantry replied that at least the English were truth-tellers; at least, they did not war on women and children; at least, they were a moral race, above treachery and deceit. The longer the rule of the Mahomedan viceroy lasted the more these opinions circulated. His mis-government begat contrast. Contrast begat a longing desire for the old master, until at last the victory of the English came to be the hope of every peasant's hut, the earnest desire of every true working man in the province.

Fathgarh.

The course of events now takes us down to Fathgarh, a station in the A'gra division, on the right bank of the river Ganges, twenty-five miles south of Sháhjahánpúr.

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Fathgarh was the seat of a gun-carriage manufactory—the works connected with which were carried on in a dilapidated fort—and the headquarters of the 10th Regiment of Native Infantry and a native battery. Three or four miles to the west of it, lies the native city of Farakhábád, the seat of a pensioned Patán Nawáb. The inhabitants of the district numbered upwards of a million. About one-tenth of these were Mahomedans, but Mahomedans of a peculiarly turbulent character, given to murder and rapine beyond their co-religionists in other provinces. They had been under English rule since the year 1802, but the characteristics of their race had long secretly rebelled against the system of order and care for life and property then imposed upon the district in which they lived.

Turbulent
character of
the Mahome-
dans of the
district.

The events at Mírath on the 10th of May had awokened in the minds of the men of the 10th Native Infantry sentiments analogous to those which had been produced elsewhere. They resolved to temporise and to bide their time. In this way the month of May was tided over. But on the 3rd of June intelligence was received of the mutinies at Baréli and at Sháhjahánpúr and of the rising of Rohilkhand. It happened that Colonel Smith, commanding the regiment, was a man of energy and decision. He at once summoned a council of the leading residents, and announced to them his intention of despatching that night the women and children by boat, down the Ganges, to Kánpúr. It was known that Kánpúr was then safe; that Euro-

Colonel Sn.it:
sends away
the non-com-
batants;

pean soldiers had arrived there ; that more were on their way thither. It seemed in every respect eligible as a place of refuge.

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June 4.

some of whom
proceed to
Kánpúr;

others return;
some stay at
Dharampúr.

At 1 o'clock on the morning of the 4th of June, then, about one hundred and seventy non-combatants, a large proportion of whom were women and children, started off in boats. The next day, all sorts of contradictory reports reaching the fugitives, it was resolved to divide into two parties. One hundred and twenty-six continued to prosecute their journey to Kánpúr, only to be seized there by the order of Náná Sáhib, and by his order to be foully murdered ; the other party, amongst whom were the wife and family of Mr. Probyn, preferred to accept the hospitality of a native landowner, Hardéo Baksh, at Dharampúr. This party was afterwards joined by Mr. Probyn and by Mr. Edwards. They remained, whilst the majority, about forty in number, after some hesitation, returned to Fathgarh (13th of June).

Meanwhile, affairs in Fathgarh had not progressed very favourably. On the very day of the despatch of the boats Colonel Smith had attempted to move the Government treasure into the fort. But the sepoys had flatly refused to allow this. With strange inconsistency, and although they were corresponding with the mutinous regiments in the province of Oudh, the same men cheerfully obeyed their Colonel's order to destroy the bridge of boats, the sole link between the district of Farakhábád and that province. They seemed to evince a true and loyal feeling, when, on the 16th of June, they handed to their Colonel

Contradic-
tory demean-
our of the
sepoys.

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June 16.

a letter written to them by the Súbádár of the 41st Native Infantry—a regiment which had recently mutinied at Sítápúr, in Oudh—in which that Súbádár announced that he and his regiment had arrived within a few miles of Fathgarh, and that he and they now called upon the 10th to murder their officers, to seize the treasure, and to join them. The native officer who communicated to Colonel Smith the contents of this letter added that he and the men had replied that they had served the Company too many years to turn traitors; that they were resolved to remain true to their salt, and to oppose by force the 41st if they should march that way. It was after this correspondence that the men of the 10th aided in breaking down the bridge of boats across the Ganges. Yet the very next day, the 18th of June, they warned Colonel Smith that they would no longer obey the British, and that he and his officers had better retire within the fort.

It would appear from this warning and this action that the men of the 10th had no desire to kill their officers; that they cared only for the coin. The day following the 41st crossed the river in boats and joined them. Bloodier counsels then prevailed.

Colonel Smith and the European population had not, meanwhile, been slow to avail themselves of the opportunity given them. To the number of upwards of one hundred* they entered the fort. Of that number only thirty-three were able-bodied

Culminates
in mutiny.

The mutinous
41st arrives.

Other fugi-
tives arrive.

* They had been joined by fugitives and travellers from other parts of the country.

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June 19.

Preparations
of the garr-
son.

Paucity of
ammunition.

men : the remainder consisted of women, children, and infirm non-combatants. The first care was to mount guns on the ramparts. A 6-pounder was at once placed in position to command the gateway. By strenuous exertions a 3-pounder, a 9-pounder, a 12-pounder, an 18-pounder, and a 24-pounder, were likewise mounted. The last three however were howitzers. A small brass mortar, and three hundred muskets were also unearthed and made ready for use.

The next care was to search for ammunition. The supply of this was, however, extremely defective. The garrison could not lay hands on more than a few muster round shot and shells; six boxes of balled, and an equal number of blank cartridges. These latter were at once broken up, and the powder was put by for the use of the guns—a lot of nuts, screws, hammer-heads and such-like articles being collected to be used as grape. At the same time the garrison were told off into three parties, each under an officer, and to these distinct watches were assigned.

All these arrangements had been happily completed before the sepoys showed any sign of molesting our countrymen. The fact was that perfect union did not reign among the mutineers. The 10th Regiment, on dismissing its officers, had placed itself unreservedly at the disposal of the Nawáb but had refused to hand over to him the treasure. The 41st, meanwhile, crossing the Ganges in boats, had entered the city, and demanded from the men of the 10th their share of the plunder. The 10th refused to part with

Disunion
amongst the
mutineers.

their spoils, whereupon the 41st reproaching them with having spared the lives of their officers, went tumultuously to the Nawáb and implored him to order the 10th to join them in an attack on the fort. The Nawáb, it is believed, gave the required order; but the 10th had, in the interval, divided the treasure amongst them. Then the greater number of them seized the first opportunity to cross the river into Oudh, and to make their way to their homes. The few who remained were set upon by the men of the 41st. In the contest which ensued many on both sides were killed. It ended only by the survivors of the 10th agreeing to follow the counsels of the 41st.

The 41st were now masters of the situation, and the object of the 41st was European blood. The Nawáb threw himself heartily into their cause, and supplied them with provisions and all the munitions of war at his disposal. But the mutineers still delayed the attack. They were awaiting, they said, an auspicious day. This delay was of no small advantage to the besieged as it enabled them, by means of the natives who still adhered to them, to store the fort with provisions.

The auspicious day was the 25th of June. But it was not till the evening of the day following that the first alarm was given. This was caused by the opening of a musketry fire upon some coolies employed by our people to pull down some walls outside, but contiguous to, the fort. It led to nothing. Before daybreak the following morning, however, the mutineers opened fire from

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June 19-21.

Bloody coun-sels prevail.

The muti-neers attack the fort.

June 25.

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June 25.

They are
foiled,

again and
again.

They change
their tactics,

their only two guns, but, finding it ineffectual, they soon caused it to cease. A little later, taking up their position behind trees, bushes, and any wall that afforded cover, they opened out a heavy musketry fire. It was, however, positively ineffective, whereas many of them were hit by the English marksmen.

The only incident which made the following day differ from its predecessor was the display by the enemy of escalading ladders. But not one of these could be planted against the walls of the fort. The aim of our countrymen was too true.

For four days similar tactics were pursued, varied only by ineffectual attempts to escalade. The enemy suffered severely from the guns and muskets of the besieged, whereas the loss sustained by the latter was extremely slight. On the fifth day the rebels changed their tactics.

Ceasing direct attack a body of them went to occupy a village called Húsénpúr, the roofs of the houses in which commanded a portion of the interior of the fort. From these roofs they opened a deadly and effective fire, speedily productive of casualties amongst the garrison. At the same time another body took possession of a small outhouse about seventy yards from the fort and commanding the rampart, loopholed it, and opened a destructive fire on the gunners, rendering the service of the guns impossible. The garrison suffered a good deal from this fire, Colonel Tucker being amongst the slain. The enemy then began mining operations, and at the end of two days sprung the mine. The explosion shook the whole

fort but blew away only five or six yards of the outer wall, leaving the inner half standing. They made two attempts, then, to storm. But the first was defeated by the vigilance of one of the garrison, Mr. Jones, who noticing their assembling below the breach, poured into them, unaided, "the fire of two double-barrels and eight muskets, and again discharging them as they were re-loaded by a native;" the second, by the excellent aim of Mr. Fisher, the chaplain, the leader of the storming party falling dead by a shot from his rifle.

The situation of the garrison was nevertheless sensibly deteriorating. They had lost some of their best men. Many of their defences were commanded. Ammunition was running short. The enemy, too, were daily devising fresh schemes of attack. The day following the repulse just recorded they managed to hoist one of their guns in a position to command the building in which the women and children were located; the other to bear against the main gateway. The firing from these was effective. The building was struck, the gate was pierced, and worse than all two of the garrison guns were disabled. Still, however, damages were repaired with a will, and the enemy were again baffled. Under these circumstances they once more had recourse to mining.

Up to this point the garrison had shown a spirit, an energy, and a resolution not to be surpassed. But their losses had been severe. Their effective number, originally small, had considerably diminished. Excessive work had thus been

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but are again
baffled.

Difficulties
under which
the garrison
labour.

New attacks.

Losses of the
garrison.

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Their pros-
pects deterio-
rate.

Possibility of
invasion.

The garrison
attempt it.

thrown upon the survivors, and they were now fairly worn out by fatigue and watching. They could still have repelled a direct attack, but when they witnessed a second attempt to mine their position, despair of a successful defence began to steal over their minds. It would have been strange had it been otherwise. It was evident that after the firing of the second mine two breaches would be available for the assault, and the garrison were not sufficiently strong in numbers to defend more than one. The case was desperate. Effective defence had become impossible.

But there remained to the garrison still one chance of escape. The rainy season had set in, and under its influence there had been a considerable rise in the waters of the Ganges. Three large boats had been kept safely moored under the fort walls. It might be possible, starting at night, to descend the rapidly flowing river to a point where they would be far from the reach of the murderous sepoys. Such a course, at all events, offered, or seemed to offer, a better chance of escape than a continuance of the defence of the fort with numbers diminished and ammunition all but exhausted. So thought, after due consideration, Colonel Smith and the garrison. They resolved then to evacuate the fort and steal away in the boats. On the night of the 3rd of July the attempt was made. The ladies and children were divided into three parties and at midnight were stowed away in the boats. Meanwhile the pickets and sentries still remained at

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July 3.

their posts. But as soon as the non-combatants had been embarked they were called in. They first spiked the guns, destroyed the small amount of ammunition that remained, and then made their way to the boats. It was 2 o'clock in the morning before they had all embarked. The order was then given to let go. The boats started in good order, but the clearness of the night betrayed their movements to the sepoy. These at once guessed the truth. Raising the cry that the Franks were running away, they fired wildly at the boats, and then followed, still discharging their pieces, along the bank. But Fortune for the moment favoured our countrymen. The banks were unfavourable for running and the current was strong. The hostile missiles all fell short.

I have already stated that the boats were three in number. They had been apportioned respectively to the commands of Colonel Smith, Colonel Goldie, and Major Robertson. But Colonel Goldie's boat was soon found to be too unwieldy and was abandoned, its occupants being removed to Colonel Smith's boat. The delay caused by the transhipment enabled the sepoy to bring down one of their guns to bear on the boats, but the balls still fell short. At length the fugitives resumed their journey and reached without accident the village of Singhirámpúr. Here they stopped to repair the rudder of Colonel Smith's boat. But the villagers turned out, opened fire upon it, and killed one of the two boatmen. The villagers still continuing to turn out, five of our

Favourable
commencement
of the
enterprize.One boat is
abandoned.Attack by the
villagers.

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Major Robertson's boat takes the ground.

The rebels approach in two boats,

and attack Major Robertson's boat.

officers* jumped into the water, waded to land and charged and drove back the enemy, numbering now about three hundred, killing some of their leaders. They then returned to the boat, the rudder of which had been repaired. They had scarcely gone a few yards, however, before Major Robertson's boat grounded on a soft sandbank. Notwithstanding every effort, and that the fugitives jumped into the water to push her off, she remained there immovable. Colonel Smith's boat, meanwhile, had gone down with the stream.

The grounded boat had been in the helpless position above recorded about half an hour when its occupants descried two boats coming towards them down the stream apparently empty. These boats approached to within twenty yards of them, when suddenly they became alive with armed sepoys. These opened upon our countrymen a murderous and continued fire. Before the fugitives had time to recover from their surprise, many of them, including Major Robertson, had been wounded, and some sepoy had already boarded the boat. Major Robertson, despite his wound, still retained his cool courage. He implored the ladies to throw themselves into the water and trust to the current rather than to the sepoy. Many of them did so. But the sepoy

* These were, Major Munro, his tribute of regret to the Lieutenants Eckford, Sweetenham, and Henderson of the 10th Native Infantry, and Captain Edmund Vibart, 2nd Cavalry. The writer gladly takes this opportunity to offer

untimely end of the last-named officer, who to the form of an Antinous united sentiments and a ripe and brilliant intellect.

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were upon them. Some of the men aiding the ladies, some alone, succeeded in swimming down the stream. But many of these were drowned; many were killed. The rest were taken prisoners and carried to the Nawáb.*

Meanwhile, Colonel Smith's boat had been carried down by the stream. Its occupants received authentic intelligence of the fate of their friends from Mr. Jones, who, after having defended himself as long as defence was possible, and received a bullet-wound in the right shoulder, had struck out into the stream. Mr. Jones states in his narrative that on board that boat he found "everything in confusion," some having been killed, some wounded by the villagers of Singhi-rámpúr. Shortly afterwards Mr. Fisher was picked up. The boat continued to drop down without pursuit, molestation, or intercourse with the natives, till on the evening of the following day it reached a village opposite Kúsúmkhor, in the Oudh territories. Here the villagers offered the fugitives assistance and protection. These at first feared treachery, but becoming convinced of the friendly intentions of the peasants, they put to shore for the night, and were refreshed by a

Colonel
Smith's boatreaches a
friendly
village.

* Amongst those who succeeded in swimming to the other boat were Mr. Jones, whose narrative I have mainly followed; Mr. Fisher, the chaplain, whose gallantry had endeared him to everyone, and who, on this occasion supported his wife and child till they died in his arms. Mr. David Churcher, supporting

Major Robertson, by means of an oar, succeeded in reaching the village of Kalhúr. Here the villagers sheltered them. Mr. Churcher remained here tending Major Robertson for two months. The latter then died. Ultimately Mr. Churcher succeeded in reaching Kánhpúr, then occupied by the British.

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Chapter VI.

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The fugitives pursue their way, one of their number excepted.

Fate of the remainder.

The gains of the Nawáb.

meal consisting of unleavened bread and buffalc milk.

Well would it have been if our countrymen had remained with these kind-hearted villagers. One of them, Mr. Jones, whose wound had become most painful, decided on doing so. The others all set out that night. They set out to meet their death. The precise form in which that death was meted out to them may not be certainly known. Some believe that the boat was stopped near Kánpúr, its occupants dragged out, and there murdered. There is, on the other hand, some ground for believing that as the boat passed Bithúr,* the stronghold of Náná Sáhib, it was fired upon by the sepoys, and all on board were killed. This, however, is certain, that they all met their death at or near Kánpúr, on the order of Náná Dhúndú Pant.

Thus had the Nawáb, Tafúzal Húsén Khán, triumphed at Farakhábád. He inaugurated his accession by the slaughter of some forty Europeans taken in various parts of the district. The prisoners brought back from Major Robertson's boat were kept for about a fortnight in confinement, and then murdered, under most atrocious circumstances. But the blood thus spilt failed to cement his throne. It failed to win for him the

* "The boat left. I heard board were killed."—*Mr. Jones's Narrative*. Mr. Jones nothing more of it for several days till their Mánjí (boat-man) who took her down returned and gave out that Nana Sahib had fired upon them at Bithúr, and all on himself succeeded in joining Mr. Probyn, and ultimately in accompanying him to Kánpúr.

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affection of the Hindús, constituting nine-tenths of the population of the district. It failed to give him a sense of security. In a few short months, it was this blood which choked his utterances for pardon, and which, when the penalty he had incurred had been remitted by the unauthorised action of a subordinate official, condemned him to an existence more miserable than death. The Government could not recede from the plighted word of their officer, but though the Nawáb was allowed to live, he lived only to see the utter annihilation of his own schemes, the complete restoration of the authority he had insulted and defied, to be made conscious every day of the contempt and disgust he had brought upon his person and his name.

BOOK IX.

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CHAPTER I.

WHATEVER may be the justification offered for the annexation of Oudh, it cannot be questioned that, having regard to the manner in which that policy was carried out, it not only failed to conciliate—it even tended to alienate from the British every class in India. Under any circumstances the absorption of an independent Mahomedan kingdom would have afforded to the already disaffected section of the Masalmáns throughout India, especially in the large cities, not only a pretext, but a substantial cause of discontent and disloyalty. But the annexation of Oudh did far more than alienate a class already disaffected. It alienated the rulers of Native States, who saw in that act indulgence in a greed of power to be satiated neither by unswerving loyalty nor by timely advances of money on loan to the dominant power. It alienated the territorial aristocracy, who found themselves suddenly stripped, by the action of the newly introduced

*Effects of the
annexation of
Oudh,*

1857.

in alienating
every class
from the
British.

British system, sometimes of one half of their estates, sometimes even of more. It alienated the Mahomedan aristocracy—the courtiers—men whose income depended upon the appointments and pensions they received from the favour of their prince. It alienated the military class serving under the king, ruthlessly cast back upon their families with small pensions or gratuities. It contributed to alienate the British sepoys recruited in Oudh,—and who, so long as their country continued independent, possessed, by virtue of the privilege granted them of acting on the Court of Lakhnao by means of petitions presented by the British Resident, a sure mode of protecting their families from oppression.* It alienated alike the peasantry of the country and the petty artisans of the towns, who did not relish the change of a system, which, arbitrary and tyrannical though it might be, they thoroughly understood, for another system, the first elements of which were taxation of articles of primary necessity. In a word, the annexation of Oudh converted a country, the loyalty of whose inhabitants to the British had become proverbial, into a hotbed of discontent and of intrigue.

On the 20th of March 1857, Sir Henry Lawrence had assumed the Chief Commissionership of Lakhnao. His clear and practical eye saw at a glance that the new system was not working

Sir Henry
Lawrence
arrives.

* When it is considered army the immense importance that there was scarcely a of this privilege may be peasant family in Oudh un-conceived. represented in the British

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1857.

His fitness for
the office.

He at once
detects the
discontent,

Which he
regards as
justifiable,

satisfactorily; that his predecessor had thrust it *en masse* on the province, and that its effect had been—alienation. Of all the men who have ever attained a prominent position in India, Sir Henry Lawrence was, perhaps, the most qualified to remove a discontent engendered by action on the part of the Government too fast, too hard, and too reckless. He had great sympathies with the people. He thoroughly understood them. He knew that their feelings, their instincts, were thoroughly conservative; that they distrusted change in the abstract; that if one thing more than another would rouse their long-suffering and docile nature, it would be change coming upon them suddenly, harshly, unaccompanied either by warning or argument. Sir Henry Lawrence noted, then, not only that there was discontent, but that there was reason for that discontent; and he at once made it his business to lessen, as far as he could, the oppressive action of the newly imposed regulations.

The correspondence of Sir Henry Lawrence with the Governor-General and with his family shows clearly not only how the discontent of the people had impressed him, but how deeply he regretted the too hasty and too zealous action of the officials who had unwittingly fomented the ill-feeling. Suddenly to introduce a system which will have the immediate effect of depriving the territorial aristocracy of a country of one half of its estates is not a policy consistent with the diffusion of a spirit of loyalty,—and yet within a month of his installation in Lakhnao Sir Henry

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Lawrence wrote to Lord Canning to inform him that in the Faizábád division of Oudh the Talúk-dárs had lost half their villages—that some had lost all! Nor did he find that the peasantry had benefited. Heavy assessments, increased duties, had driven them frantic, whilst the large towns were inundated by the disbanded adherents of the late *régime*, all in a state of discontent and disaffection!

on the
grounds
which he
assigns.

Amongst the population thus seething the dangerous spark of the caste question was suddenly thrown. Who threw it? Was it, as some have asserted, the ill-judged order of a thoughtless official? Was it, as others maintain, the angry retort of a low-caste lascar? Or was it, rather the eager grasp, the clever appropriation of a clique thirsting for an opportunity? That is a question on which perfect agreement is perhaps impossible. This, at least, seems clear to me that the hold which this question took of the minds of the sepoys was due mainly to the fact that they were for the most part men of Oudh, and that annexation and its consequences had prepared the minds of the men of Oudh to accept any absurdity which might argue want of faith on the part of the British. That the sepoys believed that the greased cartridges were designed to deprive them of their caste is, I think, not to be questioned. But they believed that calumny mainly because the action of the British Government, with respect to their own province, had so shattered their faith in the professions of the ruling power, that they were ready to credit anything against it.

Was it an
original cause,
or a pretext,
of discontent?

Reasons for
believing that
there was a
cause of dis-
content inde-
pendent of the
caste ques-
tion;

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which, though
a cause, was
only a second-
ary cause.

Sir Henry
studies the
position,

and fears the
evil is too far
advanced.

The reason
why the
danger in
Oudh was
likely to be
excessive.

Mr. Beadon called the action of the sepoys "a passing and groundless panic." But, as I have said elsewhere, if it was a panic, it was not a groundless panic. In a greater degree the annexation of Oudh and the measures which followed that annexation; in a lesser degree the actual employment of animal fat in the composition of the cartridges, constituted ample grounds for the distrust evinced by the sepoys.

In the earlier hours of his arrival in Oudh the attention of Sir Henry Lawrence had been mainly occupied by the condition and the discontent of the people he had come to govern. He felt that, could peace be maintained, there was yet time to remedy the main evil. In a very few days he had weighed the higher officials in Lakhnao and had satisfied himself that he could manage them. The question to be solved was whether the little cloud rising in the horizon near Barhámpúr would not develop into a tempest, fierce enough to disturb the tranquillity of the entire country, before he should have time to instil confidence in the minds of the people of the newly annexed province.

This question was unhappily solved in the negative. The feeling which had animated the sepoys at Barhámpúr, in the month of March, was more widely spread in Oudh than in any other province in India. For Oudh was the home of the sepoys. Oudh supplied three-fifths of the recruits annually enlisted in the Bengal army. Every feeling engendered in the ranks permeated through Oudh, whilst the notions imbibed in the

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homesteads of the peasants found an echo in every regiment of the native army.

Sir Henry Lawrence was not slow to detect the increasing feeling of mistrust in the very class on whose loyalty the British empire in India seemed to depend. Reports reached him from every corner of the province, all conveying the same story. He could not conceal from himself that the spirit of the people was deeply excited, and excited on the one subject on which to be excited was to be dangerous. He saw that credit was very generally accorded to the whisper that the British Government was bent on destroying the caste of the sepoys, and he knew that to maintain that caste inviolate the Hindú would risk his property, his homestead, all that he valued in this world ; that he would gladly sacrifice his life.

The surging
of the storm.

In the wars waged by Aurangzib against the princes of Rájpútáná, to maintain the *jézia* or poll-tax upon infidels, the Emperor possessed the advantage of counting upon the religious bigotry of his Mahomedan subjects. But Sir Henry Lawrence was not blind to the fact that in any contest which might be impending with the Hindús the sympathies of that class would be denied him. Amongst the original fomenters of the rising disaffection, many certainly were Mahomedans. The desire to recover their lost over-lordship, the ambition to revive their vanished empire, the longing to avenge themselves on the conqueror, were the motives which prompted them. But the Mahomedan customs have so much in common with the Christian

The second-
ary cause
enables the
Mahomedan
leaders to
work on their
followers.

customs, the food partaken of by the two communities is, with one exception, so similar, that they would have found it difficult under ordinary circumstances to persuade their brethren in the ranks of the army that their religion was in danger. The opportune discovery of the use of lard in the manufacture of the cartridges came to these conspirators as an inspiration from heaven. They used it with an effect that was decisive. The Mahomedan rank and file, disaffected on other grounds, determined from the moment of that revelation to cast in their lot with their Hindú comrades.

The one slight chance in favour of a peaceful issue.

That a crisis of no ordinary magnitude was approaching became apparent, then, to Sir Henry Lawrence very soon after he had assumed the reins of office at Lakhnao. He did not despair. His intimate acquaintance with the natives of India had satisfied him that there were no people in the world more tractable when once their reason had been satisfied. Fanatics, it is true, never reason. But there might, he thought, be some chance of enlisting on his side that divine faculty, if an opportunity of appealing to it before the stage of fanaticism had been arrived at could be secured. On these slender grounds he built such hopes as he entertained.

Almost from the very moment of his arrival, Sir Henry Lawrence had laid himself out to remedy the most pressing material grievances complained of by the various classes of the population. The evil already effected had been too great to admit of his being perfectly success-

ful. The aristocracy of the Court, indeed, who, as I have already stated, had been ruined by the abrupt action which followed annexation, were propitiated by the immediate payment to them of the pensions which had been promised, but till then had been withheld. An early opportunity was likewise taken of assuring the officials, who had served under the previous *régime*, that their claims to employment would receive prior consideration, and that as a rule the natives of Oudh would be preferred to immigrants from the British provinces. The case of the disbanded soldiers was more difficult. These men were promised preference in enlistment in the local corps and in the military police. Only a comparatively small number of the cavalry availed themselves, however, of this privilege. In many cases they did not hesitate to state the reason of their refusal. "I have eaten the king's salt, and will not touch that of another."* With the small traders in Lakhnao itself Sir Henry succeeded better. They were pacified by the personal interest displayed by the new Chief Commissioner in their welfare, and by the practical measures he took before their eyes to put a stop to the seizures and demolition of houses in the city, which had formed one staple of their grievances. With the territorial magnates, Sir Henry, in spite

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Sir Henry Lawrence tries to repair the fault of his predecessors;

and partially succeeds.

* This was especially the strict police, in which a like case with respect to enlistments amount of drill and discipline in the regular regiments, and was not enforced. in the military police. The disbanded soldiers accepted service more readily in the dis-

The district police were under the civil authorities alone.

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Chapter I.

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1857.

of no slight opposition, dealt in the same enlightened spirit. He held Darbárs to receive them, to listen to their views, to remedy their just complaints. And he did greatly pacify them by the enunciation of a policy, by the action of which they would be reinstated in the position they had occupied at the time of the annexation.

Would probably have wholly succeeded if he had, in the first instance, been sent to Oudh.

In this way, in a few weeks, the material evils complained of were placed in a fair way of being remedied. It was a more difficult and a more delicate task to remove the rising religious discontent. The mischief had been virtually accomplished before Sir Henry Lawrence reached Lakhnao. I think it quite possible that had he succeeded Wájid Ali Sháh it would never have arisen. But in all such questions prevention is easier than cure. I repeat—fanatics never reason. And before Sir Henry Lawrence had reached Lakhnao the religious question had assumed all the proportions of fanaticism.

The first practical intimation that the contagion of the cartridge question had reached Oudh was manifested early in April. Before advertiring to it, it is necessary that I should state the troops by whom the newly annexed province was garrisoned.

At Lakhnao itself were quartered Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, about seven hundred strong; a weak company of European artillery; the 7th Regiment Light Cavalry (native); the 13th, 48th, and 71st Regiments of Native Infantry. Besides these, there were at Lakhnao, or in its immediate environs, two regiments of Irregular Native Infantry, raised for local service in Oudh, the 4th,

Garrison of
Lakhnao.

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April.

and the 7th; one regiment of Military Police, the 3rd; a large proportion of the mounted Military Police;* one regiment of Oudh Irregular Cavalry; and two batteries of Native Artillery. Thus the native armed troops were in the proportion of nearly ten to one, the actual numbers being seven thousand to seven hundred and fifty. At Sítápúr, in addition to local troops, was stationed the 41st Native Infantry, having a detachment at Maláon; at Sultánpúr the 15th Irregular Cavalry. The other stations, Dariábád, Faizábád, and Baraitch were garrisoned only by local corps.

And of the
districts.

The intimation that the caste contagion had reached Lakhnao occurred in this wise. The surgeon of the 48th Regiment had incautiously applied his mouth to a bottle of medicine. The sepoys attributed the surgeon's action to design, and, although the bottle which had been tasted was broken in their presence, they seized an early opportunity to burn down his house. The authors of this outrage, though known to belong to the 48th, escaped detection.

First symp-
toms of dis-
affection at
Lakhnao.

In ordinary times the incident of the bottle would have had little significance. But the vengeance wreaked on the surgeon showed the importance attached to it, in the month of April 1857, by the men of the 48th. Further indica-

* The Oudh Military Police consisted of one thousand cavalry and three regiments of infantry. This force was commanded by Captain Gould Weston, who, prior to the annexation of the province, had been engaged for some years in the suppression of Thagí and Dakaití in Oudh, and had done good service as Superintendent of the Frontier Police, and as one of the Assistants to the Resident.—Sir William Sleeman's *Journey through Oudh*.

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Sir Henry
makes earnest
appeals to the
native officers
and soldiers.

tions soon intimated very plainly to the authorities that the feeling which had manifested itself in Barhámpúr was not less strongly rooted in Oudh.*

Sir Henry Lawrence, I have said, whilst not insensible to the extreme difficulty of the task, had deemed it might just be possible to dispel, by plain appeals to reason and to facts, the cobwebs from the minds of such men as had not become absolutely fanatical on the subject of the alleged attempt on their caste. He made an earnest appeal, then, to the loyalty of the men. He pointed out to the native officers how contrary it was to the experience of a century that the English should attempt to produce by fraud a result which they would consider only valuable if brought about by conviction. He explained to them the danger which threatened them—the danger of being persuaded by evil-disposed men to become false to their salt. He warned them at the same time of the consequences. He would not palter with mutiny. Sharp and summary should be the punishment of those who should fail in their duty. “It is impossible,” writes one† who was at his elbow at this period, “it is impossible here to mention the various steps taken

* “Not long after it became known that the regiment ported that an attempt had been made by some sepoys of native officers were reported the 48th to tamper with a native guard of his regiment.”—with relatives of the Ex-King Gubbins, *The Mutinies in Oudh*, of Oudh, residing in the city Not long after Capt. G. Hutchinson Adolphus Orr, command- son, Military Secretary to Sir ing one of the regiments of H. Lawrence.

† *Narrative of the Mutinies in Oudh*, by Capt. G. Hutchinson

by Sir Henry Lawrence to preserve the soldiery in their duty and the people in their allegiance. Every conciliatory measure was adopted consistent with the dignity of the British Government; and there is no doubt that by his untiring energy, discretion, ability, and determination, he did fan into a flame for awhile the wavering loyalty of many of the native officers and men, and that the army and people generally felt that his was a firm and experienced hand." This is most true. All that it was possible to do to check the mutiny was done in Oudh. Firmness combined with conciliation, fairness of speech with fairness of action, prompt punishment with prompt reward. Yet this policy—in the circumstances a model policy—though not wholly fruitless, though checking the outbreak for awhile, Too late. did not stop it in the end. The reason is not difficult to find. Oudh had been undermined—the point of fanaticism had been very generally reached before Sir Henry Lawrence arrived there. He came too late indeed to repair the mischief, though not too late to save the British honour—not too late to preserve from the hands of the despoiler the plot of ground which constituted the seat of Government, and which will be referred to in future ages as the monument of his sagacity and of the prowess of his countrymen.

For he did not confine himself solely to the work of pacifying and of reasoning with the people. He realised almost at a glance the danger that threatened India. He felt that at any moment the handful of Englishmen in the

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Partial suc-
cess of the
appeals.

Too late.

He sees the
full extent of
the coming
danger.

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April.

He takes
early pro-
cautions.

country might have two hundred millions on their hands. Whilst, then, he used every persuasive argument, and put into action every precautionary measure to avert a crisis, he prepared to meet one.

He began his preparations in April. His own head-quarters were at the Residency situated in the city, close to the river Gúmtí, and upwards of a quarter of a mile from the iron bridge leading to the Mariáon cantonments. At Mariáon were the native infantry regiments, a light horse battery of European artillery and a battery of native artillery. At Múdkipúr, a mile and a half further still from the Residency was one native cavalry regiment. In an opposite direction, in a line in fact forming a right angle with the road to Mariáon and at a distance of a mile and a half from the point of the angle, the Residency, was H. M.'s 32nd Regiment, about seven hundred strong. Nearly a mile and a half directly north of the barracks of the British Regiment, and on the opposite bank of the river Gúmtí, was the only remaining regiment of native cavalry. South of the river again, at or near Músá Bágh three miles from the Residency, were two irregular native regiments, and between them and the Residency was a magazine containing a considerable stand of arms.

The Resi-
dency.

About the Residency itself were clustered several substantial buildings of solid masonry occupied by the higher European officials. Here also were the Treasury, the Hospital, and a jail. A detachment of native troops guarded the Residency and the Treasury. One company occupied

a curved line of buildings outside the principal gate leading to the Treasury. The whole of the Residency buildings were known to the natives throughout Oudh by the name Baillie Guard.*

Rather less than one mile from the Residency, on the same side of the river Gúmtí, and close to the brick bridge spanning it is a castellated and picturesque stronghold called the Machhí Báwan—the fortress of the rebellious Shékhhs in the time of the vice-royalty of Asúf-ud-dáola, but for many years used only as a depositary of lumber—occupying a very commanding position.

The attention of Sir Henry was, in the first instance, directed to the making the Residency defensible, and to a better location of the European troops. With this end in view he began to clear away the huts and other obstructions which occupied the ground close to the Residency : to lay in supplies of grain of all sorts and European stores : to accumulate powder and small ammunition and to dig pits for their reception : to arrange for a constant water supply ; by degrees to send for the treasure from the city and outlying stations ; and to form outworks in the ground encompassing the Residency. At the same time he moved up to the vicinity of the barracks of the 32nd Foot four guns of the native battery stationed at Marión.

His preparations had not been made a moment too soon. On the 30th of April the storm threatened. On the 3rd of May it broke.

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Chapter I.

1857.
April.

Sir Henry
prepares to
meet any
possible emer-
gency.

* The Guard in question, gate by Colonel Baillie, whom commanded by a Súbadár, resident at the Court of Oudh. was first stationed at this Hence the name.

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CHAPTER I.

—
1857.
April 30.

The 7th Oudh
Irregulars
mutiny.

It happened in this wise. The 7th Regiment of Oudh Irregular Infantry was stationed at Músá Bágh about three miles from the Residency. The adjutant of the regiment was Lieutenant Mecham of the Madras Army, a cool, determined, and resolute officer. On the 30th of April when he took his men to ball-practice, these suddenly showed a disinclination to use the new cartridge. Mecham pointed out to them that the cartridge was similar to that which they had been using the previous fortnight. This seemed to satisfy the men and they proceeded with the practice. But the next morning the sergeant-major reported that the men positively refused to bite the cartridge, that many even declined to receive or even to touch it.

The day following was spent by the men in brooding over their grievances. They worked themselves to the state of fanaticism which will not hear reason, and at 10 o'clock, on the 3rd, they had arrived at the conclusion that they must kill their European officers. The latter, warned in time by the quartermaster-sergeant of the disposition of their men, nobly did their duty, and succeeded after a time in inducing the sepoys to return to their lines,* though they refused to surrender their arms.

They are induced to return to their lines.

* It was related at the trial me but what good will time of Lieutenant Mecham my death do to you? You that he owed his life on this will not ultimately prevail. occasion to his coolness and Another adjutant will take presence of mind. Taken un- my place and you will be sub-aware by the mutineers and jected to the same treatment told to prepare to die, he you receive from me." The replied: "It is true you may mutineers did not injure him.

But Sir Henry Lawrence was not content with this doubtful triumph. Having made preparations to suppress any attempt which the sepoyes might make to display insubordination he sent that afternoon two officers with instructions how to act. The men of the 7th were paraded. The question was put to them whether they would continue to bite the cartridge or whether they would refuse. The men, in an insolent and sullen manner, promised to obey. The force organised by Sir Henry, consisting of the 32nd Foot, an European battery, three regular native regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, arrived soon after on the ground. Darkness had now set in. The 7th were at once formed up and ordered to lay down their arms. In the presence of this imposing force and of the lighted portfires of the gunners they had no option but to comply. Most of them indeed fled stricken by panic, but on being assured that no violence would be used if they would obey orders they returned, and before midnight all their muskets were secured. The next day the ring-leaders were seized, and it transpired from their admissions that a treasonable correspondence with the view to a general rising had been going on for some time between them and the men of the 48th Regiment of Native Infantry.

In the events which immediately preceded, and immediately followed the affair of the 7th Oudh Irregulars, Sir Henry Lawrence had received valuable information from native officers and others. In the crisis which he saw advancing

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Chapter I.

1857.
May 3.

Sir Henry
Lawrence de-
prives them of
their arms.

The Darbár at
Lakhnau.

Book IX.
Chapter I.

—
1857.
May 8-12.

May 12.

Touching ad-
dress of Sir
Henry Law-
rence.

with rapid strides he considered that rewards should go hand in hand with punishment, that the justice,—the truth in action—which had always been the maxim of the British Government, should at all hazards be maintained. He considered it advisable, moreover, that the bestowal of the rewards should be made the occasion for a solemn ceremony, at which he might speak the mind of the Government. With this view he invited the native aristocracy, the European and native civil officials, the European and native officers, and others to a Darbár on the evening of the 12th of May. Every arrangement had been made to give solemnity to the scene. At 6 p.m. Sir Henry Lawrence entered, followed by his staff. Near him were deposited in trays the presents and rewards to be bestowed upon the loyal native officers and soldiers. But before distributing these Sir Henry addressed in Hindustani the assembled company. He went straight to the point; spoke of the fears for their religion entertained by the Hindús; reminded them how, under the Moghol rule, that religion had never been respected; how Aurangzib had imposed the jézia; and how the flesh of the cow had been thrust down the throats of unwilling converts. Turning then to the Mahomedans he reminded them that Ranjít Singh would never tolerate their religion at Láhor. Passing on from that he begged them to recall to mind the toleration which for a century the English Government had afforded to both religions. He adverted next to our power, to our exploits in the Crimea, to our

ships, our resources; pointed out how hopeless of ultimate success would be a crusade against the English. He next dwelt on the long and intimate connection between the sepoys and their officers, on the community of danger and the community of glory between them, and begged the men to cherish as their most precious heirlooms the deeds of their ancestors. He concluded an eloquent speech, delivered in the language of the people, by warning his listeners against becoming the dupes of designing men, and of the fate which would inevitably follow the neglect of his advice. He then caused the deserving native officers and soldiers to be brought up to him, and, in the name of the Government, delivered to them the rewards they had merited.*

The speech of Sir Henry Lawrence had, undoubtedly, some effect at the moment. His earnest manner, his character so trusted and so respected, added weight to his words. When the Darbár broke up there was not probably a man present who was not loyal. But the opposite feeling was too deeply rooted to be dissipated by a passing sensation. The listeners went from the Darbár into the society of the plotters and intriguers against whom Sir Henry had warned them. The whispers, constantly repeated, of these men at first weakened, and ultimately deadened the effect which had been produced by the scene at the Darbár.

* Strange contradiction! were shortly afterwards hanged Some of the men who were tried for proved disloyalty! thus rewarded for loyalty

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Chapter I.

1857.
May 12.

Its effect
passing and
transitory.

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CHAPTER I.

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1857.
May 13.

News of the
Mírath revolt
arrives.

Prompt mea-
sures taken by
Sir Henry.

That Darbár was held on the 12th of May. The Mírath mutiny had broken out on the 10th. A telegram conveying information that something serious had happened in the North-West reached Sir Henry on the 13th. A second telegram giving fuller details of the Mírath revolt and an account of the seizure of Dehlí reached him on the 14th. Averse as he was from any measures which might show premature distrust of the sepoy Sir Henry felt that a crisis had come upon him which must be met by prompt action. His plans had been arranged before-hand. During the 16th and 17th they were carried out. The morning of the last-named day saw a moiety of the 32nd Foot occupying the ground about the Residency and commanding the iron bridge. The second moiety were brought up from the city into the cantonments of Mariáon. The bridge of boats was moved nearer to the Residency and brought under control, whilst a selected body of sepoy was detached to occupy the Machhí Báwan, not yet sufficiently cleansed to be fit for occupation by European troops.

A central position was thus secured for the Chief Commissioner, for his officials, and his European soldiers. Sir Henry had by one movement prepared himself to meet any emergency. But whilst prepared he had not altogether abandoned the hope that the emergency might not arise. He apprehended danger less from the native population than from the native troops. But with time he hoped that the difficulty might

He still longs
for "time."

still be surmounted. "Time," he wrote in a memorandum dated the 18th of May, "time is everything just now. Time, firmness, promptness, conciliation, prudence A firm and cheerful aspect must be maintained; there must be no bustle; no appearance of alarm, still less of panic; but at the same time there must be the utmost watchfulness and promptness; everywhere the first germ of insurrection must be put down instantly."

Immediately on receiving information of the occurrences at Mírath and Dehlí Sir Henry Lawrence telegraphed to the Governor-General a strong recommendation to send for European troops from China, Ceylon, and other places, and for the Gúrkhás from the Hill Stations and from Nipál. Feeling, moreover, that at such a crisis it was necessary that the Chief Commissioner of the province should be invested with plenary military authority he asked the Governor-General to confer such power upon him. Lord Canning promptly replied. On the 19th he conferred upon the Chief Commissioner the plenary power asked for, and on the 22nd he gave him authority to apply to Jang Bahádúr for his Gúrkhá troops.

Sir Henry Lawrence assumed the military command on the 19th. To understand the military arrangements which had been carried out two days previously under his instructions, it will be advisable to give an outline sketch of the city of Lakhnão.

The city of Lakhnão, about fifty miles distant from Kánhpúr, extends for about three miles on the

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Chapter I.

1857.
May 18.

Sir Henry is nominated to supreme military command in Oudh.

The city of Lakhnão.

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CHAPTER I.

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May.

right bank of the river Gúmtí. All the principal palatial buildings, the Residency and the Machhí Báwan, are between the city and the river bank. South of these buildings, and covering an immense space, is the city. This is intersected by a canal which falls into the Gúmtí close to the Martinière College, about three miles south-east of the Residency. A little to the south of this is the Dilkhúsha, a hunting-box or palace, within an enclosed park. The space between the Residency and the Martinière is occupied by palaces, among which the Motí Mahal, the Sháh-Manzal, the Sikandra Bágh, and Farrabaksh-kí-kothí, are the most conspicuous. South of the city, about four miles from the Residency on the southern side of the road leading to Kánpúr, is the A'lam Bágh, a large walled garden with a high and pretentious gateway.

Sir Henry's
military ar-
rangements.

Not counting the position of the native cavalry at Múdkipúr, Sir Henry possessed now three military posts. Two of these—the Residency and the Machhí Báwan—he made as strong as he could. Having regard to possible eventualities he removed the spare ammunition from the magazines, into the Machhí Báwan. He seized the earliest opportunity of garrisoning that place with Europeans, of storing supplies there, and of mounting on the ramparts guns of sorts. Many of these were taken from the King's palaces, and were useful only to make a show. In the Residency compound, over the Treasury, he posted a mixed guard of two hundred sepoys, one hundred and thirty Europeans, and six guns—the guns being

so placed that they could, at the first alarm, be brought to bear on any mutineers. The third post was at the old cantonment of Mariáon. It was garrisoned by three hundred and forty men of the 32nd Foot, fifty European artillerymen, and six guns; the three native regiments and a battery of native artillery. Here Sir Henry, for the time, took up his quarters.

Having made these preparations Sir Henry Lawrence took an early opportunity to move the ladies and children into the houses within the Residency enclosure. Here also were brought the families and the sick men of the 32nd Regiment. At the same time the clerks, copyists, section-writers, and others of that class were armed and drilled. On the 27th of May he was able to write to Lord Canning, "both the Residency and the Machhí Báwan are safe against all probable comers." Whilst thus preparing to meet the possibilities Sir Henry betrayed none of the anxieties which he felt, but went freely amongst the people, endeavouring to calm their minds, to reason with them, to lay bare to them their folly. It was however too late, and he was made every day to feel it. "I held," he wrote to Lord Canning early in May, "I held a conversation with a Jemadár of the Oudh artillery for more than an hour, and was startled by the dogged persistence of the man, a Bráhman of about forty years of age, of excellent character, in the belief that for ten years past Government has been engaged in measures for the forcible, or rather fraudulent, conversion of all the natives.

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Chapter L

1857.
May.

The ladies
and children
are brought
into the Resi-
dency.

Mistrust
shown by a
native officer

Mutinous
feeling in the
districts.

. . . . My interview with him was occasioned by his commanding officer having specially mentioned his intelligence and good character."

Towards the end of May the long smouldering discontent of the turbulent Masalmáns of the Malhiábád district burst into a flame, and on the 27th of that month Sir Henry Lawrence detached Captain Gould Weston, the Superintendent of Military Police, in the hope of restoring order. That officer's escort consisted of a troop of his own cavalry and a company of the mutinous 7th Oudh Irregular Infantry, under the command of the gallant Mecham. In the midst of an insolent Mahomedan population, to whom everything was a grievance, and from whom Captain Weston could elicit no real tangible cause of the rebellion, these two officers were in imminent danger.* Their lives depended not less upon their own coolness and daring before their avowed foes than upon the personal influence they might exercise on the wavering fidelity of their escort. Happily these essential qualities were not wanting; had it been otherwise, neither Weston nor Mecham would have fought his way back to Lakhnao with the detachments when recalled by Sir Henry Lawrence the day after the mutiny of the troops at Mariáon.

On the same day, the 27th, Captain Hutchinson of the Engineers, Military Secretary to the Chief

* Hutchinson's *Narrative* the bold determined firmness of *Events in Oudh*, published of Captain Weston over-awed by authority. Captain Hutchinson adds: "Nothing but surrounded him."

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May 27.

Commissioner, an officer of great talent and daring, was ordered by Sir Henry Lawrence to accompany into the district, as political officer, a column composed of two hundred men of the 7th Cavalry, and two hundred men of the 48th Native Infantry. The object of sending this column was to rid Lakhnao of the presence of men who might there be dangerous, but who, posted on the northern frontier of Oudh, might be employed with advantage to restrain the turbulence of the inhabitants. The idea emanated from Mr. Christian, through whose districts the column would pass.

Marching from Lakhnao on the 27th, the column passed through Malhiábád on the 28th—scowled upon by the armed villagers—and reached Sandila the 1st of June. There Hutchinson received accounts of the mutiny of the 30th of May at Lakhnao. The sepoys heard of it by the same post. It became at once apparent that they were biding their time. Hutchinson endeavoured to calm them by the disbursement of almost the entire contents of the treasure chest in the shape of pay. For the moment they seemed pacified. Their own senior officers, Captains Burmester and Staples, believed in them implicitly. Meanwhile the column was pressing on towards the Ganges. Hutchinson, who noted the increasing insolence of the men, urged the officers not to allow themselves to be taken in the net which was preparing for them on the other side of the river. But they were deaf and would not hear. The regiment crossed. On the 7th or 8th the

Mutiny of
detached
parties of
the 48th
Native In-
fantry and
7th Light
Cavalry.

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May 30.

Sepoys at
Lakhnao
mutiny.

men rose, massacred all but one, Lieutenant Boulton, who fled to perish elsewhere, and went off to Delhi. Hutchinson, accompanied by the paymaster of pensioners, Major Marriott, who with him had declined to cross the river, returned in safety to Lakhnao.

The precautions I have before referred to had not been taken at that city at all too soon. On the night of the 30th of May the insurrection broke out. At 9 o'clock the evening gun fired as usual. The men of the 71st Regiment, previously told off in parties, started off at this signal to fire the bungalows and murder their officers. A few men only of the other infantry regiments, and some men of the 7th Cavalry, joined them. Their further proceedings will be related presently.

Sir Henry Lawrence was dining that night at the Residency bungalow at Mariáon. An officer of his staff had informed him that he had been told by a sepoy that at gun-fire (9 P.M.), the signal to mutiny would be given. The gun fired; but all for the moment seemed quiet. Sir Henry leaned forward and said to the officer, "Your friends are not punctual." The words were scarcely out of his mouth when the discharge of muskets proved that his staff officer had been well informed, and that his friends were punctual.

A strange incident happened a few minutes later. Sir Henry Lawrence, surrounded by his staff, was standing on the steps of the Residency bungalow, waiting for the horses which had been

Warning
given to Sir
Henry.

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May 30.

ordered up from the stables. They were in the full glare of Mr. Couper's house, which, fired by the mutineers, had burst almost instantaneously in a blaze. Suddenly the Súbádár of the sepoys on duty at the Residency brought up his guard, and halted it facing Sir Henry and his staff at a distance of about forty paces. The Súbádár then came up to Captain Wilson, and saluting him said, "Shall I order the guard to load with ball?" Wilson referred the question to Sir Henry, who replied, "Yes, let them load." The loading then began—Sir Henry and the officers still standing in the glare of the fire. The thud of ramming down the leaden balls was distinctly heard. The sepoys then brought up their muskets to the capping position. The caps were adjusted. The next movement of the sepoys was eagerly waited for. They had the *élite*—the chiefs—of the British force at their mercy. One disaffected man bold enough could, then and there, have decided the fate of Lakhnao. The group standing on the steps of the Residency bungalow felt this in their inward hearts. But not an action, not a gesture, showed that they felt it. Yet they must have been relieved when the shouldering of arms followed the capping. The next moment the horses were brought up, and Sir Henry followed by his staff started for the lines.

On his way he found three hundred men of the 32nd, four guns, Major Kaye's battery, and two of the Oudh force, posted in a position on the extreme

Danger of
Sir Henry
and staff.

Sir Henry's
movements
to suppress
the mutiny.

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May 30.

right of the 71st lines, and contiguous to the road leading from cantonments to the city. Recognising the necessity of preventing as far as possible communication between the mutineers and the evil-disposed in the city Sir Henry took with him two guns and a company of the 32nd to occupy the road leading from the cantonment to the bridge. He sent back shortly for the remainder of the Europeans, and for two more guns. Meanwhile, the officers of the native regiments had hastened to the lines to endeavour to reason with the men. Many of these, however, had already begun the work of plunder. A considerable body had marched straight on the 71st mess, and failing to find the officers—who had but just left—they fired it. Very soon after a musketry fire from the 71st lines opened on the Europeans. This was replied to with grape, and with such effect that the sepoy made a rush to the rear. In their hurried course they passed the infantry picket, composed of natives, and commanded by Lieutenant Grant, 71st Native Infantry. Some of his own men tried to save this officer by placing him under a bed. But a sepoy of his own regiment, who was on guard with him, discovered the place of concealment to the mutineers, and by these he was brutally murdered.

The main
street pa-
trolled.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Hardinge, taking with him a few of the Irregular Cavalry, had been patrolling the main street of cantonments, in the endeavour to maintain order and to save life and property. He was not, however, in sufficient force to prevent the burning and plundering of

the officers' houses and the bazaars. The mutineers were prowling about in all directions. One of them fired at Lieutenant Hardinge, and when his shot missed fire he came at him with his bayonet and wounded him in the arm. All this time there was great excitement in the lines. But gradually some satisfactory symptoms evinced themselves. First, about three hundred of the 13th Native Infantry, with their British officers, their colours, and the regimental treasure, marched up and enrolled themselves with the British. They were followed by a very few of the 71st, without, however, their colours or their treasure. Of the 48th nothing was heard that night. The Europeans still remained formed up in the position assigned to them in case of alarm by Sir Henry Lawrence, their front flanking that of the several native regiments. About 10 P.M. some of the mutineers crept up to and occupied some empty lines bearing on that position, and opened a musketry fire. Brigadier Handscomb, riding from his house straight into the 71st lines, was immediately shot. The fire, however, soon ceased, and arrangements having been made to protect the Residency bungalow and the part of the cantonment next the city road, and strong guards having been posted, the force piled arms and waited for the morn.

At daylight next morning, Sir Henry placed himself at the head of the force, and learning that the rebels had retired on Múdkipúr, followed them thither. Crossing the parade ground our men came upon the body of Cornet

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May 30.

Many sepoys
prove loyal.

The muti-
neers baffled,

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pursued,

and dis-
persed.

The position
is improved
by the
mutiny.

Raleigh, a newly joined officer, who, left sick in his quarters, had been murdered by the rebels. At the same moment the mutinous regiments were discovered drawn up in line. On sighting them, hesitation was at once noticed in the ranks of the, till then loyal, 7th Cavalry. Their attitude appeared to an officer of Sir Henry Lawrence's staff to betoken an intention to charge the guns. That officer consequently at once directed the guns to open fire on the distant line. This prompt action decided the matter. The 7th Cavalry, with the exception of about thirty, raising a fearful yell, galloped over to the enemy, who turned and fled. Our troops followed them up for about ten miles and took sixty prisoners. In this pursuit Mr. Gubbins greatly distinguished himself, capturing several of the enemy with his own hand. By 10 A.M. our force had returned to cantonments, the heat being excessive.

In announcing the suppression of this rising to Lord Canning Sir Henry Lawrence wrote : "We are now positively better off than we were. We now know our friends and enemies. The latter have no stomach for a fight though they are capital incendiaries." In the respect to which he referred he was indeed better off. He was rid of doubtful friends. Nearly the whole of the 7th Cavalry, a few men of the 13th, more than two-thirds of the 71st, a very large proportion of the 48th, and almost all the irregular troops, had shown their hand and departed. He could now concentrate his resources. But in

other respects the day was full of foreboding. Intelligence received from the districts soon made it clear that the entire province was in arms against British rule.

Three days indeed prior to the rising at Sítápúr. Lakhnao an incident had occurred at Sítápúr which showed very plainly that the train was laid at that station and that a single spark would ignite it. Sítápúr is the head-quarters of the Khairábád or north-west division of Oudh. It lies about fifty-one miles from Lakhnao. In 1857 it was garrisoned by the 41st Regiment of Native Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Birch, and by the 9th and 10th Regiments of Oudh Irregular Infantry. The Commissioner of the Division, Mr. Christian, resided there, together with Mr. Thornhill and Sir Mountstuart Jackson, civil officers of the Oudh Commission.

About noon of the 27th of May the vacant lines of the 2nd Regiment of Military Police, commanded by Captain John Hearsey,* were fired. It had not then become generally recognised that incendiaryism was the invariable precursor to rebellion. Although, therefore, the firing of the lines caused some uneasiness, no absolute suspicion was directed to any particular body of men. The sepoys aided in extinguishing the fire, and the incident was not immediately followed by any overt act of mutiny.

It would appear that the firing of the lines had

* Captain Hearsey was most amiable and excellent officer, formerly of the Oudh service, a man much respected by his men.

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May 31.

Sítápúr.
May 27.

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1857.
May 27.

June 2.

Plea that the
flour has been
adulterated.

The gardens
plundered.

Confidence
in regiment
of Lieutenant-
Colonel Birch.

been a tentative measure. The sepoys were anxious to feel their way, to test the credulity of their officers, before acting decidedly. They proceeded then by degrees.

Of all the regiments I have mentioned the 10th Oudh Irregulars were regarded as the most trustworthy. Great, then, was the surprise in Sítápúr when, five days later, the 2nd of June, it became known that the sepoys of that regiment had rejected the flour sent from the city for their consumption, on the plea that it had been adulterated for the purpose of destroying their caste. They insisted that the flour should be thrown into the river. The flour was thrown into the river.

They now became bolder. The same afternoon the men of the same regiment plundered the gardens of the European residents of the ripe fruit growing in them. Their officers checked them, and, after some time, with success.

It was now evident that the men were getting out of hand. Still, strange infatuation! the officers, whilst suspecting the other regiments, believed in their own. Lieutenant-Colonel Birch, commanding the 41st Native Infantry—a regiment which showed itself as truculent as any which mutinied—had the most absolute confidence in the loyalty of his men. He put that loyalty to the test by marching his regiment out on the 1st of June on the Lakhnao road to meet the mutineers advancing along it from the capital, and his men had justified his confidence by firing on their comrades and forcing them to alter their

route! After such behaviour it was treason in Sítápúr to doubt the loyalty of the 41st.

Yet Mr. Christian, a man of intellect and intelligence, did not feel secure. The idea of abandoning his post never crossed his mind. Like all the members of the noble service to which he belonged he felt that his place was where the Government had sent him. For himself he had no care; but reading rightly the signs of the times he had deemed it his duty to invite all the ladies of the station to occupy his house with their children. All responded except four who preferred to remain with their husbands. The house was well situated for defence, being cut off on one side from the adjoining ground by a rivulet. In front of it, and between it and the lines of the 41st, were posted four guns. The flanks were guarded by the irregular regiments, in whom Mr. Christian was inclined to place confidence.

The incidents of the flour and of the fruit robbery on the 2nd of June had been sufficient to warn the residents that a crisis was approaching. But Lieutenant-Colonel Birch still believed in the loyalty of the 41st. At sunrise on the morning of the 3rd, however, Major Apthorp of that regiment satisfied himself that the sepoy's were no longer to be trusted. He communicated his suspicions to Mr. Christian and his Colonel. They were soon verified. At 8 o'clock, a company of the regiment went off to the treasury to seize the public money, whilst the others, forming up, advanced in a menacing attitude against the guns

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Chapter I.

1857.
June 2.

Mr. Christian
prepares to
meet the com-
ing danger.

Major Ap-
thorp reports
the disaffec-
tion of the
41st.

1857.
June 3.They mutiny
and murder
Colonel Birch.The Irregu-
lars mutiny
also.Slaughter of
the English.

and against the irregular regiments on either flank of them.

The safety of the Europeans seemed now to depend on the fidelity of the irregulars and native gunners. But before this could be tested Colonel Birch determined to make one effort to recall his men to duty. Accompanied by Lieutenant Graves he galloped towards the treasury. Mr. Christian, having strengthened the garrison of his house by a small party of military police, about twenty, started to follow the colonel, when Captain John Hearsey, who had preceded him, rode hurriedly back with the information that that officer and Lieutenant Graves had been shot by their men. It was clear now that the sepoys were bent on the blood of their officers. The 9th Irregulars almost immediately followed the example of the 41st, killing their officers; the 10th were not slow to imitate them. They suddenly rushed with yells against the bungalow, bent on slaughter.

It is not easy to describe the scene that followed. The only possible safety lay in flight, and flight was difficult. The rivulet Saraián, which protected the rear of the bungalow against attack, was now an obstacle to the fugitives. However it was an obstacle that must be attempted. Mr. Christian, who had boldly started, rifle in hand, to meet the mutineers, seeing that all was lost, returned to his house to flee with his family. Preceded by his wife with an infant in her arms, he succeeded in crossing the rivulet, but he had scarcely reached the opposite bank when he was shot dead by the pursuing rebels. A similar fat-

befell his wife, her baby, and the nurse. The elder child, a girl taken across the river by Sergeant-Major Morton, was conveyed by him to the estate of the Mitholí Rájá and ultimately to Lakhnao where she died. Mr. and Mrs. Thornhill were shot dead either crossing the stream or just after. Sir Mountstuart Jackson, his sister, Captain Burnes, and some others likewise reached the estate of the Mitholí Rájá. There Mrs. Orr had already found shelter, and thither Captain Patrick Orr escaped from the Mohamdí party to be presently referred to. The Mitholí Rájá afforded to the fugitives only a half-hearted protection. Timid and fearing for himself he allowed them to remain in the jungles in the vicinity of his fort unmolested—and he provided them with food. They stayed there till the end of October, when, as will be told, the rebel troops took the survivors prisoners into Lakhnao.

Of the other fugitives from Sítápúr one party guided by Lieutenant Lester, who was intimately acquainted with the country, made straight for Lakhnao, which they reached. Another party, consisting of nine ladies, ten children, and three men, reached the same place, by circuitous paths, concealing themselves in the daytime, and indebted very much to the zamíndár of Rámkót, on the 28th of June. A third party, composed of Mrs. Phillipps and a few friends, found shelter in a village, and remained in concealment there for ten months, when they were rescued by a column of Lord Clyde's army. A fourth party escaped to Makápúr, and proceeded thence with

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1857.
June 3.

Some escape.

to Mitholí.

Some to:
Lakhnao.

Some lie con-
cealed.

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CHAPTER I.

—
1857.
June.

Some reach
Makápur.

Results of the
mutiny at
Sítápúr.

Malaon.

the residents of that place and fugitives from Sháhjahánpúr to Mathurá, the estate of the Dhaoréá Rájá. Here they remained in safety till discovered by a party of rebel sepoys, who took them prisoners towards Lakhnão. But escaping on the road some fled into Nipál. The majority remained for some time in concealment, but were ultimately discovered by the rebels and taken into Lakhnão. A fifth party found their way to the estate of the Mitholí Rájá as already related.

But if many thus escaped, some of them only for the moment, many too succumbed. On that terrible day twenty-four English, men, women, and children, were murdered by the sepoys. This slaughter but whetted the appetite of the loyal 41st. How they proceeded from Sítápúr to Farakhábád, and how there they incited the 10th Regiment to mutiny and murder has been told in the preceding Book.

One detachment of that loyal regiment, and a detachment of the 4th Oudh Irregulars, were, however, stationed at Malaon, also in north-west Oudh, but considerably to the south of Sítápúr. Here the only civil officer was Mr. Capper the Deputy Commissioner. His position had been long full of peril, for Malaon was on the high road to Farakhábád, and the population of that district was the most disorderly in India. Long before the mutiny at Sítápúr Mr. Capper had felt the loneliness and the danger of his position. The natives round about his station had intimated in the plainest manner possible, short of actual speech, that they knew that the sepoys were watching

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June.Mr. Capper
reaches
Lakhnao.

their opportunity. But Mr. Capper did not flinch from his duty. He was at his post when the sepoys at Sítápúr mutinied. He remained there after they had mutinied. Nor did he entertain the idea of leaving it until the detachment at Malaon had shown unmistakeably that they, too, were about to take the law into their own hands. He then mounted his horse and rode into Lakhnao.

The third district in North-West Oudh is Mohamdi. The Deputy Commissioner there was Mr. Thomason: his assistant Captain Patrick Orr.*

In a previous page† I have recorded how some of the fugitives from Sháhjahánpur reached Mohamdi. I propose now to recount the condition of that station before, and the events which happened subsequently to, their arrival there.

Neither Mr. Thomason nor Captain Orr had been blind or deaf to the signs of the times. The position of Mohamdi, almost on the frontier Its position.

* Captain Patrick Orr was the second of three brothers, all, prior to the annexation, in the service of the King of Oudh.

The eldest brother, Alexander, had then rendered excellent service as Assistant to the Superintendent of Frontier Police. After the annexation he was made an Assistant Commissioner. He was as able as he was hard-working.

The second brother, Patrick, commanded originally one of the King's regular re-

giments of infantry. On the annexation he, too, was made an Assistant Commissioner. He was a brave, zealous, and able officer. The youngest brother, Adolphus, was, under the King, adjutant of one of his infantry regiments. On annexation he was appointed to command the 3rd Regiment of Oudh Military Police, which, on the outbreak of the mutiny, was stationed in the Moti Mahal, Lakhnao.

† Book VIII. Chapter V.
page 321.

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May.

Its garrison.

of Rohilkhand and but a short distance from Sháhjahánpúr, rendered it peculiarly sensitive to the insurrectionary feeling of the population in our own provinces. The garrison consisted of a detachment of the 9th Oudh Irregulars, a regiment formerly raised and commanded by Captain Patrick Orr, under the King of Oudh, before the annexation; two companies of military police, and about fifty troopers.

Mr. Thomason
hears of the
mutiny at
Sháhjahán-
púr,

Alive as were both Mr. Thomason and Captain Orr to the gravity of the crisis they were yet hopeful that so long as Rohilkhand should remain quiet they would manage to weather the storm. Nor was it until a letter written by Mr. Jenkins from Sháhjahánpúr, reaching Mr. Thomason on the evening of the 31st of May, revealed the catastrophe at that station, that the two Englishmen felt that every faculty they possessed was about to be tried to the utmost.

receives a
letter from
the fugitives
thence.

The letter from Mr. Jenkins informed Mr. Thomason that the troops at Sháhjahánpúr had mutinied, that he and a body of fugitives, amongst whom were ladies and children, had reached Powaen, that the Rájá of that place had refused them shelter, and it begged that all the available carriage might be sent out to bring in the fugitives to Mohamdí.

He scents the
coming storm.

Mr. Thomason complied with Mr. Jenkins's request. At the same time, he and Captain Orr, feeling that the crisis was upon them, determined to take active measures for the safety of their own belongings and of the expected fugitives. Their first step was to despatch Mrs. Orr and

child to Mithaolí, a distance of twenty-six miles. The Rájá of that place was under considerable obligations to Captain Orr, and he was indebted to Mr. Thomason for many acts of kindness and courtesy. Thither, therefore, Mrs. Orr and her child were sent under the guard of some sepoys of Captain Orr's old regiment, the native officer commanding which swore fidelity. He kept his word. Marching all night Mrs. Orr and the party reached Mithaolí at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 1st of June. The Rájá, however, was asleep and would not be disturbed. When, at the end of two hours, he did awake, he sent a message to Mrs. Orr that he could not receive her in his fort, but that she must proceed to a place called Katchiání in the jungles, where she would be safer—less likely to attract the notice of roving mutineers.

To Katchiání accordingly Mrs. Orr proceeded. After a weary journey of two hours she found herself and child in a mud fort, desolate and dreary, devoid of all furniture—the very picture of discomfort. There she had to remain. There too the Rájá visited her that evening, and swore to protect her. He did not disguise from her that troublous times were upon them, and that the sepoys all over Oudh were pledged to revolt.

To return to Mohamdi'. Having sent off Mrs. Orr and her child, Mr. Thomason and Captain Patrick Orr turned to provide for their own safety and for that of their expected guests. They first caused the treasure to be moved into the fort of Mohamdi'. They then moved with their troops

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1857.
June.

Mrs. Orr is
sent to
Mithaoli,

thence to
Katchiání.

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1857.
June.

The fugitives
reach Mo-
hamdī.

'They resolved
to retire on
Sítápúr.

An escort
arrives.

into that fort. This occurred on the 1st of June. The day following the Sháhjahánpur fugitives arrived from Powáén. Weary, with naked feet, all exhausted, some badly wounded, they had with difficulty reached the place, which was not to be a place of refuge. Mohamdí was too close to the borders of Rohilkhand to be secure. It was considered certain that the mutinous regiments of that province would soon be upon the fugitives. On the other hand up to that date no mutiny had, to their knowledge, broken out in Oudh. Sítápúr was regarded as safe. To Sítápúr then Mr. Thomason wrote for carriage for the party. His letter reached Mr. Christian before mutiny had broken out at that place. Mr. Christian sent the carriage—under charge of an escort of sepoys of the Oudh Irregulars.

The terrible tragedy which ensued began with the arrival at Mohamdí of this carriage—and of this escort. The escort brought infection with them. Immediately on arrival they disseminated the report that their brethren had been cut up at Lakhnao for refusing to become Christians, and that they were resolved to be revenged. Captain Orr reasoned with the native officers. They knew him as an old servant of the King of Oudh, and his influence with them was not wholly extinct. After some conversation they announced their intention of marching back to Sítápúr, swearing that they would spare the lives of the Europeans, taking with them Mr. Thomason and Captain Orr, and allowing the others to go away unmolested. They took a solemn oath that they would do this.

Their first proceeding was to take possession of the treasure ; their next to release the prisoners. Then, at half-past 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the 4th of June they started. The Europeans accompanied them, two or three ladies crammed into a buggy, the remainder prone on baggage-carts. The first march of ten miles was accomplished without incident. Of the second march only about three miles had been walked when the halt was sounded, and a trooper told the Europeans they were at liberty to go where they liked. They pushed on at once towards the nearest town, Arangábád. They had arrived within half a mile of that place, when the mutineers, regardless of their oaths, set upon them, and began the work of butchery. Of the whole party, one alone was spared to tell the tale, and it is from his narrative that I am able to collect this story of perjury and murder.* It remains to

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1857.
June 4.

The fugitives
are all mur-
dered,

but one.

* Captain Patrick Orr. The riding my horse. Then the following is his account of the most infernal struggle ever witnessed by man began. Friday, the 5th, we marched towards Arangábád. When we had come about two koss the halt was sounded and a trooper told us to go on ahead where we liked. We went on for some distance when we saw a party coming along. They soon joined us, and followed the buggy which we were pushing on with all our might. When within half a mile of Arangábád a sepoy Key's gun from him and shot down poor old Shiels who was

rushed forward and snatched

rushed out towards the insur-

gents and one of our men

Gúrdín, 6th company, called

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—
1857.
July.

Fugitives
from Sítápúr
reach Mi-
thaoli.

add that Captain Orr after some adventures, and communicating by the way with one of the fugitive parties from Sítápúr—that led by Sir M. Jackson—succeeded in joining his wife and child at Katchiání. On arriving there he received a communication from the Rájá that the mud fort at that place was required for the Sítápúr fugitives; that it would not be safe for so many to be together; and that it was advisable that he and his wife and child should migrate to and live in the jungles about Mithaolí. This they did. By this term, jungles, the reader must not understand an ordinary forest, the noble trees of which would have afforded a grateful and necessary shade; but he must picture to himself a vast and dreary extent of land, covered with thorny brushwood, and where it was necessary to light fires at night to scare away tigers, wolves, and other wild animals. Only the coarsest food was provided for them. The other fugitives were then sent from Mithaolí to occupy Katchianí.†

out to me to throw down my clerks. They denuded the pistol and he would save me. bodies of their clothes for the I did so, when he put himself sake of plunder." The list between me and the men, and above referred to comprised several others followed his one civilian, three captains, example. In about ten minutes six lieutenants, three ensigns, more they completed their a sergeant, a bandmaster, eight hellish work They ladies, and four children. Of killed the wounded and the the drummer, who was not an children butchering them in European, I can find no fur- the most cruel way. With the ther mention. exception of the drummer boy + They consisted of Sir M. every one was killed of the Jackson and his sister; Lieu- above list, fugitives from tenant Barnes; Sergeant-Mu- Shájehánpúr, besides poor rior Morton and Mr. Christian's good Thomason and our two little girl. Joined after a time

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April.

Bahráich.

Sikrorá

Adjoining the Khairábád division is the northern, or Bahráich division of Oudh, bounded on the south by the river Ghágrá, separating it from the Faizábád division, on the west by the Sardá dividing it from Khairábád, and on the north by Nipál. The principal civil station, and the headquarters of the Commissioner of the division, Mr. Charles Wingfield,* was close to the town which gave its name to the division—the town of Bahráich. The other stations were Mathápúr to the west, Sikrorá to the south, Gondah to the south-east. Of these, Sikrorá was the principal military station. In the month of April 1857, it was garrisoned by the 1st Regiment of Oudh Irregular Cavalry, commanded by Captain Daly; by the 2nd Oudh Infantry, under Captain Boileau; and by a local horse battery, under Lieutenant Bonham.

by the party from the jungle, 71st Native Infantry. A few days later the surviving daughter of Mr. Christian died. There remained then Mrs. Orr, Miss Jackson, and the child of the former. To save the child her death was simulated, and she was conveyed in safety to the house of Mán Singh, and ultimately to the British camp. The ladies remained in confinement till the 19th of March, when they were rescued by a party of Gúrkás commanded by two British officers, and conveyed safely to the camp of Sir James Outram.

* Now Sir Charles Wingfield, K.C.S.I.

by a party of sepoys of the

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1857.
April.

Mr. Wingfield.

His sound
views.

During the month of April Mr. Wingfield had been driven by circumstances entirely unconnected with the rising storm to remove his head-quarters to Sikrorá. A man of ability, of culture, and of large views, he had not sympathised with the sweeping change of system which had inaugurated the transfer of Oudh from its Mahomedan king to British rule. He had ever been in favour of dealing gently with the territorial aristocracy. A system, roughly, even rudely introduced, which scarcely veiled its animating principle of raising the peasantry and small proprietors to a position which would enable them ultimately to oust the great landowners, was not in accordance with his ideas. He had done, then, all that lay in his power to make the transfer easy, to smooth down the rough edges, to mitigate the worst effects of the process. The appointment of Sir Henry Lawrence as Chief Commissioner, coming even when it did, was a great support to him. It would have been still greater, still more weighty, had it been made earlier.

Early fore-
sees the ten-
dency of
the policy
adopted.

Like his chief at Lakhnao, like that chief's brother at Láhor, like Durand at Indúr, like William Tayler at Patná, Mr. Wingfield had never been a partisan of the "passing and groundless panic" theory of Mr. Cecil Beadon. He had fully appreciated the events at Barhámpúr and at Bárrakpúr. The revolt at Mírath he regarded as the practical answer of the sepoys to the policy of the Government. He felt, then, than an outbreak at the military station of Sikrorá was a mere question of time ; that, given all the circumstances

of the case—the composition of the native army, the annexation of Oudh—the province, a portion of which he was administering, would not be the last to feel the shock of mutiny.

Impressed with this belief, and having absolutely no faith in the men who composed the garrison of Sikrorá, Mr. Wingfield had endeavoured to enlist on the side of the British the members of that territorial aristocracy whom the annexation of Oudh had done so much to injure. Chief among these was Dirg Bijéh Singh, Rájá of Balrámpúr, a town in the north-east corner of his division, and close to the Nipál frontier. Rájá Dirg Bijéh Singh was a man of character and sense. He entertained towards Mr. Wingfield friendly—even grateful—feelings. He had not been innoculated with the poison that pervaded the atmosphere. He received, then, Mr. Wingfield's advances with courtesy; he responded to them; and even engaged to afford refuge, in case of necessity, to him and to the officers serving in his division.

The views entertained by Mr. Wingfield regarding the general untrustworthiness of the sepoys, were fortunately shared by many other officers at Sikrorá. Neither he nor they, therefore, thought that either wisdom or courage required that the ladies and children should be left in a position, defenceless and incapable of being defended, until an actual outbreak should occur. It happened that an officer of Daly's Horse, Captain Forbes, was in Lakhnao early in June. He knew that his own men would mutiny, and he

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April.

Gratitude
felt towards
him by the
landowners.

Captain
Forbes es-
corts the
ladies and
children to
Lakhnao.

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1857.
June.

knew that at Sikrorá there was no place of refuge in case of an outbreak. Anxious, therefore, for the safety of his wife, his children, and his countrywomen, he set out from Lakhnao with a party of Sikh and volunteer cavalry, reached Sikrorá, mounted the ladies on elephants and in doolies, and conveyed them safely to the capital. Mr. George Lawrence, the Deputy Commissioner, by the express order of his uncle, Sir Henry, accompanied them. This move was accomplished on the 9th of June.

Mr. Wingfield
scents the
mutiny at
Sikrorá.

The same day the temper of the troops manifested itself in a way not to be mistaken. Intelligence had reached Sikrorá of the revolt of the troops at Faizábád on the previous day. Mr. Wingfield accordingly, mounting his horse, rode to the neighbouring station of Gondah, where was stationed the 3rd Oudh Irregulars, commanded by Lieutenant Miles. There I must leave him for a moment, whilst I narrate the occurrences at Sikrorá after his departure.

It breaks out. The day of the 9th of June was a day of great excitement at that station. So violent was the manifestation that early the following morning the officers of the infantry regiment,—Boileau, Hale, and Kendall,—mounted horse and rode straight for Balrámpúr. Lieutenant Bonham, of the artillery, refused to accompany them. He believed in his men ; he certainly possessed great influence over them ; and he still hoped that they would stand by him in the cause of order. He elected, therefore, to remain at Sikrorá, alone of

all the officers, and supported only by two farrier sergeants and the quartermaster-sergeant of the infantry regiment. Had there been no other native troops at Sikrorá his courage and his influence might have prevailed. But the men of the cavalry and infantry had broken out; they had plundered the treasury, and they were thirsting for blood. Even over these men Bonham attempted to assert authority. But it was in vain. His own men would save his life, but they would not fire on his comrades. They told him at last that he must go. They brought him at the same time money and a horse, and warned him not to pursue a certain road which they knew to be occupied by the rebels. Forced to leave, Bonham started with a heavy heart, accompanied by his three sergeants, crossed the Ghágrá by an unfrequented ferry, and reached Lakhnao the next day.

Meanwhile Mr. Wingfield had arrived at Gondah. He brought the intelligence that the troops at Faizábád had mutinied, and that those at Sikrorá were on the verge of mutiny. He found the troops at Gondah scarcely behind their comrades in that respect. They, too, had heard the news; they, too, were aware of all that had happened at Faizábád. Before the night fell they had received accounts of the mutiny at Sikrorá. In vain were they harangued by their commanding officer. Their demeanour showed that they, too, were preparing for action.

The next day they mutinied. Mr. Wingfield had not waited for the overt act, but had started

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—
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June 9.

Devotion of
Lieutenant
Bonham.

Strong feel-
ing towards
him of his
men.

Mr. Wingfield
at Gondah.

He takes re-
fuge with the

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Chapter I.

1857.

June 10.

Rájá of Bal-
rámpúr.

The station of
Bahráich.

The officials
scout the
mutiny and
leave it.

for Balrámpúr. The officers and the women* who remained at the station started as soon as the outbreak had pronounced itself, and reached the same place in safety. The number of individuals who thus received the protection of the Rájá was nineteen, exclusive of children. They all succeeded in crossing into British territory, and in reaching Gorákhpúr.

At Bahráich, the head-quarters of the division, were cantoned two companies of the 3rd Oudh Irregulars, commanded by Lieutenant Longueville Clarke. The Deputy Commissioner was Mr. Cunliffe and his assistant was Mr. Jordan. The main body of the 3rd Oudh Irregulars mutinied, as we have seen, at Gondah, on the 10th of June. As it was very clear that the two companies of the same regiment would at once follow their example, the three officers I have named wisely resolved to take advantage of their earlier information, and to escape. They started off at once, then, northward, in the direction of Nánpárá, the seat of a minor Rájá. There, however, admission was refused them, and they were forced to retrace their steps. Returning to Bahráich, they started for Lakhnao by way of Bairámghát. This was the road against which the native gunners of Sikrorá had warned Bonham. The fugitives, who had disguised themselves as natives, found the passage over the Ghágrá occupied here by the mutineers. Trusting to their disguise, however, they embarked on the ferry-boat with their horses. The

* The ladies had been sent to Lakhnao, *via* Sikrorá, on the 5th of June.

ferry-boat started. At first the fugitives appeared to attract no attention, but they had crossed scarcely one-third of the river when the cry arose that Europeans were escaping. Instantly there was an uproar. The sepoys crowding into other boats, made for the ferry-boat, opening at the same time a fire of musketry. The boatmen at once abandoned the ferry-boat. Exposed to a concentrated fire, our three countrymen were unable effectively to work the boat, thus left to itself, nor to prevent it from being borne back by the current to the bank whence it started. Before it reached that bank Cunliffe and Clarke had been shot dead. Jordan, taken alive, shared the same fate a few days later.

At Malápúr there were no troops,—consequently *Malápúr.* there was no open mutiny. The general disorganisation of the country soon, however, spread even here, and the civil officers, prominent amongst whom was the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Gonне, were forced to leave. Having been joined by other fugitives, they first attempted to make their way down the Sarjú river by boat. But warned that all the landing-places were occupied, they abandoned this attempt; they set off northward and gained the fort of Mathiári, belonging to the minor Rájá of Dhorairah. Thence Mr. Gonне made more than one unsuccessful attempt to reach Lakhnao. At last even the resource of remaining at Mathiári failed them. The adherents of the minor Rájá proved faithless. In imminent danger of their lives they had to flee. Three of the party were seized. The

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Chapter L

1857.
June.

They are
murdered
crossing by
the ferry.

The officials
leave,

and even
tually all
perish,

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—
1857.
July.

but one.

Faizábád.

Its garrison.

Precautions
taken by the
officials.

May.

remainder gained the Nipál hills, where they found shelter till, gradually, with one exception only,* they yielded to the deadly climate of the Tarai.

Faizábád is the eastern division of Oudh. It lies immediately south of the Bahráich division, and is divided into the three districts of Faizábád, Sultánpúr, and Saloní. The Commissioner was Colonel Philip Goldney.

Colonel Goldney, and the Deputy-Commissioner of the district, Captain Reid, were at the head-quarter station of Faizábád. The troops here consisted of a horse battery of native artillery, the 22nd Regiment of Native Infantry, the 6th Oudh Irregular Infantry, and a squadron of the 15th Irregular Cavalry—the whole commanded by Colonel Lennox, of the 22nd Native Infantry.

The officers at Faizábád suffered from no delusion regarding the intentions of the mutineers. The events that had taken place during the second week in May at Mírath and at Dehlí had made it clear to them that their turn would come. They took precautions then, at an early date, to prepare for the rising storm. With this view they began in May to store supplies in a house occupied by Captain Thurburn, Special Assistant Commissioner. This house was chosen because it was surrounded by a walled enclosure. This walled enclosure was now fortified. So far the authorities at Faizábád acted with wisdom and forethought. But they counted like-

* Captain John Hearsey, commanding 2nd Regiment Oudh Military Police.

wise upon resources which were certain to fail them. They counted upon the aid of the pensioned sepoys and of the landholders of the district. To count upon both these classes proved they had not fully gauged the depth of the crisis.

It would seem that it was but natural to count upon the aid of the pensioned sepoys. The yearly stipends drawn by these men were paid by the British Government, and their continuance depended on the existence of the British Government. The material interests of this class were, therefore, bound up in the maintenance of British authority. Old associations too, in many cases stronger than caste, bound them to the British. In its proper place it will be related how these men responded to the appeal made to them by Sir Henry Lawrence. But at Faizábád their numbers were too small, their influence was too slight, to weigh much in the balance against the rising discontent.

The case with respect to the landowners was different. It must not be forgotten that Faizábád was the division regarding which Sir Henry Lawrence wrote thus to Lord Canning in April 1857 : "the talúkdárs have also, I fear, been hardly dealt with. At least, in the Faizábád division, they have lost half their villages. Some talúkdárs have lost all." It may be said that the remark of Sir Henry applied only to the higher order of the territorial aristocracy. But in reality it referred to the assessment as it touched every class connected with the soil. It could not have been seriously expected that the men who had suffered most from our rule would risk their lives

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—
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May.

Value of re-liance placed on the pen-sioners;

on the
talúkdárs.

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Chapter II.

1857.
June.

to maintain it. No surprise, then, ought to be felt at the laconic record of the Deputy Commissioner : " we found that the zamíndárs, however well-disposed, would not fight against disciplined troops, with guns."

The plan of defending Captain Thurburn's house was, then, on the 5th of June, abandoned. For a moment, Colonel Goldney entertained the idea of sending the ladies and children into Lakhnao. But it was too late. The road to Lakhnao passed through Dariábád, a station in the Lakhnao division ; and disorder reigned in Dariábád.

Rájá Mán Singh,

But another plan had a little before been presented to Colonel Goldney. The principal talúkdárs of the Faizábád division, prominently amongst whom may be named Rájá Mán Singh, Udrés Singh, Thákúr Narain, Mír Bákir Húsén, and Nádir Sháh, had scented the mutiny from afar, and had warned Colonel Goldney of its approach. At this time the most considerable of these men, Rájá Mán Singh, was in disgrace. He was even under arrest. It happened that one of the assistant commissioners at Faizábád was Captain Alexander Orr. Captain Orr had well and truly served the old *régime* when Oudh had her king, had known intimately Mán Singh, and had conceived for him a great regard. When, then, the Rájá fell into disgrace Captain Orr earnestly begged his release from arrest. Mán Singh was released from arrest, and in return for Captain Orr's efforts in his behalf, he offered protection to his wife and children in his fort of Sháhganj

is communicated with
by Captain
Alexander
Orr.

during the troublous times that were coming. Captain Orr communicated the offer to the Commissioner. Colonel Goldney received it just about the time when the journey of the ladies to Lakhnao had been pronounced impracticable. He, in consultation with the other officers, determined to ask the Rájá so to enlarge his offer as to include all the ladies in the station. Rájá Mán Singh was communicated with by Captains Reid and Orr. He agreed to receive the wives and families of the civil officers, but demurred to a larger number on the ground that secrecy would thus be rendered futile. Finally, however, he agreed to receive all, provided that due caution were observed in movement.

With one exception the wives of the regimental officers decided not to accept the offer of Mán Singh. Not only did they distrust him, but they and their husbands considered that the movement would serve as a signal to the sepoys to mutiny. On the night of the 7th of June, however, the wives and children of the civil officers, and the wife and children of the Executive Engineer, Captain Dawson, started for and reached Sháhganj. They were followed to the same place, the following morning, by the wives and children of the staff-sergeants.

That night the sepoys rose in revolt. More audacious than their comrades elsewhere they did not pretend a grievance, but loudly asserted that, feeling they were stronger than the English, they intended to turn them out of the country. The senior Rissaldár of the 15th Irregular Cavalry

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He agrees to protect the civil officers and their families;

and finally those of the officers generally.

Some take advantage of his offer.

The sepoys rise in revolt,

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1857.
July 7.

but procure
boats for their
officers.

The boats set
out.

The sepoys
send intima-
tion to their
brethren of
the 17th
Native In-
fantry,

who intercept
the boats.

took command of the brigade, and endeavoured to induce the men to murder their officers. But the sepoy had not then wound themselves up to the pitch of blood-thirstiness. They were anxious to rid themselves of their officers, but not to take their lives. Keeping them under restraint all night in the quarter-guard, they procured four boats for them, and in the morning gave them money and told them to be off. The boats were unprovided with boatmen, but they had oars.

Faizábád is on the river Ghághrá, navigable thence to Bhaliá, where it joins the Ganges. Four boats containing the fugitive Europeans, and propelled by them, started before sunrise on the morning of the 9th of June. The mutineers who had plundered the treasury, and sacked the houses, did not interfere with them. But—strange contradiction—whilst protecting them against the more blood-thirsty of their own clan, whilst aiding them to depart, they sent a messenger begging the men of the 17th Regiment of Native Infantry to slay them on their way. The 17th, stationed at A'zamgarh, a station in British territory near the eastern frontier of Oudh, had arrived within a few miles of Faizábád on the 8th of June. Their line of march lay along the right bank of the Ghághrá. Their hands were already red with blood. They were willing to shed more.

The men of the 17th responded then to the call. They intercepted the two first boats at Bégamganj, about twelve miles by the road from Faizábád, though far longer by the river. Here at a point where the stream was the most narrow

they opened fire on the fugitives. A few moments later, and from the opposite bank, there started boats full of armed men to attack their left flank. Recognising the impossibility of resistance Colonel Goldney counselled a run for life. The Colonel, too old to run himself, remained to die. Seven, however, including, curious to relate, a Mahomedan sepoy of the 22nd, Téz Alí Khán, who had linked his fate to that of the British, followed the recommendation and ran across country. Two of the party were drowned endeavouring to cross a stream. The remaining five reached Amorah in safety. Here they were joined by the three officers, who had formed the crew of the fourth boat, and who had abandoned her on account of her slowness of pace before she had reached the point where the men of the 17th had been lying in wait. The party, thus augmented to eight, pushed on across country. Betrayed at Mohádaba by two policemen whom they had trusted they were attacked by the villagers. Crossing a rivulet waist-deep, hotly pursued, they lost first Lieutenant Lindsay, then Lieutenants Thomas, English, Ritchie, and Sergeant Edwards. There now remained only Lieutenant Cautley, Sergeant Busher, and Téz Alí Khán. In the chase that followed Lieutenant Cautley was caught and killed. Sergeant Busher escaped for the moment but was captured the next day. His life, however, was spared, and at the end of ten days he was released. He ultimately joined Captain Lennox at Captainganj, where he found also his fellow fugitive, Téz Alí

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June.

of the Eng-
lishmen in
three boats
one only
escapes.

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—
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June.

Fate of those
in the re-
maining boat.

Khán. The fugitives who had remained in the first and second boats, numbering eight, were massacred to a man.

Three boats have now been accounted for, the first, the second, and the fourth. But there was another manned by five officers, headed by Colonel O'Brien. This boat, following the first and second, had put in at the town of Ayodhya,* the birth-place of Rám—the town that gave its name to the province. Here they exchanged their boat for a larger one, and hired native rowers to row it. They then lay down hidden by the thatch and matting from the gaze of inquiring eyes, whilst the natives pulled away singing a national air. The boat thus passed unsuspected through the hostile array, and the fugitives reached Dánápúr in safety.

Sufferings of
Mrs. Mills
and her chil-
dren.

But some had remained at Faizábád. Amongst these were Mrs. Mills, wife of Major Mills, of the Artillery, and her three children. Mrs. Mills had refused to accept the hospitality offered by Mán Singh. When the mutiny broke out, she attempted to conceal herself in the city; but sinking for want of food she was obliged to discover herself to the leader of the mutineers. He sent her and her children across the Ghághrá into the Gorákhpúr district. Here she wandered for eight or ten days from village to village. A tender and delicate lady, her sufferings were terrible. Her youngest child died from the exposure. At last Rájá Mán Singh hearing that there was an

* The name *Ayodhya*, has *Avadh*, and *Avadh* to *Audh* or been gradually corrupted to *Oudh*.

English lady in distress, fetched her in to Sháhganj, provided for her wants, and after a few days rest, sent her and the sergeants' wives into Gorákh-púr. Her husband was one of those murdered in the second boat.

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1857.
June.

Escape of
Colonel Len-
nox and
family.

Colonel Lennox and his family had not started with the other officers in the boats. At 2 P.M., however, finding the sepoys becoming riotous and insolent for plunder he and they set out. They soon came upon the blood-thirsty 17th. But it was night. Realising their danger, they crept, unobserved, from their boat, and made their way into the Gorákh-púr district. They were soon, however, taken prisoners, and confined in the fort of Názim Mír Mahomad Húsén Khán. The Nazim was disposed to be friendly. Threatened by the mutineers, he concealed the fugitives in a reed hut in rear of his zanána, and kept them there for nine days. He then made them over to an escort sent for them by the Collector of Gorákh-púr. On their way to that station, they picked up Sergeant Busher, and the sepoy, Téz Alí, as already related.

There is still a party of the officials of Faizábád whose fate has to be recorded. I allude to the civil officers who had not started in the boats. These were Captain Reid, Captain Alexander Orr, Captain Thurburn, and Mr. Bradford. The wives and children of these gentlemen were under the protection of Mán Singh at Sháhganj, where also were Captain Dawson, Executive Engineer, Corporal Hurst of the Sappers, and a clerk named Fitzgerald.

The civil
officers of
Faizábád.

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1857.
June.

They take
refuge with
Mán Singh.

When the mutiny broke out the four gentlemen just mentioned were together. Momentarily separated from, but soon rejoined by, Mr. Bradford, they reached Sháhganj on the 11th. Mán Singh was not there. He had gone to Ayodhya, probably to watch the course of events. Thence he had sent a message to say that he had made a compromise with the mutineers, by virtue of which he would be able to afford protection to the women and children, but not to the men; that these must depart instantly, as his house was to be searched the day following.

That day a boat was secured, and that night the party including ladies and children, and consisting of thirty-eight souls, set for the river. Twenty-nine of them reached its bank, eight miles below Faizábád, just before sunrise. The carriage containing the remaining nine had broken down.* It was impossible to wait for them. The country, especially that in the vicinity of the river-bank, was swarming with mutinous cavalry. The twenty-nine then started. Their boat proceeded for some time with only occasional alarms; but on the second day it was lured by the agent sent with it by Mán Singh into a position between two forts by both of which it was commanded. Here the fugitives were forced to give up their money, their arms, and their valuables. There was no help for it. After suffering much from hunger, from exposure, and other causes, and

* This contained the ser- and were ultimately sent into
geants' wives and children. Gorákhpúr with Mrs. Mill, as
They returned to Sháhganj already related.

after constant detention, the fugitives reached Gópálpúr on the 21st of June. By the loyal Rájá of that place they were cordially received, hospitably entertained, and provided with the means of proceeding to Dánápúr, where they arrived the 29th of June.

Sultánpúr, the chief town of the district of that name, lies on the right bank of the river Gúmtí, almost in a direct line between Faiz-ábád and Alláhábád. The principal civil officer was Mr. Block, C.S. Sultánpúr was the headquarters of the 15th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry, commanded by Colonel S. Fisher, one of the most gallant and daring officers in the service.

On the 5th of June, Mr. Block received intimation from a native official, a Mahomedan, whom he had sent on duty to Chandah, that mutinous sepoys from Jánpúr in British territory had arrived at that place, professing themselves to be in correspondence with the troops at Sultánpúr, and declaring their resolve to kill all the Europeans. This intimation was repeated the following day. Mr. Block at once ordered the man back to Sultánpúr, and communicated the intelligence he had received to Colonel Fisher, who at once despatched all the ladies in the station in the direction of Alláhábád under charge of two officers. The Mahomedan returned to Sultánpúr the 8th of June, saw Colonel Fisher and Mr. Block, told them that the Jánpúr sepoys had plundered Chandah and were on their way to Sultánpúr, that their own men were not to be depended

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1857.
June.

Loyalty of
the Rájá of
Gópálpúr.

Symptoms
of mutiny.

Book IX.

Chapter I.

—
1857.

June 8.

Murder of
Colonel
Fisher,of Captain
Gibbings,and of
Messrs. Block
and Stroyan.

upon, and advised them, whilst there was yet time, to leave the place. This Colonel Fisher and Mr. Block decided not to do.

Early next morning the 1st Regiment of Military Police, commanded by Captain Bunbury, rose in revolt. Colonel Fisher rode down to their lines, followed by his men, to endeavour to recall them to order. Whilst he was addressing them, a policeman came round and shot him in the back. He fell mortally wounded from his horse. His own men had been passive spectators of the deed. They would not now approach him, although they allowed the adjutant, Lieutenant Tucker, to tend him in his last agony. Whilst they permitted this, however, they turned upon the second in command, Captain Gibbings, shot him, and then shouted to Lieutenant Tucker to be off. By this time Colonel Fisher's last agony was over, and Tucker, having nothing more to do, mounted, and, riding for his life, succeeded in reaching the fort of Rústam Sáh, on the banks of the Gúmtí. By this chief he was sheltered. He eventually reached Banáras in safety.*

Meanwhile, the Mahomedan already referred to had conveyed to Mr. Block and Mr. Stroyan news of Colonel Fisher's death, and of the mutiny of the troops. The two gentlemen started off to flee, and reached a small house in the vicinity of the station. Imprudently stopping here, whilst their guide was sent to ascertain how matters were pro-

* Captains Bunbury and pitality from the same chief-Smith, Lieutenant Lewis and tain. They all reached Ba-Dr. O'Donel also received hos- náras.

gressing in the station, they were attacked and murdered.

Thus did Sultánpúr pass into the hands of the rebels. These, after plundering the houses and securing the treasure, started off in the direction of Lakhnão.

The other district station in the division of Salóní Faizábád was Salóní. The Deputy-Commissioner here was Captain L. Barrow.* The troops consisted of six companies of the 1st Oudh Irregulars, commanded by Captain Thomson. By the exertions of the officers tolerable order was maintained here for the first nine days in June. On that day intelligence arrived of the mutinies at Sultánpúr and elsewhere, and of the approach of mutineers from other stations. The next day the troops threw off the mask and revolted. The officers succeeded in leaving the station in safety, and in reaching the fort of Daraopúr, possessed by a talúkdár, Rájá Hanmant Singh of Kálá Kankar,†

* Subsequently Chief Commissioner of Oudh.

† This noble Rájpút had been dispossessed, by the action of the revenue system introduced by the British, of the greater part of his property. Keenly as he felt the tyranny and the disgrace, his noble nature yet declined to regard the fugitive chiefs of the nation which had nearly ruined him in any other light than as people in distress. He helped them in their distress. He saw them in safety to their own fortress. But when,

on bidding him farewell, Captain Barrow expressed a hope that he would aid in suppressing the revolt, he stood erect, as he replied: "Sáhib, your countrymen came into this country and drove out our king. You sent your officers round the districts to examine the titles to the estates. At one blow you took from me lands which from time immemorial had been in my family. I submitted. Suddenly misfortune fell upon you. The people of the land rose against you. You came to me whom

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June 9.

Generosity
of Rájá
Hanmant
Singh.

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—
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June 10.

who not only sheltered them, but escorted them to the ferry opposite Alláhábád. It deserves to be recorded that ten of Captain Thomson's sepoys continued faithful and never left him.

We come round now to the division from whose capital we started—the division of Lakhnao. The other two district stations here were Púrwá and Dariábád.

Dariábád.

At Dariábád, on the high road from Faizábád to Lakhnao was quartered the 5th Oudh Irregular Infantry, commanded by Captain W. H. Hawes. This officer was zealous, active, and much liked by his men. It is scarcely possible that even had no extraordinary temptation assailed them they would have remained faithful, for they were bound by the ties of blood and caste to the men who all around them were rising in revolt. But they were tempted beyond the ordinary temptation. In the public treasury of Dariábád lay stored £30,000 in silver—and they knew it. Captain Hawes knew it too, and knowing that fact, and the inevitable consequences which would ensue were the money to remain at Dariábád, he had made an effort, in the early part of the last week of May, to escort it into Lakhnao. In this attempt he was baffled by the ill-will of some of the men of his regiment. But Captain Hawes was a man who did not lightly resign a well

Mutiny of
the sepoys.

you had despoiled. I have country." It is satisfactory saved you. But now,—now to be able to add, that after I march at the head of my the suppression of the mutiny retainers to Lakhnao to try his lands were restored to this and drive you from the true-hearted gentleman.

digested idea. On the 9th of June, he made a second effort. On this occasion he succeeded, amid the cheers of his men, in escorting the money outside the station. But he could not persuade them to take it further. A portion of them suddenly mutinied, gained the upper hand, and drove their officers away. Captain Hawes escaped by a miracle. "He was repeatedly fired at, sometimes a volley being directed at him, and, at others, single deliberate shots."* But he escaped, and not only he, but, after various adventures, all the other officers, civil and military, with their wives and children, belonging to Dariábád. After the departure of the Europeans, the mutineers proclaimed Wájid Alí Sháh, ex-King of Oudh, as their king.

Púrwá is about twelve miles from the Ganges, Púrwá. not far from the high road between Kánhpúr and Lakhnao. There were no troops there. The Deputy-Commissioner there, Captain Evans, maintained his position in his district till the end of June, sending in all the information he was able to glean regarding affairs at Kánhpúr. His own wife and children, his assistant, Mr. Arthur Jenkins, were at that ill-fated station. Captain Evans, loyally assisted by his Mahomedan officer of police, Mansab Alí by name, was able to keep open communications till Sir Hugh Wheeler's force had succumbed. After that catastrophe, it was impossible for him to remain at his post. He, therefore, retired on Lakhnao.

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Escape of
Captain
Hawes.

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June 12.

Lakhnao on
the 12th of
June.

To that city we must now return. We left it on the 31st of May, just after the outbreak there had been suppressed by the vigour and energy of the Chief Commissioner. We return to it on the 12th of June. In the interval every station in the province had been lost to the British. Writing on that day to the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West, Sir Henry Lawrence thus expressed his sense of the situation :—“ We still hold the cantonment, as well as our two posts, but every outpost (I fear) has fallen, and we daily expect to be besieged by the confederated mutineers and their allies. The country is not yet thoroughly up, but every day brings it nearer that condition All our irregular cavalry, except about sixty Sikhs of Daly’s corps, are either very shaky or have deserted The irregular infantry are behaving pretty well, but once we are besieged it will be black against white, with some very few exceptions. More than a hundred police deserted last night, and since I began this page I have received the report of the military police post having deserted the great central gaol over which they were specially placed Then, again, we ought to have only one position. I put this question to some sixteen officers five days ago, but all stood out for the two positions. I am convinced they were wrong, and the best of them now think so, but we are agreed that, on the whole, the Residency is the point to hold The talúkdárs have all been arming, and some have already regained possession of the villages of which Mr. Gubbins dispossessed them.” On

the day following he expressed a similar opinion in a letter to Lord Canning. After enumerating the native troops still faithful, about five hundred and thirty, he added : "few of them can be expected to stand any severe pressure. We, however, hold our ground in cantonment, and daily strengthen both our town positions, bearing in mind that the Residency is to be the final point of concentration." These extracts will suffice to show how fully Sir Henry Lawrence appreciated the situation. I propose to describe in the next chapter the manner in which he met the storm when it actually burst over his head.

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June 12.
The situation

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THE repression of the mutiny of the 30th and 31st of May at Lakhnao had, at least, rid the cantonments of the least trustworthy of the sepoys. But the incessant labour, mental and bodily, the deprivation of sleep, the constant anxiety, had told on the already overtasked strength of the Chief Commissioner. His spare frame daily became still sparer, physical strength diminished under mental toil. His medical advisers insisted then that he should rest for a time from the labours of his office. Sir Henry Lawrence, I have already stated, had been on the point of proceeding to Europe for the benefit of his health when he was summoned by Lord Canning to Oudh. Regarding that summons as a call of duty, with characteristic forgetfulness of self, he had obeyed it. But the fatigues, the excitement, the anxiety had now made his state worse than it had been when his medical advisers

Illness of Sir
Henry Law-
rence.

had ordered him home from Rájpútáná. It was necessary that he should rest.

No one had felt less confident as to his power to stand the wear and tear of work in trying times than Sir Henry himself. His strength he knew might utterly fail him at any moment. Under ordinary circumstances he might, and probably would, have felt satisfied that the Government would on his demise provide a fit officer as his successor. But the circumstances were not ordinary. In the then state of the country the Government had not the means to send to the province a successor from outside its borders. They might not even have the power of communicating with those in the province itself. In that case the succession would, by right of seniority, devolve upon a civilian in whose judgment and capacity for the post Sir Henry Lawrence had no confidence.

To prevent the possibility of an occurrence which he could not regard in anticipation in any other light than as a public misfortune, Sir Henry Lawrence, feeling his strength daily failing, despatched to Lord Canning on the 4th of May a telegram in which he earnestly recommended that, in the event of anything happening to himself, the office of Chief Commissioner might be conferred on Major Banks, and the command of the troops on Colonel Inglis. "This," he added, "is no time for punctilio as regards seniority. They are the right men, in fact the only men for the places."

The Major Banks referred to was the Commissioner of the Lakhnao division. He belonged to

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His views
regarding his
successor.

Recommends
Major Banks
and Colonel
Inglis.

Major Banks

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June.

the Bengal Army. He was distinguished by the wide range and the depth of his acquirements, by his thorough knowledge of the natives of India, by administrative talents of the highest order, by a large fund of humour, and by his large-hearted sympathies. He was the most promising political officer who had not actually attained the highest grade in that branch of the Indian Service. For languages he had a remarkable talent. He was familiar alike with Persian, with Hindí, and with Sanskrit. Major Banks had filled several appointments with distinction; had gained the esteem of men so opposed to each other as were Sir Charles Napier and Lord Dalhousie; and, on the annexation of Oudh, had been selected by the latter to be Commissioner of one of the four divisions of the kingdom. Installed as Commissioner of Lakhnao Banks speedily justified Lord Dalhousie's opinion. How he had impressed a man not easily deceived is apparent from the recommendation made by Sir Henry Lawrence to Lord Canning that Banks should succeed him.

Lieutenant-
Colonel
Inglis.

Lieutenant-Colonel Inglis, the other officer referred to, commanded the 32nd Foot. He was in the prime of life, an excellent soldier, active, energetic, and quick-sighted. The native army having mutinied, and the only remaining reliable troops being European troops, it was practically necessary that the officer commanding the European regiment should have the chief military authority. It was, to repeat Sir Henry Lawrence's remark, "no time for punctilio" as re-

garded seniority. The recommendation, then, was characterised by practical good sense.

Five days after the despatch of this telegram, the health of the Chief Commissioner seemed to give way entirely. On the 9th of June, "an alarming exhaustion came on, and the medical men pronounced that further application to business would endanger his life."* In consequence of this sudden illness, a provisional council was formed of Mr. Gubbins, the Financial Commissioner, Mr. Ommaney, the Judicial Commissioner, Major Banks, Colonel Inglis, and the Chief Engineer, Major Anderson. Of this council, Mr. Martin Gubbins was the President.

The character of Mr. Gubbins has thus been sketched by Sir Henry Lawrence: "He is a gallant, energetic, clever fellow, but sees only through his own vista, and is therefore sometimes troublesome." Now at this particular period, the "vista" of Mr. Gubbins showed him the danger of retaining the armed remnants of the native regiments, the necessity of trusting the native military police. As president of the Council of Five he insisted, then, that the sepoys who still remained in the lines should be disarmed and dismissed. In vain was it pointed out to him that these men had stood the test; that they had been tried in the fire; that they had not only resisted temptation, but had acted with spirit against their comrades on the 30th and 31st of May. Mr. Gubbins would listen to no argument. Opposed

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Sir Henry
resigns his
authority t
a council of
five.

The Presi-
dent—Mr.
Martin Gul
bins.

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—
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June 11.

Sir Henry
resumes
authority.

in the Council, he yet step by step carried out his favourite measures, until, on the 11th of June, he actually started off to their homes all the sepoyes belonging to the province. This act had upon Sir Henry Lawrence an effect more decisive than the prescriptions of his medical advisers. It roused him to action. Shaking off his weakness, he immediately dissolved the Council, resumed authority, the following day recalled the sepoyes, and "had the satisfaction of seeing numbers return to their post, with tokens of delight, the honesty of which was verified by their loyalty during the siege."*

His views
regarding
the native
troops,

Sir Henry Lawrence was particularly desirous to retain the services of a large portion of the native troops. He believed that those who had stood the ordeal of the 30th of May would thenceforth remain faithful. He believed that without the aid of native troops his position at Lakhnao would not be tenable. And he believed, likewise, that by judicious arrangement, it would be possible to ensure loyalty and good service from those who still remained. On resuming office, then, he directed his energies at once to this matter. He collected all the Sikhs from the three native regiments, and formed them into one battalion; the Oudh men he likewise banded together, rejecting those only who had given evidence of disloyalty. Sir Henry had recourse likewise to men of another class. Confident that many of the men who had served in the Company's

* MS. Memorandum, quoted by Merivale. *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence.*

army prior to the annexation had carried with them to their homes their military pride and their fidelity to their masters, he summoned by circular to Lakhnao all of their number who would care to re-enlist for the cause of order. The response to this summons was very remarkable. About five hundred pensioned sepoys hastened to Lakhnao. Amongst them were the gray-headed, the halt, the maim—even the blind—some on crutches, —all anxious to evince their loyalty. Sir Henry gave them a kind and cordial reception. He selected about a hundred and seventy of them for active service, and placed them under separate command. The number of the native brigade was thus brought to nearly eight hundred.

That night the whole of the cavalry of the military police remaining at their head-quarters at Lakhnao broke into revolt. The cavalry were under the special command of Captain Gould Weston, and he at once rode down to their lines, situated near the Dil A'rím Kothí on the left bank of the Gúmtí, followed only by his two native orderlies. He came upon them as they were starting and exhorted them to listen to the voice of duty and of honour. But his efforts proved unavailing, and they galloped off into darkness.

The next morning (the 12th of June) the 3rd Regiment of Infantry of the Military Police mutinied at the Motí Mahal about a mile and a half from the Baillie Guard. Captain Adolphus Orr, who, although he had removed his family into safety at the Residency continued to occupy

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June 11.

and the pen-
sioners.

The military
police cavali-
revolt;

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—
1857.
June 12.

Captain
Gould Wes-
ton.

Owes his
life to his
daring.

his house near his men, fortunately escaped uninjured, and riding in hot haste to the superintendent reported that the regiment had gone off in the direction of the Dil Kúsha Park, and was in full march towards Kánpúr. Weston was engaged at the time with Mr. Ommaney, the Judicial Commissioner, but on hearing the evil tidings he instantly, without one moment's hesitation, rushed from the house, mounted the first horse he could find from the picket of the 7th Cavalry, and galloped after the mutineers. He overtook them about five miles from the Residency. It is impossible to over-estimate the danger of his position. There he was—a solitary European—in the presence of about eight hundred men who had mutinied, and who fully intended to join in the attempt to drive the English out of India. One shot would have sufficed to lay low the daring Frank. But it was that very daring that saved Weston. The bolder spirits were captivated by it. Dashing aside the muzzles already pointed towards their English commander they declared in reply to his appeal to them to return to their duty that they must go—they were committed to it—but that his life should not be taken. They then fell in and marched onwards. A few men of the 2nd Regiment of Military Police who had been on guard at Weston's house but who had joined the mutinous 3rd Regiment, determined to remain with him, and they returned to the Residency that night to tell of Weston's escape from death, which, bearing in mind the force of evil example, and the fact that scores of officers had already

fallen victims to their men, was well nigh miraculous.*

On their way back they were met by the cavalry and the two guns of the little force despatched in pursuit, under Colonel Inglis, and which had far outstripped the two companies of Her Majesty's 32nd intended for their support. But the ground was broken and difficult, and although the artillery did some execution and the native troopers cut up a few stragglers, a fair blow was not struck at the main body. Meanwhile a considerable number of the mutineers had occupied a village on the further side of some ravines, our infantry had not come up, and the day was fast closing. Colonel Inglis, therefore, wisely determined to desist from further pursuit, and brought back his men much exhausted after a long and trying march in an exceptionally hot day. The enemy lost about twenty killed and had many more wounded, whilst some ten prisoners were captured. Two of our troopers were killed, and others were wounded, including their gallant native officer; two of the Europeans succumbed to sun-stroke, and Mr. Thornhill of the Civil Service, a man of great, even remarkable, daring, was twice seriously wounded.

Since the mutiny of the 30th of May efforts to make the Residency defensible had been pushed on with extraordinary vigour. The outer tracing had been connected by breastworks; ditches had

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June 12.

The muti-
nous police
followed up.

Mr. Thorn-
hill, C.S.

Attempts
made to
render the
Residency
defensible;

* Hutchinson's *Narrative*; see also Rees's *Siege of Lucknow*.

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June 12.

been excavated in front of them, and parapets erected behind them ; at certain points ramparts had been thrown up and embrasures had been pierced ; slopes had been scarped ; stakes and palisades fixed ; some houses had been demolished ; the roofs of others had been protected by mud walls ; windows and doors had been barricaded ; walls had been loop-holed. All the ordnance belonging to the ex-King of Oudh that could be found in the city was brought within the defences. Some houses outside the walls of the Residency were left solely because time had not remained to level them, as had been intended. They thus afforded shelter to the enemy, who not only made them points of observation to watch the garrison, but kept up from them a heavy fire on the defences.

and the
Machhí
Báwan.

Nor was the Machhí Báwan neglected. Sir Henry Lawrence had originally resolved to hold this post in conjunction with the Residency, only to concentrate on the latter when threatened in overwhelming force. With this view he had strengthened it and made it habitable for Europeans. He then stored it with food and ammunition. On the 13th of June, Sir Henry Lawrence was able to write to Lord Canning in the words already quoted : "We hold our ground in cantonment, and daily strengthen both our town positions, bearing in mind that the Residency is to be the final point of concentration." Sir Henry continued to strengthen the Machhí Báwan till the very last, believing that the preparations made would be greatly noised abroad, and would affect the *morale* of the enemy.

A terrible anxiety which preyed upon Sir Henry Lawrence about this time, was caused by his inability to assist Sir Hugh Wheeler, then beleaguered at Kánpúr. The scission of communication with that station on the 6th of June had made it clear that the native troops there had mutinied. That they had gone further, and, under the leadership of Náná Sáhib had besieged the British general in his barracks, had been shortly afterwards made known. Then there came from General Wheeler earnest appeals for help. Mr. Gubbins, generous, sympathetic, strong-willed, and eager, urged him to comply with these appeals. But it was, in point of fact, simply impossible. How it was so cannot more fitly be expressed than in Sir Henry's own words.

Writing to Sir Hugh Wheeler on the 16th of June the Chief Commissioner said : " I am very sorry indeed to hear of your condition, and grieve that I cannot help you. I have consulted with the chief officers about me, and, except Gubbins, they are unanimous in thinking that with the enemy's command of the river, we could not possibly get a single man into your intrenchment. I need not say that I deeply lament being obliged to concur in this opinion, for our own safety is as nearly concerned as yours. We are strong *in* our intrenchments; but by attempting the passage of the river, should be sacrificing a large detachment without a prospect of helping you. Pray do not think me selfish. I would run much risk could I see a commensurate prospect of success. In the present scheme I see none." A week

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June 13.

Sir Henry's
anxiety about
Kánpúr.

His reasons
for not
moving to
its aid.

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JUNE 16.

Soundness of
those reasons.

later he wrote to Lord Canning; “It is deep grief to me to be unable to help Kánpúr; I would run much risk for Wheeler’s sake, but an attempt, with our means, would only ruin ourselves, without helping Kánpúr.” No military critic will question the soundness of these views.

To cross the Ganges, even with the entire force at the disposal of Sir Henry Lawrence, in the face of the army serving under Náná Sáhib, would have been impossible.

A few days later a letter reached Sir Henry with the information that Wheeler had agreed to treat with Náná Sáhib. He then knew that all was over. His forebodings were confirmed by the receipt of details of the massacre on the 28th of June.

Learns the
fate of the
Kánpúr
garrison.

“If Kánpúr holds out I doubt if we shall be besieged at all.” Thus had Sir Henry Lawrence written to Lord Canning on the 23rd of June. But five days later he learned that Kánpúr had fallen. Prior to that date, and with more certainty every day, had come the intelligence that the mutinous troops of the Oudh Irregular force—the troops who had revolted in the provinces—were gradually collecting at a place called Nawáb-gánj Bárá Bánkí, only twenty miles from Lakhnao. The subsequent movement of these troops, whose numbers were not inconsiderable, obviously depended on the result of the leaguer of Káhpúr.

It was known on the 28th that that place had fallen. The following morning the advanced guard of the enemy’s force marched on Chinhat, a village on the Faizábád road, within eight miles of the Residency.

Hears that
the enemy
are moving
on Chinhat.

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June 29.His reasons
for deter-
mining to
strike a blow.

This gave Sir Henry an opportunity at which he clutched. With the foresight of a real general opposed to Asiatics he felt that for him to await an attack would be to invite a general insurrection, whereas, an effective blow dealt at the advanced troops of the rebels would paralyse their movements, and spread doubt and hesitation amongst them. He hoped and believed, in fact, that it might not be impossible to reply to Kánpúr by Chinhát. To say that because he did not succeed his plan was bad and impolitic is not a logical argument. His plan was justified alike by military science and by political considerations. Whilst he fought a battle in which victory would have been decisive, he lost nothing by defeat. He did not, in a word, risk part of his general plan, nor was he in a worse position after his defeat than that which he had occupied before he went out to fight. In some respects, indeed, his general position became more assured, because more clearly defined.

Those reasons
sound.

Sir Henry's first step was to withdraw the troops from the cantonments and to bring them within the Residency. He then ordered that a force composed of three hundred men of the 32nd Regiment; two hundred and thirty men of the regular native infantry; the small troop of volunteer cavalry, thirty-six strong; one hundred and twenty troopers of the Oudh Irregulars; ten guns and an 8-inch howitzer, should assemble at the iron bridge at daylight the following morning to march thence at once in the direction of Chinhát. It deserves here to be remarked that of the ten

Concentrates
his forces.

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June 30.

Marches on
Chinhat.

guns six were manned by natives and four only by Europeans. The howitzer was on a limber drawn by an elephant driven by a native.

The force had been ordered to march at dawn, but the necessary arrangements caused unavoidable delay, and the sun was already high—it was past 6 o'clock—when it marched from the iron bridge across the Gúmtí in the direction of Chinhat. After marching three miles along the metalled road it reached the bridge spanning the rivulet Kúkrail. Here a halt was ordered whilst Sir Henry with his staff, and a few cavalry, rode in front to reconnoitre. From the summit of a rising ground under some trees he could see nothing. He then and there decided to return to Lakhnao, and sent the Assistant Adjutant-General to countermarch the force, in view to its marching back. This order was carried out, when suddenly fresh instructions arrived for the force to move on towards Chinhat. The men then advanced along "a newly raised embankment, constructed of loose and sandy soil, in which every now and then gaps occurred, indicating the positions of future bridges."* The force was formed in regular order. An advanced guard of cavalry, with vedettes thrown out, led. This was followed, first, by the 8-inch howitzer, then by the four guns manned by Europeans, then by four manned by natives. An hundred and fifty men of the 13th Native Infantry came next, followed by two guns manned by natives, then by three hundred

* Gubbins.

men of the 32nd Foot, and then by the remaining native troops, eighty in number. After marching in this order for about a mile and a half they descried the enemy drawn up at a distance of about twelve hundred yards, their right covered by a small hamlet, their left by a village and a lake, their centre resting on the road. Simultaneously the enemy saw them and at once opened a heavy round-shot fire.

Sir Henry immediately halted his column and deployed the infantry into line. Then placing his European guns in position, and ordering the infantry to lie down, he returned the enemy's fire. A continuous cannonade from both sides was now kept up. Then, after something of a lull, which induced many officers to believe that the British were getting the best of the day, the enemy suddenly divided, and menaced both flanks in considerable force. That on the British left was made not only in overwhelming numbers, but from the cover of the village of Ishmáilganj—a village which ran parallel to that part of our line occupied by the 32nd. The fire from this village caught that regiment in flank, and in a very few minutes nearly half of its number present, with a large proportion of officers, including the commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel Case, were lying dead or disabled on the ground. Meanwhile every effort had been made to bring the native artillery into action but with very indifferent success. The native artillermen were traitors. Two of the guns had been upset in the ditch, and the traces of some of the others had been cut.

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Describes the
enemy.

Battle of
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The enemy
gain our left
flank.

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The British
retreat.

Gallantry
of Captain
Radcliffe
and his com-
panions.

The pursuit
is checked
at Kúkrail;

Elated with their first success, the enemy pressed heavily on, and a retreat became necessary if any of the force were to be saved. A retreat was then commenced, the 32nd necessarily, from the position they had occupied near the road, leading; the native infantry protecting the rear. The retreat once begun, the enemy galloped their guns on either flank of our force, and continued to pound it with grape all the way to the Kúkrail bridge. So heavily was the column pressed, that few of those who were hit were saved, a fact borne out by the extraordinary proportion of killed to wounded—in the 32nd alone one hundred and fifteen to thirty-nine. As the retiring force approached the bridge over the Kúkrail a large body of the rebel cavalry was descried immediately in their line of retreat. They were in considerable force. But on our side there was no hesitation. Captain Radcliffe's trumpet sounded the charge, and instantly our thirty-six horsemen dashed at the enemy. A more gallant charge was never made. It appalled the rebels. They did not wait for it but turned and fled. The line of retreat was secured.

The danger, however, was not over. The enemy's infantry was pressing on. All our gun-ammunition was exhausted. In this dilemma Sir Henry showed a nerve and decision not to be surpassed. He placed the guns on the bridge and ordered the portfires to be lighted. The feint had all the hoped-for effect. The enemy shrunk back from a bridge apparently defended by loaded guns. They at once relaxed their pursuit, and

our little army succeeded in gaining the shelter of the city and in retiring in some sort of order on the Machhí Báwan and the Residency. Their losses, however, had been most severe, and they had left the howitzer and two field-pieces behind them.*

Immediately after crossing the Kúkrail bridge Sir Henry Lawrence made over the command to Colonel Inglis, and, followed by his staff officer, Captain Wilson, and by his secretary, Mr. Couper, —who, acting throughout the day as his aide-de-camp, had displayed equal coolness and courage— galloped, unattended by any escort, through the city to the Residency. Arriving there, Sir Henry ordered out fifty men of the 32nd, under an officer, Lieutenant Edmonstone, to the iron bridge over the Gúmtí, with a view to their being posted in the two houses on either side of the bridge, to defend it. Towards this bridge the elated enemy surged in crowds, but they never forced it. The fifty Englishmen, covered by a fire from two 18-pounders in the Redan battery, held it successfully, though not without loss, till noon. The enemy then desisted, and crossed the river by another bridge. Our men were then finally withdrawn. This defence was a very gallant affair.

That the loss of the battle of Chinhat should precipitate the crisis was certain. But the crisis

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again at the
Gúmtí.

Advantages
derived by
the loss of
the battle.

* These two field-pieces Bonham of the Artillery to were, however, spiked by save the howitzer would Captain Wilson, the Assistant Adjutant-General, before most assuredly, had Sir Henry Lawrence lived, have they were left. The heroic gained for that officer the efforts made by Lieutenant Victoria Cross.

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would have equally come had there been no battle. And the battle, unfortunate in its immediate results though it proved to be, had at least this advantage,—it removed from Sir Henry's mind any doubt he might have had as to his ability to hold two positions. Brigadier Inglis states, in his despatch, that, had both posts been held, both must have fallen; and he ascribes the concentration of the troops on the better position of the two to Chinhat.

Calmness in combat of Sir Henry.

Of the behaviour of Sir Henry Lawrence on that day but one opinion has been recorded. That opinion is ably summarised in the record of a gallant soldier, the Assistant Adjutant-General throughout the siege. "Throughout that terrible day, during the conflict," records Captain Wilson, "and when all was lost, and retreat became all but a rout, and men were falling fast, he displayed the utmost calmness and decision; and as, with hat in hand, he sat on his horse on the Kúkrail bridge, rallying our men for a last stand, himself a distinct mark for the enemy's skirmishers, he seemed to bear a charmed life."

The first consequence of the defeat was the occupation of the city by the rebels and the uprising of the discontented spirits within it. That very afternoon they began to loop-hole many of the houses in the vicinity of and commanding the Machhí Báwan and the Residency. They even succeeded in bringing a six-pounder to bear on the outer verandah of the post afterwards known as Anderson's post. Subsequently, about

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centrate all his defensive efforts on the Residency he signalled the following night to the garrison of the Machhí Báwan to evacuate and blow up that fortress. These orders were admirably carried out by Captain Francis, 13th Native Infantry, then commanding at that post. A quarter of an hour past midnight the garrison of the Machhí Báwan entered the Residency with their guns and treasure, without the loss of a man. Shortly afterwards the explosion of two hundred and forty barrels of gunpowder and of five hundred and ninety-four thousand rounds of ball and gun ammunition announced the complete destruction of that post.

A singularly good fortune attended the time chosen for this operation. The enemy had determined, before they commenced in earnest to besiege the Residency, to devote a preliminary night to the plunder of the shops of the town. They were engaged in this congenial work when the explosion of the Machhí Báwan signified to them that they had missed a great chance.

The troops of the garrison, consisting of nine hundred and twenty-seven Europeans* and seven hundred and sixty-five natives, were now concentrated in the Residency. To all appearances the situation was desperate. Not only were the fortifications incomplete, but the enemy had at once occupied and loop-holed the houses which had been left standing outside and close to those

The time for
the evaca-
tion fortu-
nately chosen.

The garrison.

The weak-
ness of the
defences.

* These were composed as officers, not with English regiments or Artillery, 100; Civil 84th Foot, 50; Artillery, 89; and Uncovenanted, 153.

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fortifications. The west and south faces of the enclosure were practically undefended, the bastion which had been commenced at the angle of the two faces having been left unfinished. Looking at the weakness of our resources and the comparative numbers of the besiegers and the besieged it is not wonderful that Sir Henry himself, at the first moment, scarcely expected to hold out, without relief, for more than ten or fifteen days.*

The mode in
which they
might have
been forced.

And if the enemy had possessed as leader a real soldier, such was the advantage of their position, so great was their superiority in point of numbers, it is possible that the earlier forebodings of Sir Henry might have been realised. A general who would have freely sacrificed his men, and whose men would not have flinched from his summons, might well have taken advantage of the disaster of Chinhat. The Residency was not, in a military sense, defensible, and must have succumbed to the determined onslaught of determined men, vastly superior in numbers to the garrison.

Comparison
between the
English and
Asiatic sol-
dier.

But it is a remarkable fact that the mutiny produced no general amongst the mutineers—not a single man who understood the importance of time, of opportunity, of dash, in war. It is, too, worthy to be noted, that whilst no men in the world have a greater contempt of death than the natives of India, they yet almost always shrink from a hand to hand encounter with Europeans. Still more are they averse from an attack on a fortified position defended by Europeans. If carelessness

* His letter to General Havelock, dated 30th of June.

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of life be courage no people in the world are braver than the natives of India. But the courage which is required to make a man a real soldier is something more than mere carelessness of life. Such a man must be anxious to affront death, to court it. He must be indifferent to pain ; must be capable of enjoying the delirium of battle ; must be animated by a love of glory, and above all by a confidence in his superiority to his enemy. None of these qualities are possessed by the native soldier to the same extent as by our own countrymen ; whilst, with respect to the last, it is conspicuous by its absence. Perhaps it is mainly because the native soldier opposed to the British soldier, far from feeling the confidence I have referred to, is imbued with the conviction of the enormous superiority of his enemy, that his moral nature is cowed, and he cannot fight him as he can and does fight a fellow Asiatic.

Certainly in the case of Lakhnao this moral power was a strong factor on the side of the British. There they were, few in numbers, occupying a position, not, in a military sense, defensible ; two sides of it, indeed, practically undefended. To attack them came an army enormously superior in numbers, flushed with victory, and occupying positions which commanded a great portion of the defences. To all appearance the victory of the attacking party was assured. It was not gained, simply because the inferior moral nature of the Asiatic, shrinking involuntarily from actual contact with the European

Effect of
the superior
morale of the
English.

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e Resi-
ency enclo-
re. What
is it?

behind defences, neutralised the superiority of numbers.

What was the position? Let the reader imagine a number of houses, built for ordinary domestic purposes, originally separated from each other by small plots of ground, but now joined together by mud walls and trenches—the mud walls for defence from outer attack, the trenches for protection against the enemy's shells! Such in a few words was the enclosure known to the world, from the principal building within it, as the Residency. It is true that the walls of the houses were thick, that the bricks were of that small class peculiar to India during the last century, and that they were cemented by well-tempered mortar. But even the strongest houses constitute but a poor military position. This position, moreover, was blockaded and attacked by the enemy before, as I have said, a single part of it had been made really defensible. As the blockade progressed, and whilst the enemy were erecting batteries, mounting guns, throwing up barricades, and loop-holing the empty house outside of, but close to the enclosure, the garrison had time, notwithstanding the fierce and continuous fire maintained upon them, to repair and in some cases even to strengthen their defences. These defences were naturally rough, run up under enormous difficulties, and never in the most finished state deserving the names of regular fortifications. The houses of the several occupants, and the batteries erected along the line of intrenchments came to be regarded as posts, at

each of these posts was commanded by an officer. What these posts and who these officers were will be related in due course. At present, I have to do with the earliest and most regrettable incident of the siege.

Since the retirement of our force within its lines of defence the fire of the enemy upon it had been continuous. Night and day, from the tops of surrounding houses, from loop-holed buildings, from every point where cover was available, they had poured in a perpetual fire of round shot, of musketry, and of matchlock balls. Many of the garrison who were in places considered before the siege perfectly safe were hit. But no place was so exposed as the Residency itself, and on it a well directed fire was constantly maintained. Moreover, the enemy had recourse to digging deep approaches to their batteries and guns, and these effectually concealed them from our sharp-shooters.

But long before the cautious system of attack thus described had attained its full development, the garrison sustained an irreparable loss.

Sir Henry Lawrence occupied in the Residency a room convenient for the purpose of observing the enemy, but much exposed to their fire. There, the day after the defeat at Chinhhat, he was seated conversing with his secretary, Mr. Couper. Suddenly an 8-inch shell, fired from the very howitzer we had lost at Chinhhat, fell into the room, close to them. It ~~sank~~, however, without injury to either. The whole of the staff then implored Sir Henry to remove to a less exposed

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Proceedings
of the enemy
after Chinhhat.

A shell
penetrates
Sir Henry
Lawrence's
room.

position. But this he declined to do, remarking with a smile that another shell would never be pitched into the same room. Later in the day, when it was evident the enemy's round-shot were being directed at the Residency and were striking the upper storey Captain Wilson and Mr. Couper again pressed Sir Henry to go below and to allow his things to be moved. He promised to comply on the morrow. The following morning he went out to post and arrange the force which had come in from the Machhí Báwan and to place the field-pieces in position. He returned tired and exhausted about 8 o'clock. He lay down on his bed, and transacted business with the Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Wilson. He was engaged in this work when suddenly a howitzer shell entered the room, and bursting, wounded him mortally. He lingered in extreme agony till the morning of the 4th, when he died. Captain Wilson's account of the event is as follows :—

A second
strikes and
kills him.

Captain Wil-
son's account
of the event.

" During the first day the enemy threw an 8-inch shell from the howitzer they had captured from us into the room in which Sir Henry and Mr. Couper were. It burst close to both, but without injury to either, and curiously enough did little damage. We now urged Sir Henry to leave the Residency and go elsewhere, or at least go down below into the lower storey. This, however, he then declined to do, as he laughingly said he did not believe the enemy had an artilleryman good enough to put another shell into that small room. Later in the day some

round shot came into the top storey of the Residency; and in the evening Mr. Couper and I both pressed him to go below, and allow his writing things and papers to be moved; and he promised that he would the next day."

"Towards 8 a.m." (on the 2nd) "he returned, greatly exhausted (the heat was dreadful), and lay down on the bed with his clothes on, and desired me to draw up a memorandum as to how the rations were to be distributed. I went into the next room to write it, but, previous to doing so, I reminded him of his promise to go below. He said he was very tired, and would rest a couple of hours, and that then he would have his things moved. In about half an hour I went back into the room with what I had written. His nephew, Mr. George Lawrence, was then lying on a small bed parallel to his uncle's, with a very few feet between them. I went between the beds, and stood on the right hand side of Sir Henry's, with one knee resting on it. A native servant was sitting on the floor pulling the punkah. I read what I had written. It was not quite in accordance with his wishes, and he was in the act of explaining what he desired altered, when the fatal shot came; a sheet of flame, a terrific report and shock, and dense darkness, is all I can describe. I fell on the floor, and, perhaps for a few seconds, was quite stunned. I then get up, but could see nothing for the smoke and dust. Neither Sir Henry nor his nephew made any noise, and, in alarm, I cried out, 'Sir Henry, are you hurt?' Twice

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I thus called out without any answer. The third time he said, in a low tone, ‘I am killed.’ The punkah had come down with the ceiling, and a great deal of the plaster, and the dust and smoke were so great that it was some minutes before I could see anything; but as they gradually cleared away I saw the white coverlet of the bed on which Sir Henry was laid was crimson with his blood. Some soldiers of the 32nd now rushed in and placed Sir Henry in a chair. I then found that the back of my shirt was all blown off (I had on only a shirt and trowsers), that I was slightly wounded by a fragment of the shell, that our chief was mortally wounded; and that the servant pulling the punkah had had one of his feet cut off by another fragment of the shell. Mr. George Lawrence was alone of the four in the room unhurt.”

Character of
Sir Henry
Lawrence.

Sir Henry Lawrence was one of those rare characters which it is difficult to over-praise. The adjective “noble” expresses most nearly what he was. His thoughts and his deeds were alike noble. In one of the eloquent and effective speeches which he who was then Mr. Disraeli delivered when in the cold shade of opposition “justice” was most felicitously described as being “truth in action.” The life of Sir Henry Lawrence was a witness to the soundness of this aphorism. The nobleness of his nature, the honesty of his mind, his unqualified love of justice, displayed themselves in his every act. He was just to others because he was true to himself. Than his, it is difficult to imagine a

His noble
nature.

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purer, a more unselfish, a more blameless, and at the same time a more useful life. He, at least, did not live in vain. Great as were his services to his country those he rendered to mankind were still greater. The establishment of the Lawrence Asylum—an institution which provides, in the healthy mountainous ranges of India, food, lodging, and instruction, for the children of our European soldiers, was not the least important of those services. To it Sir Henry gave his time, his savings, the energies he could spare from his duties. He inoculated his friends and the Government of India with his ardour. For more than thirty years that institution has borne testimony to the practical nobility of the spirit which founded it.

It must not be imagined that because he possessed great virtues Sir Henry Lawrence was fashioned after the manner of the monks of the middle ages. There could not be a greater mistake. He was essentially human with strong human passions. His passions, indeed, had been brought gradually and by long training very much under control.* Yet, even when they burst the bonds, there was something noble about them too. He never concealed the annoyance which had been caused him by having been “cavalierly elbowed out of the Panjáb.” He felt that he had been wronged, that injustice had been done him, that

His human
passions.

* He did not admit this. us Lawrences, has strong Writing of Mr. Coverly Jack- passions not under much con- son, he says: “He is an able trol.” and energetic man, but, like

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Faculty of
gaining re-
spect and
affection.

advantage had been taken of his generosity, and he showed that he felt it. This wrong, he admitted, had caused him to fret even to the injury of his health. Yet how hearty was his forgiveness of those who had so wrung him when the stain on his reputation, as he regarded it, was removed by Lord Canning. "I can now," he writes, "more freely than ever forgive Lord Dalhousie." In his personal dealings with other men the nobleness of his nature is reflected by the love, the respect, the affection, he drew towards himself. "Few men," wrote Brigadier Inglis, when commenting on his demise, "few men have ever possessed to the same extent the power which he enjoyed of winning the hearts of all those with whom he came in contact, and thus ensuring the warmest and most zealous devotion for himself and for the Government which he served." The deep affection with which he was regarded when living survives to the present day. Of no man is the recollection more warmly cherished. Nor is this to be wondered at, for no man ever excited so much enthusiasm in others. When he arrived at a decision those to whom he communicated felt that the subject had been thoroughly considered in all its bearings, and that the order was final. His elevation excited no envy. His nature and his policy alike incited him to trust. He believed in the honour, the right feeling, the public spirit of those with whom he was brought in contact until they actually showed themselves unworthy of his confidence. He gained, to a greater extent than

Trust re-
posed in him

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tives.

any Englishman of the present century, the trust of the natives. He gained this trust by his absolute frankness. Far from flattering them, far from simulating a regard which he did not feel, his frankness was carried to the extremest limit. But they believed in him. They had a saying that "when Sir Henry looked twice up to Heaven and once down to earth, and then stroked his beard, he knew what to do." He devoted all his energies to the country he served so well. In a word, he was a striking type of that class, not a rare one, of the public servants of England, who give themselves without reserve to their country. That Sir Henry Lawrence felt to the last the inner conviction that he had so given himself wholly and without stint, is evidenced by the expression of his dying wish, that if any epitaph were placed on his tomb, it should be simply this: "Here lies Henry Lawrence who tried to do his duty."

The credit of the successful defence of the Residency at Lakhnao is due, in the first place, to Sir Henry Lawrence. He alone made it possible successfully to defend it. Three weeks before any one else dreamed of the chance even of a siege he began to lay in supplies. He did more. To ensure the prompt provisionment of the place he paid for the supplies so stored considerably in excess of their market value. It is a fact, not perhaps generally known, that he did this in spite of the written protests of men so highly placed that they might almost be called his colleagues. He caused to be brought into the Residency the

Credit due
to Sir Henry
for the ability
to defend the
Residency
with success.

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treasure from the city, and, whenever feasible, from out-stations. The treasure amounted to a very large sum. To obviate the necessity of placing a guard over it, he buried it, and made it the site of a battery in the Residency enclosure. He collected there the guns, the mortars, the shot and shell, the small arms, the ammunition, and the grain. A great portion of the latter he caused to be stored under-ground. He strengthened the fortifications, formed outworks, cleared away the obstructions close up to the Residency. He did all this before the siege commenced. And it was owing to his care, his energy, his determination, his foresight in respect of these things, that the gallant men who survived him were able to offer to the foe a successful resistance.

Lakhnao the
Plevna of
India.

The value of that successful resistance to the general interests of England in India has never publicly been sufficiently appreciated. It appears to me that this is the proper place, dealing as I am with the character of the man who made that successful resistance possible, to estimate it. An event which occurred nearer to us in the autumn and winter of last year will bring more vividly before the reader than any description the value of the successful defence of Lakhnao. I allude to the defence of Plevna by the Turks. That splendid feat of arms neutralised for four months two Russian armies, and gave time to Turkey to organise whatever means she might have to prolong the contest. Now the Lakhnao Residency was the Plevna of India. It is not too much to assert that the siege of the Residency

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kept in Oudh for five months immense masses of the regular army*—troops who but for that defence would have been employed either in overrunning the North-West or in reinforcing the garrison of Dehlí. It was the splendid defence of the Residency that kept those troops from harming us, that gave time to England to send out reinforcements. That defence was, in a word, necessary to the maintenance of the hold of England on India. That that hold was preserved sums up, briefly, the amount of one portion of the debt incurred by England to Sir Henry Lawrence.

Sir Henry died, I have said, on the 4th of July. In consequence of his death-bed instructions Major Banks assumed the chief civil authority, whilst the command of the troops devolved upon Brigadier Inglis.

Major Banks succeeds him.

The ground on which were built the detached houses now about to be attacked was an elevated plateau, the surface of which was rough and unequal. The defences traced around it had the form of an irregular pentagon. A glance at the accompanying plan will show that regarding the point indicated as “Innes's house” as the northern-most point, its eastern face ran irregularly parallel with the river Gúmtí as far as the Baillie Guard. From that point to “Anderson's garrison” constituted the south-eastern, and from

The “posts”
of the Resi-
dency.

* Besides the regular troops been drafted into the local were many thousand men and police force of the coun-
belonging to the ex-king's try; also the numerous re-
army, and many of whom had tainers of the talúkdárs.

Anderson's garrison to "Gubbins's battery," the south-western face. The western face comprehended the line between Gubbins's battery and Innes's garrison.

Innes's garrison occupied a long, commodious lower roomed house, containing several rooms, two good verandahs, and having a flat roof. It was commanded by Lieutenant Loughnan of the 13th Native Infantry, a most gallant officer.

Overlooking this post on the eastern face was the Redan battery, at the apex of the projecting point of high level ground. This battery was armed with two 18-pounders and a 9-pounder. It was commanded by Lieutenant Samuel Lawrence of the 32nd Foot.

The line of intrenchments between the Water Gate and the Banqueting hall, transformed into a hospital, was commanded by Lieutenant Langmore of the 71st Native Infantry. It was entirely without shelter.

Passing over the Residency and the Banqueting hall, we come to the Treasury buildings situated below and to the eastward of the latter known under the name of the Bailey Guard. This was armed with two 9-pounders and an 8-inch howitzer, commanded by Lieutenant Aitken, 13th Native Infantry. Following the outer tracing we come to Fayrer's house with one 9-pounder, commanded by Captain Gould Weston, late Superintendent of the Military Police; to the Financial garrison post commanded by Captain Sanders, 13th Native Infantry; and to Sago's house, commanded by Captain T. T. Boileau, 7th Cavalry. The two

last-named buildings were commanded by the Post office armed with two 18-pounders and a 9-pounder, and whose garrison was under the orders of Lieutenant Graydon.

Following the line of outer-works we arrive at the Judicial post, an extensive upper-roomed house, commanded by Captain Germon 13th Native Infantry. Next to that, and forming the south-eastern angle of the position, was Anderson's post,—a two-storied house surrounded by a wall, with two good verandahs, and intrenched and loop-holed. No battery was attached to this post. It was commanded by Captain R. P. Anderson, 25th Native Infantry.

The Káhnpúr battery, constructed of earth and palisades, was the next post. This was armed with an 8-pounder and two 9-pounders. This was the only post the commandant of which was constantly changed. The reason was that it was so entirely commanded by the enemy's works, that when they concentrated a heavy fire upon it, no man could live in it. But neither could the enemy occupy it, for it was entirely commanded by the house behind it. It thus remained to the end a part of our defences. The Thug jail, occupied by the boys of the Martinière College, and commanded by their principal, Mr. Schilling; the Brigade Mess, a high and convenient building, commanded by Colonel Master, 7th Light Cavalry; and the Sikh squares; led to Gubbins's post, armed with two 9-pounders and an 18-pounder, and commanded by Major Aphorp, 41st Native Infantry. Be-

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tween this post and the Church garrison were the Bhúsa intrenchments and sheep pens, slenderly defended by the officers and soldiers of the Commissariat Department. The Church garrison consisted of about a dozen Europeans. It was stored with grain. This leads us back to Innes's house, whence we started.

Of the garrisons within the line of defence may be mentioned Ommaney's post, connected by a lane with Gubbins's post and supported by the residents of the Bégam Kótí, few in number and principally on the staff.

It must always be remembered that on the morrow of Chinhat this plateau was, in a military sense, indefensible. In many places barricades of earth constituted the only defence against the enemy. Nor was it easy to repair the want. "It is difficult," wrote a staff officer, "to chronicle the confusion of those few days, for everywhere confusion reigned supreme." The same authority gives a little further on examples of this confusion. After mentioning the severe wound received by the commissariat officer, Lieutenant James, at Chinhat, and the consequent disorder in that department, he paints in graphic terms how the bullocks, deserted by their attendants and wandering about in search of water, fell into wells; how fatigue parties of civilians and officers, after having been engaged many hours in repelling the enemy's attacks, had to spend six or seven more in burying the dead cattle; how the horses of the troopers of the 7th Cavalry who had deserted, maddened for want of water, broke

Difficulties in
the way of
the defence.

loose and fought with each other, unheeded by the over-worked garrison.

The enemy was not ignorant of the confusion that reigned behind those weak ramparts. Why did they not take advantage of it? They had guns, they had position, they had over-whelming numbers. One determined rush, or an unceasing succession of determined rushes, and though their losses would have been enormous, the position must have been carried. The reader will have already answered the question. They did not attempt those rushes because they were entirely Asiatics and the defenders were mainly Europeans!

The course which they pursued, and the means adopted by the garrison to baffle that course, have been described in immortal language by the Brigadier who commanded the defence.* It would be difficult to add to the grandeur of that simple and expressive story. Regarded from a literary point of view it is a model of despatch-writing. But it is far more than that. Its greater merit lies in the fact that it records with unsurpassed modesty, untinged by a shadow of self-laudation, a long deed of heroism, unsurpassed and unsurpassable, to be spoken of with reverence so long as the pulse of the English heart beats high in appreciation of what is brave, of what is manly, of what is noble.

Far from taking of their victory at Chinhat that prompt advantage at which an English army

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July 4.

Why the
enemy took
no advantage
of those diffi-
culties.

The defence
—as de-
scribed by
Brigadier
Inglis.

* *Despatch of Brigadier Inglis* partment, given at full length to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military De-

Tactics of the
mutineers.

in Appendix B.

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July 1-20.

Casualties
in the early
part of the
siege.

would have clutched, the rebels, for nearly three weeks, did everything but assault those slight defences. They did indeed occupy the houses which commanded them ; they erected batteries ; they placed guns in position ; they dug trenches to protect their men from our shells ; and for the entire period I have mentioned, that is from the 1st to the 20th of July, they kept up a terrific and incessant fire day and night, not less than eight thousand men, and probably a larger number, firing at one time into our position. Their fire was very effective. The mosques, the houses which from want of time to destroy them had been allowed to stand, the not very remote palaces, afforded them commanding positions. Their shells penetrated into places before considered absolutely secure. Many succumbed to this incessant rain of projectiles. Mrs. Dorin was killed in an inner room of Mr. Gubbins' house ; Mr. Ommaney, of the Civil Service, was mortally wounded on the 4th of July ; Major Francis, of the 13th Native Infantry, a very gallant officer, on the 7th ; Mr. Polehampton, the chaplain, the same day, severely. Before the 20th of July dawned, the list of casualties had been increased by Mr. Bryson, at one time Sergeant-Major, 16th Lancers, shot through his head on the 9th ; by Lieutenant Dashwood, 48th Native Infantry, who succumbed the same day to cholera ; by Lieutenant Charlton, 32nd Foot, shot through the head on the 13th ; by Lieutenant Lester, mortally wounded on the 14th ; by Lieutenants Bryce and O'Brien, wounded on the 16th ; by Lieutenant Harmer wounded, and Lieutenant

Arthur killed, on the 19th. That day also, Mr. Polehampton, wounded on the 7th, died of cholera. In addition to these officers, many privates, Europeans and natives, succumbed. A few of the latter deserted to the enemy.

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Upon the improvised defences the effect of the enemy's fire was even greater. Thus on the 15th Anderson's house was entirely destroyed by round shot, though still nobly held by the garrison; on the 18th, many round shots were fired into the Post office, Fayrer's house, Gubbins's, and the Brigade mess-house. At one time the rebels succeeded in setting the Residency on fire by firing carcasses into it. At another they threatened an assault on Gubbins's post. In fact they had recourse to every possible expedient excepting one, and when they did attempt that one it was met gloriously and successfully.

Further
effect of the
enemy's fire.

The garrison during these three weeks had their work cut out for them. The order, so conspicuous by its absence in the first hours of the siege, was gradually restored. By the 10th arrangements had been made for securing and feeding the bullocks, whilst the surviving horses, after scores had been shot down, had been got rid of by turning them loose over the intrenchment in the dark of the night. A strong element of disorder was thus removed. These animals, however, had previously perished in great numbers, and the interring of them was no slight addition to other labours.*

Proceedings
of the gar-
rison.

* Numbers of horses and at night by working parties, bullocks died, and their burial in addition to nightly fatigue

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July 1-20.

Difficulties
they had to
contend with.

The first
sortie.

Daring of
Lieutenant
Sam. Law-
rence.

The heat during this time was excessive. Cholera was busy. The stench from putrid animals was most offensive. Few officers had a servant. The real work of the garrison, in fact, took place in the night time. Then, stores had to be dug out and carried, guns to be shifted, trenches to be dug, shafts for mines sunk, the dead buried, and the thousand and one necessities devolving upon men so situated attended to. Still the garrison showed no signs of faltering. The necessity for having the mind constantly on the stretch, however, whilst, perhaps, it added to the bodily capacity to bear fatigue, told in the long run upon many.

On the 7th of July a sortie was made. The party consisted of fifty men of the 32nd and twenty Sikhs. The object was to examine Johannes house, a building outside, and close to the line of defence, near the Brigade mess, as it was believed that the enemy were mining. The sortie was successful. The enemy were driven out of the house, and fifteen or twenty of their number were killed. On our side three men were wounded.

I cannot quit the account of this sortie without making special reference to the gallantry of

parties for the purpose of or day. In all duties the burying the dead, carrying up officers equally shared the supplies from exposed positions, repairing intrenchments, draining, and altering the position of guns, in addition to attending on the wounded, caused excessive fatigue to the thin garrison, who had but little rest, night or day. In all duties the labours with the men, carrying loads, and digging pits for putrid animals, at night, in heavy rain. All exerted themselves to the utmost, alternately exposed to a burning sun and heavy rain."—*Journal of a Staff Officer.*

the officer who led it, Lieutenant Sam. Lawrence, of the 32nd Foot. The cool daring he displayed obtained for Lieutenant Lawrence the Victoria Cross.*

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For some time subsequently the garrison confined themselves strictly to defence. But on the 20th the enemy changed their tactics. They determined then to try the rush which they should in the first instance have attempted.

At midnight, on the 20th of July, the enemy's fire almost ceased, nor was heavy firing resumed in the early morning. About half-past 8 o'clock, however, a considerable movement on their part was noticed. The garrison in consequence were well on the alert. A little after 10 o'clock they sprung a mine inside the water-gate, about twenty-five yards from the inner defences, and close to the Redan. Immediately after the explosion the enemy opened a very heavy fire on the defences near which the mine had been sprung. Under cover of this fire, as soon as the smoke and dust

July 20.

The first
assault.

* It may be interesting to garrison, 'for the purpose of the reader to peruse the words examining a house strongly in which the bestowal of this held by the enemy, in order honour was notified. In the to discover whether or not a London *Gazette* of the 22nd of November 1859, the following announcement appeared:— "Lieutenant, now Brevet-Major, S. Lawrence, 32nd Foot.—Date of act of bravery, 7th July 1857.—For distinguished bravery in a sortie on the 7th of July 1857, made, as reported by Major Wilson, which he had his pistol late Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General of the Lucknow one of the enemy."

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July 21.

Gallantry
of young
Loughnan.

The attack
repulsed at
all points.

had cleared away, they advanced in heavy masses against the Redan. The garrison, however, received them with so heavy a fire that they reeled back sorely smitten ; nor, although they made a second attempt, and penetrated to within a very few yards of the English battery, could they effect a lodgment. Again they fell back, baffled.

Simultaneously a heavy column advanced against Innes's house. The garrison here consisted only of twelve men of the 32nd Foot ; twelve of the 13th Native Infantry ; and a few non-military servants of Government ;—the whole commanded by Ensign Loughnan, 13th Native Infantry. Against this handful of men, the enemy pressed in large numbers, and made their way to within ten yards of the palisades. A rolling fire sent them back. They came, however, again,—and again ;—and again ;—but always with the same result. The officer who commanded the post, young in years, but cool, wary, determined, and resolute, covered himself with glory. His name, I repeat, was Loughnan. He at last forced the enemy to desist from their attempts to storm the post, and to content themselves with a heavy musketry fire from a safer distance.

But the enemy's attack was by no means confined to the two points I have noted. They made a desperate and very determined attempt on the Kánpúr battery, their standard-bearer, who led them on, jumping into the battery ditch. But a well-directed bullet having stopped his further progress the enemy became disheartened and fell back. Very soon afterwards they advanced with

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scaling ladders against Anderson's and Germon's posts. But their reception at both was so warm that they retreated, not to renew the attack.

It was now 2 o'clock. The enemy continued for two hours to pour in a heavy fire, and even attempted to effect a lodgment in one of the brick-built cook-houses close to the outer defences. But the real attack was over. Made in great force and with considerable resolution it had been defeated by the British with a loss of but four killed and twelve wounded. By sharp experience the garrison had learned the wisdom of not too much exposing themselves.

This attack and this repulse deserve to be considered under two aspects—the material and the moral. As a feat of arms it is scarcely to be surpassed by any feat in history. It was the triumph of British coolness and pluck over Asiatic numbers and swagger; of the mind over matter. But in a moral point of view it was more important still. It showed the mutineers that they had miscalculated their chances; that if it had ever been possible for them to storm the intrenchment, that time had gone by; that, unless famine should come to aid them, they and their associate Asiatics would never triumph over that handful of Europeans.

Nor did they, the Europeans who formed that garrison, feel less the moral exaltation of that victory. After three weeks of incessant pounding with shot and shell the enemy had tried to overwhelm them by an assault. In making that assault they had been singularly favoured. Their mine

Moral aspects
of the re-
pulse;on the
Asiatics,on the Euro-
peans.

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had been sprung in accordance with their calculations ; they had covered the advance of their infantry by a fierce artillery fire ; their infantry had penetrated to within a few yards of the defences ! And yet the garrison had repulsed them,—and repulsed them with a loss so small that it did not visibly affect their numbers. The garrison were immensely elated at the results of the day, and, when their posts were visited in the evening, they could talk of nothing but of the heavy losses they had inflicted on the enemy as shown by the numerous corpses in front of their posts. Well might they, from that day, look forward with more hope to the future !

**Death of
Major Banks.**

But the day following this inspiring victory the garrison sustained a loss which it could ill afford. Major Banks, who had succeeded Sir Henry Lawrence as Chief Commissioner, was shot through the head whilst reconnoitring from the top of an out-house. It is true that the functions devolving upon Major Banks were purely civil functions. But his great knowledge of the natives, his noble and cheery nature, his accurate perception of the situation, had rendered him invaluable as a colleague to Brigadier Inglis. His fearlessness, his courage, and his sympathy with suffering had endeared him greatly to the garrison. His place was not filled up.

This arrangement did not take place, however, without a protest. Mr. Gubbins at once intimated his intention of assuming the position of Chief Commissioner. But Brigadier Inglis and his advisers felt that the time for divided authority

**Brigadier
Inglis holds
in abeyance**

had passed ; that under the circumstances it was necessary that there should be but one chief, and that that chief should be a soldier. The Brigadier then issued an order intimating that the office of Chief Commissioner would be held in abeyance until such time as the Government of India could be communicated with.*

From the 20th of July to the 10th of August the enemy contented themselves mainly with keeping up an unremitting fire upon the garrison, loop-holing more houses and bringing the attack closer and closer. They made no general assault. The garrison were so fully occupied in repairing damages, in countermining, often successfully, and in replying to the enemy's fire, that they could not find sufficient time to remove the carcasses of horses and bullocks. The stench from these and from others only partially buried became almost unbearable, and possibly aided in fomenting the pest of flies, the spread of fever, of cholera, of dysentery, of scurvy, and of small-pox amongst the garrison. Perhaps the most fatal cause was the badness and insufficiency of the food, the want of cooks, and consequently the indifferent cooking.

But in the midst of these troubles and trials a spark of hope of aid from outside glimmered in the horizon. Many letters had been despatched by messengers believed to be faithful, but up to the 25th of July no reply had been received to any of them. Early in the morning of the

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the post of
Chief Com-
missioner.

The three
weeks follow-
ing the first
assault.

Letter from
Colonel
Tytler.

* This arrangement subsequently received the approval of the Governor-General.

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July 22.

22nd, the pensioner Angad came in from Kánpúr, but without a letter. Angad was a very remarkable character. He had been a sepoy, but he must have proved a very bad bargain, for he had quitted the military service, when still young, smooth-faced, and wiry. He was the only messenger sent out from the intrenchment who ever brought back a letter. On this occasion he did not carry one with him for fear of being detained by the enemy; but he stated that the English had been victorious; that he had seen two European regiments at or near Kánpúr; that one of them had square buttons and the other light blue caps. This description greatly puzzled Brigadier Inglis and his staff who could not call to mind any regiment in the British army which wore square buttons or whose heads were adorned with light blue caps. But it was perfectly accurate. The square buttons belonged to the 78th Highlanders,—the blue caps, covers, to the 1st Madras Fusiliers.*

At 11 o'clock on the night of the 25th the same pensioner, who had been sent out again on the night of the 22nd to General Havelock's camp returned with a reply to that letter from that officer's Quartermaster-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser-Tytler. The letter stated that "Havelock was advancing with a force sufficient to bear down all opposition, and would arrive in five or six days."† Brigadier Inglis at once resolved to smooth the way for the relieving force by transmitting by the same channel to General

* Now the 102nd.

† Brigadier Inglis's despatch.

Havelock a plan of his position and of the roads approaching it. Angad accordingly took advantage of the first dark night to leave the intrenchment with the plan, drawn up by Major Anderson, and two memoranda partly written in the Greek character. He delivered these to General Havelock at Mangarwár on the 28th of July. They satisfied him as to "the extreme delicacy and difficulty of any operation to relieve Colonel Inglis."* Meanwhile the occasional sound of heavy firing on the road between Kánpúr and Lakhnao, continued to confirm the hopes raised by the opening of this communication in the minds of the garrison.

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Four days later,—the ominous 10th of August, —the enemy made their second assault. About 10 o'clock that morning a body, numbering perhaps sixteen hundred, were observed by the garrison massed behind their trenches, opposite the southern face of the defences. Very soon after, a large force was noticed approaching the bridge of boats from the Mariáon cantonments. Brigadier Inglis was not slow to mark the significance of these movements. The word was passed that an assault was impending. Instantly all the occupants of the posts were on the alert. Half an hour later the enemy fired a shell into the Bégam Kótí, a building in the centre of the intrenchment. This was apparently a signal, for immediately after they sprang a mine between Johannes house and the Brigade mess. The effect of the

Effect of the
mine sprung
by the
enemy.

* Havelock's *Despatch to the Commander-in-Chief*, 28th of July 1857.

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AUGUST 10.

explosion was terrible. The greater portion of the Martinière house was blown in; the palisades and defences for the space of thirty feet were destroyed. On the smoke and dust clearing away, a breach was discovered through which a regiment might have marched in unbroken order. The enemy advanced with great resolution, occupied Johannes house and garden and the buildings close to the Kánpúr battery, and made a desperate effort to take that post. But they were met, not only by a withering front fire from its defenders, but the garrison of the Brigade mess, composed of a large proportion of officers, many of them excellent shots, and armed with their sporting guns and rifles, poured upon their flank from its roof a well directed and continuous fusillade. This front and flank fire quite paralysed them. Some thirty of their number, however, more daring than their comrades, penetrated into the ditch of the battery within a few feet of our guns. But hand-grenades freely rolled into the midst of them speedily caused them to run back, under a heavy musketry fire, to their comrades under cover. Their losses were enormous.

The attack repulsed,

everywhere.

They make a final effort; but in vain.

This attack then was repulsed. But whilst it was progressing, another had been attempted on the adjoining face. The explosion of a mine in front of Sago's house was the signal for the assault. But it was repulsed as bravely and as successfully as had been the other, just described.

It was now about noon. The losses of the enemy had been very severe. Repulsed at all the points they had attempted, he kept up, however,

for two hours a steady and continuous fire of round shot and musketry. This then subsided into the ordinary routine fire which never ceased. But about 5 o'clock they made a sudden and formidable rush on Captain Sanders's post (the Financial garrison). So determined were those who led the assault, that one of them actually seized the bayonet on the musket of a man of the 84th and tried to wrench it off. He was shot, and the attack was repulsed.

At 9 o'clock the assault was renewed on this post, on Innes' house, on Anderson's post, and on Gubbins' post. But at each and all these places they met a reception which caused them to repent their audacity. By 10 o'clock the comparative quiet all around the intrenchments was a confession that the second general assault had failed.

On this occasion our losses scarcely exceeded those sustained on the 21st of July. They amounted to three Europeans and two sepoys killed, and about double that number wounded. It was remarked by many of the garrison that the attack was neither so persistent, nor so energetic, as on the previous occasion—a proof how the *morale* of the enemy had been lowered by their first repulse.

Still, to achieve that victory, the garrison had been terribly tried. The reader must never forget how the paucity of their numbers told against them. There were men enough, it is true, to man the posts, to work the guns, to repulse the enemy. But to do all this every man was required. Reliefs were impossible. The same

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August 10.

Effect of the
assault on
both parties.

The British
soldier during
the siege

men who had fought all day, had to continue under arms, working and watching all night. It was the exposure, the fatigue, the want of rest, the inferior nourishment, that combined to constitute an enemy more formidable than hostile bullets; an enemy wearing to the constitution, undermining the health, though never affecting the moral or the animal courage of the soldier. The illustrious French general, Foy, once wrote that "the British soldier is not brave at times merely; he is so whenever he has eat well, drunk well, and slept well." Sir William Napier rightly denounced this estimate as being a "stupid calumny." At Lakhnao the British soldier had to contend against want of sleep, against bad food, and latterly against an entire want of liquor and tobacco. Yet who will deny that at the defence of that place, "every helmet caught some beams of glory"? True it is, that even there "no honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the applauses of his countrymen; his life of danger and hardship was uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed." But cold must be the blood, dull and clouded the spirit of the man, whose heart does not throb as he peruses the lines which follow, as applicable to the defenders of Lakhnao as they were when penned by the immortal historian,* to the tried soldiers of Wellington. "Did his heart sink therefore? Did he not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest of ills, sustain the most terrible assault in battle unmoved, and

* Sir William Napier.

with incredible energy overthrow every opponent, at all times proving that, while no military qualification was wanting, the fount of honour was still full and fresh within him!" Who will say that this eloquent record of the stamp and character of the unlettered men who beat the choicest soldiers of Napoleon does not literally and accurately pourtray the moral and physical qualities of their successors in the ranks of the British army, who, at the defence of Lakhnao, sustained to the full even the lofty measure of their imperishable renown?

The next day, and the day following, the enemy continued a heavy cannonade. They appeared to concentrate their fire on the Kánpúr battery, which had already suffered so severely. The position of the garrison here was really critical. The battery was completely commanded by the enemy. It was quite impossible to hold it against an assault. Yet with a splendid audacity, the defenders would not withdraw their guns, lest such an act should give the enemy confidence!* In the evening of that day a strong working party did their utmost to repair damages in that battery and to remove from it one disabled gun. Three days later the battery was again rendered untenable, but again that night, and the following, were the damages repaired and the defences strengthened. Brigadier Inglis, always at hand whenever danger was to be encountered, having heard that the officers and men of the

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a worthy
successor of
the warrior
of the Penin-
sula.

The Kánpúr
battery.

* This post (the Kánpúr battery) was so dangerous that he changed every day.

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August 12.
A sortie
made and
repulsed.

post believed that it had been successfully mined, went to it and remained there the night of the 16th.

In the interval, the 12th of August, the garrison, made a sortie in order to find out the intentions of the enemy in digging close to Sago's house. The party consisted only of twelve men of the 32nd Foot, under Lieutenant Clery, accompanied by Captain Hutchinson of the Engineers. The enemy, however, were well on the alert, and their covering party, strong in numbers, compelled our troops to retire without effecting their object.

On the 18th, the enemy delivered their third general assault. This time the usual preliminary mine had been dug under one of the Sikh squares. Exploded at daylight its effect was electric. Two officers and two sentries on the top of the house were blown into the air and fell among the *débris*. The guard below, consisting of six drummers and a sepoy, were buried in the ruins and lost their lives. Of those on the roof, the officers and one of the sentries escaped with a few bruises. The other sentry was killed.

Success of
the explo-
sion of the
enemy's
mine.

In other respects the explosion was most successful. A clear breach, some twenty feet in breadth, had been made in the defences. The enemy, stimulated and excited, were not slow to take advantage of this opening. One of their officers, a very gallant fellow, sprang at once to the top of the breach, and waving his sword called on his men to follow. Before, however, his summons was responded to, a bullet had laid him low. His place was instantly occupied by another but he

was as instantly killed. Simultaneously the head of the column was sorely smitten by the flank fire from the top of the brigade mess. The *morale* of the sepoy's was greatly affected by these casualties, and the attacking force seemed suddenly to melt away. By means of some barricaded lanes, however, they managed shortly after to take possession of the right flank wall of the Sikh square. But the garrison, admirably commanded, not only drove them from this, but succeeded in capturing one of the houses previously held by them, between the Sikh square and Gubbins's house. It was from this house that the enemy had most annoyed that face of the defences. Consequently it and others contiguous to it were blown up that evening.

The third assault was thus not only less formidable than its two predecessors ; it resulted in a positive advantage to the besieged. And yet never had the latter been taken more completely by surprise, the presence of a mine in that spot not having been suspected. Notwithstanding the vigilance exercised by the garrison of the Sikh square they had not heard the slightest sound of the working of the mine which exploded.* No precautions had, therefore, been taken. The enemy then had the opportunity most coveted by an assailing army—an open breach, an unprepared

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August 18.

The assault repulsed,

with advan-
tage to the
garrison.

* The officers at this post which occasioned the calamity were Lieutenant Mecham and of yesterday, must have been Soppett, and Captain Orr worked by the enemy with (unattached). One of them sharp and noiseless tools, as thus wrote, the day after the not the slightest sound occurrence : "The new mine, ever reached us."

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Reason for
specially
dwelling on
the four
great as-
saults.

garrison, their own troops massed, their leaders bold and resolute. And yet they were foiled. Who will assert that the result would have been the same if the defenders had been the assailants, and the assailants the defenders?

In a history of the great Indian mutiny, and especially in the history of a prolonged siege, it is impossible to record every act of heroism, to describe every isolated attack, and every individual defence, however noble, and however gallant. I have selected, therefore, for more particular description the four general assaults made upon the defences of the Residency as affording the most striking examples of the conduct of the hostile parties. In this third assault I have shown how, with every advantage before them, the assailants were not only beaten back but actually lost ground. The inquiry naturally arises—to what particular action on the part of our troops were they indebted to their victory? It is due to those gallant men to answer this question somewhat in detail.

A glance at the sketch* will show that the outer Sikh square was commanded by the Brigade Mess. The explosion of the mine found the officers on the roof of that house ever watchful and ready and with a large reserve of loaded muskets. It was their fire which struck down the two daring leaders who in succession mounted the breach. It was their fire, taking an advancing enemy in the flank, which made the enemy's formed masses

* Facing page 442.

shrink from the assault. But that was not all. At the first sound of the explosion the entire garrison were on the alert at their allotted post. The Brigadier ordered down the reserve, consisting of only eighteen men, to the threatened point, and placed them in a position which commanded the breach from the right. At the same time boxes, doors, planks, etc. were rapidly carried down to make as much cover as possible to protect our men against musketry; a house, also, was pulled down and a road made for a gun; and, after incredible exertions, a 9-pounder was got into a position which commanded all the breach, and was loaded with a double charge of grape. I may leave this simple description without comment. It is typical of the garrison and its commander. Threatened with a great calamity, every resource to meet it was brought at once into play. The history of war does not show a brighter example of coolness and courage. The conduct of the assailants and the assailed on that 18th of August marks emphatically the fathomless distinction between the European and Asiatic in the qualities of a real soldier!

It may not be out of place to point out here some of the peculiarities which distinguished this garrison from ordinary garrisons of besieged places—peculiarities which, strange though the assertion may at first sight appear,—account to a certain extent for their success. One of these was the paucity of their numbers. One effect of this was that the garrison of a post at the begin-

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Detailed action of the garrison in the repulse of the 18th of August.

Peculiarities which distinguished this garrison from ordinary garrisons.

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ning of the siege remained the garrison of that post to the end. The men were never relieved, because there were no others to relieve them. So great was the necessity to be for ever on the alert that the member of one garrison was unable to visit the member of another garrison. The only man who quitted his post was the man who went in the morning to fetch the day's rations. Even when the post was knocked down by the enemy's fire the garrison of that post built up fresh defences from the *débris*. It was thoroughly understood by all that there was no retreat; that all must die at their posts; and that whatever casualties might occur vacant places could not be filled. One consequence of this was that the defenders of a post on the western face knew nothing during the day of what was going on on the eastern face. It is true that every evening the Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Wilson, visited every post, generally accompanied by Mr. Couper, and whilst examining its state, noting its wants, and receiving the reports of the commander, encouraged the soldiers with accounts of success achieved in other parts. It is true also that there was a reserve—but its numbers from casualties had diminished very considerably. This reserve, and the Brigadier and his Staff, were the only members of the garrison who had no fixed post to defend. The men of the reserve were posted in the centre of the position, with the strictest orders that they were not to move thence except under the personal orders of the Brigadier or his Staff. Sum-

The reserve.

monses from other persons were on no account to be attended to. It was their business to rush wherever the Brigadier might consider their presence to be most needed. Nobly did they perform this dangerous duty. The others lived or died where they had been originally posted.

One consequence of this permanency of location, of this knowledge that they could neither be reinforced nor relieved, was to sharpen the wits of the defenders, to make them take precautions which otherwise they might have overlooked. Thus they had always a considerable reserve of loaded muskets: they were careful never to expose themselves unnecessarily; when boring loop-holes they made sure that the background should be dark. The subject of loop-holes was, indeed, so thoroughly mastered that it deserves a paragraph to itself.

It must never be forgotten that the assailants and assailed were quite close to each other. The distance that separated them was, in many points, not greater than the average width of a street such as the Strand. No man on either side dared, therefore, expose himself in the open to discharge his musket. Unless at the time of a general assault the muskets were fired through loop-holes. Now, when two hostile parties are so close to each other it is very easy to discover the bearings of particular loop-holes—and to avoid them. Having found a point out of their range the besieging party would be naturally encouraged to post men at that point to fire on any defender who might expose his person. The garrison

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August 18.

Precautions
taken by the
garrison.

Loop-holing.

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came gradually to encourage the assailants to occupy such a point and to have confidence in occupying it. But they marked well the direction ; and during the night they bored holes in that direction. In the morning the enemy would come up by twos and threes to occupy their chosen post ; or the garrison would do something to attract them there. Then the muskets would be discharged from the new loop-holes. The result was almost always successful. This method of out-witting the enemy was tried again and again, and generally with success.

**Correction
of prodigality
of fire.**

At the commencement of the siege officers and men were prodigal of their fire. Even on the darkest night they discharged their pieces at an enemy they could not see. But, at the end of about ten days, this evil corrected itself. The fatigue was too great, the constant recoil of the piece too painful, to permit it to continue. After that the men husbanded their resources and never fired but when they could cover a foe. The garrison learned after the siege that nothing had tended more to daunt the enemy than the perfect stillness which used to prevail in the intrenchment during the night.

**The look-out
system.**

Another most important matter in the defence was the mode adopted to obtain information of the enemy's movements. To procure this information, an organised system of "look-out" was established at a very early date. It was carried out in this way. At daybreak an officer, accompanied by a sepoy, was detailed to take post in the highest tower on the roof of the Residency.

From holes made in this tower the officer watched all the movements of the foe. He had slips of paper with him, and one of these he sent down by the sepoy whenever necessary. They were relieved every two hours. A precisely similar watch was maintained from the roof of the Post office. In this manner the Brigadier was kept acquainted with the movements which came within observation. These duties were by no means devoid of danger. During the defence two officers were severely wounded while so employed.

As I am writing of the roof of the Residency this may be a fitting place to record that on the highest point of that roof the British flag waved gloriously throughout the long siege. Whilst the members of the garrison felt a noble pride in thus displaying to their assailants their resolute confidence, the sight of that symbol of British predominance filled the hearts of those assailants with fury. The flag was a constant aim of their sharpshooters. Again and again were the halyards severed; the flag was riddled; the staff cut through, by bullets. But, as soon as darkness permitted, a new staff, new halyards, were supplied. Patched up though it might be, the flag continued to the last to float defiance to the enemies of England.

Perhaps no mode of foiling the enemy was more mining. practised by a portion of the garrison than mining and counter-mining. To enable the general reader to understand how this was effected I will briefly describe the process carried on in the defences as described to me by one of those who

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The British
flag.

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The method
adopted.

was present. A shaft some four feet in diameter was sunk in the interior of the defences, as near as possible to the point to be assailed, to a depth of from twelve to twenty feet, according to circumstances. From this the gallery was run out in the direction and to the distance required. Now the real toil began. One man—an officer or soldier as the case might be—worked with a short pickaxe, or crowbar, to loosen the earth in front of him—to make a burrow just sufficiently high to clear his head when seated, and wide enough to allow of his working. Close behind this first worker sat another with an empty wine case. This he filled with loose earth. When filled he jerked a cord as a signal, and the box was drawn to the shaft, where another individual again gave notice to two at the top holding a rope attached to either side of the case. These pulled it to the surface, emptied, and returned it. Thus five men worked at once. Two in the mine, one at the bottom of the shaft, two above it.

There were usually ten men thus employed on one mine, relieving each other at intervals agreed upon by themselves. The usual spell was half an hour, but was not unfrequently less. As the gallery progressed, it was visited by an officer of Engineers, who gave all necessary instructions.

These mines were not always made for offensive purposes. Frequently they were used to cut off the subterraneous advance of the enemy. In such cases they were run out a short distance, and then carried on laterally.

The fatigue and labour of constructing such

works with indifferent tools and scant and impromptu appliances in a hot night in India, after fighting and working all day on an insufficiency of indifferent food, and without stimulants of any kind, cannot easily be imagined.

It deserves to be remarked that throughout the siege officers and men equally stood sentry. There were no exemptions. No place within the defences was absolutely safe. Even the building used as a hospital was constantly under artillery fire. In August a shell exploded there, killing one sepoy and wounding two others. On the 5th of September an 18-pounder shot traversed the building, wounding again Lieutenant Charlton and a soldier of the 32nd. In fact, both attendants and patients were always under fire.

But to return. The defeat of the 18th of August had a depressing effect on the mutineers. They kept up, it is true, during the next day, a heavy fire, but they made no serious attempt to prevent the further demolition of houses and buildings outside the defences which had, up to that time, afforded them excellent cover. This demolition was effected by a small party under Captains Fulton, Hutchinson, and Anderson, supported from within the defences by a covering fire.

The day following, however, the rebels had recovered their spirits, and, covered by the heaviest cannonade the garrison had till then sustained, made an attempt to burn down the gates at the Baillie Guard, but without result. They soon had to learn that mining was an art which

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The officers
and men
share alike.

The hospital
no place of
safety.

Houses out-
side the in-
trenchment
demolished.

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August 19.

The garrison
successfully
mine Jo-
hannes'
house.

could be practised by defenders as well as by assailants. Johannes' house, held by the enemy, was a dominant position, and, as the siege wore on, the fire from it had become intolerable. It could no longer be taken by a sortie, for the enemy, warned by the previous successful sally, held it in such force as to render impossible any further attempt of the kind. There was only one resource, and that was to mine under it. Many nights of terrible toil, sustained almost exclusively by the officers, were spent in the work. At last the Engineer officer reported that the mine was, he believed, well advanced under the building. It was then heavily charged. To entice as many of the enemy as possible within the building, the garrison, on the 21st, opened upon it a heavy musketry fire. The enemy, regarding this fire as the prelude to another sortie, crowded into the house to assist in its defence. No sooner did the garrison note this than they fired the mine. The result was most successful. Johannes' house played no further part in the siege of Lakhnau.

Occurrences
between the
third and
fourth as-
sault.

In the interval between this date and the fourth and last assault on the 5th of September the losses of the garrison alike from the fire of the enemy and from sickness were very heavy. I find Captain Wilson, the Assistant Adjutant-General, thus writing in his journal on the 23rd of August :— “A heavy cannonade from the enemy from daylight till about 10 P.M. when it slackened. Their principal efforts were against the Brigade Mess-house and Kánpúr battery : the former they

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August 23.

seriously damaged, and succeeded in entirely levelling the guard-houses on the top, both of which had fallen in and there was no longer any cover for our musketry to fire from. Our ranks were rapidly thinning." The following extract from the same diary on the same day will show the enormous difficulties which beset the garrison even in the matter of labour absolutely necessary and of the repair of damages from the enemy's shot. "We had work nightly," writes Captain Wilson, "for at least three hundred men; we had the defences to repair daily, supplies to remove from godowns which were fallen in from the effect of the enemy's shot, mines to counter-mine, guns to remove, barricades to erect, corpses to bury, and rations to serve out; but with our weak, harassed, and daily diminishing garrison, we could seldom produce as working parties more than three fatigue parties of eight or ten men each relief." Other difficulties too were overtaking them. It was the rainy season. And the grass and jungle outside the defences had grown in the prolific manner natural to grass and jungle during the rainy season in India. This extreme growth rendered it possible for the mutineers to steal up, unobserved, close to the intrenchment. The heavy rain had likewise greatly injured many of the defences. Many of the supplies had been expended; the supply of tobacco was exhausted; flour had become scarce.

The supplies diminished.

In place of flour wheat was now issued to all who could find time to grind it. The stench from decaying and decayed offal had become, in many

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Hopes of
relief.

places, scarcely durable. Mortality from sickness had, too, become very prevalent especially amongst the children.

There was, however, during this period one great counterpoise to the mental and bodily wear and tear. The garrison were still buoyed up by hope from outside. On the 22nd and 23rd reports of distant firing were heard. These had been often noticed before, and now caused but little excitement. But on the 28th, the messenger Angad returned within the intrenchment conveying a letter from General Havelock, dated the 24th, with the information that he had no hope of being able to relieve them for twenty-five days. They had a certainty then of three weeks' continuance of this life, probably of more. One result of this letter was a further reduction in the amount of rations !

The fourth
grand assault.

On the 5th of September the enemy tried their fourth grand assault. The morning was fine, with a late moon giving a clear light before day had broken. The enemy, however, waited for the dawn to commence a cannonade severer, if possible, than the last referred to. As the sun rose about eight thousand rebel infantry were descried preparing for an assault. It is needless to add that the garrison were ready—waiting for it. About 10 o'clock the enemy exploded two mines, one—the larger—close to the 18-pounder battery ; the other at the Brigade Mess-house. Fortunately they had miscalculated their distance and in each case the explosion did little harm. But as soon as the smoke

had cleared away they were seen advancing with great resolution—their attack specially directed against Gubbins's post. Planting an enormous ladder against the bastion they essayed to mount it. Several reached the top but they encountered so heavy a fire of musketry and hand-grenades from the defenders that not a man could gain a footing. They came on again and again, however, with extraordinary courage,—not only against this point but against the Sikh square and the Brigade Mess-house; nor was it until Repulsed. they had lost an enormous number of men that they fell back, beaten, baffled, and dispirited. The British loss amounted to but three killed and one wounded.

It deserves to be recorded that in this attack eight sepoys of the 13th Native Infantry, assisted by three artillerymen, loaded and worked the 18-pounder in the 13th battery, and after three or four rounds, succeeded in silencing the 18-pounder opposed to them. This battery was entirely under charge of those sepoys. It had been constructed solely by them under the superintendence of the Engineers, and they were very proud of it.

Similar attacks, though in less force, were made the same day at other points, but they were all repulsed. The 5th of September was, in fact, the worst day the assailants had experienced. They had lost more men than on any previous occasion, and they appeared to those of the garrison who occupied positions commanding a view of their retreat to be more thoroughly

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September 5.

The "eight" of the 13th Native Infantry.

The assailants are dispirited by their repulse.

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September.

Sickness
increases
within the
defences.

beaten than ever. Certainly they were more thoroughly dispirited, for they never tried a general assault again.

Still for twenty days the garrison remained cut off from the outer world, exposed day and night to a heavy fire of musketry and guns, to mines, to surprises, to attacks on isolated parts. The most unhealthy month of the year, the month in which the stagnant water caused by the abundant rainfall of July and August dries up, emitting miasmatic smells bearing with them fever, dysentery and cholera, had now come to find a congenial field for its ravages within the intrenchments. The live stock, too, was sensibly diminishing, the small stock of rum and porter,* reserved only for the sick and wounded, was running low. As the numbers of the garrison diminished the labours of the survivors naturally augmented. Added to this, scarcely a day passed but some portion of one or other of the posts crumbled under the weight of the enemy's fire. Now it was two sides of Innes's house, steadily cannonaded daily with 18-pounder shot, that fell in;† now the verandah of the Residency

* Some idea of the scarcity nel shirt fetched £4, whilst may be conceived from the five old ones realised £11 4s. prices realised at auction and On the 19th the price of a at private sales. On the 10th bottle of brandy had risen a bottle of brandy realised to £2.

at auction £1 14s.; on the † The post was, however, 12th, £2 were given for a still nobly held, and prepara-small chicken; £1 12s. for a bottle of Curaçoa, whilst the same price was offered for two —*Diary of a Staff Officer.* pounds of sugar. A new flan-

that succumbed to incessant battering ; now the wall of the building occupied by the boys of the Martinière. Some idea of the incessant nature of the hostile fire may be gleaned from the fact that on the 8th of September two hundred and eighty round shot, which had lodged there during the siege, varying in size from a 24 to a 3-pounder, were gathered from the roof of the Brigade Mess-house alone !

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At 10 P.M. on the 16th the pensioner Angad was again sent out with a letter rolled up in a quill for General Havelock. He evinced no reluctance. The risk was great, certain death if discovered, but the reward promised him was enormous—not less than five hundred pounds a trip. He was absent just six days. He returned at 11 P.M. on the 22nd bringing with him a letter containing the gratifying intelligence that the relieving force had crossed the Ganges and would arrive in three or four days ! To guard against that depression amongst his men apt to be engendered by disappointed hope, the Brigadier put on ten days to the time, and announced to the garrison that help from outside would arrive certainly within the fortnight. The effect was electric. The garrison were greatly elated by the news, and on many of the sick and wounded the speedy prospect of a possible change of air and security exercised a most beneficial effect. As to Angad—whatever may have been his adventures, they had satisfied him for his life. “Live or die,” he exclaimed,

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Angad again
sent out.

Angad brings
glad tidings.

“I have made the trip three times in safety ;

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The approach
of the reliev-
ing force
heralded.

I'll go no more, but come life or death I'll remain with you." *

On the 23rd—the day following Angad's return—a smart cannonade was heard in the direction of Kánpúr: some even fancied they heard musketry fire. A considerable movement of troops was also observed in the city, but the object was not apparent. A similar sound of distant firing and a similar movement of troops in the city was noticed likewise on the 24th. The night that followed was very unquiet, two alarms keeping the whole garrison under arms. It subsequently transpired that the enemy, aware of the near approach of the relieving force, were determined to use all possible means to prevent communication between that force and the garrison. Sounds indicating great disturbance reached them from the city. At 10 o'clock the following morning a messenger arrived bringing an old letter from General Outram dated the 16th. The messenger could only add of his own knowledge that the relieving force had reached the outskirts of the city. The anxiety of the garrison was now intense. It was not lessened by the gradual cessation of the fire about an hour later (11 A.M.). The sounds of disturbance still continued, however, to reach them from the city. At noon the sound of musketry and of cannon close at hand gladdened their ears, whilst the smoke from the discharge of the latter showed that their friends were within the limits of the city. The excitement now almost

**Intense
excitement of
the garrison.**

* Angad had made four these only had been undertaken trips; but the three last of by order of the Brigadier.

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passed the power of endurance. But it had to be borne. For an hour and a half it was evident that a fierce struggle was going on. But then it became evident that the European had asserted his superiority. At 1.30 P.M. many of the people of the city commenced leaving with bundles of clothes on their heads and took the direction of the cantonments across the different bridges. At 2 P.M. armed men and sepoys began to follow them, accompanied by large bodies of Irregular Cavalry. Whilst the struggle in the city had been progressing a blockading party of the enemy's troops had continued to keep a heavy fire on our defences. They continued it, now that their comrades were retreating, more vigorously than ever. But the garrison, leaving them to do their worst, brought every gun and mortar to bear on the foe fleeing from the city. They were able to do this with the more effect as the bridge of boats had been carried away, and many of the enemy's cavalry had to swim the river Gúmtí. The cannonade on these men lasted an hour and a half, a proof that their numbers must have been considerable.

The scene that followed cannot be better told than in the words of one to whose diary* I am so largely indebted. "At 4 P.M." writes Captain Wilson in his journal "report was made that some officers dressed in shooting coats and solah hats, a regiment of Europeans in blue pantaloons and shirts and a bullock battery were seen near

Signs of the
enemy's de-
feat.

The relief.

* *The Defence of Lucknow,—a Diary by a Staff Officer.*

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Mr. Martin's house and the Motí Mahal. At 5 P.M. volleys of musketry, rapidly growing louder, were heard in the city. But soon the firing of a Minié ball over our heads gave notice of the still nearer approach of our friends, of whom as yet little or nothing had been seen, though the enemy had been seen firing heavily on them from many of the roofs of the houses. Five minutes later, and our troops were seen fighting their way through one of the principal streets; and though men fell at almost every step yet nothing could withstand the headlong gallantry of our reinforcements. Once fairly *seen*, all our doubts and fears regarding them were ended: and then the garrison's long pent-up feelings of anxiety and suspense burst forth in a succession of deafening cheers. From every pit, trench, and battery—from behind the sandbags piled on shattered houses—from every post still held by a few gallant spirits, rose cheer on cheer. Even from the hospital many of the wounded crawled forth to join in that glad shout of welcome to those who had so bravely come to our assistance. It was a moment never to be forgotten.

The meeting.

"Soon," continues the journal, "soon all the rear-guard and heavy guns were inside our position; and then ensued a scene which baffles description. For eighty-seven days the Lakhnao garrison had lived in utter ignorance of all that had taken place outside. Wives who had long mourned their husbands as dead were again restored to them. Others, fondly looking for-

ward to glad meetings with those near and dear to them, now for the first time learned that they were alone. On all sides eager inquiries for relations and friends were made. Alas ! in too many instances the answer was a painful one."

But relief had come. Communication with the outer world had been opened. By whom had this gallant dash through the beleaguering force been accomplished? This is a question which I shall answer fully in the next chapter. In this place I will only add that when the delirium of joy at the sight of old friends, and of receiving intelligence from outside had given place to sober considerations, it was recognised that the garrison had been not relieved, but reinforced; that the losses sustained by the incoming force had been so great that, combined with the garrison, they still could not thoroughly master the enemy. In some respects, even, the position of the garrison had been rendered worse. There were more mouths to feed, and there was no increase of food to supply them; more accommodation to be provided only to be obtained by extending the position; and withal the uncertainty as to the period when it would be possible for the Government to equip another force sufficiently large to attempt a real relief.

But with the arrival of that force concludes Summary. the episode of the first siege of the Lakhnao Residency. If in the course of my narrative of that unsurpassed trial of courage and endurance I have not more markedly referred to individuals by name it is because, where all fought so nobly,

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Was it relief
or reinforce-
ment?

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Honour to
whom honour
is due.

where all showed such a devotion without stint and a valour that was dauntless, I have thought it becoming to accept the judgment—the keen and decisive judgment—of the man who was in all respects the best qualified to form an opinion. In his admirable report to the Government of India* Brigadier Inglis has specially mentioned those to whom he considered himself most indebted. In that report the members of the staff; the commandants of outposts; the officers of the artillery, of the 32nd, of the 84th, and of the native regiments; the gentlemen of the Civil Service, covenanted and uncovenanted; of the medical service, and those unconnected with the Government, are specially mentioned. Omitting necessarily the names of the class regarding which Sir William Napier wrote: “no honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the applauses of his countrymen”—the private soldier—all, who in the opinion of the Brigadier deserved special mention, have been mentioned. But there is one exception—an important though necessary exception. Brigadier Inglis could say nothing regarding the conduct of Brigadier Inglis. I may be allowed to fill up the vacuum.

Brigadier
Inglis.

To command a small party defending a weak intrenchment against an overwhelming force, certain sterling qualities are necessary. A man need not be a strategist or a tactician. But, whilst confident in bearing, unyielding in temper, he

* *Vide Appendix B.*

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must be bold, determined, and resolute in action. He must likewise possess the valuable quality the existence of which displays itself in the capacity to weigh correctly the professional opinions of the officers about him. Now by the testimony of all with whom I have conversed on the subject Brigadier Inglis fulfilled all these conditions. His daring obstinacy in resisting, his confident mien, his cool courage, gained him the respect and affection of officers and men. What he might have accomplished in the field I cannot say. But it may with confidence be affirmed that for the actual duties devolving upon him—for the defence of a weak post with a small force—few men were better qualified than Brigadier Inglis, and certainly no one more merited than he the honours and promotion by the bestowal of which a grateful country showed its sense of the eminent service he had rendered.

But it is impossible to allude to the qualities of Captain Wilson without paying a special tribute to the man who was his right hand—a man to whose untiring watchfulness, great decision, and unceasing exertions, the prolonged and successful defence of the Residency was in no small measure attributable. This is not my opinion only. It was the opinion of Brigadier Inglis: it is the opinion of every man of the garrison with whom I have spoken. I allude to Captain Thomas Fourness Wilson, now Colonel Wilson, C.B., of the Bengal Staff Corps, and A.D.C. to the Queen.

Captain Wilson had been nineteen years in the army when the mutiny broke out. He had no inte-

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rest, and was still but a regimental captain when Sir Henry Lawrence came to Lakhnao. On being nominated brigadier-general Sir Henry was naturally anxious to have as his assistant adjutant-general a perfectly competent officer. He selected Captain Wilson, unknown to him before, but whom he had specially marked from the time of his first conversation with him. Brought at once into confidential relationship with Sir Henry Wilson speedily gained his admiration and esteem. His activity, his prudence, his cool daring, his stern and inflexible nature, the determination with which he carried out orders, marked him as the man for the occasion. And when, after Sir Henry's death, Wilson served under Inglis in the same capacity, he won his confidence by the display of the same qualities which had gained for him the esteem of his predecessor.

It is impossible, indeed, to over-estimate the "splendid conduct," of this officer during the long siege. Brigadier Inglis, from whom I have taken this expression, wrote of him at the time that he "was ever to be found where shot were flying thickest;" and he bore emphatic testimony alike to "his untiring physical endurance and bravery," and to "his ever ready and pertinent counsel and advice in moments of difficulty and danger." Every night throughout the siege he visited the several posts, ready with advice, with assistance, with encouragement. His determined nature, his prompt decision, were invaluable to all, from the Brigadier to the meanest private. Nor will it be possible to speak of the gallant

defence of the beleaguered Residency without associating it in the mind with the name of Thomas Fourness Wilson.

Brigadier Inglis was fortunate in his Engineers. Captain Fulton, who, to the grief and dismay of every one in the garrison, was killed on the 14th of September. Captain Fulton was a man unsurpassed in his profession, supremely daring, and ever courting danger. No one than he more fertile in resource, more ready, more eager. He was peculiarly happy in the devices he adopted to foil the cunning of the enemy. A short experience had convinced him that when he had detected the enemy mining the wisest plan was to meet him with a countermine. Often would he proceed, pistol in hand, descend into the burrow which formed his countermine, and wait listening to the progress of the hostile pickaxe on the same level. The enemy hearing no sound would continue to work confidently. Suddenly the ground would give way to the pick. A lantern would be shown behind the leading man. Instantly Fulton's pistol would lay that man low. The others unable to pass him would turn and run. Before they could come back the mine would be filled and exploded. His death, occurring but eleven days before the relief, was most acutely felt and lamented by all. It even caused a feeling akin to dismay.

Amongst others who are gone a tribute must be paid here to Lieutenant James, the Commissariat officer. It would be difficult, indeed, to add a word to the glowing eulogium of Brigadier

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Captain Ful-
ton.

Lieutenant
James.

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Inglis. “It is not too much to say that the garrison owe their lives to the exertions and firmness of this officer.” Wounded as he was at Chinhāt by a ball in the knee, causing him immense suffering, he refused to be placed on the sick list, and never ceased to pay the strictest attention to his onerous duties. His determination and his courage were alike conspicuous. His peculiar temperament fitted him exactly for the position he held. Lieutenant James lived to justify to the full the high opinion entertained of him by all his comrades. He met his death in the prime of life when pigsticking in Bengal. As a tribute—though a feeble tribute—to his daring nature and manly qualities he was buried in the scarlet hunting coat which he wore when he met his fatal accident.

Mr. Couper,
C.S.

I have spoken of Mr. Couper. This gentleman deserves more than a passing mention. A civilian, he was ever ready to descend into the mine, to visit the posts, to assist in interring the dead animals, to dig trenches, to carry stores, and to fight. He was ever cheery and buoyant. His subsequent career has not belied the early promise. For at the present moment he is Sir George Couper, Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces.

These men were types of their class in devotion to duty, and to their country. There were many others. Prominent amongst those who fell during the siege, nobly fighting, or who died of wounds, or from other causes, were Radcliffe of the 9th Cavalry, daring, ready-witted, full of energy; Francis of the 13th Native Infantry, “a brave,

The honoured
dead.

good officer, respected by all, and in whom Sir H. Lawrence had much confidence"; Anderson, the Chief Engineer, to whose able counsel Brigadier Inglis felt deeply indebted; Simons, of the Artillery, distinguished at Chinhat; Case, of the 32nd, who fell when gallantly leading on his men at that battle; Shepherd and Arthur, of the 7th Cavalry, killed at their posts; Hughes, of the 57th Native Infantry; Mansfield and McCabe, of the 32nd—all three foremost in danger; Lucas, a gentleman volunteer, and Boyson of the uncovenanted service, both conspicuous for their coolness and courage. These were among the honoured dead. To mention with them the survivors who rivalled them, men of whom Master, Langmore, and Aitken were the types, it would be necessary to recount the story of the siege in every minute detail.

It is difficult to praise too highly the fidelity and gallantry of the remnants of the 13th, the 48th, and the 71st Native Infantry, and the daring and bravery of their officers. Of those regiments the 13th counted the greatest number of loyal men. They were chiefly posted at the Baillie Guard. This position was described by Brigadier Inglis as "perhaps the most important in the whole line of defences." Here, led by the most gallant of men, Lieutenant Aitken, they rendered the most splendid service. "They were exposed," reported Brigadier Inglis, "to a most galling fire of round shot and musketry, which materially decreased their numbers. They were so near the enem-

The native
troops.

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that conversation could be carried on between them; and every effort, persuasion, promise, and threat, was alternately resorted to, in vain, to seduce them from their allegiance to the handful of Europeans, who, in all probability, would have been sacrificed by their desertion." They vied with their European comrades in the work of the trenches, in the ardour of their courage, in their resolution to defend to the last the spot of ground assigned to them. True it is that they were led by their own officers, and it would be impossible to overpraise men such as Germon, Aitken, and Loughnan, of that regiment. But the sepoy did more than fight. They risked even their caste for the English. On an occasion when it had become necessary to dig new intrenchments, and to erect a new battery on the spot where sepoy had been previously buried, the highest Bráhmans of the 13th responding to the call of the gallant Aitken, themselves handled the putrid corpses to throw them into the outer ditch.

A few words must here be devoted to the native pensioners who replied to the call of Sir Henry Lawrence. I have stated in a previous page that about one hundred and eighty of these men were enrolled. It is difficult to write in too high terms of the conduct of these men. Most of them were old, the vision of some was impaired. Yet they bore themselves most bravely. Unable to work much, they yet manned the loopholes, and the least capable amongst them were ever ready to load and pass to their countrymen the spare muskets always at hand. Notwith-

The pen-
sioners.

standing the facts that throughout the siege these men received no tidings from their family or their relations ; that they were on reduced rations and entirely deprived of the condiments so highly prized by a native of India in his advanced years ; not a single instance of desertion occurred amongst these men. Some died, many were killed, yet no one heard a grumble from the survivors. They continued to the last to abuse the rebels, and to declare that having for so many years eaten the salt of the State, the State had a right to their lives.

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Imperfect as is this story of this first siege, it would be still more so were it to contain no reference to those who, despite their own sufferings and their own privations, used every effort to assuage the sufferings and the privations of others. "Many," wrote Brigadier Inglis referring to the ladies, "among whom may be mentioned the honoured names of Birch, of Polehampton, of Barber, and of Gall, have, after the example of Miss Nightingale, constituted themselves the tender and solicitous nurses of the wounded and dying soldiers in the hospital." The word "many" might be held to include all whose attention was not absorbed by their own children, or who were not held down by sickness and ill health. They were exposed to danger of no ordinary kind, to privations almost unparalleled. When the siege began the number of ladies amounted to sixty-eight, and of children sixty-six. Of the former seven, of the latter twenty-three succumbed to the want of suitable food, to the fire of the enemy, and to

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The losses
sustained.

privations. It has rarely happened that ladies have been placed in a position so trying—never that they have displayed qualities more worthy of respectful homage.

One word regarding the losses sustained by the defenders. I have already stated that at the beginning of the siege the strength of the garrison amounted to nine hundred and twenty-seven Europeans, and seven hundred and sixty-five natives. Of the Europeans, one hundred and forty were killed or died of their wounds; one hundred and ninety were wounded; this does not include sixteen non-military men killed and fourteen wounded. Of the natives, seventy-two were killed and one hundred and thirty-one were wounded. There were deaths from other causes, and a few of the natives deserted. This is certain that on the 25th of September the number of the European defenders, including sick and wounded, had been reduced to five hundred and seventy-seven; that of the natives to four hundred and two. In eighty-seven days the garrison had thus been reduced, in various ways, by three-eighths.

But they are now in the first delirium of the long-expected relief. They are welcoming with enthusiastic delight Outram, Havelock, and their gallant following. It remains for me now to relate how it was that Outram and Havelock accomplished the great feat of arms with which their names will for ever be associated.

B O O K I X.

CHAPTER III.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL NEILL, pressed by the Commander of the Forces, Sir Patrick Grant, to hasten to Kánpúr to join General Havelock as soon as possible, in order that he might be on the spot to take command of the force should Havelock from any cause become unfit for the duty, left Alláhábád on the 16th of July, and proceeding with all possible expedition, reached Kánpúr on the 20th. On his way he had received a note from General Havelock telling him that he was anxiously awaiting his arrival, as immediately on that occurring, he intended "to strike a blow that will rebound through India." Neill, as I have said, arrived on the 20th. He dined that evening with Havelock, and was informed that he intended to begin the passage of the Ganges on the morrow, leaving Neill in command at Kánpúr with about two hundred men, the majority of whom were sick and wounded. In this arrangement, Neill,

July 16.

Brigadier-General Neill arrives at Kánpúr.

Havelock announces his intention to march to relieve Lakhnao.

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1857.
July 20.

He traces
out a position
on the Káñh-
púr side.

Havelock
crosses into
Oudh.

Takes no
impedimenta
with him.

anxious that Havelock should take with him every available man, entirely concurred.

Before deciding on making a desperate effort to relieve Lakhnao General Havelock had traced out a position resting on the river, which it would be easy for a small force to hold against very superior numbers. The work was being intrenched and some guns were being mounted there at the time of Neill's arrival. He was to complete and to hold it.

The morning of the 21st set in rainy—the heavy rain of the Indian monsoon—but the preparations had been made the evening before, and, in the presence of Havelock's determination to push on, nothing would have stayed them. That day the artillery and a portion of the 78th Highlanders passed over to the opposite bank. To cross the Ganges in the height of the rainy season is no easy matter. The breadth of the swollen river, the rapidity of the current, alone present formidable obstacles. Fortunately, the General had at his disposal a small steamer. To this steamer he caused to be attached five or six of the boats peculiar to the country, and these she towed across—with difficulty; for it was all she could do to hold her own against the current.

It will easily be understood that, under the circumstances stated, and although the force destined for the expedition numbered little more than fifteen hundred men, and although they took with them no tents of any kind, the operation should be tedious. It occupied just four days. On the afternoon of the 24th, General Havelock crossed

likewise, and marched the force about five miles on the Lakhnao road, halting for the night at the little village of Mangalwár.

The force which was now starting on an expedition, which, however desperate it was, seemed at the time to present, under so daring a leader as Havelock, some chance of success, consisted of artillery—ten guns, imperfectly equipped and imperfectly manned; of infantry—the remnants of the 64th, the 84th, the 78th, the Madras Fusiliers, and of Brasyers' Sikhs; and of cavalry, some sixty volunteer horse. Small as were their numbers they were animated by the best spirit, and had unbounded confidence in their General.

On the night of the 24th of July this force bivouacked at Mangalwár. It remained halted at that village four days, to enable the General to complete his dispositions for carriage and supplies.

On the 28th these had been made so far as, in the disorganised state of the country, it was possible to make them. At 5 o'clock on the morning of the 29th the force began its onward movement.

After marching three miles the advanced pickets of the enemy were discerned. These fell back as our men still pressed on, and disclosed the enemy occupying a very strong position. Their main force rested on the town of Onáo, a straggling place, extending about three-quarters of a mile, and which the heavy rains and the nature of the soil rendered it impossible to turn on either side. In advance of this town, and between it and the British force, was a succession of walled enclosures, filled with skirmishers. These joined

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1857.
July 21.

Constitution
of his force.

His first
bivouac at
Mangalwár.

Makes a de-
cided ad-
vance.

Finds the re-
bels occupy-
ing Onáo.

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CHAPTER III.

—
1857.
July 29.

Strength of
the position.

Havelock is
forced to at-
tack it in
front.

His first suc-
cess.

He man-
œuvres to be
attacked.

themselves on to a village, united with Onao by a narrow passage, and all the houses in which were loop-holed and occupied. The narrow passage referred to was also commanded by loop-holed houses on either side of it, whilst the enemy had placed their batteries so as to pour a concentrated fire on troops advancing against the town.

It was impossible to turn such a position; it was murderous work to attack it in front. But if he was to get on at all Havelock had no option. The simple motto of "move straight forward," embodying a principle which has never failed when tried by British troops against Asiatics, must be adopted. After a steady reconnaissance, then, Havelock gave his orders. Covering his main body with skirmishers, armed with the Enfield rifle, he opened a heavy fire from them and from his guns on the more advanced positions of the enemy. This fire drove them from those positions and forced them to take refuge in the loop-holed houses. At these Havelock then sent the 78th Highlanders and the Madras Fusiliers. Gallantly did they advance. But to dislodge an enemy from loop-holed houses, singly, one after another, is deadly work. So our men found it. Havelock, therefore, ordered up the 64th. Their advance decided the day. The enemy were either bayoneted in the houses or sought refuge in flight.

But the town of Onao was still in the enemy's possession, and, what was of more consequence, fresh troops were observed hastening down the Lakhnao road in its direction. Havelock at once

1857.
July 29

made preparations to meet them. Drawing off his force on to a spot of dry ground between the village and the town, he placed his guns in a position to command the high road, by which alone he could be attacked, and waited for the movement of the enemy further to develop itself. In a short time it was manifest he would be attacked. They were marching in dense masses upon him. Havelock's joy was great. He felt that he had them. Restraining his impatience till they were well within distance, he suddenly opened upon them from both arms a withering fire. It stopped them. They attempted to deploy. But on either side of them were swamps and marshes. Consequently, their horses and their guns stuck fast, their infantry floundered. All this time they were exposed to a continuous fire. Being what they were they did not then make the one movement, a straight rush, which might have saved them. Meanwhile, some of our men, wading in the marshes, made their presence perceptible on either flank. That was the final blow. The rebels gave way, and fled precipitately, leaving in our possession fifteen guns.

Success of
manoeuvre

In one of his letters written during his advance on Kánpúr, I think it was just after the battle which gave him that place, Havelock remarked that viewing his position, he suddenly recollected "old Frederic at Leuthen," and acted accordingly. Probably no man had more completely studied the campaigns of that great master in the art of war, as well as those of his immediate successor in the roll of Fame. If he had learned from

He deter-
mines to
follow up
blow.

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July 29.

Frederic the mode in which to turn to his own advantage a false position occupied by himself he ever adhered strictly to the Napoleonic maxim of promptly following up a victory. He could not at Onáo put into execution this maxim in the manner which would have gladdened his heart—for to carry it out efficiently a general has need of cavalry, and Havelock had but sixty sabres. But he could and he did work it in the only way open to him. Notwithstanding that he and his men were under the terrible July sun of India, he determined to push on after the enemy as soon as his men should have satisfied the cravings of exhausted nature. He ordered, then, a halt; and while the cooks prepared the food, and the doctors attended the wounded, he caused to be disabled the fifteen guns he had captured, for want of cattle to take them with him!

Gives his men
their food;and pushes
forwards.Finds the
enemy in
force at
Bashíratganj.

At the end of three hours the men again fell in, and pushed forwards—always towards Lakhnao. They had marched six miles, when suddenly they came in sight of a walled town, situated in the open, and intersected by the road which they must traverse. This was the town of Bashíratganj. It looked very formidable. In front of it was a large pond or tank, swollen by the surrounding inundation to the form of a river. On the Lakhnao side of it was another pond or lake, traversed by a narrow causeway. It possessed besides a wet ditch, and its main gate was defended by an earth-work and four guns, and flanked on either side by loop-holed turrets. Havelock halted his men, while he rode to reconnoitre. The scheme that

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July 29.

Endeavours,
while attack-
ing in front,
to cut them
off.

Forces the
position, but
fails to cut
them off.

Result of the
day's fight-
ing.

Considera-
tions which
forced them
selves upon
his notice

his brain then conceived was very daring. But it had this great merit that, if successful in every detail, the enemy would be destroyed. He conceived in a word the idea of amusing the enemy with a cannonade, whilst he should send the 64th to cut off the enemy from the causeway. When he should consider that movement sufficiently pronounced, he would storm the town with the 78th and the Madras Fusiliers, and catch the enemy between two fires. He succeeded in all, except in the most decisive of his combinations. He poured a tremendous fire on the town, whilst the 64th made a flank movement to his right; then, when he deemed the moment to have arrived, he sent on his remaining infantry at the main gate. But—one of the chains in his scheme had snapped. The 64th had not reached the causeway—and the main body of the enemy escaped across it.

Still their loss that day had been severe. It was computed that not less than four hundred of them had been killed or wounded. On the British side eighty-eight had been placed *hors de combat*—but two battles had been gained!

But the thoughts of the General that night were not consoling. It was not alone, or even mainly, that his losses in the fight had been heavy. Sickness also had done its work. On the morrow of the two battles he could not, deducting the necessary guards, place in line more than eight hundred and fifty infantry. He knew that in front of him were places to be traversed or stormed, the means of defence of which exceeded those of

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July 30.

the places he had already conquered. Then, he had no means of carrying his sick. He could not leave them. He could not leave behind a sufficient force to guard them. But perhaps his strongest difficulty lay in the fact that every step forwards would take him further from his base, and he had information that that base was threatened. Náná Sáhib, in fact, had no sooner heard of the onward move of the British, than he sent a considerable body of cavalry across the river to cut off their communications with Kálhpúr.

Such arguments as these were sufficient to make even Havelock hesitate. But with them came the other consideration,—the possibility, notwithstanding all these obstacles, of success. But he could not help putting to himself this pertinent question :—What sort of success would it be? If, on the morrow of his first march he could bring only eight hundred and fifty infantry into line, how many would he be able to muster on the morrow of the fourth? This question was answered by the General's own Quartermaster-General in a telegram sent to the Commander-in-Chief. "We could not hope to reach Lakhnao," telegraphed Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser Tytler, on the 31st, "with six hundred effective Europeans; we had then to pass the canal, and force one and a half mile of streets"—and this in face of some thousands of trained and disciplined soldiers, and an armed and countless rabble!

I do not think the soldier lives who would fail to justify the resolution at which Havelock arrived

Dominating
force of those
considera-
tions.

Havelock
falls back on
Onáo.

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July 30.

the following morning, to fall back on Mangalwár, and to ask for reinforcements. From Mangalwár it would be possible to send the sick and wounded to Kánpúr without permanently weakening his force. He effected this movement the following day without haste, and in the most perfect order. He did not march before 2 P.M. and then retired only to Onáo. The following morning (31st) he fell back on Mangalwár. Thence he despatched his sick and wounded into Kánpúr, and a letter to General Neill, stating that he had been forced to fall back, and that to enable him to reach Lakhnao it was necessary that he should receive a reinforcement of a thousand men and another battery of guns.

Neill received this letter the same day. He had assumed command at Kánpúr on the 24th, and in a few hours the troops there had felt the effect of his vigorous and decided character. Neill was a very remarkable man. By the law of desert he stands in the very front rank of those to whom the Indian mutiny gave an opportunity of distinction. It is impossible to put anyone above him. Not only did he succeed in everything he undertook, but he succeeded when the cases were all but desperate. He succeeded because he dared; because he threw into all he attempted the energy of one of the most determined characters ever bestowed on man. Such a man could not fail and live. His whole soul was in his profession. He had made his regiment, the Madras Fusiliers, equal to any in the world. At Banáras he had, by his vigour and decision,

Neill at
Kánpúr.

Character of
Brigadier-
General
Neill.

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July 24.

crushed an outbreak, which, had it been successful, would have raised all the country to the north-west and to within a hundred miles of the capital. The same qualities displayed at Alláh-ábád had saved that important fortress. In the moment of success, when men had begun to stake all their hopes on his advance to Kánpúr, he was suddenly superseded by Havelock. And now, second to that general, he was at Kánpúr commanding there a few invalids, with the commission to finish the fortified work on the river, to erect *têtes de pont*—so that on the subsiding of the waters a bridge of boats might be established—and to send on to his senior officer all the reinforcements in men and material he might receive.

Neill, I have said, assumed command on the 24th of July. He had been but ill-satisfied with the state of affairs, as he found them, at Kánpúr. The location of the troops appeared to him faulty; the camp pitched without method or arrangement; no effectual steps taken to put a stop to the plundering in the city—a plundering carried on by our European and Sikh soldiers.* But on the 24th he was master and could remedy these evils. His first act on the 25th was to appoint a superintendent of police; to re-establish authority and order in the city and bazaars; to put a stop to plundering. He announced his assumption of command, and notified the carrying out of the measures above stated in a telegram the same

It displays
itself in
vigorous
action.

* *Private Journal of Brigadier-General Neill, unpublished.*

day to the Commander of the Forces, Sir Patrick Grant. The spirit of the man showed itself in the all but concluding words of this telegram:—"All well here. I will hold my own against any odds."

He was a bold man who would thus write under existing circumstances. Not only was Neill aware that Náná Sáhib, distant from him but twenty-four miles, was threatening to cross the river and to attack him, but he had received information that the mutinous 42nd Native Infantry were within eight miles of the station, and that other native regiments were gradually collecting on the right bank of the Jamná with the avowed intention of making a dash on Kánpúr. But Neill was not disturbed. "If the 42nd are within reach," he recorded in his journal on the 30th, "I will deal them a blow that will astound them." With the levies of Náná Sáhib he did deal. On the 31st he despatched a party of fifty Fusiliers and twenty-five Sikhs, with two 6-pounders and a $5\frac{1}{2}$ -inch mortar, manned by six gunners, under the command of his aide-de-camp, Captain John Gordon, of the 6th Regiment N. I., in the steamer to Jájamao, to seize the boats in which it was reported Náná Sáhib intended to cross the river. The party destroyed several boats, carried off six or eight, and returned to Kánpúr the next day.

Neill meanwhile had been receiving small reinforcements. He was daily expecting half a battery (Olpherts's), with which to reinforce Havelock; but unfortunately there was a deficiency of gunpowder—and no gunpowder could be ex-

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Chapter III.

1857.
July 25.

Boldness of
his resolves.

Sends Cap-
tain John
Gordon to
clear the
river.

500 NEILL'S FEELINGS AT HAVELOCK'S RETREAT.

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CHAPTER III.

1857.
July 30.

Considera-
tions which
influenced
Neill;

and which
made him
regard with
dismay the
retirement of
Havelock
on Onáo.

pected for a week. Under these circumstances, and in view of the one fact that on the 30th he received from General Wilson, commanding before Dehlí, a letter intimating that it might be necessary for him to retire on Karnál, and of the other that his own position was threatened from the west, it became more than ever necessary to show a bold front, and even, whenever feasible, to strike a blow. The one thing necessary for the success of Neill's views in this respect was that Havelock should continue to move successfully on to Lakhnao.

This being the case, and the character of the man being considered, some idea may be conceived of the fury which seized him when he received, on the night of the 31st, a letter from General Havelock, informing him of his retrograde movement, and that he could not advance until he should receive a reinforcement of a thousand European infantry and another battery of guns. A second letter merely asked for all the infantry that could be spared and half a battery. With the demand for guns came, too, the information that of the fifteen pieces taken from the enemy every one had been destroyed. "Our *prestige* here is gone," records Neill in his journal. The letter from General Wilson was bad enough,—but that was only a possibility—it might not happen. But this retirement, the death-blow to all his hopes, had actually occurred. Who, he asked himself, was to blame for it? He did not take long to answer. He had no love for Havelock. He had felt deeply the slight, as he considered it, that he, the second in

command, had not been invited to assist at the councils of war which had been held; that although asked to communicate unreservedly with Havelock, he had been told to address his Adjutant-General. These things had chafed him. And now this retreat had come to upset all his calculations. He could not restrain himself. He had been asked to communicate "unreservedly" with Havelock through his staff. He determined to write "unreservedly" direct. He did so.*

* The following is the text They are now joined by the of the most salient part of 42nd N.I., which have passed Neill's letter:—"I late last on. I could not move out and night received yours of 6 p.m. intercept them. . . . You talk yesterday. I deeply regret of advancing as soon as reir. you have fallen back one foot. The effect on our prestige is very bad indeed. Your camp was not pitched yesterday before all manner of reports were rife in the city—that you had returned to get more guns, having lost all you took away with you. In fact, the belief amongst all is that you have been defeated and forced back. It has been most unfortunate your not bringing any guns captured from the enemy. The natives will not believe that you captured one. The effect of your retrograde movement will be very injurious to our cause everywhere, and bring down upon us many who would otherwise have held off, or even sided with us. The troops at Gwádiár have marched, whether to this or Agra is not yet known. The troops collected at Fath-wáh will very soon follow.

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Chapter II

1857.
July 31.

Communicates his
opinions to
Havelock,

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CHAPTER III.

1857.
August 2.

and is re-
buked and
makes an
amende.

Havelock
receives a
small rein-
forcement,

Havelock replied in the indignant tone which might have been expected. By this time the first burst of Neill's anger was over, and the rejoinder he sent to Havelock's reply was pronounced by the high authority to which it was referred—the acting Commander-in-Chief, to be "perfectly unexceptionable." The matter was then allowed to drop, but the correspondence had produced between the two generals a coolness which, whilst it did not interfere with co-operation for the good of the State, could yet never be forgotten.

On the 3rd of August Havelock was reinforced by Olpherts's half-battery and a company of the 84th. Hopes had been held out to him that the 5th Fusiliers and the 90th Light Infantry would reach Kánpúr early in August. Had the Government of India only taken the precaution to disarm the native regiments at Dánápúr early in June, this might have been possible. But the fatal trust in men known to be untrustworthy had kept the 5th Fusiliers in Bihár and had

here sharp, for there is much my command, be his experi-
to be done between this and ence what it may. Understand
Agra and Delhí." In his reply, this distinctly, and that a con-
Havelock described this letter sideration of the obstruction
as "the most extraordinary that would arise to the public
letter he had ever perused." service at this moment alone
"There must be an end," he prevents me from taking the
went on to say, "to these pro- stronger step of placing you
ceedings at once. I wrote to under arrest. You now stand
you confidentially on the state warned. Attempt no further
of affairs. You send me back dictation. I have my own
a letter of censure of my reasons, which I will not
measures, reproof and advice communicate to anyone, and
for the future. I do not want I alone am responsible for
and will not receive any of the course which I have
them from an officer under pursued."

stopped the onward progress of the 90th.* This culpable weakness made itself felt in Lakhnao as well as in Bihár. But the disappointment only roused Havelock to renewed exertion. On the 4th of August, having then about fourteen hundred effective men under his command, two heavy guns (24-pounders), two 24-pounder howitzers, and a battery and a half of guns, he started a second time in the direction of the besieged Residency. Having heard that the town of Bashíratganj had been re-occupied in force he bivouacked that night at Onáo. Leaving that place early the following morning he found the enemy occupying a position very similar to that from which he had dislodged them on the 29th of July. This time he determined there should be no mistake; that if the enemy would only wait the completion of his turning movement, they should not escape. Havelock then ordered the advance by the road of the heavy guns, supported by the 1st Madras Fusiliers and the 84th Foot; whilst the 78th Highlanders, the Sikhs, and Maude's battery, should turn the village on its left. The heavy guns, commanded by Lieutenant Crump of the Madras Artillery, a very able and gallant officer, speedily dislodged the enemy from the outer defences. As they retreated our infantry advanced. Meanwhile the turning movement greatly disquieted them. They saw that if carried out it would entrap them. Bewildered by the

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Chapter III.

1857.
August 4.
and renews
his advance
into Oudh.

He finds
the enemy
strongly
posted at
Bashíratganj

Again at-
tempts to
annihilate
them.

They flee in
a panic,

* "So great is the alarm," Fusiliers have been retained, wrote a journalist at the time, though grievously required to "that H.M.'s 90th and 5th reinforce Káhnpur."

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CHAPTER III.

—
1857.
AUGUST 5.

and their
position is
gained.

Considera-
tions which
weighed at
his conjunc-
ture with
Havelock.

progress it was making and much embarrassed by the firing in front of them they were stricken by panic and fled across the causeway. This flight saved them from certain and entire destruction. The turning movement had not been completed. Still it had advanced so far that in their flight across the causeway the enemy came under the fire of the guns of Maude's battery and were mown down in numbers. The heavy guns continued all this time their destructive fire, silencing the guns of the enemy and forcing them back. The rebels did indeed for some time longer hold villages to the right and left of the town, but in the end they were forced out of these.

Still, though the enemy was beaten, "the whole transaction," to use the language employed by Lieutenant-Colonel Tytler to Sir Patrick Grant, "was most unsatisfactory, only two small iron guns, formerly captured by us, and destroyed, in our ideas,* being taken."

The loss of our force had not been large. Two had been killed and twenty-three wounded. The loss of the rebels was estimated at three hundred. But there were weighty considerations to stay further advance. Cholera had broken out in the camp. This disease and fever had placed seventy-five men on the sick list. In the action at Bashíratganj one-fourth of the gun ammunition

* These were the guns captured on the 29th of July. perfectly, however, that the General Havelock reported enemy again fired out of regarding them that they had them." been "dismantled by the Com-

had been expended. Between that town and Lakhnao, was a deep river, the Sái, and three strong places, guarded it was believed by 30,000 men. The zamíndárs, too, had risen on every side in bodies of five hundred or six hundred, independent of the regular troops. "All the men killed yesterday," wrote Colonel Tytler, "were zamíndárs." But even were the force able to reach Lakhnao what could it effect, enfeebled and worn out, against the myriads who would oppose it in the streets? On the morrow of the fight at Bashíratganj it was impossible to parade nine hundred infantry. To what extent would this number be reduced in fighting its way to the Residency?

These were potent reasons against an advance, but there were others still stronger. Intelligence reached Havelock on the 5th that the men of the Gwáliár contingent had successfully mutinied against their own Maharájá, and were threatening to move on Kalpí. Kalpí was a position which would threaten Kánhpúr, and menace the communication with Alláhábád. It is true that had it been possible to strike a decisive blow at Lakhnao the striking of it would have been the best reply to any demonstration on Kalpí. Not less true that a defeat involving a heavy loss to the force in an attempt on Lakhnao would precipitate any such demonstration. The intelligence regarding the Gwáliár force then brought home to Havelock for immediate decision the question of advance or retreat. The advance could scarcely be successful, and yet failure in it

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Chapter III

1857.
August 5

If he con-
tinued to
advance his
numbers
would have
been greatly
reduced.

Other con-
siderations
which in-
fluenced him.

The action
of Havelock
justified.

He falls
back on
Mangalwár,
but again
advances in
order to cover
his passage of
the river.

involved, in Havelock's opinion,* the destruction of his force, and with it, possibly, a disaster at Kánpúr. Retreat only risked Lakhnao. But did not an unsuccessful advance subject Lakhnao to a risk even greater?

No sensible man will deny that, under the circumstances of the case, Havelock exercised a wise judgment in deciding to retire and wait for reinforcements. He fell back on Mangalwár. He lay there for four days recruiting his men. On the 11th he purposed to recross into Kánpúr. But learning that the rebels had established themselves in considerable force at Bashíratganj, with advanced parties at Onáo, prepared to disturb him while crossing, he resolved to anticipate them. For the third time, then, he advanced along the Lakhnao road, pushed the advanced parties of the enemy out of Onáo, and bivouacked near that town for the night. At dawn the following day, the 12th, he set out and found the enemy strongly intrenched behind earthworks in a village in advance of Bashíratganj. Covered by his artillery and skirmishers Havelock advanced in echelon of battalions from his right. The swampy nature of the ground delayed the advance of the heavy guns, and our troops suffered somewhat meanwhile from the enemy's fire. Our guns when in position opened on the earthworks, with-

* "The only three staff of Lucknow involves the loss of officers in my force whom I this force. In this I concur." ever consult confidentially, —*Brigadier-General Havelock* but in whom I entirely confide, *to the Commander-in-Chief*, are unanimously of opinion August 1857.
that an advance to the walls

1857.
August 12.

out, however, making much impression. An infantry charge was, therefore, resolved upon. The 78th Highlanders precipitated themselves, without firing a shot, on the earthworks in front, while the Madras Fusiliers, to whom the turning movement had been entrusted, took them in flank. The result was decisive. Two of the enemy's guns were captured and turned on them. They fled in disorder, leaving about two hundred killed and wounded. Our loss amounted to thirty-five.

Beats the
enemy at
Bashiratganj
and recrosses.

Having thus scared away the enemy Havelock leisurely fell back on the 13th, and by 2 o'clock of that day had recrossed into Kánpúr without a casualty. His troops were taken over in the steamer and in country boats towed by the steamer, the current being still too strong to permit the putting together of the bridge of boats, materials for which had been prepared.

In his absence the gallant Neill had not been idle. The night of the 5th of August intelligence had reached him that a party of the mutinous 42nd Native Infantry, aided by some disaffected villagers, had plundered part of Bithor, and had sacked the house, and carried off the two daughters of Súbádár Narain Rao, a relative of Náná Sáhib, but who, throughout the mutiny, had been staunch in his allegiance to the British, and had suffered much persecution in consequence. Neill at once ordered a party, commanded by Captain J. Gordon, and accompanied by the Súbádár referred to, to set out at daybreak the following morning in the steamer for Bithor. Gordon started at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, having under him forty:

Action of
Neill at
Kánpúr.Again de-
spatches
Captain J.
Gordon to
clear the
river.

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August 6.

men of the Madras Fusiliers, twenty-five Sikhs, and six gunners, in charge of two 6-pounders, and a $5\frac{1}{2}$ -inch mortar. Passing Bithor, the roof of one of Náná Sáhib's houses was observed to be crowded with men. These were speedily put to flight. A party was then sent on shore to endeavour to recover the daughters and property of the Súbádár—the latter accompanying it. In both attempts success attended its efforts. The steamer, whose guns had meanwhile effected considerable damage on the houses and shipping of the rebels—sixteen boats having been sunk—picked up the Súbádár,* his daughters, and property—and reached Kánpúr at 6 o'clock that same evening.

And again.

A third steamer expedition under the same officer, Captain Gordon, was organised for the 8th. The object this time was to intercept the troops of Náná Sáhib, who had begun the previous evening to cross the Ganges three miles above Bithor. The steamer, having on board the same number of troops as on the 6th, set out again at 4 A.M. Passing Bithor, a shot was directed at her from the shore. This was followed by a heavy musketry fire, and it soon became evident that the place was occupied by a strong body of the mutinous 42nd. The steamer returned the fire from guns and Enfields as she slowly moved

* "We then took on board about eight years old. Some of the Súbádár and the Sikhs. of the Súbádár's plundered The Súbádár was looking quite happy, having recovered his two little daughters. One of them (the eldest) is really a beautiful little creature, property was also recovered, so he was in high glee altogether."—*Manuscript Journal of an Officer present.*

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August 8.

on, the sepoy following her, taking advantage of every scrap of cover for three miles. At this point the current was so strong that the steamer could proceed no further. The sepoy then took possession of a house on the bank and opened a heavy fire; but they were speedily shelled out of it. Captain Gordon, unable to make further way against the current, ascertained by other means that no troops were crossing, and then turned the head of the steamer down stream. But after passing Bithor, she struck heavily on a sand-bank. Fortunately this sand-bank was beyond musketry range. There the steamer remained all night. The following morning the enemy brought some guns to bear upon her, but the great strength of the current had enabled her to cut her way through the sand-bank during the night, and at daybreak she dropped down to Kánpúr.

Captain Gordon had ascertained that the number of mutineers, regular troops, at Bithor, amounted to about two thousand. He made his report accordingly to Brigadier Neill. With a soldier's true instinct, Neill the next morning, marched about two hundred men and four guns about three miles on the Bithor road, passing the city on the way. This movement had the best effect. It gave confidence to our well-wishers, and discouraged the rebels and their friends. It was repeated the following day and the day after.

I have already stated that General Havelock recrossed on the 13th. He at once assumed com-

Neill parades
his troops.Havelock
re-assumes
command at
Kánpúr.

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August 13.

mand. The meeting between the two generals was outwardly friendly; but it was impossible after the correspondence I have alluded to that there should be any real cordiality between them. At an interview on the following day Neill expressed to Havelock his opinion that his men were not then in a fit state to march on Lakhnao; that they required rest, and not to be unnecessarily exposed; that it was indispensable that the rebels at Bithor should be dealt with first. The private journal of Neill shows that he still held to his previous opinion, that in retiring after his first victory on the 29th of July, Havelock had committed an error which could not be redeemed until he had received large reinforcements. I cannot concur in this view. Subsequent events prove, I think, that it was not well founded. Indeed—considering the immense temptation to Havelock to advance, the pain which the issue of the order to retreat caused him, I cannot but regard his resistance to that temptation as the most heroic act even of his heroic career.

Havelock's
resistance of
the tempta-
tion to ad-
vance on
Lakhnao
justified by
subsequent
events.

Havelock allowed his troops to rest on the 14th and 15th. At 4 o'clock on the morning of the 16th, leaving only a hundred men under Neill in the intrenched camp, he marched against Bithor. The rebels at that place, now augmented to nearly four thousand, were composed of sepoys from the 17th, 28th, 31st, 34th, and 42nd Native Infantry; of the 2nd Regular and 3rd Irregular Cavalry; of Náná Sáhib's retainers and two guns. Havelock found them drawn up in advance of the castle of Bithor. Their position was strong, being defended

by intrenched mud quadrangles filled with sepoys, and sheltered by plantations of sugar-cane rising high above the head. Two villages, one on either flank, and connected by earth-works, formed the supports of this position. The villages were strongly occupied. The enemy looked so formidable that Havelock resolved to avail himself of his great superiority in guns. He made his men lie down, whilst for twenty minutes he poured on the enemy a heavy fire from the artillery and Enfield rifles. The guns made, however, little impression on the quadrangles, and Havelock saw he must effect his purpose with the bayonet. Covering his infantry with the Madras Fusiliers, he gave the order for an advance. The quadrangles were rapidly approached, but when our men were within twenty yards of them, the men of the 42nd Native Infantry, dressed in their red coats, started up, and met them. Bayonets were actually crossed, and it was not till sixty of the 42nd had fallen that they retired on their supports between the two villages. Havelock cannonaded this position for a time, but the enemy's guns were so well served that he again sent on the infantry. Another desperate contest ensued. The enemy defended their guns with great spirit and were only driven from their position by hard fighting. Meanwhile a body of their cavalry, some two hundred strong, had made a raid on our rear, killed twenty or thirty camp followers, and carried off the mess property of the volunteers. This raid did not, however, affect the action. That was decided in front of Bithor by the defeat of the

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August 16.

Havelock
marches
against the
rebels at
Bithor.

The 42nd
Native In-
fantry cross
bayonets
with our men

and fight
with great
gallantry,

but are
beaten.

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August 16.

he victory
early
sought.

Havelock, on
return from
his victory,
finds himself
superseded.

Reflections
on the policy
of judging
only by re-
sults.

enemy, the capture of his position, and the loss of his two guns.

Still, victory as it was, it was in every sense of the word most exhausting to the victors. In the 84th Regiment seven men died from sunstroke alone. The Madras Fusiliers lost five from the same cause. In killed and wounded we lost between fifty and sixty. The men were much knocked up from fatigue. They could not pursue the enemy, but bivouacked where they had fought. The next morning they returned to Kánpúr.

This was on the 17th. General Havelock found awaiting him on his return a copy of the *Calcutta Gazette*, dated the 5th of August, containing the nomination of Major-General Sir James Outram to the military command of the country in which he was operating. He learned, in fact, that he was superseded. He received this information from the *Gazette* alone. It was accompanied by no communication to break the news. He had the harsh and bald announcement only.

This, then, was the result of his splendid daring, of his victories against Náná Sáhib, of his strenuous efforts to reach Lakhnao ! Supersession ! A hard word to a victorious soldier ! For though Havelock had failed to reach Lakhnao he had ever been victorious. Supersession ! The first thought of a feeble Government when their hopes have not been entirely fulfilled ! With what confidence could any man serve a Government which acted in this manner towards one who had shown, by his daring, his self-negation, his devotion, by his success wherever success was possible,

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August 17.

that he had never despaired of the safety of his country. It was not in this way that Rome treated her generals. Terentius Varro carried rashness to its extreme when he fought Hannibal, yet, recognising the patriotism of his motives, Rome received Varro with applause. She thanked him for not having despaired of the fortunes of the republic. Havelock was opposed to no Hannibal, but he had fought against an enemy exceeding him in numbers, occupying chosen and well fortified positions, and animated by the energy of despair. Circumstances had forced him to emulate even Varro in rashness. He had been compelled to risk much, to put aside the prudent part of the regulations of the military science, to dare and to dare greatly. He had won all his battles. And if in the ultimate aim he had not entirely succeeded, it was to a great extent because the fatuous action of the Government of India with respect to the sepoyes at Dánápúr had hindered the onward progress of the reinforcements by whose aid alone complete success would have been possible!

And he was superseded—without a word—by a simple announcement in the *Gazette*. Again was it apparent that success was the sole standard by which, in those troublous times, the Government judged their servants. Mark their action in this respect. At Dánápúr they threw on Major-General Lloyd the responsibility of disarming or of not disarming the sepoyes. That officer took thereupon certain measures which were not successful. In consequence, the Government super-

The policy of
judging by
results.Examples of
the effect of
that policy as
pursued, with
out discrimi-
nation, by the
Government
of India.

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1857.

August 17.

sede him and announce their intention to bring him to a court-martial. At A'gra, Brigadier Polwhele fights a battle with the enemy, and though one result of that battle was the retirement of the enemy from A'gra, yet in the actual conflict he was beaten. The Government of India promptly remove him from his command. Mr. William Tayler saves the province of Bihár. Then, in the dire extremity to which that province is again brought by the action of the Government he issues an order which in its operation might, under certain circumstances, expose the Government to the chance of losing a few thousand pounds. Fortune brings on the spot a heaven-born soldier to avert that chance. Yet, because it had been incurred, Mr. Tayler is removed from his post and professionally ruined. Neill starts from Calcutta, achieves great things at Banáras and at Alláhábád. The Government of India are impatient for him to march on Kánhpúr. But the mutiny has caused confusion in every department. Supplies have to be stored; carts to be collected; elephants, camels, and bullocks, to be brought in—and this when the whole civil organisation of the country is out of gear. Neill, aided nobly by the civil authorities, completes all his arrangements. At last he is on the point of moving. But there has been some delay—necessary delay—yet delay. The very day he telegraphs he is about to move on he learns that he has been superseded by Havelock. He, labouring, perspiring, taking no rest night or day, displaying an energy that acts as inspiration to

all around him, has not yet been sufficiently expeditious for the occupiers of the gilded saloons of Calcutta. Again, the test of results is applied. Neill makes way for Havelock. And now, under the influence of the same test, Havelock gives way to Outram.

It is one of the glories of our countrymen that, however acutely they may feel a disappointment of this nature it never affects their public conduct. It is this recognition of, and this devotion to, duty that stamp the Englishman. He subordinates to it all private feelings. He may be keenly sensible of the injustice perpetrated towards himself, but above himself is always his country. He may have his own views as to how that country may best be served—but when the Government which represents it has other and different views he feels bound to devote all his energies to make possible of success the orders of the Government. Thus acted Neill. And now, thus also acted Havelock. Superseded as he regarded himself to be, he was as active, as daring, as devoted, as when he ruled the unfettered commander of an independent force. Never indeed was the exercise of the great qualities of resolution and energy more necessary than after his return from the expedition against Bithor. Out of seventeen hundred English troops whom he had had altogether under his order from the time of his quitting Alláhábád but six hundred and eighty-five remained effective. Not only was he now compelled to abandon for the moment all idea of

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August 17.

The distinguishing characteristic of English-men,

is eminently conspicuous in Havelock.

Difficulties and dangers of his position.

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—
1857.
August 17.

recrossing into Oudh, but the action of the Gwáliár contingent threatening Kalpí rendered it doubtful whether he could even hold Kánhpúr. Kalpí once occupied by this force, consisting of five thousand disciplined men with thirty guns, and his communications with Alláhábád might at any moment be cut off. To the north, the Nawáb of Farrakhábád was ready with thirty thousand men—some sepoys, some raw levies—to take advantage of any difficulty which might threaten Kánhpúr. It was, too, in the power of the rebels in Oudh to cross the Ganges at any point below Kánhpúr, and acting singly, or co-operating possibly with the Gwáliár troops, to endanger his communications. Of all these dangers Havelock had the fullest cognizance. Yet his judgment was never clouded. To remain at Kánhpúr was undoubtedly a risk, but to fall back on Alláhábád would have been a calamity. Not only would he have lost by such a movement the *prestige* and the material advantages his victories had gained, but such a movement would have had the effect of uniting against him the now divided enemies, and of placing them, with more means at their disposal, in a position stronger than that from which he had dislodged Náná Sáhib. His central position, faulty as it was in a military sense, gave him an immense moral power. He resolved to hold it as long as possible. He announced, then, to the newly-arrived Commander-in-Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, that if hopes of reinforcements were held out to him, he would, in spite of the very threatening aspect of affairs, continue to hold

He faces
them with
calmness and
resolution.

Kánhpúr; that otherwise he should be forced to retire on Alláhábád. The reply of Sir Colin on this head was re-assuring. Reinforcements were on their way. Havelock resolved to await them at Kánhpúr.

The month that intervened between the battle of Bithor and the arrival of Sir James Outram was rich in events, which, if not showy, were important. On the 20th of August, the indefatigable Captain Gordon had again been sent on an expedition in the steamer. This time he was to proceed down the river and destroy some sixty-two boats belonging to the Oudh rebels, said to have been collected opposite Rájghát, in the Fathpúr district. The operation was one most necessary to be carried out, for it was by these boats that the Oudh rebels might hope to cross the river and operate on our communications with Alláhábád. Gordon, taking with him one hundred men of the Madras Fusiliers, twelve artillery-men, twelve Sikhs, and three pieces, started on the 19th. On the way down the river, hundreds of horse and foot were noticed collected on the Oudh side opposite the intrenched camp of the British. The steamer was fired at from more than one fort on the way down. The expedition may be pronounced successful, for the party on board the steamer managed in four days to destroy thirty-five boats of various sizes.

Arrangements meanwhile were made and carried out for sending all the sick and wounded who could bear the journey to Alláhábád. Reinforcements gradually arrived in small parties; the

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Aug. 17-20.

He resolves
to hold
Kánhpúr.

Captain Gor-
don again
sweeps the
Ganges.

Preparations
at Kánhpúr.

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—
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August 20.

troops were allowed to rest after their fatigues; the regulations for the maintenance of public order were rigorously enforced; the works at the intrenchment were pushed on. In all these works the co-operation of the civil authorities, at the head of whom was Mr. Sherer, C.S., was of inestimable value. Our countrymen had the gratification likewise of welcoming fugitives from various parts of the country. On the 1st September, Mr. and Mrs. Probyn and family, Mr. Edwards and Mr. Jones, came in from Oudh. "They looked so joyous and happy after their sufferings."* On the 4th, eleven more (Eurasians) came in from Kalpí, their release having been negotiated some time before by General Neill with the Rájá of that place. To keep the men in spirits, games and races were instituted every evening; there were occasional theatrical performances, and a band constantly played.

Neill is appointed to command the right wing of the relieving force.

The feeling entertained by Neill towards Havelock had never been very cordial. The two men were not formed to act together. Neill had chafed much under the inaction to which since Havelock's arrival he had been subjected, and he had greatly feared that in the advance which was to take place, he would again be left behind. His gratification then may be imagined when, on the eve of Outram's arrival, Havelock informed him that the command of the right wing of the relieving force had been conferred upon him.

Sir James Outram arrived at Kánpúr on the

* Brigadier Neill's Journal.

15th of September. If there were anything in the world which could reconcile a successful soldier to supersession it would be to be superseded by such a man as Outram. Sir James Outram bore the highest character. He was a paladin of the days of chivalry and romance. To a fearlessness which never recognised danger, to a nerve that never trembled, to a coolness that never varied, he added a generosity without stint, a forgetfulness of self rarely paralleled, a love of the soul's nobility for its own sake alone. Not idly had he been called the Bayard of the Indian army. He was without fear and without reproach. Engaged in many contests, he never fought for himself—he fought always the cause of those whom he believed to have been wronged. When a man so acts—when he gives himself, as it were, to others—the thought of self always flies. So it was with Sir James Outram. He gave all his energies to his clients. On their behalf he staked his prospects, his position, his future. He was appalled neither by the power, the talent, the interest, of the side to which he was opposed. He had emphatically the courage of his opinions, and, convinced of their soundness, he fought for them to the end.

In an earlier part of this volume * I have stated that Sir James Outram had arrived in Calcutta on the 1st of August. Four days later he was re-appointed Chief Commissioner of Oudh, and nominated to the joint command of the Dánápúr

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1857.
August 20.
Sir James
Outram.

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1857.
Sept. 2.

He arrives at
Alláhábád,

and sets out
for Kánpúr.

Learns that
the rebels are
attempting to
cut him off.

Despatches
Vincent Eyre
against them.

and Kánpúr divisions—a command including practically the entire country between Calcutta and A'gra. General Outram left Calcutta at once by river steamer, and after a tedious voyage up the Ganges, reached Alláhábád on the 2nd of September. He devoted three days to the necessary preparations. These made, he sent off on the morning of the 5th the 5th Fusiliers, some detachments of the 64th and the 1st Madras Fusiliers, and Major Eyre's battery of artillery—the same which, with a detachment of the 5th, had relieved A'rah—following himself the same evening with the 90th Light Infantry.

For the first three days the progress of the troops was uneventful. But on the fourth day, on arriving at the camping-ground of Kalógan, definite information reached Outram that a party of insurgents from Oudh, in number from three to four hundred, with four guns, had crossed the Ganges, near the village of Kúndanpati, on the trunk road between Fathpúr and Alláhábád. The object of this party was evident. It was to sever the communications between Outram and Alláhábád.

Outram at once sent orders to the advanced guard of his force to halt where it was. On joining it, he directed Major Eyre to march against the enemy. For this purpose, he placed at that officer's disposal one hundred men of the 5th Fusiliers, sixty of the 64th, all mounted on elephants, and two guns. Forty men of the 12th Irregulars were directed to join this detachment on its march.

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1857.
Sept. 10.

Eyre marches
on the enemy,

Eyre set out on the 10th. On reaching, that same evening, the village of Hatgaon he was joined by Captain Johnson and his forty horsemen (the 12th Irregulars). As these men had made a forced march of twenty-four miles to join him Eyre prudently resolved to halt for a few hours. By so doing he would refresh his men, and still be able to reach his destination by daybreak. He set out again at half-past one in the morning and came in sight of Khúndanpati at early dawn. The villagers whom he met reported the rebels to be close at hand, if not actually within the walls of the village, and that their boats were moored about a mile off. Eyre at once ordered his cavalry to gallop at once to the gates of the town,—to guard them should the rebels still be there—to pursue and hold them in check should they have evacuated it. Meanwhile he pressed on the infantry.

The prudence of these dispositions was quickly justified. The rebels, learning almost at the same time of Eyre's approach, had already commenced a hasty retreat towards the river, and were entering their boats when the cavalry came upon them. The latter were just in time to prevent the unmooring of the boats. The infantry and artillery came up very soon after. Eyre at once gave orders to board. The enemy, crowded in their boats, made for some time an obstinate resistance. Seeing then that the day was going against them, they made a desperate attempt to blow up the boats and all therein. In one boat only was the attempt partially successful. Noting their failure, and resolved not to ask for quarter, they threw their

and crushes
them.

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1857.
Sept. 11.

Eyre's deci-
sive action
defeats the
plans of the
rebels.

guns overboard, and precipitated themselves into the river. Eyre at once drew back his men, and opened upon the enemy a grape and musketry fire the effect of which was decisive. Not a man surrendered—but only three escaped.

The effect of this decisive movement completely paralysed the plans of the mutineers. It was felt all over the Doáb. Another, and, it was estimated, a larger party, had landed some four miles higher up with the intention of co-operating with the men against whom Eyre had marched. But so great was the terror caused by his victory that they re-embarked and re-crossed into Oudh before the cavalry could intercept them. The movement, so skilfully planned and so vigorously carried out, had, in fact, relieved Sir James Outram from the danger, no light one, of having his communications cut off during the contemplated operations in Oudh.*

Outram
arrives at
Kánhpúr.

Thus secure regarding his communications, Outram continued his march, and reached Kánhpúr on the 16th of September. His very first act was of a nature so noble, so generous, so disinterested, that had it been the solitary glorious act of his glorious life, it would have sufficed to

* That this was the view secure, which otherwise must be taken by the General himself have been entirely cut off is clear from the despatch to the Commander - in - Chief, A general insurrection, I am dated the 11th of September: assured, would have followed "The importance of this success will, I am sure, be appreciated by your Excellency and the Governor-General. I now consider my communications through throughout the Doáb had the enemy not been destroyed, they being but the advanced guard of more formidable invaders."

surround his name for ever with a halo of veneration and respect—an act so rare, so striking in its self-abnegation, that lesser and ignoble natures, unable to comprehend it, endeavour to seek for it a motive congenial to the temper of their own minds,—but yet an act essentially genuine—pertaining to the nature of the man—consistent with every previous act of his life.

Sir James Outram had been sent to Kánpúr to command the force which was to relieve Lakhnao. In accepting that command he superseded the man whose daring efforts with an inferior force to effect that relief had won for him the applause and admiration of his countrymen. To the generous nature of Outram it seemed revolting that he should reap where another had sown; that he should obtain the glory where another had endured the trials and the dangers. He could not do it. He was determined that it should not be done. Availing himself of the circumstance that whilst, in a military point of view, he was commander of the forces about to march into Oudh, he would also enter that country in a civil capacity as its Chief Commissioner, he published, the day of his arrival at Kánpúr, the following order:—

“The important duty of relieving the garrison of Lucknow had been first entrusted to Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., and Major-General Outram feels that it is due to that distinguished officer, and to the strenuous and noble exertions which he has already made to effect that object,

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He generously leaves to Havelock the glory of relieving Lakhnao.

The order
which he
issued on the
occasion.

that to him should accrue the honour of the achievement.

“ Major-General Outram is confident that this great end for which Brigadier-General Havelock and his brave troops have so long and gloriously fought, will now, under the blessing of Providence, be accomplished.

“ The Major-General, therefore, in gratitude for, and admiration of, the brilliant deed of arms achieved by Brigadier-General Havelock, and his gallant troops, will cheerfully waive his rank in favour of that officer on this occasion, and will accompany the force to Lucknow in his civil capacity, as Chief Commissioner of Oudh, tendering his military services to Brigadier-General Havelock as a volunteer.

“ On the relief of Lucknow, the Major-General will resume his position at the head of the forces.”

Rare and noble act of generosity! Only a soldier can appreciate the full extent of abnegation of self which it involved. Well might the illustrious warrior who then commanded in chief in India—well might Sir Colin Campbell, when announcing to the army this deed of real glory, write these glowing words: “ Seldom, perhaps never, has it occurred to a Commander-in-Chief to publish and confirm such an order as the following one, proceeding from Major-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B.

“ With such a reputation as Major-General Sir James Outram has won for himself, he can well afford to share glory and honour with others.

Sir Colin
Campbell
appreciates
Outram's
noble self-
abnegation.

Sir Colin
Campbell's
order to the
army.

But that does not lessen the value of the sacrifice he has made with such disinterested generosity in favour of Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., commanding the field force in Oudh.

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“Concurring as the Commander-in-Chief does, in everything stated in the just eulogy of the latter by Sir James Outram, His Excellency takes this opportunity of publicly testifying to the army his admiration for an act of self-sacrifice and generosity, on a point, which, of all others, is dear to a real soldier.”

I cannot believe that there will be one amongst my readers who will grudge the time and the space I have devoted to the complete elucidation of this “act of self-sacrifice and generosity.” The incidents of war often harrow the imagination. They bring to the surface many of the darker and the baser emotions of human nature. They show men to the world with their passions excited often beyond control, their worst feelings rampant and raging. This was especially the case with the mutinous sepoys, and with the rebellious population generally. It is a relief to turn from the contemplation of such incidents to a noble deed—a noble deed of a noble man—unparalleled and unsurpassable of its kind—and which will have its record eternal as the language in which it has been chronicled.

Reflections
on the act.

General Havelock then remained commander of the force that was to relieve Lakhnao. He issued the same day an order acknowledging “the kind and generous determination of Major-General Sir James Outram, G.C.B., to leave to him the

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Sept. 16.

Numerical
strength of
the relieving
force.

task of relieving Lucknow, and rescuing its gallant and enduring garrison," and expressing " his hope that the troops will strive, by their exemplary and gallant conduct in the field, to justify the confidence thus reposed in them."

The force now at Havelock's disposal consisted of three thousand one hundred and seventy-nine men of all arms.* He divided it into three brigades :—two of infantry, the third of artillery. The first brigade consisted of the 5th Fusiliers, the 84th Regiment, and, attached to it, two companies of the 64th, the 1st Madras Fusiliers. It was commanded by the gallant Neill.

The 2nd Brigade, composed of the 78th Highlanders, the 90th Light Infantry, and the Sikh regiment of Firozpúr, was commanded by Brigadier Hamilton, 78th Highlanders.

The 3rd Brigade comprehended Captain Maude's battery, Captain Olpherts's battery, Major Eyre's battery of heavy 18-pounders, the whole commanded by Major Cooper.

Besides these there were a hundred and nine volunteers, and some fifty-nine of the 12th Irregulars, believed to be faithful, under the command of Captain L. Barrow. Major-General Outram was one of these volunteers. To defend Kánh-

* The numerical strength of the component portions of the force was as follows:—

European Infantry	-	-	-	-	2,388
Ditto	Volunteer Cavalry	-	-	-	109
Ditto	Artillery	-	-	-	282
Sikh Infantry	-	-	-	-	341
Native Irregular Cavalry	-	-	-	-	59
<hr/>					
Total	-	-	-	-	3,179

púr during the advance on Lakhnao there remained the Head-Quarters of the 64th Regiment, under the command of Colonel Wilson.

The whole of the reinforcements had reached Kánpúr by the morning of the 16th of September. It was decided, however, not to attempt the passage of the river till the bridge of boats should be completed.

The enemy, meanwhile, were on the alert. On the afternoon of the 17th, a party of their cavalry and infantry, with three guns, came down to the opposite bank to reconnoitre. Their appearance was the signal for the withdrawal to our side of a party of Sikhs who had been sent across to cover the formation of the bridge. Emboldened by this, a portion of their infantry crossed to an island, and under cover of the long grass found there opened a fire on the men working at the bridge. But a few round and shrapnell shot from our heavy pieces soon drove them away.

The bridge head on the opposite side was covered by a detachment of our men during the night, and on the 18th the bridge had so nearly approached completion, that it was resolved to make arrangements at once to effect a successful passage. On the 18th no enemy was to be seen on the opposite bank. That morning four guns of Maude's battery were crossed over to the island above referred to, and the 78th Highlanders and the 90th Light Infantry were marched to a position en the river bank to be ready to take immediate advantage of the completion of the bridge. Subsequently, part of the 90th and three

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Measures
taken to en-
the passage
of the Gange;

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—
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Sept. 18.

The passage.

guns of Maude's battery crossed the river. At 11 o'clock the enemy brought down their heavy guns and opened fire on our men. Our guns answered. The cannonade lasted three hours, when it ceased almost as suddenly as it had begun.

On the 19th the bridge was ready. Our troops crossed in the following order. The 78th Highlanders led. They were followed by the Sikhs of the regiment of Firozpur, by the remainder of the 90th Light Infantry, by Olpherts's battery, by the 1st Madras Fusiliers, then Her Majesty's 84th and two companies of the 64th, the Volunteer Cavalry and Irregulars, then half of Maude's battery, in the order named.

As soon as they had crossed the troops were formed into contiguous columns at quarter distance, and the 84th were ordered to lie down as they were in the line of the enemy's fire. Skirmishers from the 78th Highlanders were sent out at once to cover the line. General Neill's brigade was then ordered to take up a position on the right of the line and to drive the enemy from some sand-hills occupied by them about six hundred yards in advance. Neill immediately moved forward his brigade and attacked the enemy.

They made a firm resistance but were driven from their position. Whilst the infantry fight was going on Olpherts brought up a half battery in splendid style and silenced the enemy's guns. The enemy slowly retired, and the cavalry having followed them up to observe, the force piled arms and laid themselves out for breakfast, pending the

First movements after
the passage
of the main
body had
been effected.

arrival of the camp equipage. This did not reach the ground till past 3 o'clock.

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Sept. 20.

Passage of
the heavy
guns.

The next day was devoted to the crossing of Eyre's heavy guns. They were brought into camp by noon. The arrangements for the advance were then complete.

At half-past 5 o'clock on the morning of the 21st the force started on its arduous task. The second brigade, having Olpherts's battery attached to it, and with the volunteer cavalry on its reverse flank, led; the first brigade, with Maude's battery, followed; then came Eyre's heavy battery, escorted by the 5th Fusiliers, one wing leading, the other covering the rear; last of all, the 12th Irregulars under Captain Johnson. The pickets of the previous night formed the baggage and rear guards.

The advance
on Lakhnao.

On approaching the village of Mangalwár it became evident that the enemy were massed there in great strength. Havelock upon this took ground to the left, and deployed into line, having the volunteer cavalry on the extreme left. This manœuvre had scarcely been accomplished before the enemy's guns, five in number, opened fire. They had playing on the road one heavy gun defended by a breastwork. Our three batteries at once replied, whilst our infantry marched through the swamp to the hard ground from which they could act on the rear of the enemy. Just at this moment the rain came down in torrents. This did not affect our men, but before they could reach the road behind the village the enemy had evacuated it. A rapid pursuit ensued. It was most successful.

The enemy
driven from
Mangalwár.

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The volunteer cavalry captured two guns, a set of colours, and an elephant, and killed about a hundred and twenty men. It was said in camp that five men had fallen to the sword of Lieutenant Havelock alone. Olpherts's battery, though newly horsed with but half trained horses, pushed on splendidly, doing great execution. As our infantry advanced they found the road strewed with shoes which the rebels had cast off to facilitate their flight. But fast as they ran our men followed to within musket-shot. This close pursuit drove the enemy helter-skelter through the village of Onáo without their making even an effort to defend it.

Our troops
make a mo-
mentary halt
at Lakhnao,

and bivouac
for the night
at Bashírat-
ganj.

Our men halted for breath and a mouthful of food at Onáo. They stayed there but half an hour. Then, pushing on, they reached Bashírat-ganj—likewise abandoned by the enemy in their flight—and put up for the night in the *serai* or travellers' resting place—a very large building, capable of accommodating nearly the whole of the force. There was not a man not wet to the skin, for the rain had been of the pelting nature peculiar to the break-up of the rainy season. The baggage was some distance behind, but it came up two hours later, and afforded then to our men the luxury of dry clothes and a dinner.

The force had thus reached with but a skirmish the furthest point of Havelock's three brilliant inroads into Oudh. This time there was no talk of retreat. Yet, excited with victory, proud of their day's work as they were, the men were not unconscious that their greatest difficulties lay

Temper of
the men.

before them. But had those difficulties been ten times greater they were in the mood to overcome them. The end to be attained was the relief of their beleaguered countrymen—of those countrymen who for more than eighty days had held out against the hosts of the enemy. It was that enemy who now barred their onward progress. The pent-up determination of every heart found vent that night in the expressions of firm resolve that, be the resistance of the enemy what it might, it should bar the way no longer.

The rain fell heavily next morning as Havelock's force left its night quarters at half-past 7, the first brigade leading. Every one was in the highest spirits, and, in spite of the pelting downpour, wetting to the skin, all stepped out gaily. No enemy was seen in front—a few cavalry only, at a safe distance, on the flanks. After a march of sixteen miles they reached the village of Baní. Baní was a strong and defensible position. To reach it a force coming from Káhnpúr had to cross the river Saí, here spanned by a long bridge built of masonry. After passing the bridge the road takes a turn to the right. The river was not fordable. Strong as was the position, the enemy neither used the advantages it offered to them nor opposed to our troops the smallest opposition. They even neglected to break down the bridge. Nor, although they had constructed two half-moon batteries on the Lakhnao side of it had they the spirit to use them. In a word, panic-stricken by our rapid advance, they abandoned the best chance they had of stop-

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They recommence the onward movement.

The rebels, panic-stricken, abandon their defensible position.

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Sept. 22.

The troops
bivouac for
the night at
Baní.

They start
again the
following
morning,

but meet no
enemy till
they approach
the A'lambá-
búgh.

ping us and evacuated their strongest position before even it had been attacked. Baní was but sixteen miles from Lakhnao. Havelock, then, in the hope of giving information of his approach to the garrison of the Residency, fired that evening a Royal salute. His men lay there for the night, their indignation aroused and their slumbers troubled by the constant sound of the booming of the cannon fired against their beleaguered countrymen.

The events of the following day, the 23rd, were certain to be crucial. Breakfast, then, was served out to the men before they started. But by half-past 8 o'clock they were on their way marching in column of subdivisions right in front. The rain had cleared off but it was very close and steamy, without a breath of wind.

Since 6 o'clock that morning the booming of the cannon discharged against the Residency had ceased. This silence seemed to indicate that the enemy were massing their big guns to oppose the relieving force. Our men, however, unawed by the silence, pressed on with determined step. For some time no enemy was visible. But as they approached the A'lambágh infantry began to show themselves on their flanks, and it soon became apparent that the enemy were prepared to receive them at that walled garden. A party of cavalry was sent on to reconnoitre. They returned to report the enemy had six guns in position; that their left rested on the A'lambágh, their centre and right being drawn up behind a chain of hillocks.

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Sept. 23.Havelock's
dispositions
for attack.

Havelock then halted his force, changed the order of the column from right to left in front, and brought up the 78th Highlanders and Eyre's heavy guns. These changes having been effected the British force moved on. No sooner, however, were they within range than the enemy's guns opened with round and grape shot. They must have studied the distance very carefully for their first shot knocked over three officers of the 90th, all of whom subsequently died. The casualties amongst the men and camp followers were likewise considerable. But these losses did not check the advance. Whilst the 78th, the 90th, and the remainder of the 2nd Brigade pushed quickly on to gain the open ground on which it could deploy, Neill, with the 1st Brigade, took ground to the left, passing through deep ditches, through swamps, and over heavy ground. On reaching the open he deployed his men in a position causing them to overlap the enemy's right. Meanwhile Eyre's battery on the road, and Olpherts's on the right, had opened out on the enemy. Maude's quickly followed. This fire had the effect of dispersing the rebel cavalry and cleared the way for the advance of our men. By this time the two brigades had reached open ground, had deployed, and were advancing, the 2nd on the front, the 1st enveloping the enemy's right. Neill led his men over very heavy ground and drove the enemy from several villages in succession. The key of the enemy's position, however, was the A'lambágh and the upper-storied buildings adjacent to it.

He drives the
enemy from
the A'lambágh,

These the rebels defended with great resolution ; but they could not withstand the assault made by the 5th Fusiliers. Advancing with the bayonet the men of this splendid regiment cleared the houses and stormed the position. The rebels then fell back to resume the contest on the morrow. Of the guns they had brought into action five were captured by the Volunteer Cavalry. One of these, however, in the darkness and confusion of the night, they recovered.

Having driven the enemy from the A'lambágh the force advanced to within sight of the domes, the minarets, and the gardens of Lakhnao. But the day's work had been hard—much still remained to be effected, and the General prudently determined to halt for the night. Accordingly he took up a position, placing the 1st brigade on the right, the 2nd on the left, of the road, Eyre's heavy battery on the road itself. Our men, however, had scarcely taken up the ground assigned to them and had halted, when the rebels who, up to that time, had been fleeing in desperate haste, suddenly stopped, brought up fresh guns, and opened a heavy fire on the regiments as they stood or lay in line. They occupied also in considerable strength a two-storied house, subsequently known as the Yellow house, and from it began a fusillade on our line. Just at this time the rain came down in torrents and our men were soon wetted to the skin. Havelock met this action of the enemy by drawing back his line out of fire, throwing his right on the A'lambágh and refusing his left. The movement was a difficult

advances,
then halts for
the night.

The enemy
turn upon
him.

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He contents
himself with
occupying a
strong posi-
tion for the
night.

one, as darkness had set in, and the road was jammed with horses, elephants, bullocks, guns, and men. However, it was carried out. The 5th Fusiliers occupied the A'lambágh. The other regiments were more or less provided for, some occupying hamlets, some lying in the open. The Madras Fusiliers bivouacked in mud ankle deep; but they and the rest of the force "were as merry and jolly as possible.* The rain had ceased. The men had been greatly cheered by the news that reached them that day that Dehlí had been captured, and were in a humour to bear up against evils far greater than those they were encountering. They had shown their enthusiasm by loudly cheering Olpherts's battery as, led by that most daring officer, it had passed in front of the infantry line at a gallop to charge the enemy.

Fine temper
of the men.

The force halted throughout the day of the 24th to prepare for the desperate deed of the morrow. During the day the position was further changed so as to remove the men entirely from the range of the enemy's guns, which nevertheless continued their cannonade. The enemy's cavalry likewise, creeping round to the rear, made an attempt on our baggage, but, after killing, by surprising them, some ten or twelve of our men, they were driven off. That night all the baggage of our men was stored in the A'lambágh and a guard of two hundred and fifty men was placed there.

The force
halts during
the 24th.

At last the day of trial dawned. General Havel-

The advance
on the 25th.

* MSS. Journal kept at the time.

lock, in consultation with Sir James Outram, had resolved to advance, not by the direct route to the Residency, but by another and more circuitous road skirting the Chárbágh canal. At half-past 8 o'clock on the morning of the 25th, the 1st brigade, headed by Maude's battery, with two companies of the 5th Fusiliers leading, moved off in column of sections, right in front. They had advanced but a short distance when a tremendous fire opened upon them. From the A'lambágh to the Yellow house before alluded to the advancing troops had to encounter a perfect storm of round and grape shot and a sharp fire of musketry. Vigorously pushing on they approached the enclosure called the Chárbágh and a village, both filled with the enemy. From these the musketry fire was very galling. Our men, however, dashed at the enemy, and expelled them.

The Chár.
bágh bridge.

The next point to be reached was the Chárbágh bridge, the only opening left into Lakhnao. This bridge was barred by an earthen parapet about seven feet high, stretching completely across it, and having in the centre an opening, overlapped on both sides by the walls of the parapet, through which it was possible for only one man to pass on foot. On this parapet were mounted six guns, two of them 24-pounders. To the right of the bridge, on the side by which the British were advancing, were some enclosures occupied by the enemy. On approaching the position the force halted; Maude brought two guns to the front and opened fire, whilst Outram, taking with him the 5th Fusiliers and the Sikhs, proceeded to

drive the enemy from the enclosures on the right, with the view of bringing a reverse fire on the guns defending the bridge.

The enemy, on their side, had not been slow to reply to the challenge given them by Maude, and for some time the artillery duel raged with great fury. In this the enemy had the advantage of numbers and position. They had heavy guns, and those guns were under cover. Maude had but two light guns, and they were in the open.

When the duel had lasted half an hour, it became evident that Maude could make no impression on the enemy. He had lost twenty-one men at the Yellow House, and others had fallen in front of the bridge. In his despair he appealed to young Henry Havelock, then standing by his side, to "do something." Havelock rode at once to Neill, who was standing on the opposite side of the road, and suggested to him that he should charge the bridge. But, in the absence of Outram, Neill conceived that he would not be justified in giving such an order until that general's turning movement should have made itself felt. Fraser-Tytler made a similar attempt, and with the same result.

Something, however, had to be done. Under these circumstances, young Henry Havelock, always bold, daring, and adventurous, imperilled his commission to carry out an idea which had flashed through his brain. Turning his horse's head, he galloped off in the direction of the post occupied by his father. After making the turn

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An artillery
duel ensues
there.

Maude ap-
peals to
young
Havelock.

Havelock's
daring ruse.

of the road, he halted, waited for three or four minutes, then galloping back to Neill, saluted him and said—as if bringing an order from the general, whom he had not seen—“You are to charge the bridge, Sir.” Neill at once issued the order. Tytler and Havelock carried it across the road, formed up the men, and gave the order to advance.

Arnold of the Madras Fusiliers dashed on to the bridge with the advance of twenty-five men, Tytler and Havelock accompanying them mounted. Tytler’s horse was shot dead, and he was pierced through the groin. Every other man of the twenty-five, the mounted Havelock and a private named Jakes excepted, was shot down by a discharge from the enemy’s six guns loaded with grape. Havelock, unable to pass the overlapping barrier of which I have spoken, sat in his saddle, his sword in his hand, calling on the men to come on. Jakes stood by his side loading and firing as fast as he could. The interval between their first touching the bridge and the arrival on it of the storming column was, probably, not more than two minutes, but it seemed an hour. Standing alone on the bridge, the two Englishmen—the daring officer and the gallant private—were exposed to a fire from all the neighbouring houses, every wall loop-holed, every window fortified by sand-bags, and every roof occupied. In the language of Outram, “they were the target for many muskets.” Just at this moment, when the storming party was coming on, a rebel sepoy jumped on the parapet, within ten yards of Have-

lock, and took at him a deliberate aim. The direction was true, but the musket threw high, for the bullet passed through the centre of the top of his hat. Havelock paid him back in truer coin. Returning his sword to the scabbard, he drew his revolver and shot him, as he was reloading, through the body.

A few seconds later the Madras Fusiliers came up with a rush, swarmed over the parapet and through the gap, and carried all before them. The 78th Highlanders belonging to the 2nd brigade followed; and the captured guns were spiked.* The entry into Lakhnao was won !

On the whole of the 2nd brigade closing up, the whole force advanced, but, in pursuance of the resolution already referred to, instead of moving straight on through the city, they took a turn to the right at the bridge, and pushed on by a very bad and narrow road along the outskirts. The troops pressed along this road, subjected here to but little opposition.

The enemy, however, having made a demonstration on the rear of our force, two regiments were detached to cover the advance of the remainder, as well as to protect the heavy guns, the dragging of which over the heavy road was found both tedious and difficult.

* For his gallant conduct on this occasion, Havelock was recommended by Sir James Outram for the Victoria Cross. He had previously received it for his conduct at Kánpúr. Maude also received the Cross for the persistent gallantry he displayed this day. "But for his nerve and coolness," wrote Outram, "the army could not have advanced." Private Jakes was killed later in the day.

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The Chárbagh
bridge is
carried.

Havelock
determines
not to force
the main
streets, but t
turn them.

Two regi-
ments de-
tached to
cover the
rear.

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Progress of
our men
through the
city.

Terrible
obstacles in
their way.

They gal-
antly sur-
mount them.

Olperts
gains the
Cross.

This road gradually led into the outskirts of the city, and our men were forced to penetrate through narrow streets and lanes, every one of which seemed alive with the enemy's fire. Still the one way to win the day was to press on, and the men continued to dash forward, overcoming or disregarding every obstacle. Suddenly, however, they found their progress impeded by a most formidable obstacle. Before them lay a narrow bridge over a nullah with high banks on the opposite side. This bridge lay under the lee of the Kaisarbágh, partially commanded by the two guns posted there and by the muskets of the numerous enemy occupying it. Our infantry and our guns were forced to cross that bridge, and to cross it almost singly. The fire opened from the Kaisarbágh was tremendous. It happened, however, that a sheltered position was attainable on the other side from which the enemy might be fired at with advantage. Our troops, then, as they ran across the bridge took up this position, and opening a fire, to some extent covered their comrades. But the ordeal was a terrible one and many men fell at this point. Having passed this obstacle, the force re-united and halted under cover of some deserted buildings near the Chattar Manzil and Farídbaksh palaces.

It was before this—before, indeed, the Chárbágh bridge had been carried—that Olpherts performed the gallant deed which gained for him the Victoria Cross. The 90th Light Infantry, led by Colonel Campbell, had been ordered to charge and carry a battery of two guns, strongly posted at the end

of a street. They charged and carried it. Whilst they held the guns, Olpherts, who had charged with them, galloped back, under a severe fire of musketry, and brought up limbers and horses to carry off the captured ordnance. This was, in round numbers, the thirtieth time that this gallant officer had deserved the Cross he so nobly wears!

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To return. Darkness was now coming on. The rear-guard, with the heavy guns, the wounded, and the baggage, was behind, exposed to the fury of the enemy. In a consultation with General Havelock Sir James Outram proposed that the force should occupy the Chattar Manzil palace for a few hours to permit the junction with the rear-guard. The proposition showed judgment and prudence, for the Chattar Manzil was a strong position easy to hold, and virtually communicated, by means of intervening palaces, with the Residency. Had the suggestion been adopted the safety of the rear-guard would have been assured, and the entrance into the Residency enclosure could have been effected with comparatively little loss. But General Havelock considered that the importance of letting the beleaguered garrison know that succour was at hand outweighed every other consideration.

Outram pro-
poses to halt
at the Chattar
Manzil till
the rear-
guard should
rejoin;

The troops, re-formed, accordingly pushed on. The houses in Khás Bazaar were thronged with the enemy. As our men approached the archway, a tremendous fire opened upon them. Neill, who was leading them, passed through the archway, then, suddenly pulling up his horse, he directed his Aide-de-camp, Gordon, to gallop back and recall a half-battery which had taken a wrong

but accedes
to Havelock's
earnest de-
sire to push
on.

The troops
again push
on.

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The death of
Neill.

James Neill.

road. He remained there sitting on his horse, his head turned in the direction from which he expected the half-battery to emerge, when a sepoy, who had taken post on the arch, discharged his musket at him over the parapet on the top. The bullet entered his head behind the left ear, and killed him.

Thus fell one of the bravest and most determined men in the British army. Neill had only required opportunity to become great. Hating pedantry, cant, and circumlocution, he was essentially a man of action. In the early days of the mutiny, when everyone from highest to lowest seemed utterly abroad, Neill suddenly appeared on the scene, and by his prompt decision and quick energy had in a moment stayed the plague. He was a born warrior, very cool, very keen-sighted, and very determined. His military capacity must not be judged by his condemnation of Havelock's retreat from his first advance. He, I believe, under similar circumstances, would have acted similarly. But his judgment was clouded on this occasion by his personal feelings. He had felt deeply his supersession by Havelock, and he disliked him. Every one of his acts was marked by judgment, by a keen appreciation of the end to be attained. In a word, he was a noble type of the northern land that owned him. Though twenty-one years have elapsed since he fell the memory of him still lives, fresh and green, in the hearts of those who knew him—and who, knowing, loved and respected him—alike in India and in England.

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Our men,
still pushing
on, overcome
every ob-
stacle,

Undeterred by the loss they had sustained our troops pressed on through the Khás Bazaar, fiercely assailed by a musketry fire. Emerging from this, the sounds of cheering from the Residency enclosure suddenly gladdened the ears of the Highlanders and their comrades. Others of the advancing force, who had forced their way through other streets, appeared on the scene almost immediately afterwards, and took up the cheers most vociferously. Well, indeed, might their hearts swell within them! Those cheers were but the natural outburst of the sweetest feelings of which the nature of man is capable—the pleasure of aiding those in dire distress.

But they are not yet within the enclosure. The night was dark, and before our troops could enter it was necessary to make a way for them and for the guns. To displace the impediments at the gate of the Baillie Guard which had so long resisted the enemy's assaults caused some delay. But at last they were removed, and many of the victorious troops entered. Then ensued the scene which I have endeavoured faintly to describe in the last chapter.

and reach
the gate of
the Baillie
Guard.

I have said that many of the victorious troops entered. The bulk of them, however, lay all that night on the ground between the Baillie Guard gateway and the Faridbaksh palace and rejoined their comrades early the next morning. There still remained the rear-guard, Of them, even in the morning, there were no tidings. At noon, consequently, a party was ordered out to support or to disengage them. This detachment, con-

They enter,
some that
night, some
the following
morning.

Sept. 26.

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Sept. 26-27.

The rear-
guard.

The losses of
the rear-
guard.

A 24-pounder
gun is re-
covered.

sisting originally of two hundred and fifty men of the 5th Fusiliers, and Sikhs of the Firozpúr regiment, and subsequently reinforced by a hundred men of the 78th Highlanders under Captain Haliburton, and a hundred of the 32nd under Captain Lowe, the whole commanded by Colonel Napier, R.E.,* effected their junction that night with the rear-guard, who had forced their way to, and were holding, the walled passage in front of the Motí Mahal palace. The junction having been effected, the surviving sick and wounded were transported on the morning of the 27th along the river bank into the intrenchment.

It then became a great object to extricate from the exposed position in which it had been left on the 26th, a 24-pounder gun, used the previous day against the enemy. It was scarcely possible to approach this gun, so heavy was the fire maintained on it. The attempt, however, was made by three daring men, Olpherts of the Bengal, Crump of the Madras, Artillery, and Private Duffy of the Madras Fusiliers. Crump, an officer of the most brilliant promise, was killed; but Duffy, by a display of combined daring and ingenuity, managed to fasten a rope to the gun in such a manner as to ensure its withdrawal.†

The gun recaptured, earnest endeavours were made to open out a road for the whole of the ordnance through the palaces to the Residency. At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 27th, the

* Now Lord Napier of Magdala. the recommendation of Olpherts, received the Victoria

† For this act, Duffy, on Cross.

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Sept. 27.

whole force proceeded undiscovered through the enemy's posts, and succeeded in packing the heavy guns and waggons in the garden of the Motí Mahal. The garden adjoining, and which was held in force by the enemy, was then attacked and carried by detachments of the 90th, 32nd, and 5th Fusiliers, led by Colonel Purnell and Captain McCabe. From this point measures were taken to open a road for the guns through the palace, and by the 1st October every gun and waggon was safely lodged in the intrenchment.

Such an operation as the relief of Lakhnao by so small a force could not indeed be effected, save at a heavy sacrifice of life. The actual loss, up to the 26th of September inclusive, in killed and wounded, amounted to five hundred and sixty-four officers and men. This does not include the casualties sustained by the rear-guard up to the morning of the 27th, amounting to sixty-one killed and seventy-seven missing. As the missing were sick or wounded men who had been intercepted or slain, the number of killed of the rear-guard may be counted as the total of the two numbers, or one hundred and thirty-eight. This would raise the entire losses of the relief operation to seven hundred and two, officers and men. Amongst the former was Major Cooper, commanding the artillery brigade. By his death the command of that brigade devolved upon Major Eyre.

The force which had thus with such daring and persistent bravery reached the beleaguered Residency discovered in a few hours that they had

The garrison
are rein-
forced—not,
relieved—by

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Havelock's
success.

reached that spot only to increase the number of the garrison. Means of transport for the combined force were absolutely wanting. Even had they the transport, was that force strong enough to escort the ladies and children in safety to Kánpúr? These were considerations which pressed themselves on Sir James Outram, who had, on the 26th, resumed command. For the moment the result of the successful advance on Lakhnao was that more mouths were required to be fed—more lodgment had become necessary for the garrison. These were difficulties. But to meet and overcome difficulties is one of the natural tasks of a real man. How Sir James Outram met and conquered them I shall describe in the next volume.

Reflections on
the defence—
and on the
successful
advance.

There remained meanwhile to him, to Havelock, and to their gallant comrades the inspiring conviction that by greatly daring they had accomplished a feat unsurpassed in the history of war. The English traveller who shall visit Lakhnao may well pause, struck with wonder and admiration, as contemplating the narrow streets and lofty houses of the city, the size of the palaces, the extent of the walled enclosures surrounding them, he calls to mind that they were a handful of his countrymen who forced their way through those narrow streets, the houses filled with armed enemies; who beat down the opposition offered them by the foe in those walled enclosures;—to rush to the succour of other men, also countrymen, who, beleaguered in a weak position—a position in a military sense not defensible

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—had repulsed, during eighty-seven days, the incessant attacks of countless foes. Contemplating in turn the city and the enclosure he will be unable to resist the conviction that the relievers and the relieved were in very deed worthy each of the other. If he wonder at the possibility of a small force maintaining itself in the battered enclosure of the Residency he will equally doubt the power of repeating a feat such as that which Havelock and his soldiers accomplished. Both the one and the other were impossible had they not been done. That both were achieved was due to a combination of qualities which, on another field and on a different occasion, exposed our countrymen to the taunt that they never knew when they were beaten. The spirit that had animated Raleigh, that had inspired Drake, that had given invincible force to the soldiers of Cromwell, that had dealt the first deadly blow to the conqueror of Europe, lived in these men—their descendants. It was that spirit, born of freedom, which filled their hearts with the conviction that, being Englishmen, they were bound to persevere, bound to dare every danger, every discomfort,—to conquer. It was not simply the joy of battle—the *certaminis gaudia* which incited Attila* to con-

* At the battle of Chalons dressed them: "After having Attila, observing the repulse conquered under my orders of the attack of his troops on a great part of the world, you a hill which the enemy had ought to know what sort of a succeeded in occupying before man I am, and I cannot for him, sent for the commanders get what you are. Let us of his divisions and thus ad- leave to generals accustomed

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quest—that animated their hearts. Rather was it the conviction that they were struggling

to slumber on the bosom of peace encouragements of an ordinary character. War is your natural condition; vengeance your sweetest passion. For you a battle is a holiday; let us celebrate this one with joy. Behold your victims; sacrifice them to your glory; to the manes of your companions whom they surprised and killed. Here, courage has nought to fear from wile and artifice. These open plains can give cover to no ambush. All is open; all is assured to valour. And what is this army that you are about to fight? It is a confused mass of weak and effeminate nations, afraid of each other, hating each other, and who were tearing each other to pieces when the fear of your arms united them. Already, before the battle, they tremble. It is terror which has lent them wings to fly to that height. They repent already of having offered battle in the plains. They seek elevated ground to be out of reach of your missiles; they would like to hide themselves in the clouds. As for the Romans we know them already. I only fear the promptitude of their flight. Without awaiting even the first blow they are accustomed to fly before the dust raised by our horses' feet. Give them,

cis, c. 12.

then, no time to arrange themselves in battle array. Cast yourselves on their squadrons; then, without stopping to pursue your victory over them, charge the Alans, the Franks, and the Visigoths. They are those alone whom we have need to conquer; they are the nerves of the army; all the rest will fall with them. Think not that your individual fate depends on the enemy. No dart can reach him who is reserved by Mars to sing the song of victory. No dart can touch him who has to conquer, whilst he who has to die would meet his fate even in inglorious ease. Why should Fortune have given the Huns victory over so many nations unless it were to prepare them for the joys of this battle? Why should she have opened to our ancestors the Maeotic marsh closed and unknown for so many ages? If circumstances do not deceive me—here—here before us—is the field of which so many exploits have been the promise and the forerunners. For myself, I will be the first to launch my javelin against the enemy —let him die who shall refuse to follow Attila! (*Si quis potuerit Attila pugnante otium ferre, sepultus est.*)” —Jornandès, *de Rebus Geticis*.

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for the right, that they were combating treacherous foes, that England looked to them for the vindication of her honour and for the safety of the trust she had confided to them, that inspired the defenders with dogged resolution—the soldiers who followed Havelock with an *élan* that was irresistible. The men whose great achievements, reflecting an eternal glory on their country, I have but faintly pourtrayed, all lived but twenty-one years ago. Some of them are with us still. Outram and Havelock and Inglis and Neill have passed away, but there are those why remain who emulated their example, and on whom the inspiration of their great deeds has not been cast away. There survive at least a Napier of Magdála, then the chief of Outram's Staff, and whose name and reputation have since become European; a Vincent Evre, who carried into Oudh the daring and resolution that had saved Bihár; a Wilson who was the right hand of General Inglis at Lakhnao; a Lowe, who commanded the 32nd during the defence, and a Bassano who succeeded him, when wounded, in that command; a Havelock who gained his Victoria Cross at Kánhpúr, and who accompanied his father in all his great exploits; a Gordon, who was the trusted staff-officer of Neill. And there are many others. These men have been tried in the fire. They are representatives of those gallant soldiers from whose minds neither the assaults of an overwhelming enemy, the privations of scanty food, incessant watching, nor the terrible trials of climate, could obliterate the fact that

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they were Englishmen, and as such were bound to conquer—and who did conquer.

I leave them now, and with regret. But I leave them for a field not less noble. For I have to narrate now how it was that the imperial city of Dehlí succumbed to the army which had so patiently and so persistently assailed it.

APPENDIX A.

THE entire proceedings of the Bengal Government, in respect of the Wahábí fanatics of Patná in 1857, are so extraordinary that they merit distinct and special notice.

The principal facts are now matters of history, as Dr. Hunter, who had free access to the Government archives, has given a detailed and accurate account of these remarkable men in his work on "Our Indian Mussulmans."

From his pages it may be learned "that some years ago the great Wahábí prophet, Syad Ahmad, organised a regular system of apostolic successors; that two of the khalifs or vice-regents, Inayat and Wilayat Ali, had early established a character for themselves on the frontier as fanatical firebrands; and so far back as 1847 Sir Henry Lawrence sent them as dangerous characters to their homes at Patná, where security was taken from them for their future good conduct."

In 1850 they were again found "preaching sedition in the Rájsháhí district of Lower Bengal, and were twice turned out of the district"; and in 1851 the vice-regents, though bound by bond and security to remain at their homes in Patna, "were found disseminating treason on the Panjáb frontier."

And finally, in 1852, they "had established a regular organisation for passing up men and arms from Bengal to the rebel camp at Sittána."

But the most significant fact connected with this history

is that on the 9th of August 1852, only five years before the mutiny, the magistrate of Patná reported that "the rebel sect was on the increase in that city; sedition was openly preached by the principal inhabitants of this capital of a British Province. The police had leagued themselves with the fanatics, and one of their leaders, "Maulvi Ahmed-oola (Ahmad Ullá), assembled 700 men in his house, and declared his resolve to resist any further investigation of the magistrate by force of arms."⁴

Dr. Hunter then proceeds, "The British Government could no longer shut its eyes to the existence of a great treasonable organisation within its territories for supplying money and men to the fanatical camp on the frontier. During the autumn of 1852 Lord Dalhousie recorded two important minutes on the subject, and by the first he directed the internal organisation to be closely watched."

The above brief extracts from Dr. Hunter's able work, written under the most favourable auspices for the accurate ascertainment of the facts, is, I imagine, sufficient to prove to the satisfaction of the most incredulous that a dangerous confederation existed in the country; that the city of Patná was the head-quarters of the sect of Wahábís, and contained not only the two notorious vice-regents or khalifs, but at least one determined and desperate leader, even in the time of peace, sufficiently bold and powerful to defy the power and authority of the British Government.

And if it be inquired who this resolute traitor was, I may reply that he is the identical man whose arrest and precautionary confinement in 1857 by Mr. Tayler I have described at page 52 of this volume.

Such, then, briefly sketched, was the known and recorded state of Patná at the commencement of the mutiny and rebellion.

Lord Canning had only recently arrived, and was necessarily dependent on the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and his own secretaries for all important information.

It is fair, therefore, to assume that he was in ignorance of the character and antecedents of the Wahábí fanatics, their connection with Patná, the intrigues in which they had been detected, and, doubtless, of the open defiance with which Ahmad Ullá had resisted the warnings of the magistrate.

But what can be said to excuse, what can be imagined to explain, the ignorance, or, if not ignorance, the infatuation of the Bengal Government?

Mr. Halliday had been appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal about 1853, but for years prior to his appointment he had been secretary under ex-officio Governors, and, as well is known, exercised all the powers, though not bearing the responsibilities, of Governor. Is it conceivable that he was ignorant of all the strange and important incidents above noticed?

Was not he well aware that the prophet's vice-regents had their homes at Patná, that security for their good conduct had been taken, that Lord Dalhousie, as ex-officio Governor of Bengal, had placed on record a minute regarding them?

There had been, as related in the first volume of this history, an organised attempt at Patná in 1845 to tamper with the British sepoys, which, had the Panjáb campaign ended in failure, would doubtless have been carried out.

And it must have been evident to Mr. Halliday, as it was to all intelligent observers, that Patná was the centre of intrigue and dangers.

In the face of these facts, when Mr. Tayler, from information received, and from his own observation of certain suspicious incidents, quietly arrested and placed under precautionary surveillance the notorious Ahmad Ullá and two other leaders of the Wahábí sect, Mr. Halliday, instead of even then admitting that he had at least directed his precautionary measures towards individuals of suspected character whose names were in the black books of the Government, coldly calls for the "proofs on which the arrest had been made," designating these men as the "Wahábí gentlemen,"

a complimentary appellation never before used in such a case, and evidently implying, though not openly expressing, disapprobation of the act of arrest.

Not even at that crisis did Mr. Halliday condescend to consult his records, or to communicate to Mr. Tayler the significant incidents regarding these men.

Though the archives of Government would have shown him that these very men had for years been under suspicion, bound by sureties not to leave Patná, and compelled to give security for good conduct; that Ahmad Ullá, their leader, had openly defied the authorities, not one word of warning or caution did he vouchsafe to the officers responsible for the safety of the province and the lives of the Christian residents.

But strange as was this neglect on the part of the Lieutenant-Governor, it might be overlooked or excused as an oversight, or, at worst, unintentional negligence, but for what subsequently occurred.

Not only did Mr. Halliday fail to give intimation to his representative of these elements of danger in the great city of Patná, but, with the palpable fact before him of the outbreak at Mírath, he endeavoured to lull the Commissioner of Patná into a state of false and dangerous security by officially informing him that he could not bring himself to believe that there was "any danger in Patná"; that the mutiny of the Dánápúr sepoys in the face of the European force was "*inconceivable*."

And this opinion was recorded with respect to a city where eight years before a plot had been hatched by a band of conspirators; when cash had been distributed to the sepoys; a scroll discovered containing the names of one hundred of the principal families:—a city which was the head-quarters of the two notorious vice-regents of the great Prophet—in which Mr. Tayler himself two years before represented the existence of dangerous excitement.

But the acmé of delusion, if delusion, indeed, it was, which thus induced Mr. Halliday to cast aside the lessons of ex-

perience and deny the existence of danger where all the worst elements of danger notoriously existed, has not yet been reached. But some short time after Mr. Tayler's removal, when Mr. Tayler's successor, in a personal attack on Mr. Tayler himself, in which he endeavoured to distort and disparage that gentleman's measures, actually recorded his opinion that the Wahábí leaders, whom Mr. Tayler had placed under surveillance, were "innocent and inoffensive men," mere "bookmen," against whom there was "no cause of suspicion"; and again, that he was inclined to believe that Mr. Tayler had been induced by two native gentlemen, Dewán Mawla Baksh, the Deputy Magistrate, and Syud Wiláyut Ali Khán, a wealthy banker in the city, to arrest the Wahábís, because, from their special loyalty, they (the Wahábís) stood in the way of their own treasonable designs; Mr. Halliday, in spite of all his means of information as to the real facts, actually endorsed these fatuous opinions with his official approval, sent the letter of Mr. Samuels for publication in the newspaper, and circulated it to all the Commissioners in Bengal for their information and guidance, refusing at the same time to give publicity to Mr. Tayler's refutation.

What was the issue of this controversy? That the mutiny which Mr. Halliday held to be inconceivable took place I need hardly mention, but the exposure of the incorrectness of his opinions regarding the Wahábís was reserved for a future day. The story is like a novel. Seven years had elapsed; Mr. Tayler, driven by relentless persecution, had resigned the service, but was still in India. The Wahábí leaders, who had been released when the crisis had passed, were in high favour with Government; Ahmad Ullá had been honoured with official appointments, specially introduced by the Lieutenant-Governor to the new Viceroy in Calcutta, and was basking in the sunshine of official favour.

Suddenly, and with no previous notice or intimation, an officer arrived at Patná from the Panjáb. A clue had been

discovered. With a warrant in his pocket he walked into Sadikpúr, the quarter of the Patná city where the Wahábís had their abode, entered, without being suspected, into Mol-wí Ahmad Ullá's house, and with the help of the police arrested the happy family all unprepared either for flight or resistance.

A series of judicial trials was then held by the distinguished Commissioner of the Panjáb, Sir Herbert Edwardes.

The result of these deliberate and impartial investigations confirmed in every respect Mr. Tayler's estimate of these dangerous and intriguing characters.

Ahmad-Ullá himself was subsequently tried at Patná.

The innocent and inoffensive bookmen, upheld by Mr. Samuels with the concurrence and approval of Mr. Halliday, were proved to be confirmed and deadly traitors; the injured Ahmad-Ullá was shown to be their chief leader.

It was proved that they had for years been deliberately plotting against the British Government, supplying our enemies on the frontier with men and money, and publicly preaching at Patná a crusade against the infidel.

They were convicted and sentenced to be hanged. The sentence was commuted by the High Court to imprisonment for life, principally on the ground that the Government, by its laxity, had in some sense encouraged their treason. They were banished to the Andaman Isles, where Ahmad-Ullá was under nominal confinement when Lord Mayo was murdered.

It is difficult to exaggerate the important character of this strange episode.

At a crisis of national peril we find two high officers both in different degrees responsible for the safety of a great province, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and the Commissioner of Patná.

It was, I need hardly say, of the utmost importance that each should form an accurate estimate of the character and purposes of the people by whom he was surrounded and with whom he had to deal.

Mr. Halliday, the Lieutenant-Governor, with all the means of information on record before him sufficient to establish with certainty the dangerous character of the Patná Wahábís, deliberately endorsed the recorded opinion that they were innocent men, above suspicion, and officially circulated this declaration throughout his Government.

Mr. Tayler, the Commissioner, forming his opinions with difficulty, without any information supplied or hinted at by the Government, acting on his own observation of passing events, his acquaintance with Mahomedan character, and the special tenets of the Wahábí sect, came to the conclusion that they were dangerous characters—that their influence would probably be exerted against the Government, and, if so exerted, would be fraught with danger. Arriving at this conclusion, he at once acted wisely; avoiding opposition or resistance, he quietly and unostentatiously placed them under safe surveillance.

And how were the services of these two officers rewarded? **Mr. Halliday**, who by his ignorance, neglect, or want of judgment thus imperilled the Empire, is honoured by the marked approval of the Crown, and obtains a seat in the Council of India.

Mr. Tayler, whose judgment was correct, whose action was prompt, is removed from his post, and driven by persecution to resign the service.

And if this was the case with respect to those dangerous traitors, I find the same misconception and the same ignorance in regard to the loyal and the good.

Mr. Tayler received active and disinterested support from two (among other) respectable natives.

One, a deputy-magistrate named Maola Baksh, and the other a banker, unconnected with Government, named Wiláyut Ali Khán.

Both these men did important service at great risk to themselves, and both were specially recommended by **Mr. Tayler** for honour.

Both were disparaged, and Mr. Samuels and Mr. Halliday endorsing the disparagement, officially upheld the recorded suspicion that these loyal men had hood-winked Mr. Tayler and induced him to arrest the Wahábís because of their exceptional and unprecedented loyalty.

Since then Dewan Mowla Baksh has been honoured with the Star of India, and Wiláyut Ali Khán has been recommended for the same distinction, and was especially introduced to the Prince of Wales during his visit to Patná, and congratulated for his service in 1857.

Thus, both for good and evil, Mr. Halliday was totally, even dangerously, wrong, though possessing all the means of correct judgment.

Mr. Tayler, with no assistance but his own vigilance and discernment, was, in every respect and on every point essential to the safety of the province, right.

I needly hardly dwell on the deep importance of this state of things, which is perhaps unparalleled in history.

But I cannot close this strange tale without adverting to some later incidents which give almost a dramatic character to the picture.

I have shown Mr. Tayler struggling against the ignorance and infatuation of Mr. Halliday, accused of persecuting innocent and inoffensive men (afterwards sentenced to death as deadly traitors), and his entire administration denounced as causing "public scandal and discontent."

I have also shown how entirely his views, opinions, and actions were vindicated by subsequent events, and the recorded testimony of many of the most able and distinguished Indian statement.

But it was left to a still later day to add a sad and tragical verification of Mr. Tayler's warnings.

In 1871, the Chief Justice of Calcutta was stabbed by a Wahábí fanatic on the steps of his own court, and the following year Lord Mayo, visiting the Andaman Islands, was assassinated also by a Mahomedan.

Official optimism held the murder to have been actuated by private vengeance, without any political purpose. Mr. Tayler, however, in a memorandum which he submitted to the Secretary of State, gave cogent reasons for concluding that whatever the personal character of the actual murderer, the deed had been contrived and aided by the notorious Ahmad-Ullá, whose open defiance of the authorities I have noticed, and whose treason was established in the trials before Sir Herbert Edwardes.

This man, a fact but little known, was in the Andamans at the time of the murder, and had been exerting as much influence from his prison cell as in his house at Patná.

These are the facts of the case. They appear to me equally to justify the conduct of Mr. Tayler towards the Wabábís, described in the text, and to condemn the action of the Government towards Mr. Tayler.

APPENDIX B.

**"FROM BRIGADIER INGLIS, Commanding Garrison of Lucknow,
TO THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT MILITARY DE-
PARTMENT, Calcutta.**

Dated, Lucknow, 26th September 1857.

"SIR.—In consequence of the very deeply-to-be-lamented death of Brigadier-General Sir H. M. Lawrence, K.C.B., late in command of the Oude Field Force, the duty of narrating the military events which have occurred at Lucknow since 29th June last, has devolved upon myself.

"On the evening of that day several reports reached Sir Henry Lawrence that the rebel army, in no very considerable force, would march from Chinhut (a small village about eight miles distant on the road to Fyzabad) on Lucknow on the following morning; and the late Brigadier-General therefore determined to make a strong reconnoisance in that direction, with the view, if possible, of meeting the force at a disadvantage, either at its entrance into the suburbs of the city, or at the bridge across the Gokral, which is a small stream intersecting the Fyzabad road, about half-way between Lucknow and Chinhut.

"The force destined for this service, and which was composed as follows, moved out at 6 A.M. on the morning of the 30th June:—

Artillery.—Four Guns of No.—Horse Light Field Battery.

Four ditto of No. 2 Oude Field Battery.

Two ditto of No. 3 ditto ditto ditto.

An eight-inch Howitzer.

Cavalry.—Troop of Volunteer Cavalry.

120 Troopers of Detachments belonging to the
1st, 2nd and 3rd Regiments of Oude Irregular
Cavalry.

Infantry.—300 Her Majesty's 32nd.

150 13th Native Infantry.

60 48th Native Infantry.

20 71st Native Infantry (Sikhs).

“The troops, misled by the reports of wayfarers—who stated that there were few or no men between Lucknow and Chinhut—proceeded somewhat further than had been originally intended, and suddenly fell in with the enemy, who had up to that time eluded the vigilance of the advanced guard by concealing themselves behind a long line of trees in overwhelming numbers. The European force and the howitzer, with the native infantry, held the foe in check for some time, and had the six guns of the Oude Artillery been faithful, and the Sikh Cavalry shown a better front, the day would have been won in spite of an immense disparity in numbers. But the Oude artillerymen and drivers were traitors. They overturned the guns into ditches, cut the traces of their horses, and abandoned them, regardless of the remonstrances and exertions of their own officers, and of those of Sir Henry Lawrence's staff, headed by the Brigadier-General in person, who himself drew his sword upon these rebels. Every effort to induce them to stand having proved ineffectual, the force, exposed to a vastly superior fire of artillery, and completely outflanked on both sides by an overpowering body of infantry and cavalry, which actually got into our rear, was compelled to retire with the loss of three pieces of artillery, which fell into the hands of the enemy, in consequence of the rank treachery of the Oude gunners, and with a very grievous list of killed and wounded. The heat was dreadful, the gun ammunition was expended, and the almost total want of cavalry to protect our rear made our retreat most disastrous.

"All the officers behaved well, and the exertions of the small body of Volunteer Cavalry—only forty in number—under Captain Radcliffe, 7th Light Cavalry, were most praiseworthy. Sir Henry Lawrence subsequently conveyed his thanks to myself, who had, at his request, accompanied him upon this occasion, Colonel Case being in command of H. M.'s 32nd. He also expressed his approbation of the way in which his staff—Captain Wilson, Officiating Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant James, Sub-Assistant Commissary-General; Captain Edgell, Officiating Military Secretary; and Mr. Couper, C.S.,—the last of whom had acted as Sir Henry Lawrence's A.D.C. from the commencement of the disturbances,—had conducted themselves throughout this arduous day. Sir Henry further particularly mentioned that he would bring the gallant conduct of Captain Radcliffe and of Lieutenant Bonham, of the Artillery, (who worked the howitzer successfully until incapacitated by a wound), to the prominent notice of the Government of India. The manner in which Lieutenant Birch, 71st N. I. cleared a village with a party of Sikh skirmishers, also elicited the admiration of the Brigadier-General. The conduct of Lieutenant Hardinge, who, with his handful of horse, covered the retreat of the rear-guard, was extolled by Sir Henry, who expressed his intention of mentioning the services of this gallant officer to His Lordship in Council. Lieutenant-Colonel Case, who commanded H. M.'s 32nd Regiment, was mortally wounded whilst gallantly leading on his men. The service had not a more deserving officer. The command devolved on Captain Steevens, who also received a death-wound shortly afterwards. The command then fell to Captain Mansfield, who has since died of cholera. A list of the casualties on this occasion accompanies the Despatch.

"It remains to report the siege operations.

"It will be in the recollection of His Lordship in Council that it was the original intention of Sir Henry Lawrence to

occupy not only the Residency, but also the fort called Muchhee Bhowun—an old dilapidated edifice, which had been hastily repaired for the occasion, though the defences were even at the last moment very far from complete, and were moreover commanded by many houses in the city. The situation of the Muchhee Bhowun with regard to the Residency has already been described to the Government of India.

"The untoward event of the 30th June so far diminished the whole available force, that we had not a sufficient number of men remaining to occupy both positions. The Brigadier-General, therefore, on the evening of the 1st July, signalled to the garrison of the Muchhee Bhowun to evacuate and blow up that fortress in the course of the night. The orders were ably carried out, and at 12 P.M. the force marched into the Residency with their guns and treasure without the loss of a man ; and shortly afterwards the explosion of 240 barrels of gunpowder and 6,000,000 ball cartridges, which were lying in the magazine, announced to Sir Henry Lawrence and his officers—who were anxiously awaiting the report—the complete destruction of that post and all that it contained. If it had not been for this wise and strategic measure, no member of the Lucknow garrison, in all probability, would have survived to tell the tale ; for, as has already been stated, the Muchhee Bhowun was commanded from other parts of the town, and was moreover indifferently provided with heavy artillery ammunition, while the difficulty, suffering, and loss which the Residency garrison, even with the reinforcement thus obtained from the Muchhee Bhowun, has undergone in holding the position, is sufficient to show that, if the original intention of holding both posts had been adhered to, both would have inevitably fallen.

"It is now my very painful duty to relate the calamity which befel us at the commencement of the siege. On the 1st July an 8-inch shell burst in the room in the Residency

in which Sir H. Lawrence was sitting. The missile burst between him and Mr. Couper, close to both; but without injury to either. The whole of his staff implored Sir Henry to take up other quarters, as the Residency had then become the special target for the round shot and shell of the enemy. This, however, he jestingly declined to do, observing that another shell would certainly never be pitched into that small room. But Providence had ordained otherwise, for on the very next day he was mortally wounded by the fragment of another shell which burst in the same room, exactly at the same spot. Captain Wilson, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, received a contusion at the same time.

"The late lamented Sir Henry Lawrence, knowing that his last hour was rapidly approaching, directed me to assume command of the troops, and appointed Major Banks to succeed him in the office of Chief Commissioner. He lingered in great agony till the morning of the 4th July, when he expired, and the Government was thereby deprived, if I may venture to say so, of the services of a distinguished statesman and a most gallant soldier. Few men have ever possessed to the same extent the power which he enjoyed of winning the hearts of all those with whom he came in contact, and thus ensuring the warmest and most zealous devotion for himself and for the Government which he served. The successful defence of the position has been, under Providence, solely attributable to the foresight which he evinced in the timely commencement of the necessary operations, and the great skill and untiring personal activity which he exhibited in carrying them into effect. All ranks possessed such confidence in his judgment and his fertility of resource, that the news of his fall was received throughout the garrison with feelings of consternation only second to the grief which was inspired in the hearts of all by the loss of a public benefactor and a warm personal friend. Feeling as keenly and as gratefully as I do the obligations that the whole of us are under to this great and good man, I trust

the Government of India will pardon me for having attempted, however imperfectly, to pourtray them. In him every good and deserving soldier lost a friend and a chief capable of discriminating, and ever on the alert to reward merit, no matter how humble the sphere in which it was exhibited.

"The garrison had scarcely recovered the shock which it had sustained in the loss of its revered and beloved General, when it had to mourn the death of that able and respected officer, Major Banks, the Officiating Chief Commissioner, who received a bullet through his head while examining a critical outpost on the 21st July, and died without a groan.

"The description of our position, and the state of our defences when the siege began, are so fully set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, furnished by the Garrison Engineer, that I shall content myself with bringing to the notice of His Lordship in Council the fact that when the blockade was commenced only two of our batteries were completed, part of the defences were yet in an unfinished condition, and the buildings in the immediate vicinity, which gave cover to the enemy, were only very partially cleared away. Indeed, our heaviest losses have been caused by the fire from the enemy's sharp-shooters stationed in the adjoining mosques and houses of the native nobility, the necessity of destroying which had been repeatedly drawn to the attention of Sir Henry by the staff of Engineers; but his invariable reply was, 'Spare the holy places, and private property too, as far as possible;' and we have consequently suffered severely from our very tenderness to the religious prejudices and respect to the rights of our rebellious citizens and soldiery. As soon as the enemy had thoroughly completed the investment of the Residency, they occupied these houses, some of which were within easy pistol shot of our barricades, in immense force, and rapidly made loop-holes on those sides which bore on our post, from which they kept up a terrific and incessant fire day and night, which caused

many daily casualties, as there could not have been less than 8,000 men firing at one time into our position. Moreover, there was no place in the whole of our works that could be considered safe, for several of the sick and wounded who were lying in the Banqueting hall, which had been turned into an hospital, were killed in the very centre of the building, and the widow of Lieutenant Dorin and other women and children were shot dead in rooms into which it had not been previously deemed possible that a bullet could penetrate. Neither were the enemy idle in erecting batteries. They soon had from 20 to 25 guns in position, some of them of very large calibre. These were planted all round our post at small distances, some being actually within fifty yards of our defences, but in places where our own heavy guns could not reply to them, while the perseverance and ingenuity of the enemy in erecting barricades in front of and around their guns, in a very short time rendered all attempts to silence them by musketry entirely unavailing. Neither could they be effectually silenced by shells, by reason of their extreme proximity to our position, and because, moreover, the enemy had recourse to digging very narrow trenches about eight feet in depth in rear of each gun, in which the men lay while our shells were flying, and which so effectually concealed them, even while working the gun, that our baffled sharpshooters could only see their hands while in the act of loading.

"The enemy contented themselves with keeping up this incessant fire of cannon and musketry until the 20th July, on which day, at 10 A.M., they assembled in very great force all around our position, and exploded a heavy mine inside our outer line of defences at the water gate. The mine, however, which was close to the Redan, and apparently sprung with the intention of destroying that battery, did no harm. But as soon as the smoke had cleared away, the enemy boldly advanced, under cover of a tremendous fire of cannon and musketry, with the object of storming the Redan. But they

were received with such a heavy fire, that, after a short struggle, they fell back with much loss. A strong column advanced at the same time to attack Innes' post, and came on to within ten yards of the palisades, affording to Lieutenant Loughnan, 13th N.I., who commanded the position, and his brave garrison, composed of gentlemen of the Un-covenanted Service, a few of Her Majesty's 32nd Foot, and of the 13th N.I., an opportunity of distinguishing themselves, which they were not slow to avail themselves of, and the enemy were driven back with great slaughter. The insurgents made minor attacks at almost every outpost, but were invariably defeated, and at 2 P.M. they ceased their attempts to storm the place, although their musketry fire and cannonading continued to harass us unceasingly as usual. Matters proceeded in this manner until the 10th August, when the enemy made another assault, having previously sprung a mine close to the Brigade Mess, which entirely destroyed our defences for the space of twenty feet, and blew in a great portion of the outside wall of the house occupied by Mr. Schilling's garrison. On the dust clearing away, a breach appeared, through which a regiment could have advanced in perfect order, and a few of the enemy came on with the utmost determination, but were met with such a withering flank fire of musketry from the officers and men holding the top of the Brigade Mess, that they beat a speedy retreat, leaving the more adventurous of their numbers lying on the crest of the breach. While this operation was going on, another large body advanced on the Cawnpore battery, and succeeded in locating themselves for a few minutes in the ditch. They were, however, dislodged by hand grenades. At Captain Anderson's post they also came boldly forward with scaling ladders, which they planted against the wall; but here, as elsewhere, they were met with the most indomitable resolution, and the leaders being slain, the rest fled, leaving the ladders, and retreated to their batteries and loopholed defences, from whence they kept up for the rest of the

day an unusually heavy cannonade and musketry fire. On the 18th August the enemy sprung another mine in front of the Sikh lines with very fatal effect. Captain Orr (unattached), Lieutenants Mecham and Soppitt, who commanded the small body of drummers composing the garrison, were blown into the air, but providentially returned to earth with no further injury than a severe shaking. The garrison, however, were not so fortunate. No less than eleven men were buried alive under the ruins from whence it was impossible to extricate them, owing to the tremendous fire kept up by the enemy from houses situated not 10 yards in front of the breach. The explosion was followed by a general assault of a less determined nature than the two former efforts, and the enemy were consequently repulsed without much difficulty. But they succeeded, under cover of the breach, in establishing themselves in one of the houses in our position, from which they were driven in the evening by the bayonets of H.M.'s 32nd and 84th Foot. On the 5th September the enemy made their last serious assault. Having exploded a large mine, a few feet short of the bastion of the 18-pounder gun, in Major Aphorp's post, they advanced with large heavy scaling ladders, which they planted against the wall, and mounted, thereby gaining for an instant the embrasure of a gun. They were, however, speedily driven back with loss by hand grenades and musketry. A few minutes subsequently they sprung another mine close to the Brigade Mess, and advanced boldly; but soon the corpses strewed in the garden in front of the post bore testimony to the fatal accuracy of the rifle and musketry fire of the gallant members of that garrison, and the enemy fled ignominiously, leaving their leader—a fine-looking old native officer—among the slain. At other posts they made similar attacks, but with less resolution, and everywhere with the same want of success. Their loss upon this day must have been very heavy, as they came on with much determination, and at night they were seen bearing large numbers of their killed and wounded over the

bridges in the direction of the cantonments. The above is a faint attempt at a description of the four great struggles which have occurred during this protracted season of exertion, exposure, and suffering. His Lordship in Council will perceive that the enemy invariably commenced his attacks by the explosion of a mine, a species of offensive warfare for the exercise of which our position was unfortunately peculiarly situated, and had it not been for the most untiring vigilance on our part in watching and blowing up their mines before they were completed, the assaults would probably have been much more numerous, and might, perhaps, have ended in the capture of the place. But by countermining in all directions, we succeeded in detecting and destroying no less than four of the enemy's subterraneous advances towards important positions, two of which operations were eminently successful, as on one occasion not less than eight of them were blown into the air, and twenty suffered a similar fate on the second explosion. The labour, however, which devolved upon us in making these countermines, in the absence of a body of skilled miners, was very heavy. The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council will feel that it would be impossible to crowd within the limits of a despatch even the principal events, much more the individual acts of gallantry, which have marked this protracted struggle. But I can conscientiously declare my conviction that few troops have ever undergone greater hardships, exposed as they have been to a never-ceasing musketry fire and cannonade. They have also experienced the alternate vicissitudes of extreme wet and of intense heat, and that, too, with very insufficient shelter from either, and in many places without any shelter at all. In addition to having had to repel real attacks, they have been exposed night and day to the hardly less harassing false alarms which the enemy have been constantly raising. The insurgents have frequently fired very heavily, sounded the advance and shouted for several hours together, though not a man could be seen, with the view, of course, of harassing

our small and exhausted force, in which object they succeeded, for no part has been strong enough to allow of a portion only of the garrison being prepared in the event of a false attack being turned into a real one. All, therefore, had to stand to their arms, and to remain at their posts until the demonstration had ceased; and such attacks were of almost nightly occurrence. The whole of the officers and men have been on duty night and day during the eighty-seven days which the siege has lasted, up to the arrival of Sir J. Outram, G.C.B. In addition to this incessant military duty, the force has been nightly employed in repairing defences, in moving guns, in burying dead animals, in conveying ammunition and commissariat stores from one place to another, and in other fatigue duties too numerous and too trivial to enumerate here. I feel, however, that any words of mine will fail to convey any adequate idea of what our fatigue and labours have been—labours in which all ranks and all classes, civilians, officers, and soldiers, have all borne an equally noble part. All have together descended into the mines, all have together handled the shovel for the interment of the putrid bullock, and all, accoutred with musket and bayonet, have relieved each other on sentry, without regard to the distinctions of rank, civil or military. Notwithstanding all these hardships, the garrison has made no less than five sorties, in which they spiked two of the enemy's heaviest guns, and blew up several of the houses from which they had kept up their most harassing fire. Owing to the extreme paucity of our numbers, each man was taught to feel that on his own individual efforts alone depended in no small measure the safety of the entire position. This consciousness incited every officer, soldier, and man to defend the post assigned to him with such desperate tenacity, and to fight for the lives which Providence had entrusted to his care with such dauntless determination, that the enemy, despite their constant attacks, their heavy mines, their overwhelming numbers, and their incessant fire, could never succeed in

gaining one single inch of ground within the bounds of this straggling position, which was so feebly fortified that had they once obtained a footing in any of the outposts the whole place must inevitably have fallen.

"If further proof be wanting of the desperate nature of the struggle which we have, under God's blessing, so long and so successfully waged, I would point to the roofless and ruined house, to the crumbled walls, to the exploded mines, to the open breaches, to the shattered and disabled guns and defences, and, lastly, to the long and melancholy list of the brave and devoted officers and men who have fallen. These silent witnesses bear sad and solemn testimony to the way in which this feeble position has been defended. During the early part of these vicissitudes, we were left without any information whatever regarding the posture of affairs outside. An occasional spy did, indeed, come in with the object of inducing our sepoys and servants to desert; but the intelligence derived from such sources was, of course, entirely untrustworthy. We sent our messengers daily, calling for aid and asking for information, none of whom ever returned until the 26th day of the siege, when a pensioner named Ungud came back with a letter from General Havelock's camp, informing us that they were advancing with a force sufficient to bear down all opposition, and would be with us in five or six days. A messenger was immediately despatched requesting that on the evening of their arrival on the outskirts of the city two rockets might be sent up, in order that we might take the necessary measures for assisting them while forcing their way in. The sixth day, however, expired, and they came not; but for many evenings after officers and men watched for the ascension of the expected rockets, with hopes such as make the heart sick. We knew not then, nor did we learn until the 29th August—or thirty-five days later—that the relieving force, after having fought most nobly to effect our deliverance, had been obliged to fall back for reinforcements; and this was the last communication we received.

until two days before the arrival of Sir James Outram, on the 25th September.

"Besides heavy visitations of cholera and small-pox, we have also had to contend against a sickness which has almost universally pervaded the garrison. Commencing with a very painful eruption, it has merged into a low fever, combined with diarrhoea; and although few or no men have actually died from its effects, it leaves behind a weakness and lassitude which, in the absence of all material sustenance save coarse beef and still coarser flour, none have been able entirely to get over. The mortality among the women and children, and especially among the latter, from these diseases and from other causes, has been, perhaps, the most painful characteristic of the siege. The want of native servants has also been a source of much privation. Owing to the suddenness with which we were besieged, many of these people who might, perhaps, have otherwise proved faithful to their employers, but who were outside the defences at the time, were altogether excluded. Very many more deserted, and several families were consequently left without the services of a single domestic. Several ladies have had to tend their children, and even to wash their own clothes, as well as to cook their scanty meals entirely unaided. Combined with the absence of servants, the want of proper accommodation has probably been the cause of much of the disease with which we have been afflicted. I cannot refrain from bringing to the prominent notice of His Lordship in Council the patient endurance and the Christian resignation which have been evinced by the women of this garrison. They have animated us by their example. Many, alas! have been made widows, and their children fatherless, in this cruel struggle. But all such seem resigned to the will of Providence, and many, among whom may be mentioned the honoured names of Birch, of Polehampton, of Barbor, and of Gall, have, after the example of Miss Nightingale, constituted themselves the

tender and solicitous nurses of the wounded and dying soldiers in the hospital.

" It only remains for me to bring to the favourable notice of His Lordship in Council the names of those officers who have most distinguished themselves, and afforded me the most valuable assistance in these operations. Many of the best and bravest of these now rest from their labours. Among them are Lieutenant-Colonel Case and Captain Radcliffe, whose services have already been narrated; Captain Francis, 13th N.I.,—who was killed by a round shot—had particularly attracted the attention of Sir H. Lawrence for his conduct while in command of the Muchhee Bhowun; Captain Fulton, of the Engineers, who also was struck by a round shot, had, up to the time of his early and lamented death, afforded me the most invaluable aid; he was, indeed, indefatigable. Major Anderson, the Chief Engineer, though, from the commencement of the siege, incapable of physical exertion from the effects of the disease under which he eventually sank, merited my warm acknowledgments for his able counsel; Captain Simons, Commandant of Artillery, distinguished himself at Chinhut, where he received two wounds, which ended in his death; Lieutenants Shepherd and Arthur, 7th Light Cavalry, who were killed at their posts; Captain Hughes, 57th N.I., who was mortally wounded at the capture of a house which formed one of the enemy's outposts; Captain McCabe, of the 32nd Foot, who was killed at the head of his men while leading his fourth sortie, as well as Captain Mansfield, of the same corps, who died of cholera—were all officers who had distinguished themselves highly. Mr. Lucas, too, a gentleman volunteer, and Mr. Boyson, of the Uncovenanted Service—who fell when on the look-out at one of the most perilous outposts—had earned themselves reputations for coolness and gallantry.

" The officers who commanded out-posts—Lieutenant-Colonel Master, 7th Light Cavalry; Major Aphorp, 41st

N. I.; Captain Gould Weston, 65th N. I.*; Captain Sanders, 41st N. I.; Captain Boileau, 7th Light Cavalry; Captain Germon, 13th N. I.; Lieutenant Aitken, and Lieutenant Loughnan, of the same corps; Captain Anderson, 25th N. I.; Lieutenant Graydon, 44th N. I.; Lieutenant Langmore, 71st N. I., and Mr. Schilling, Principal of the Martinière College —have all conducted ably the duties of their onerous position. No further proof of this is necessary than the fact which I have before mentioned, that throughout the whole duration of the siege the enemy were not only unable to take, but they could not even succeed in gaining one inch of the posts commanded by these gallant gentlemen. Colonel Master commanded the critical and important post of the Brigade Mess, on either side of which was an open breach, only flanked by his handful of riflemen and musketeers. Lieutenant Aitken, with the whole of the 13th N. I. which remained to us with the exception of their Sikhs, commanded the Bailey Guard—perhaps the most important position in the whole of the defences; and Lieutenant Langmore, with the remnant of his regiment (the 71st,) held a very exposed position between the hospital and the water gate. This gallant and deserving young soldier and his men were entirely without shelter from the weather, both by night and by day.

"My thanks are also due to Lieutenants Anderson, Hutchinson and Innes, of the Engineers, as well as to Lieutenant Tulloch, 58th N. I., and Lieutenant Hay, 48th N. I., who

* G. G. O., No. 1546, dated, *Fort William*, 15th November 1858: in Council, with the concurrence of his Lordship, desires to rectify that omission, and is pleased to direct that that officer's name be added to the paragraph commencing with the words 'the officers who commanded the outposts,' and inserted after the name of Major Aphorop, 41st Native Infantry. Order Books to be corrected accordingly."

were placed under them to aid in the arduous duties devolving upon that department. Lieutenant Thomas, Madras Artillery, who commanded that arm of the service for some weeks, and Lieutenants Macfarlane and Bonham rendered me the most effectual assistance. I was, however, deprived of the services of the two latter, who were wounded, Lieutenant Bonham no less than three times, early in the siege. Captain Evans, 17th B. N. I., who, owing to the scarcity of Artillery officers was put in charge of some guns, was ever to be found at his post.

"Major Lowe, commanding H. M.'s 32nd Regiment; Captain Bassano, Lieutenants Lawrence, Edmonstoune, Foster, Harmar, Cook, Clery, Browne, and Charlton, of that corps, have all nobly performed their duty. Every one of these officers, with the exception of Lieutenants Lawrence and Clery, have received one or more wounds of more or less severity. Quartermaster Stribbling, of the same corps, also conducted himself to my satisfaction.

"Captain O'Brien, H. M.'s 84th Foot; Captain Kemble, 41st N. I.; Captain Edgell, 53rd N. I.; Captain Dinning, Lieutenant Sewell, and Lieutenant Worsely, of the 71st N. I.; Lieutenant Warner, 7th L. C.; Ensign Ward, 48th N. I.; (who, when most of our Artillery officers were killed or disabled, worked the mortars with excellent effect); Lieutenant Graham, 11th N. I.; Lieutenant Mecham, 4th Oude Locals; and Lieutenant Keir, 41st N. I., have all done good and willing service throughout the siege, and I trust that they will receive the favourable notice of his Lordship in Council.

"I beg particularly to call the attention of the Government of India to the untiring industry, the extreme devotion and the great skill which have been evinced by Surgeon Scott (superintending surgeon) and Assistant-Surgeon Boyd, of H. M.'s 32nd Foot; Assistant Surgeon Bird, of the Artillery; Surgeon Campbell, 7th Light Cavalry; Surgeon Brydon, 71st N. I.; Surgeon Ogilvie, Sanitary Commissioner;

Assistant Surgeon Fayerer, Civil Surgeon ; Assistant Surgeon Partridge, 2nd Oude Irregular Cavalry ; Assistant Surgeon Greenhow ; Assistant Surgeon Darby, and by Mr. Apothecary Thompson, in the discharge of their onerous and most important duties.

" Messrs. Thornhill and Capper, of the Civil Service, have been both wounded, and the way in which they, as well as Mr. Martin, the Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow, conducted themselves, entitles them to a place in this despatch. Captain Carnegie, the Special Assistant Commissioner, whose invaluable services previous to the commencement of the siege, I have frequently heard warmly dilated upon, both by Sir H. Lawrence and by Major Banks, and whose exertions will probably be more amply brought to notice by the Civil authorities on some future occasion, has conducted the office of Provost Marshal to my satisfaction. The Reverend Mr. Harris and the Reverend Mr. Polehampton, Assistant Chaplains, vied with each other in their untiring care and attention to the suffering men. The latter gentleman was wounded in the hospital, and subsequently unhappily died of cholera. Mr. McCrae, of the Civil Engineers, did excellent service at the guns, until he was severely wounded. Mr. Cameron, also, a gentleman who had come to Oude to enquire into the resources of the country, acquired the whole mystery of mortar practice, and was of the most signal service until incapacitated by sickness. Mr. Marshall, of the Road Department, and other members of the Uncovenanted Service, whose names will, on a subsequent occasion, be laid before the Government of India, conducted themselves bravely and steadily. Indeed, the entire body of these gentlemen have borne themselves well, and have evinced great coolness under fire.

" I have now only to bring to the notice of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General in Council the conduct of several officers who composed my Staff ;—Lieutenant James, Sub-Assistant Commissary-General, was severely wounded

by a shot through the knee at Chinhut, notwithstanding which he refused to go upon the sick list, and carried on his most trying duties throughout the entire siege. It is not too much to say that the garrison owe their lives to the exertions and firmness of this officer. Before the struggle commenced, he was ever in the saddle, getting in supplies, and his untiring vigilance in their distribution after our difficulties had begun, prevented a waste which otherwise, long before the expiration of the eighty-seven days, might have annihilated the force by the slow process of starvation.

"Captain Wilson, 13th N. I., Officiating Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, was ever to be found where shot was flying thickest, and I am at a loss to decide whether his services were most invaluable owing to the untiring physical endurance and bravery which he displayed, or to his ever-ready and pertinent counsel and advice in moments of difficulty and danger.

"Lieutenant Hardinge—an officer whose achievements and antecedents are well known to the Government of India—has earned fresh laurels by his conduct throughout the siege. He was officiating as Deputy Assistant Quarter-master-General and also commanded the Sikh portion of the cavalry of the garrison. In both capacities his services have been invaluable, especially in the latter, for it was owing alone to his tact, vigilance, and bravery, that the Sikh horsemen were induced to persevere in holding a very unprotected post under a heavy fire.

"Lieutenant Barwell, 71st N. I., the Fort Adjutant and officiating Major of Brigade, has proved himself to be an efficient officer.

"Lieutenant Birch, of the 71st N. I., has been my A.D.C. throughout the siege. I firmly believe there never was a better A.D.C. He has been indefatigable, and ever ready to lead a sortie, or to convey an order to a threatened outpost under the heaviest fire. On one of these occasions he received a slight wound on the head. I beg to bring the

services of this most promising and intelligent young officer to the favourable consideration of His Lordship in Council.

"I am also much indebted to Mr. Couper, C. S., for the assistance he has on many occasions afforded me by his judicious advice. I have, moreover, ever found him most ready and willing in the performance of the military duties assigned to him, however exposed the post or arduous the undertaking. He commenced his career in Her Majesty's Service, and consequently had had some previous experience of military matters. If the road to Cawnpore had been made clear by the advent of our troops, it was my intention to have deputed this officer to Calcutta, to detail in person the occurrences which have taken place, for the information of the Government of India. I still hope that when our communications shall be once more unopposed, he may be summoned to Calcutta for this purpose.

"Lastly, I have the pleasure of bringing the splendid behaviour of the soldiers, *viz.*, the men of H. M.'s 32nd Foot, the small detachment of H. M.'s 84th Foot, the European and Native Artillery, the 13th, 48th, and 71st Regiments N. I. and the Sikhs of the respective corps, to the notice of the Government of India. The losses sustained by H. M.'s 32nd, which is now barely 300 strong; by H. M.'s 84th and by the European Artillery, shew at least that they knew how to die in the cause of their countrymen. Their conduct under the fire, the exposure, and the privations which they have had to undergo, has been throughout most admirable and praiseworthy.

"As another instance of the desperate character of our defence and the difficulties we have had to contend with, I may mention that the number of our artillerymen was so reduced that on the occasion of an attack, the gunners—aided as they were by men of H. M.'s 32nd Foot, and by Volunteers of all classes, had to run from one battery to another wherever the fire of the enemy was hottest, there not being nearly enough men to serve half the number of guns,

at the same time. In short, at last, the number of European gunners was only twenty-four, while we had including mortars, no less than thirty guns in position.

“With respect to the native troops I am of opinion that their loyalty has never been surpassed. They were indifferently fed and worse housed. They were exposed—especially the 13th Regiment—under the gallant Lieutenant Aitken, to a most galling fire of round shot and musketry, which materially decreased their numbers. They were so near the enemy that conversation could be carried on between them; every effort, persuasion, promise, and threat was alternately resorted to, in vain, to seduce them from their allegiance to the handful of Europeans, who, in all probability, would have been sacrificed by their desertion. All the troops behaved nobly, and the names of those men of the native force who have particularly distinguished themselves, have been laid before Major-General Sir James Outram, G.C.B., who has promised to promote them. Those of the European force will be transmitted in due course for the orders of his Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief.

“In conclusion, I beg leave to express on the part of myself and the members of this garrison, our deep and grateful sense of the conduct of Major-General Sir J. Outram, G.C.B., of Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., and of the troops under those officers who so devotedly came to our relief at so heavy a sacrifice of life. We are also repaid for much suffering and privation by the sympathy which our brave deliverers say our perilous and unfortunate position has excited for us in the hearts of our countrymen throughout the length and breadth of Her Majesty’s dominions.

“I have, &c.,

“(Signed) J. INGLIS, *Colonel,*
 H. M.’s 32nd Brigadier.”